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Crime and commercial activity: 
an introduction to two half-brothers 
Crime and commercial activity 
Petrus C. van Duyne1 
 
 
Economic half-brothers and banalities 
 
Commercial activity and (organised) crime have an awkward relationship – like 
two half-brothers, one of whom is born out of wedlock. They are different but 
also have too much in common for them to be able to deny their relationship, 
though the legitimate brother attempts in vain to do so (or is obliged, 
grudgingly, to admit to it). Time and again their paths cross: often times the 
legitimate economic brother finds himself victimised; sometimes he obtains an 
advantage from his half-brother, and at other times he behaves in ways similar to 
those of his relative. After all, they are family and share a legal-illegal interface 
(Passas, 2002). On the other hand, his criminal half-brother will brag about his 
upperworld relationship, claiming that he is just a businessman too. However, 
despite their similarities and the relationship between them, they still are 
illegitimate relatives. While the legitimate entrepreneur may be victimised, the 
illegitimate one is either a ‘victim’ of the law or of one of his fellow crime-
entrepreneurs. That makes a fundamental difference: the criminal half-brother 
has to devote more energy to the search for means of survival than does the 
legitimate one. 
 The criminal part of the family, the crime-entrepreneurs and their crime-
markets, have, under the heading of ‘organised crime’, for some time captured 
‘global attention’. Recently this attention has been heightened by increasing use 
of the qualifier, ‘transnational’, though the trade in contraband has taken place 
across borders since time immemorial. So-called ‘transnational organised crime’ 
is considered such a worldwide threat that it has even been the subject of a 
United Nations convention (2000). The imagery behind it is that of the police 
fighting a formidable and sophisticated foe operating in well-thought out 
criminal organisations in highly complex markets. This image, which has been 
advanced to justify the claim for more investigative powers, has found little 
support from independent researchers (Reuter, 1983; Weschke and Heine-
Heiss, 1990; Paoli et al. 2000; Van Duyne, 1995).2 Hence it remains a 
hypothesis, albeit one not strictly formulated as such. 
                                                 
1  Petrus C. van Duyne is Professor of Empirical Penal Science at the University of  Tilburg, the 
Netherlands. 
2  It should be noted that assessment research commissioned by the authorities does not lend 
much support to the hierarchy model either. 
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Let us pose an alternative, counter hypothesis, taking Greek philosopher 
Protagoras’ adage – “Man is the measure of all things” – as a starting point. What 
is the human measure of the ‘organised-crime’ phenomenon and its related 
crime economy? To answer this question we will follow Euclid’s simple 
method, positing a few axioms and seeing what can be deduced from them. Let 
us assume that our protagonists are not more complicated as human beings than 
their law-enforcement antagonists, and see what mundane picture we obtain as 
compared to the one conjured up by the law-enforcement rhetoric. 
 Beneath the misleading garments draped over and around ‘organised crime’ 
by politicians, policy makers, law-enforcement officers and hundreds of scholars, 
there are a number of related ‘banalities’, or simple behavioural principles. The 
first one is: 
 
? the illegal half-brother wants to get rich too but does not want to be 
caught using illegal means; 
? the second banality is that for much of the time he needs the cooperation 
of one or more like-minded, but trustworthy persons; 
? the third banality is that following their initial successes they are likely to 
stay together (for a while); 
? the fourth banality is that they simply start with what they have at hand, 
socially and economically: commercial opportunities, social and economic 
skills, tools and people with which to pursue their economic aims. Or, in 
a more dignified formulation: they need ‘human and economic capital’. 
 
Apart from the first principle, the other three apply to the legitimate enterprises 
of the family too. Do we need any additional basic principles to describe the 
more complex manifestations of criminal entrepreneurial conduct? Staying out 
of the grip of the law is a very basic drive, giving rise to most observed 
organisational conduct, ranging from that of an accomplice on the look-out for 
cops, to more professional counter measures, to sophisticated forms of money 
laundering. On top of that come the social and economic requirements of the 
entrepreneurial surroundings, which have to be heeded for survival. To the 
extent that these are complex, they are reflected in the nature and structure of 
the criminal enterprise, rather than being a reflection of a complex criminal 
human mind. One can consider these forms of organisational conduct as 
reflections of the basic imperative: ‘don’t get caught’. They are a form of 
criminal risk management. This is one of the circumstances that impact on group 
and network shaping (Bruinsma and Bernasco, 2004). As such it is of more 
importance than the oft-quoted imperative of ‘profit maximisation’. The latter, 
rather than revealing a kind of deeper insight, is merely the legitimate dream of 
every entrepreneur. Getting caught, locked up, sentenced and stripped of hard-
earned assets, are very real negative prospects. 
 How plausible is this counter hypothesis? If most of the entrepreneurial 
conduct of organised crime is so shallow why are the images of ‘organised-
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crime’ that have been most salient in recent decades so full of threatening 
sophisticated criminals? The answer to this question is perhaps simple too, 
though we have to dig beneath a muddled political surface covering other 
banalities. In the first place, we have the most interesting case of how the US 
successfully turned domestic penal policy into foreign policy by means of public 
fear management (Van Duyne and Levi, 2005; Woodiwiss, 2001, 2003, Bewley-
Taylor, 1999). It goes without saying that large-scale political objectives cannot 
be pursued but on the basis of imagery that is ‘larger than life’. The US’ working 
formula consisted of a rough but highly effective form of international public 
fear management. Its success can be measured in terms of its global impact: most 
national governments, and in the end the UN, took over the simple fear 
formula. Indeed, why should the basics of penal policy be less banal than the 
criminal targets themselves? 
 In the second place, criminal entrepreneurs grow up and learn together with 
their legitimate half-brothers. The organisation of the crime trade must keep 
pace with social, economic, technical and legal developments, which usually 
imply more complexity. Criminal entrepreneurs who fall behind such 
developments soon get caught and disappear from the ‘organised crime registers’ 
unless they learn from their mistakes. This turns the phrase, ‘organised criminals 
become increasingly more sophisticated’, into a tautology or a piece of political 
rhetoric of which there is too much already. 
 If things are really that simple, why have the authorities failed to eliminate 
this renegade entrepreneurial ‘organised-crime’ relative? Is he just a bit smarter 
after all, or are the proprietors of the legitimate family business somewhat 
ambiguous in their attitude? 
 
 
Vulnerable to crime and crime-fighters 
 
Judging from the many assessments that have been produced in the recent past, 
the authorities seem to be awe-struck by the ‘organised-crime’ phenomenon, 
notwithstanding the fact that the awful image was of their own making. As the 
threat described in the repeated annual situation reports failed to recede, and as 
the reports failed to bring any really new insights, many experts realised that a 
new methodology was required. If the ‘organised criminals’ were not actually 
alien invaders but the hushed-up part of the social and economic family, why 
not focus attention on the family as a whole and assess its vulnerability? In this 
refocusing of attention the University of Ghent has played a pivotal role, as 
described in the first chapter of this book (Vander Beken, 2005). 
 Taking the economic angle as their point of departure, Vander Beken, 
Verpoest, Bucquoie and Defruytier give a thoughtful account of their vulnerability 
approach. The vulnerability approach is not a competing methodology, but an 
X-raying of an economic sector to find out its degree of receptiveness to crime. 
High vulnerability does not necessarily imply that the sector concerned is 
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infected by ‘organised crime’ or even victimised. The sector may even profit 
from crime, as do the real-estate or yachting markets when wealthy criminals 
buy the expensive objects traded in these markets in times of recession. The 
vulnerability study may be complemented with other investigations more 
directed at criminal groups for example. Vulnerability analyses start with broad 
descriptions at the level of the total environment before focussing on the micro 
level of economic entities and business processes. 
 The economic sector whose vulnerability to crime (and by implication 
‘organised crime’) was investigated by the authors is the road freight transport 
sector. This sector was not selected because the key to success in the trafficking 
of contraband is to hide the transportation activities. That would lead to a self-
fulfilling prophecy. The selection criteria were derived from sector and market 
features, that is, the industry’s relative importance in the economy, the low entry 
thresholds, and aspects such as low transparency. The detailed evaluation of the 
entrepreneurial landscape and the in-depth analyses of business processes show 
that the industry’s vulnerability to crime (whether as victim or perpetrator) is, 
generally, substantial. The authors are modest in their claims concerning the 
strength of the instrument used for their assessment. Even though much of the 
procedure is still an ‘art’ – a not uncommon situation in organised-crime 
research – it provides a rank-order of the indicators, which facilitates decision-
making. 
 That one can speak not only of vulnerability to organised crime, but also of 
vulnerability to organised crime-fighters, can be deduced from the paper by 
Jackie Harvey of the University of Northumbria. The author poses some 
intriguing questions, and assesses the validity of politically motivated estimates 
concerning the extent of money laundering, in the light of macro-economic 
data. In the first place, the production of money laundering figures looks very 
much like price rigging at an auction. A few organisationally connected main 
players drive up the figures while, through mutual cross-referring, they provide 
the appearance of validity to these numbers (which are then taken by the 
scholarly community at face value). In the second place, the objectives of anti-
money-laundering policy have gone far beyond those of keeping the bad half-
brother with his dirty money out of the house. Though the author does not say 
so in so many words, it has become a rich man’s financial foreign policy 
(Stessens, 2000, 2001). The power the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
exerts on money laundering exceeds anything one would expect from an 
informal club. It can blacklist countries and territories for not complying with its 
recommendations, though this treatment (without appeal) appears to be meted 
out only to those who are not members. Together with the other auction 
bidders, such as the OECD, the FATF has directed its attention to the off-shore 
financial sectors, small territories that once heeded the advice of the World Bank 
to divert their meagre economic resources to financial services. Interests changed 
and the rich countries’ officials returned to complaining about these services. 
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As Protagoras’ adage also applies to the goodies of the family, the reader may 
share the author’s puzzlement about the overlap between the various bodies and 
organs that have some role in protecting the world’s finances from bad relatives. 
Jackie Harvey is most moderate in pointing to the fact that the OECD scratches 
the back of the FATF (and the other way round: both share the same office 
facility). As a favour, FATF has included tax evasion in its definition of 
laundering and focused on the ostracised offshore tax havens. In this way the tax 
interests of the US and its industrialised allies are served at the same time as the 
legitimate economy is purged of the influence of tainted offshore relatives. 
 However, what is the evidence that the targeted ‘opaque’ countries are 
actually money-laundering centres? As the financial crime-fighters’ zeal has 
never extended to the collection of valid empirical evidence, the author had to 
scrape together whatever meagre facts she could find. The outcome should be 
considered indicative, particularly as the list of countries where money 
laundering takes place, or that are vulnerable to it, is composed by US bodies. 
Nevertheless, side by side with countries like Panama we find respectable FATF 
members like the UK, which is spared the FATF’s wrath, however. The 
evidence of money laundering is inconclusive. Large economies with active 
financial markets, favourable corruption-index scores and all the anti-laundering 
measures in place are as vulnerable to money laundering as countries that score 
lower on these indexes. At any rate there is little statistical evidence that there is 
much difference. Nevertheless, they are (financially) browbeaten (Stessens, 
2001).  
 It is fascinating to observe how crime fighters in general and an informal 
crime-fighting body like the FATF (though officially backed by the great powers) 
are able to carry on virtually unopposed. The story about the hype surrounding 
the new Internet technologies, and the potential money-laundering opportunities 
supposedly provided thereby, is recounted by Ton Schudelaro. As soon as 
opportunities arose for making financial transactions more efficient by using 
Internet technology, great concern was voiced. It is remarkable that everyone 
simply repeated and quoted whatever the FATF thought fit to assert. For years the 
fear of Internet-related money laundering was disseminated broadly, while nobody 
raised the simple question: how many cases of Internet-based laundering do we 
actually have? 
 Schudelaro took the trouble to go through all the sources and found one case 
in which criminals established a bank in Antigua, advertised their financial 
secrecy services on the Internet and absconded with $10 million after a public 
warning from the authorities. However, this was not a case of money laundering 
but embezzlement and deceit. Some of the victims hoped perhaps for a neat 
laundering service. As no new evidence of Internet-related laundering emerged, 
the FATF simply stopped mentioning it in its annual reports. However, the 
lesson that was learned from this crime-fighter’s conduct was not that the 
responsible broadcasting of serious warnings must be accompanied by fact-
finding and proper expert analysis. Rather, some expressed the opinion that the 
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absence of evidence actually demonstrated the cleverness of the criminals. This 
reminds us of Church Father Tertulian’s saying, ‘Credo quia absurdum’. Crime-
fighters are true believers indeed. Beware of true believers. 
 
 
Half-brothers in transition 
 
The relation between the licit and illicit economies is flexible, and is determined 
more by the surrounding entrepreneurial landscape than by cunning and 
planning. This applies to the evildoers as well as to those on the good side of the 
thin blue line. The entrepreneurial landscape in Central and Eastern Europe has 
changed considerably and is far from consolidated. The Baltic republics have just 
entered the European Union, the Russian Federation is still groping for some 
economic order, while the Czech Republic has experienced the naïve rush 
toward a market economy without professionalising the control side – a 
circumstance that has opened the gate to many get-rich-quick fortune-seekers. 
Not all of them are irredeemable felons, neither are they repentant lost sons in a 
sinful economy; rather, most are ordinary individuals who simply take advantage 
of criminal opportunities as they present themselves. 
 Naturally one cannot generalise about a territory that stretches from the 
Baltic Sea to the Danube. Estonia faces the wealthy Scandinavian countries while 
it has the huge and unruly Russian hinterland at its back. It is not surprising that 
the law enforcement experts, whose opinions are presented in Anna Markina’s 
chapter on the changes that were predicted to take place in Estonia after its 
accession to the EU, expected an increase in crime across the country’s borders. 
This concerned not only the next-door Russians, but also Asians, who also have 
an interest in the global (crime-) trade and the movement of goods. Would 
criminals from the East converge on Estonian territory? The experts expressed 
their concern that this would happen, assuming a fusing of interests, for example, 
concerning export (smuggling) facilities. True, the Estonians have their criminal 
entrepreneurs too: the fleshpots of Brussels are coveted by licit as well as illicit 
entrepreneurs. In addition, price differences due to differential tax and excise 
rates have contributed to a thriving cross-border trade in alcohol and tobacco 
(Van Duyne, 2003). More changes are expected after Estonia’s accession to the 
Schengen countries, though one may wonder whether crimes between the 
Schengen countries should still be counted as ‘cross-border’ crime.  
 Licit entrepreneurs are risk takers to no lesser a degree than their illegitimate 
relatives, though they must observe different rules of the game, even when they 
have to carry on their activities amidst criminal entrepreneurs and have to deal 
with them on the same footing. The difficulties encountered in this interaction 
are reported by Nils Bagelius, who tells us the saga of the Swedish ‘business 
crusaders’ in Russia and the Baltic states. It involves the management of risks and 
uncertainties, questions about the persons with whom to deal, trust and control, 
and realising in time when the moment has come to draw the curtains and leave 
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the economic stage on which criminal and non-criminal players are so difficult 
to distinguish. Even if one can tell the good from the bad brother, it may 
sometimes be more efficient to engage the bad brother if this neutralises his 
intentions or makes him useful by allowing one to delegate to him management 
of the risky conflict situations. 
 The thirteen Swedish companies that ventured into the Baltic countries and 
Russia were exposed to various contingencies and pressures, which do not easily 
fit a single pattern. Hence the experience of the management of the companies 
also differed. Of course, the prospects for enterprises seem attractive: a large 
market and low production costs. But these are offset by the costs of 
enforcement of contracts, bureaucratic uncertainties and unpredictable 
informalities, which may weigh heavily financially and morally. In order to get a 
hold on the insecure environment eight companies resorted to local ‘wise guys’ 
for negotiations. Though a causal relation is not clear, the engagement of the 
‘wise guys’ did not result in a happy outcome: five of the firms closed down 
nevertheless. The assistance of the police and security services, resorted to six 
times, proved more effective: only one of the firms concerned had to terminate 
its activities. Of the five firms that were liquidated because of criminal 
interference, four also turned to the ‘wise guys’ for support. Criminal pressure 
was not only exerted in Russia: three companies were pressurised in Sweden, 
where one employee was gunned down. It is difficult to generalise from these 
small numbers, though Bagelius’ observations are in line with the study of 
Varese (2001). 
 The relationship between crime and commercial activity in the transition 
countries depends too much on historical backgrounds and the actual cultural 
landscapes to enable it all to be captured in a single pattern. Empirically this 
implies that it is wrong to assume a kind of organised economic crime 
‘population’ about which we can formulate general statements. Does every 
country have its own kind of licit-illicit half-brother relationship? An affirmative 
answer is given by Miroslav Scheinost and his colleagues Vladimir Baloun and 
Drahuse Kaderabkova, as far as financial and economic crime in the Czech 
Republic is concerned. The picture they sketch looks highly idiosyncratic. The 
hasty privatisation, the lack of professionalism, deficient legislation and the get-
rich-quick greed of many naïve entrepreneurs whose improvisations led them to 
cross the thin blue line alongside shrewd criminals: all this looked like an open-
air financial-economic crime-experiment. As an experiment it was a costly 
success, though lacking the grim Russian component of violence, which 
reduced its international media attractiveness. What is organised crime without 
blood? 
 While the picture of financial and economic crime in the Czech Republic 
contains many features pertaining to the local situation, there are yet some points 
that can be recognised in other contexts. The criminal economic profiteers, most 
of them in their thirties and older, have no criminal records, or records of 
economic crime only, and certainly no violent backgrounds. Also, their modus 
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operandi, such as ‘borrowing’ from their own firms, or constructing pyramid 
frauds, is not uncommon in other jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the unique 
historical combination of privatisation of large state industries, the clumsy way in 
which this was handled, and the absence of informal rules of commercial 
conduct, turned many once law-abiding socialist citizens into criminal capitalist 
adventurers. In the awkward relationship between the two half-brothers with 
which we started (‘family, yet different’), it became increasingly difficult to tell 
one from the other. Where does one draw the line between delaying payments 
to keep a company afloat, and long firm fraud? The transition zone between 
legal and criminal behaviour becomes ever larger when the practise of delaying 
payments becomes widespread commercial policy. Likewise, awarding oneself as 
the general manager of a bank an undeserved salary increase, granting a loan to a 
related firm and a more substantial loan – which, against initial intentions, is 
never paid back – to one’s own firm, are not distinct behavioural categories 
associated with different types of person. 
 The havoc created by the ‘respectable’ brothers of the Czech financial 
community was staggering. The banks were bled white as a result of loans to 
firms (partly) owned by the bank managers themselves. Cleaning up this sector 
cost the Czech government 22% of its 2004 budget, though this covered not 
only criminal damage. The impact of the financial crime that took place during 
the transition period is still being felt. The murky dealings on the financial 
market, though they do not qualify as ‘transnational crime’, had an international 
impact nonetheless: the hope that Prague would become the main stock 
exchange in Central and Eastern Europe went up in smoke. 
 While economic crime amounts to only 10% of recorded crime, the financial 
damage it inflicted was 67% of the total criminal damage in 2002. It is interesting 
to observe how this is valued from a ‘traditional’ organised-crime perspective – 
something we can ascertain from the volume, Organised crime in Europe (Fijnaut 
and Paoli, 2004). In the chapter about organised crime in the Czech Republic, 
Nozina (2004) describes criminal activities deriving from a number of (foreign) 
quarters, but economic crime is scarcely mentioned. Domestic high-level 
financial conspiracies are not even noticed. Of course, not all forms of economic 
crime should be equated with organised crime: many offences succeed not 
because of the high level of organisation but because of the gullibility of the 
victims. Another finding –one that may explain the scale of the damages caused 
– is the re-offending rate: one fifth of the convicted economic criminals return 
unrepentant to their economic niche. Apparently they learn the wrong lesson 
and continue their business, as usual. 
 
 
Business as usual 
 
Legitimate markets, legally structured by dense networks of rules designed to 
protect a multitude of interests, provide an equally large number of criminal 
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opportunities. Such opportunities arise not always at the margin, but often right 
in the middle and often with the full knowledge (if not complicity) of to-be-
protected market participants, whether entrepreneurs or consumers. Part of the 
protection consists of making consumers pay more for certain coveted but 
potentially dangerous articles, through the state imposed price wedge. As many 
consumers hate being overcharged for things they want, crime-entrepreneurs 
able to offer these things at reduced prices by skimming the price wedge find a 
wide-open market of ‘accomplices’. In Europe this mainly concerns tobacco and 
alcohol. The price wedge not only serves to protect health but also to finance 
collective goods like unemployment insurance, pensions and the social and 
economic fabric of society. This price wedge is also imposed on a more dynamic 
commodity: labour, the mobility of which was recently given an enormous 
boost all over the continent. 
 The cost of labour is a general concern in the industrialised countries: high 
labour costs mobilise firms and labourers alike, though in different directions. 
Firms move to ‘cheap’ countries in order to buy cheap labour, and the cheap 
labourers move to expensive countries to get more pay for their work. Here we 
find an interesting difference in criminal labelling: firms on the move, ‘globally’ 
shopping for cheap labour are not considered criminal; labourers on the move 
for better pay may be illegal, those who help or employ them criminal. 
 It would be incorrect to say that this ‘imbalance’ as Passas (2001) would call 
it, represents the whole story. As a matter of fact, the activity of skimming the 
tax on wages, consisting of income tax and social security contributions, is quite 
old, though it has not entered the annals of the ‘organised-crime’ literature. The 
chapter by Petrus C. van Duyne and Mark Houtzager gives an account of the 
waxing, waning and recent resurrection of the Dutch koppelbaas, as the illegal 
subcontractor is called in the Netherlands. During the 1970s, the koppelbaas, the 
‘boss’ coupling labour demand to manpower supply, became a prominent figure 
in the Dutch construction industry, though his range of operation also covered 
West Germany and Belgium. The imposition of a fiscal liability on main 
contractors and principals broke the symbiosis of licit and criminal entrepreneurs. 
Did the phenomenon disappear? It disappeared in the media at any rate, while 
the police (disliking the investigation of complicated labour-fraud schemes) 
found during the 1990s a new, more prestigious topic: organised crime. At that 
time economic crime was defined in such a way as conceptually to remove it 
from the field of organised crime (unless committed by ‘certified hoodlums’). So 
the koppelbaas could emerge again unseen as soon as market conditions became 
favourable again. 
 Market conditions in the late 1990s drove licit and illicit entrepreneurs 
together once more. Labour costs and shortages provided a competitive edge to 
those who succeeded in economising by hiring from a koppelbaas. The latter 
could recruit new labourers from the EU countries as well as from Eastern and 
Southern Europe. ‘Old’, veteran koppelbazen were joined by new Turkish and 
Kurdish entrepreneurs in the horticultural areas. A good example of how closely 
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the legitimate and criminal half-brothers can cooperate was the creation of 
koppelbazen by legitimate constructors to do their dirty fiscal job. They dismissed 
their staff, established a koppelbaas who became the new employer, and hired 
back the same staff from him. The koppelbaas was assumed to take care of the 
fiscal obligations, which he predictably neglected. It was the near-perfect 
‘legitimate’ organisation of crime: the upperworld creating and managing its 
own crime-enterprises. Is the dichotomy of upperworld and underworld not 
wrong after all? 
 The dichotomy may be wrong in some social and economic fields and 
correct in others, which demonstrates that broad generalisations are to be 
avoided. Organising labour fraud is different from organising excise fraud on the 
basis of untaxed cigarettes and alcohol. Labour fraud takes place right in the 
upperworld; trading untaxed goods is an activity of the underground economy 
and does not need any upperworld involvement. Cigarette fraud, its short 
history and unfolding in Germany, is narrated by Klaus von Lampe. It is a 
surprising history, because it shows that an underground market does not 
necessarily spread over a country evenly, even if the economic incentives are 
everywhere the same. The most important incentive is the price wedge, which is 
the same all over Germany. Given the assumed mobility of people, consumers 
and criminal traders alike, one would expect the illegal market to emerge 
everywhere on a comparable scale. And if the consumers did not go to the 
traders, the latter would go to the consumers. Indeed, that should follow from 
one of the most frequently quoted dogmas in the organised-crime literature: that 
of ‘profit maximisation’. However, this is not what Von Lampe discovered. 
Around 60% of the cigarette cases discovered in the first half of the 1990s were 
found in the three north-eastern Länder, which together account for only 10% 
of the German population. 
 What is the reason for this imbalance? Are consumers in the other regions 
happy with the high-taxed cigarettes? That is not very likely. Is there a 
monopolist syndicate that restricts the contraband trade to these Länder? Von 
Lampe did not find crime syndicates with hardened felons. Actually most 
offenders had no criminal record at all. Only a few traders had previous 
convictions, but not for serious offences. The author also observed that, with the 
passage of time, the organisation of this crime became more sophisticated, but as 
a result of the unfolding of this underground market, not as a driving force. Of 
course, people learn, criminal entrepreneurs too. Hence, purely (criminal) 
economic factors do not fully explain the geographical structure of this crime 
market. The (tentative) explanation has, rather, a social feature: the interaction of 
Polish suppliers and local Vietnamese distributors. This is (again) a highly 
idiosyncratic situation, which cannot be generalised to other markets or regions. 
 This conclusion is underlined by Per Ole Johansen’s study of the Norwegian 
illegal alcohol market. After the First World War not only the US but also 
Norway took part in the ‘open air’ experiment of alcohol prohibition. The 
backgrounds were also not dissimilar: moral (Christian) fundamentalists, in 
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addition to socialists who considered alcohol the enemy of the labourer (this was 
not a feature in the US). The prohibitionists got their way and also the 
comparable and predictable underground economy. But unlike the US, the 
Norwegian authorities ended this unfortunate experiment sooner (1927) and 
kept prices high by various measures such as the imposition of high taxes and the 
maintenance of a state monopoly. So there was every reason to expect the 
continued existence of an ‘organised-crime’ market, such as the one that 
developed in the US during prohibition. But there the comparison ends: no 
Norwegian version of Al Capone or Lucky Luciano emerged during the long 
and continuous period in which old hands taught new comers the craft. In all 
other respects, the smugglers and wholesale distributors remained what they 
were: tradesmen and Norwegian citizens praising the Christian Party for keeping 
prices high and Norway out of the EU. 
 Importers, distributors and illegal distillers, together keep the illegal alcohol 
market going as a kind of supplementary economy and demonstrate few problems 
with the half-brother relationship. Wholesale importing has always been 
accompanied by the presence of legal firms to provide the proper documentary 
coverage and handle the illegal revenues. These ‘company smugglers’ work 
alongside a motley crowd of professional smugglers and those who have normal 
jobs with illegal business as a side-line activity designed to provide a 
supplementary income. Meanwhile the illegal alcohol business has become an 
integral part of the mainstream culture, notwithstanding the fact that it is 
officially denied. Though it may easily be defined as ‘organised crime’, it is not 
considered a threat to the democratic nature of Norway. This is also due to the 
apparent lack of bribery. Actually, the smugglers do not need to bribe. 
 Is this organised crime-trade, Norwegian style, another idiosyncrasy? Not 
necessarily. We find the same flexible network features that are usually found in 
underground markets: a delta-like entrepreneurial landscape in which, through a 
multitude of mutually connected creeks, the trade flows downstream to eager 
customers. But still, this socio-economic crime-landscape does have peculiarly 
Norwegian features. 
 
 
Drugs and sex 
 
From the upperworld perspective, exploiting (or satisfying commercially) the 
basic human needs for psychotropic substances and sex is fundamentally far 
removed from the respectable family business. Economic criminals too look 
down on these criminal branches. Historically, the preferred denotation for these 
activities has been ‘organised crime’. Leaving aside such moral stands, the traders 
are likewise criminal entrepreneurs who must heed the same risk-management 
principles as the alcohol and cigarette traffickers. It goes without saying that the 
entrepreneurial environment – partly determined by the commodity, the related 
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international penal regime and the local social and cultural circumstances – is 
very different. 
 The three contributions contained in this volume cover very different local 
and commercial landscapes. The ecstasy industry in the Netherlands is described 
by Tom Blickman. For good reasons the author describes the Dutch market 
against a global background, as Dutch production is mainly export directed. But 
what is the Dutch share of the global traffic? The author first introduces us to 
one interesting aspect of the global ecstasy (and drug) trade, namely the global 
bickering about numbers, particularly with the US and the UN (United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime). The US authorities complain that the lion’s share 
(42%) of the ecstasy pills seized in the US originate from the Netherlands. But 
using other parameters, the Dutch authorities present lower figures. Without 
siding with the Dutch, it is fair to remind the reader that the UN as well as the 
US have a reputation for engaging in statistical inflation when to do so serves 
their need to suggest the existence of big problems (Van Duyne and Levi, 2005; 
Reuter and Truman, 2004). Nevertheless, even according to the UN figures, the 
worldwide market for the consumption of stimulants (amphetamine type 
substances, including ecstasy) consists of 8.3 million users. About 73% is 
accounted for by Europe and North America, while Asia is catching up quickly. 
Production facilities too are shifting away from the Netherlands, diminishing its 
unwanted prominence. 
 The causes of the Dutch prominence in this market are not clear yet. 
According to the author’s interpretation, the main cause is the presence of 
‘routine socio-economic activities’ – or, as we mentioned at the beginning of 
this introduction, the fourth ‘banality’ of having social, economic and 
commercial opportunities close to hand: facilities, like-minded people, skills and 
tools. These are not in all respects unique, but their combination, together with 
certain purely accidental circumstances contributed to the rise in prominence of 
the Netherlands in the market for stimulants in general and ecstasy in particular. 
 From the 1980s, the Netherlands developed into an export and transit 
country for drugs, particularly for cannabis products. This sector of the drug 
market had low priority and many smugglers developed their social and 
technical infrastructure undisturbed while tapping many of the facilities of 
legitimate industries. Later, the rising ecstasy industry tagged along with the 
broader illegal drug industry, which is to a large extent centred in Amsterdam. 
Accidental personal initiatives were also of influence: in the southern provinces 
of the Netherlands there was much illegal distilling, and hence laboratory skills 
were available. These were used for cooking amphetamines, mainly exported to 
Sweden. This was also an accidental development, due to the prison friendship 
of a Dutch criminal with Swedish fellow criminals who introduced him to the 
lucrative Scandinavian market. The step from amphetamine to ecstasy 
production was not great. 
 Meanwhile, around 1990, ecstasy became a new, and popular element in the 
youth culture in the Netherlands, Belgium and Spain (Ibiza), and it spread 
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rapidly to other countries in Europe. This broad demand side (which with 8.3 
million users worldwide should not be exaggerated) is supplied by a broad array 
of criminal enterprises, reflecting the network-like structure, with top and 
lower-level traders, found elsewhere (Hobbs). This autonomously developing 
entrepreneurial activity was given an accidental boost from an unexpected 
quarter: the police. In their zeal to catch the most senior criminals they allowed 
criminal infiltrators to ‘grow’ towards the higher echelons, which meant that 
many known bulk shipments were left untouched. Another criminal informer 
learned the craft of amphetamine cooking and after the arrest of his criminal 
mentor, spread the technique by teaching others. The prosecutions to which 
these breaches of the code of criminal procedure gave rise, were all nullified 
(Huskens and Vuijst, 2002). The producers and traders concerned are still at 
large and are assumed to have contributed to the saturation of the Dutch market. 
These are the vicissitudes of any market and certainly the criminal ones, making 
inroads on the researcher’s neat structural patterns and generalisations. 
 Another example of such vicissitudes in the shaping of the crime economy is 
to be found in the Bulgarian drug market. In the early 1990s, following the 
change of regime, Bulgaria soon found a place on the criminal map of Europe – 
but with an interesting variation. While organised-crime researchers (re)‘-
discovered’ the applicability of a network model of interpretation, and (partly) 
did away with the criminal hierarchies, the Bulgarians started with them: the 
criminal bosses operated top down. Tihomir Bezlov describes how the bosses 
structured and divided the drug market among themselves in an orderly fashion. 
Each boss got or conquered his territory over which he ‘ruled’. This deviation 
from the prevalent model is not a strange Balkan caprice of the Bulgarians, but is 
likely to be a derivation of the developments in the criminal ‘protection 
industry’, which by its very nature is territorially bound (Gambetta, 1993). 
Market organisation was horizontal as well as vertical: beneath each boss there 
was an orderly ramification of tasks and territories, a bit the way Cressey (1969) 
described syndicated crime in America. This orderly conduct (which was not, 
however, without bloodshed) may be attributed to the circumstance that a score 
of security service officers drifted into criminal waters. 
 After 2000 the surrounding landscape changed. The number of young 
criminal entrepreneurs increased while the black markets could not absorb all the 
growing human and financial capital. In addition, the cross-border trade in all 
sorts of contraband increased making top-down management inefficient. The 
bosses did not disappear but, as befitted the dynamics of the European crime-
markets, they adapted to the more informal and flexible network structures. 
These markets do not only comprise prohibited goods, but also licit 
commodities traded in the ‘grey commercial zones’, which provided the bosses 
with more coverage and investment potential within the licit economy. At the 
time of writing the situation is still unclear. Are the crime bosses about to settle 
down in the licit economy relinquishing their hold on their traditional wards, or 
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do they continue to straddle two worlds? Crime entrepreneurs are difficult to 
gentrify. 
 The sex market is one that is difficult to conceptualise in terms of the tense 
family relationship of the licit-illicit half-brothers. Depending on the legal 
system, providing commercial sexual services is not criminal. However, making 
someone do so against her (his) will through the use of force or deceit is 
universally considered a serious crime. So, we are right in the underworld. 
Nevertheless, the upperworld-underworld dichotomy is weakened here as well. 
The research findings presented by Almir Maljevic show that upperworld light 
penetrates this dark corner of the crime market too. 
 The forced provision of sexual services is closely connected to trafficking in 
humans, mainly women. The forces driving women to leave hearth and home 
are abundantly present in Southern and Eastern Europe. 93% of the women 
investigated came from economically depressed countries like Moldavia (44%), 
Romania (37%) and the Ukraine (12%). The dead-end situation they run away 
from is not only economic. The desperation can also be psychological and social: 
domestic violence and abuse as personal push factors increase gullibility and the 
likelihood that alluring job offers are believed. Only a small minority (said they) 
realised that their jobs would be sexual ones. 
 Summarising the abuse and ill treatment would not add much to what has 
already been learned from other European studies on human trafficking 
(Aronowitz, 2001). It is more interesting to observe that more than a quarter of 
the women stated that they were treated well and had good relationships with 
their ‘owners’: they were paid and could visit the doctor, or their families at 
home. This correlated with the level of education of the victim and the 
economic status and integrity of the family. Bad family conditions were an 
important factor in explaining later ill treatment: those who were already victims 
at home were more likely to be victimised abroad. Women who were better 
treated became often recruiters: one third of the women had been recruited by 
friends and acquaintances. 
 What about the ‘upperworld light’ that penetrates this market? Does it consist 
only of the use of (corrupt) facilities concerning documents, border crossings or 
attitudes of tolerance on the part of the police? In fact there is more to it: law 
enforcement pressure has increased in recent years, making the sex bosses more 
risk averse and careful in their treatment of the women, leading to a decrease in 
requests for help. The author also observes a shift of the locations of work places 
to private premises. Is the sex industry, in serving upperworld needs, moving 
upwards itself? This is not very likely: not only because of the risk of 
victimisation in this area, but also because of the nature of the needs that are 
serviced. Despite his greed, an economic criminal is more easily reunited with 
the family than a murky sex entrepreneur. 
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Back to human size 
 
The introduction began by placing criminal entrepreneurs in a ‘true-to-life’ 
perspective: the criminal merchants whose organisational manifestations are 
manifold but usually a function of the commodity that is traded, and the 
commercial and cultural surroundings. If things are so simple, how has the 
threatening image of sinister complexity arisen? Transnational organised crime! 
Maybe the feature ‘complexity’ is too often attributed to constructions that on 
closer inspection range from incomprehensible chaos to a series of half-
improvised clever projects. In addition there are unpredictable contingencies and 
the vicissitudes of law-enforcement priorities and the licit market itself, all 
adding to a disorderly but fascinating crime-economy. Few would like to admit 
that we are fighting criminal chaos. Hence, retrospectively the police, the media 
and policy makers call it ‘complex’ and ‘organised’ instead (Hobbs, 2004). 
Granted, in the area of economic crime complicated schemes do exist. But most 
fraud schemes consist of a multitude of improvised makeshift paperwork 
constructions. These take much effort to unravel, not because they are based on 
ingenious systems, but because of the lack thereof. The police will call this 
‘semi-organised disorder’, ‘complex’, and so will many researchers who have 
interviewed police officers. 
 Returning to the half-brother metaphor, if the basic human entrepreneurial 
traits are shared, then the difference lies in criminal risk-management, which is 
usually not characterised by strategically ‘looking ahead’ but rather by short-term 
tactics. Are crime-entrepreneurs so stupid or short sighted that they are at best 
capable of leaving behind only a trail of short-term professional disguises? Not 
necessarily, because they may realise that they are just illegitimate half-brothers 
with no real title to their criminal wealth. So, why should they do more? Why 
organise more, and more thoroughly, for the sake of an uncertain inheritance, 
normally only obtained by the very few fellow criminals who already have one 
and a half foot in the respectable upperworld economy? Crime and commercial 
activity are a complicated family indeed. 
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The vulnerability of economic sectors to 
(organised) crime: 
The case of the European road 
freight transport sector 
The vulnerability of economic sectors to organised crime 
Tom Vander Beken 
Karen Verpoest 
Annemie Bucquoye 
Melanie Defruytier1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The fear of so-called organised crime and its perceived threat to society 
dominates the agendas of many national and international policy makers. 
Significant amounts of money have been invested in the fight against it, and 
numerous special counter measures have been taken (Levi, 2004). The fear of 
organised crime is based on two basic assumptions: first, that it is something that 
exists and can be identified as such; second, that it is something dangerous and 
poses a significant threat to society as a whole. Although these basic assumptions 
are, at least implicitly, present in most discussions about organised crime, their 
empirical and theoretical foundation is not undisputed as both the concept, and 
assumptions about ‘its’ threat to society, have been subject to substantial 
scientific critique (See e.g. Van Duyne, 2002, 2004; Von Lampe, 2004). 
 This chapter focuses on the second, ‘dangerousness’, assumption. It will 
therefore deal with the assessment of ‘organised’ crime threats and will propose a 
methodology to address the issue of how these may be more adequately 
measured. The debate about the concept of organised crime and its usefulness in 
social science is not addressed here as such. This does not mean that the 
importance and the consequences of this discussion are not recognised. Rather, 
for the purposes of this chapter, it is accepted that some activities are labelled as 
‘organised’ crime and that, at least in this sense, ‘organised crime’ ‘exists’. From 
this point of view, discussion of the assessment and measurement of organised 
crime remains relevant. 
 More specifically, this chapter acknowledges the existence of various reports 
and assessments of ‘organised’ crime and presents a methodology to improve 
such assessments. The starting point is that a risk-based approach can assist the 
drafting of better, or at least more transparant, reports about the threat or risk 
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posed by certain criminal phenomena. In earlier research, the general 
methodological framework of this approach was described, referring to methods 
to assess: threats stemming from criminal groups and from their use of counter 
strategies; the vulnerabilities of economic sectors, and the involvement of 
criminal groups in illicit markets (Vander Beken, 2004; Vander Beken and 
Defruytier, 2004). This chapter reports research focusing on 1) the further 
development and refinement of the methodological framework through 
measurement of the vulnerability of licit economic sectors (Vander Beken, 
Defruytier, Bucquoye and Verpoest, 2005), and 2) the results obtained by 
applying this framework in a study of the European road freight transport sector 
(Bucquoye, Verpoest, Defruytier and Vander Beken, 2005). The chapter consist 
of two major parts. First the background to studies of the vulnerability of 
economic sectors is described. In the second part, a method for such studies is 
proposed and applied to the case study. 
 
 
Towards a risk assessment approach to (organised) crime 
Belgium pioneering in Europe 
 
The importance attached by the Belgian law enforcement authorities to good 
data on ‘organised’ crime was stressed in June 1996 when the National Action 
Plan Against Organised Crime was issued.2 One of the key goals of the Action 
Plan was to obtain a better view of the phenomenon as the basis for an 
appropriate response to it. 
 Consequently, it was decided that the Minister of Justice would issue annual 
reports on the organised-crime situation, and that these would be followed up 
by meetings to consider them. Drawn up on the basis of information supplied by 
law-enforcement agencies and other information sources, the reports were not, 
however, satisfactory. Although the reports were extensive and detailed, experts 
were of the opinion that they could not serve as a basis for the presentation of a 
realistic picture of the organised crime situation as they were too vulnerable to 
distortion caused by perceptions of the resource needs of the agencies 
responsible for supplying the information on which they were based. Therefore 
it was recognised from the outset that there was need for a more comprehensive 
methodology, based on more sources and other forms of analysis. 
 Since such a methodology was unavailable in Belgium, project 28 of the 
Federal Safety and Security Plan, presented by the Belgian  government in 2000, 
stressed the importance of research on the phenomenon of (organised) crime and 
the development of a methodology that was comprehensive. In response to these 
policy requirements, two studies were carried out by Ghent University (Black, 
                                                 
2  Action Plan of the Government against Organised Crime, 28 June 1996, Parliamentary 
Inquiry Commission on organised crime in Belgium. Final Report by Coveliers en Desmedt, 
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Vander Beken and De Ruyver, 2000; Black, Vander Beken, Frans and 
Paternotte, 2001). In 2001, the minister of justice decided that the resulting 
methodology would be used in the future. It would be implemented gradually 
and give rise to a holistic strategic analysis, thereby inducing a shift in crime 
analysis such that the annual reports would take the form of risk/threat 
assessments directed at the future, rather than being situation reports describing 
existing circumstances and therefore merely focusing on the past. 
 The starting point of the methodology employed is a risk-assessment approach. 
The aim is to measure risk or threat, and the analysis is based on various kinds of 
data. As a consequence, the concern is not merely to examine law enforcement 
activities, but also to focus on the criminal phenomenon itself and to 
demonstrate what might happen, doing so in such a manner that appropriate 
action can be taken. The assessment is performed on four different levels: 
criminal groups, counter measures, illicit and licit economic sectors. These four 
analyses are preceded by a so-called ‘environmental scan’ identifying main trends 
in the external environment and the overall objectives of the agencies involved 
(Vander Beken, 2004). The aim is eventually to perform this risk/threat analysis 
on a nationwide level in Belgium. In an initial stage, a ranking of criminal 
groups according to the threat they pose, as well as an analysis of appropriate 
counter measures, will be undertaken. 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual model and methodology 
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Assessments of (licit and illicit) markets 
 
As assessments of the vulnerability of markets have been scheduled to be 
conducted in the near future, further methodological work on this issue was 
carried out. This has led to a first methodological framework to measure the 
vulnerability of economic sectors (Vander Beken, Cuyvers, De Ruyver, Hansens 
and Black, 2003) and an application to the Belgian diamond sector (Vander 
Beken, Cuyvers, De Ruyver, Defruytier and Hansens, 2004). 
 
 
The European Union goes for threat assessments 
 
At the European level it became clear that the methodology used for the 
Organised Crime Situation Report (OCSR) also needed improvement. During 
the German3 and Swedish4 presidencies it was proposed to develop a threat 
assessment methodology that could shift the focus of the report from a 
description of current and historical situations, to an account of the threats and 
risks deriving from likely future developments, and their implications for law 
enforcement within the EU. 
 In the autumn of 2001, the Belgian presidency proposed an Action Plan to 
convert the OCSR into an annual strategic report for planning purposes, 
primarily focussing on the assessment of relevant threats and risks, as well as 
recommendations related to combatting and preventing organised crime.5 The 
starting point was the Belgian conceptual model and methodology mentioned 
above. This Action Plan has been further discussed and the intention is to 
implement the different parts of it gradually. The 2002 Organised Crime Report 
already had a different structure and has offered more detailed explanation of 
certain phenomena through its use of two complementary methods – namely, 
PEST (Political, Economic, Social and Technological) and SWOT (Strengths, 
Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) analyses – and more data sources. 
Of the four parts of the action plan, the criminal group analysis and the counter-
measure analysis were considered to be the most feasable in the short term 
(Vander Beken, Savona, Korsell, Defruytier, Di Nicola, Heber, Bucquoye, 
Dormaels, Curtol, Fumarulo, Gibson and Zoffi, 2004). Additional research on 
the vulnerability of economic sectors was asked for. 
 Besides this, the relevance of the research on the vulnerability of economic 
sectors to crime was also addressed in another context. After the Tampere 
European Council of 19996 called for the integration of crime-prevention 
                                                 
3  Council of European Union, 8469/99, Crimorg 55, Brussles, 19 May 1999. 
4  Council of European Union, 6628/01, Crimorg 19, Brussels, 13 February 2001. 
5  Council of the European Union, 14959/01, Crimorg 133, Brussels, 10 December 2001. 
6   Conclusion 41, Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council, 15-16 October 2001. 
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aspects into actions against crime, the importance of the crime proofing7 of 
legislation was taken up in various EU documents. The first programme of the 
European Crime Prevention Network established crime proofing as a top 
priority8 and OLAF, the European Anti-Fraud Office, has been entrusted with 
the establishment of a system of fraud proofing in order to strengthen the 
preventative aspects of protection of the Community’s financial interests.9 
Although there is very little scientific information to guide the process of crime 
and fraud proofing and only some member states have best practices in that 
respect (Albrecht, Kilchling and Braun, 2002), the European Forum for the 
Prevention of Organised Crime concluded that crime and fraud proofing cannot 
be carried out without knowledge of the context in which the legislation to be 
proofed was passed, and it was recognised that studies of the vulnerability of 
economic sectors are the necessary framework within which crime proofing 
must be performed. 
 With this objective in mind, the European Commission asked for research on 
the development of a European methodology for the assessment of the 
vulnerability of economic sectors and an application of it in two case studies: 
European road freight transport and music.10 
 
 
Measuring the vulnerability of legal sectors to crime 
 
There have been few attempts to apply a systematic methodological framework 
to studies of the vulnerability of licit sectors. There are academic attempts to 
predict high-risk business conditions (Albanese, 1987 and 1995), historical 
analyses of markets and crime (Reuter, Rubinstein and Wynn, 1983) and studies 
of the relationship between organised crime and legitimate industries (Van 
Duyne, 1993; Levi and Naylor, 2000; Williams and Savona, 1996; Naylor 2002). 
Economic sectors themselves carry out vulnerability studies (see e.g. Van de 
Voort and O’Brein, 2003). Although these studies can be valuable sources of 
sector information, their scope is mainly economic (business interests) and they 
are not always methodologically useful as the methods used are mostly not 
                                                 
7  See e.g. Joint Report from the Commission and Europol of March 2001 ‘The scanning of 
loopholes and crime facilitating opportunities has a particular virtue when applied to the 
legislation making process . . .  risk assessments and diagnosis should be further developed 
within it’. 
8  European Crime Prevention Network, First Programme: Setting priorities and objectives for 
the period July 2001 – December 2002. 
9  Commission Communication of 7 November 2001 concerning the fraud-proofing of 
legislation and contract management, SEC (2001) 2029 final. 
10  The research was financed by the European Commission’s Agis programmme and is known 
by the acronym MAVUS (Method for and Assessment of the Vulnerability of Sectors). 
Coordination: T. Vander Beken (IRCP, Ghent University); partners: the Universities of 
Trento, Amsterdam, Freiburg and Cardiff. The study will be published in Vander Beken 
(2005). 
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disclosed. Moreover, many of these studies start from a rather unilateral approach 
to the relationship between crime and the legal economy, focusing on security 
and the sector as a victim of crime only. As a clear-cut methodological 
framework to assess the vulnerability of legal sectors to crime has hitherto not 
existed as such, we have tried to develop one. 
 In order to define the landscape upon which organised crime typically 
operates, we have employed Dwight Smith’s (1980) ‘spectrum-of-enterprise’ 
idea along with its further developments in other studies (see e.g. Beare and 
Naylor 1999; Edwards and Gill, 1999; Schloenhardt, 1999; Paoli, 2002). 
Consequently, we have chosen to approach organised crime from an economic 
perspective, considering it a profit- and opportunity-driven phenomenon. The 
focus of analysis is thus on the context that potentially provides the opportunities 
for criminal entrepreneurship. For this reason, contrary to the practice of 
traditional organised crime analyses, we have chosen to focus the analysis on the 
task environment, i.e. the legal economy, rather than on actors or specific 
(organised) crime groups. 
 A method for assessing the vulnerability of legal sectors should thus be 
directed at detecting those weaknesses of the sector that can be exploited by 
criminals, and that result in opportunities for organised crime (Albanese, 1987). 
 As an understanding of a predominantly economic environment is required, 
the method draws, to an important extent, on concepts and theory developed in 
the field of economics. The foundation of the methodology is thus undeniably 
multi-disciplinary. On the one hand, the methodology aims at providing a 
systematic approach to the acquisition of insight into the dynamics of specific 
legal markets. Therefore, Michael Porter’s concept of ‘clusters’ in the legal 
economy (Porter, 1980 and 1990) and the concept of ‘business processes’ 
(Rozenkrans and Emde, 1996), used in management science, are both integrated 
into the methodology. On the other hand, concepts and theory from sociology 
and criminology are used in order to keep the economic paradigm in perspective 
and avoid an approach that is exclusively economic in nature. Von Lampe 
rightly states that: 
 
‘[…] the enterprise paradigm does provide a basis for the cumulative generation 
of knowledge. Economic concepts, however, have only a limited value . . . the 
enterprise paradigm is at risk of disregarding criminal structures that exist or 
emerge, due to other circumstances than the dynamics of illegal markets’ (von 
Lampe, 2002).  
 
Therefore, concepts like ‘criminal networks’ (see e.g. Paoli, 2002; Kleemans, 
Van den Berg and Van de Bunt, 1999; Levi, 2003) and ‘the nature of the legal-
illegal interface’ (Passas, 2002) are reflected in the methodological framework as 
well. 
 Use of the term ‘vulnerability’ as a conceptual focal point for economic-
sector scanning necessitates some indication of how to interpret it. Focusing on 
the vulnerability of licit sectors has preventive objectives above all, as it must also 
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allow problem areas that have not yet been affected by organised crime to be 
identified. The general idea is thus to provide coverage of the activities of 
organised criminality within the legal market place in which such organised 
activity is suspected, known and may possibly be expected to take place (Vander 
Beken and Defruytier, 2004). 
 What needs clarification at this point is that the relationship between crime 
and economic sectors is multi-directional and not simply one-way, as the 
concept of vulnerability might suggest. Economic sectors cannot always be 
considered as the victims of crime only. Their products and services may be 
attractive to criminals for reasons other than theft or forfeiture. That is, products 
and services might be vulnerable (attractive to criminals) because they can be 
used or misused as instruments or facilitators of crime. Thus, vulnerability studies 
not only look for situations in which crime might directly harm the sector 
(sector as the mere victim), but also for situations in which the sector itself 
creates, inadvertently or on purpose, opportunities for organised crime. 
 Finally, with regard to the conceptual model employed as part of the EU’s 
new methodology for measuring organised crime, it should be stressed that 
assessments of the vulnerability of economic sectors are only one part of an 
organised-crime threat-assessment, and that their results have to be read (and, if 
necessary, corrected) together with the output of analyses of criminal groups, 
counter strategies and illegal markets. If a vulnerability study demonstrates that a 
given sector is particularly exposed to crime, then this in itself is insufficient to 
justify the conclusion that the sector should be made a top priority. If analysis of 
the relevant criminal groups and their activities shows that criminal activity in 
the sector is unlikely – perhaps because the groups in question lack the will, or 
the means, or both to (mis)use the vulnerabilities – the threat posed by the latter 
are to be adjusted accordingly. 
 The proposed methodology for vulnerability studies consists of two parts. 
The first part involves three phases, each of which is descriptive. By means of 
information gathering and processing, the phases are meant to generate 
knowledge about all aspects of the task environment in which criminal 
behaviour takes place. The second part, consisting of the fourth, fifth and sixth 
phases, is analytical in nature and involves applying to the information obtained 
during the preceding phases, a set of indicators in order to draft a vulnerability 
profile of the economic sector concerned. 
 In order to avoid ‘self-fulfilling prophecies’, the first three phases of the study 
are conducted without specific reference to the sector’s vulnerability. Their 
purpose is limited to the necessary preparation of the analytical phases in which 
the information is evaluated. These first three phases can in turn be split into two 
parts. The sector analysis and the analysis of the wider environment relate to 
information gathered on a meso-level (sector) and macro-level (cluster). The 
third phase, namely, the analysis of the reference model, relates to in-depth, 
micro-level information gathered on the task environment (business processes). 
Although all three steps are similar in purpose, they differ in terms of the 
economic level on which information is gathered. 
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The fourth and fifth phases are the most important steps, as the information that 
is compiled and processed during the preceding phases is evaluated and analysed 
on the basis of a set of indicators. A common scaling technique is used to assign 
to the sector being studied a vulnerability score in terms of each of the 
indicators. Because the information gathering is performed on two distinct 
economic levels, this weighing exercise has to be performed twice: once in 
width and once in depth. What needs clarification at this point is that, in 
practice, the weighing exercise is less the result of a purely statistical operation in 
which in- and output are numerically/mathematically linked, than it is the 
outcome of balanced decision-making and transparent choices based on context 
variables, known criminal cases and case studies. 
 In practice, the scoring exercise is the outcome of balanced decision-making 
in which context variables, known criminal cases and case studies all play an 
important role. 
 Once all these phases have been gone through, the outcome is a vulnerability 
profile of the sector (both in width and in depth). Finally, the profile is made up 
of a list of vulnerabilities which, in a conclusion, can be ranked according to 
their importance. By way of a summary, Figure 2 offers a diagramatic 
representation of the different levels of analysis, the economic units on which 
they are focussed and each of the methodoligical steps taken. 
 
Figure 2. Levels of analysis, economic units and methodological steps 
taken 
 
Level Economic Unit Methodological steps 
 
Macro 
 
Meso 
 
Micro 
 
 
Cluster, Network 
 
Sector 
 
Economic entity 
Business processes 
 
Environmental Scan 
 
Sector Analysis 
 
Reference Model 
Analysis 
 
 
In the following sections the methodology is further illustrated by applying it to 
the case of the European road freight transport sector. 
 
 
Sector analysis 
 
A first step in the sector analysis is to define and delineate clearly what the sector 
includes. As at present there exists no suitable definition of ‘road transport of 
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goods’, we decided to define the sector in terms of ‘core activities’ and their 
position in the business structures of the legal entities that belong to the sector. 
We therefore used ‘NACE Rev. 1’11 to define which economic activities are 
included, and which are excluded from the sector. Code 60.24, ‘freight transport 
by road’, corresponds most closely with the core activity of what is meant by 
‘road transport of goods’.12 For the purposes of our study, only licit entities that 
are professionally engaged in the haulage of goods on behalf of third parties are 
considered. 
 The sector analysis focuses on two aspects: sector features and market 
features. In relation to the sector features, it can be concluded that in economic 
terms road freight transport is an important European sector. Its economic 
relevance derives from the numbers it employs, its substantial turnover, its share 
of the Gross National Product of a number of member states, and its significant 
role in the global commodity chain. Market features refer to barriers to entry to 
the sector, and to market conditions. Barriers to entry to the sector are relatively 
low. Once an enterprise has been established within the sector, the main 
challenge confronting it is survival in a highly competitive environment. The 
consequences of this economic reality are a high bankruptcy rate, especially 
among the smaller market players, and the need to be able to offer flexible 
logistic solutions to increasingly exigent clients. The sector’s client-oriented 
approach has led to highly differential, and non-transparent, pricing policies 
(Dullaert, 2002). 
 At the end of the first descriptive phase, analysis of sector and market features 
revealed frequent violations of the statute of self-employment, a shortage of 
qualified personnel, differences between the member states in terms of the 
control of access to the market, and complex and non-transparent processes of 
price setting. 
 
 
Environmental scan and cluster analysis 
 
Environmental scan 
The environmental scan is a process in which the broader environment is 
scanned by means of collecting and analysing data concerning the external 
environment of the object studied, to determine relevant developments and 
trends at the macro-level. The idea is to define future developments which 
                                                 
11  At the EU level, the NACE activity nomenclature refers to the statistical classification of 
economic activities in the European Community and has existed since 1990. From the outset, 
the European Commission intended that the new NACE (Rev.1) should be used by all mem-
ber states for the compilation and presentation of statistical data. The NACE Rev. 1 can be 
consulted on the EUROSTAT Classification Server, http://europa.eu.int/comm/euro-
stat/ramon/nace_rev1_1/nace_rev1_1en.html. 
12  URL: http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/ramon/geninfo/geninfo_en.html#nace. 
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might influence the sector, and more specifically the business choices of the 
entities belonging to the sector, and to enable policy-makers to develop an 
appropriate pro-active strategy. 
 Environmental scans are often structured through the use of an artificial 
device that distinguishes between specific elements constituting the environ-
ment. In this study, the PEST method is used to assess the environment. PEST is 
a standard acronym for the division of the environment into political, economic, 
social and technological domains. 
The following sections give an overview of the main trends in these four 
domains in relation to the macro-level analysis of the transport sector. 
 Political trends show a balance between liberalisation of the transport market 
and harmonisation of market conditions. Initially, EU policy gave special 
emphasis to liberalisation. The latter reached its peak with completion of the 
single internal market. Harmonisation, however, is far from having been 
completed (Stevens, 2004). Recent political developments focus more on 
harmonising market conditions. These developments have put road transport 
under pressure insofar as it is no longer the only significant player in the 
transport of goods, and is losing ground to other transport modalities.13 So, in the 
future, road transport companies will have to compete,  not only with each 
other, but also with these other modalities. 
 As mentioned, at the European level, the transport sector is of considerable 
economic relevance, while European road transport companies have to operate 
in an increasingly competitive environment. Economic trends – just-in-time 
delivery (Blauwens, De Baere and Van de Voorde, 2002), delocalisation14 and 
bipolarisation15 – must be understood in the light of this growing competition. 
These trends are alternative ways of coping with competition and are attempts to 
keep the sector viable. They function as short-term solutions, and do not offer a 
sustainable long-term answer. Moreover, these trends reinforce the competitive 
nature of the environment. 
 The social trends affecting the road freight transport sector are all derived from 
modern society’s character as a ‘global village’, and it is they that are responsible 
for the most salient image of the sector. In modern society, all kinds of goods are 
demanded and delivered all over the world. Most of these deliveries require road 
transport to some degree.16 For environmental reasons, and as a result of the 
                                                 
13  European Commission, White Paper. European transport policy for 2010: time to decide, 
Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Committees, 2001, p. 2-3. 
14  X., ‘Délocalisations dans les transport’, CNT Rapport Social 2000, URL: http://www.cnt.fr/ 
rapports/RS2000_Délocalisation _dans_les_transports.pdf. 
15  J. Burnham, ‘A more European transport than ever!’, CNT Transport/Europe, Bulletin of the 
Observatory on Transport Policies and Strategies in Europe, Issue No. 8, May 2003, 8 p., 
URL:http://www.cnt.fr/Commissions_Permanentes/Observatoire/Europe/bulletin_Trans-
port_Europe/TE_Bulletin8-A.pdf. 
16  OECD, Delivering the Goods: 21st Century Challenges to Urban Goods Transport, Paris, 
OECD Publications, 2003, p. 26-29. 
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pressure of public opinion, road transport is finding itself subject to increasingly 
stringent restrictions. Because of this increasing control, the former autonomy 
associated with the driver’s profession is fading and the job is becoming 
decreasingly attractive. Transport companies are experiencing difficulties in 
recruiting motivated and skilled drivers. Therefore, they are often obliged to 
employ unskilled or inexperienced drivers, which reconfirms the negative image 
of the sector.17 
 In terms of technological trends, one can observe that the transport sector is 
being increasingly affected by technological innovations. Although these 
innovations can optimise the efficiency and security of the transport system, they 
cannot be utilised without the assistance of people. This essential human 
intervention in transport services operations has become a target for criminals 
testing the integrity of employees.18 
 
Cluster analysis 
In this phase the cluster concept serves to structure the information collection 
and analysis. This analysis focuses on the more immediate external environment 
of the road transport sector, describing all the relevant factors and players and 
their relationship with the sector. 
 Concerning supporting and related sectors, road freight transport firms are 
dependent on a wide range of suppliers. For the supply of fuel, transport 
companies are dependent on the supporting petroleum sector. In investigations 
and research on organised crime, the petroleum sector has more than once been 
reported as vulnerable to crime (van Duyne, 1995; Coveliers and Desmedt, 
1999). Fuel fraud is a fast-growing part of the black market. Illegal fuel is all 
about evading excises, and most of the fraud is on diesel. In most European 
countries, the major part of the price of a litre of diesel is tax. Other fuels, like 
red diesel and kerosene, carry little or no tax. Anyone using those low-tax fuels 
on the road can save a lot of money. Because of the highly competitive 
environment in which the European road transport sector operates, companies 
may be inclined to (mis)use low-tax fuels to raise their profit margins. Suppliers 
of security are becoming increasingly important for the transport sector as well. 
As the sector is often the victim of crime, especially of crime against vehicles 
(e.g. theft of vehicles and cargo), transport companies are increasingly interested 
in tracking and tracing systems. 
 The element government occupies an important position in the cluster. The 
role of public authorities in regulating the market cannot be overestimated. The 
European road freight transport sector is subject to dozens of European 
regulations and directives (besides a number of UN conventions). However, due 
                                                 
17  European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, EU Road 
freight transport sector: Work and employment conditions, Luxembourg, Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, 2004, p. 55-56. 
18  Council of Ministers, Improving Security for road freight vehicles, CEMT/CM (2001), p. 11-15. 
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to the fact that most aspects of the sector are regulated by European directives 
rather than regulations, few elements are dealt with in a harmonised way. 
Moreover, control and enforcement of policy towards the main aspects of the 
transport sector, and customs regulation, remain national competences, although 
many initiatives designed to enhance co-operation between the member states 
have already been taken. Although there is a growing awareness on the part of 
the authorities of the need for a more comprehensive enforcement policy, the 
latter remains in the hands a of a range of control authorities, creating problems 
of coordination between member states. 
 For the road freight transport sector, a relevant financial player is the insurance 
sector. Insurance is important for two reasons. On the one hand, insurance 
premiums form part of the costs a transport company has to bear. Premium costs 
are a function of the goods that are transported and the contracts concluded. On 
the other hand, insurance can be a source of revenue for transporters. In theory, 
payments by insurance companies are limited to the value of replacement and 
cannot be considered as sources of additional income. In practice, however, 
insurance policies can be and are misused in ways such that insurance payments 
sometimes provide additional income.19 
 The European transport sector is represented by international sector 
organisations, for both employees20 and employers.21 As these organisations 
operate on a European level, and as they represent so many companies and 
employees, they are able to bring pressure to bear on governments. Besides these 
organisations, the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions also has influence on policymakers. 
 Finally, crime is also considered a cluster element. After all, criminals and 
criminal groups form part of the context in which sectors function. The 
transport sector is subjected to different forms of crime because of certain 
intrinsic characteristics, among which are the competitive nature of the market, 
and the essential role the sector plays in criminal circuits. Depending on the 
specific nature of the criminal activity concerned, firms in the sector can act as 
victims, facilitators of crime, or accomplices. As victims, transport firms’ main 
concerns lie in the theft of goods and vehicles, and in smuggling. Regarding the 
latter type of crime, firms are not only potential victims as sector players can 
knowingly facilitate or commit such crimes. Regarding corruption and fraud, 
sector players can act as offenders.22 
 
                                                 
19  Confirmed by the Secretary General at BVT, interview on 1 April 2004. 
20  European Transport Workers’ Federation, About the ETF, URL: http://www.itf.org.uk/ 
itfweb/etf/be/eabout_1.htm. 
21  International Road Transport Union, Mission, Objectives, Priority Issues,  
 http://www.iru.org/Presenting/ Organisation/section2.E.html. 
22  The data gathered and processed for this cluster element come from earlier reports on crime 
and the transport sector, from public and private sector bodies, and interviews with customs 
and law enforcement authorities, and with security sector representatives. 
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Reference model analysis 
 
With this third step we descend to the micro-level of the analysis. The 
information processing on this economic level is focused on defining and 
discussing the concrete corporate culture and functioning of the entities that are 
found in the road freight transport sector. The micro-level analysis ultimately 
leads to the possibility of evaluating business processes on a level detached from 
the individual business entities they belong to, allowing conclusions to be drawn 
on a sector level.  
 The basic elements in the analysis are six relevant business processes: 
purchasing, sales, book-keeping, administration, personnel management and 
services operations. For business entities in the road freight transport sector, two 
of these business processes, ‘services operations’ and ‘personnel management’, are 
highly relevant, certainly in relation to vulnerability assessments.  
In relation to the reference model of a transport company, ‘services operations’ 
constitute the most important business process. Their importance stems from the 
fact that they are responsible for the core output, namely, offering transport 
services. 
 Because the service offered by a transport company is for the most part 
situated on the road and thus away from the main site of the business, tracking 
and controlling the production process is problematic. Although in recent years 
new technological expedients (e.g. tracing and tracking systems) have been 
developed, the risks in relation to the production process remain high, certainly 
for small companies for which these new technologies appear to be too 
expensive. 
 In terms of ‘personnel management’, the characteristics of the corporate culture 
(compliance and business ethics) affect the integrity of drivers in particular, 
increasing or decreasing the risk that they act as the accomplices of criminals or 
avail themselves of criminal opportunities on their own account. 
 Moreover, the neglect of proper screening procedures, and less-than-
thorough background checking, enhance the risk of employing members of 
criminal groups. There have been indications that organised-crime groups send 
out their members as temporary employees, for instance, so that they are able to 
operate from inside transport companies.  
 
 
Analytical phases 
 
At this stage the information gathered, processed and ordered in the three 
preceeding phases is used to perform the actual vulnerability assessment. The 
analytical exercise is carried out both in width and in depth, each time using a 
set of indicators (Rozenkrans and Emde, 1996). 
 In the broad scan, the information that is collected and processed on the 
meso and macro levels (the sector analysis, the environmental scan and the 
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cluster analysis) is used to award the sector a score in terms of a number of 
indicators in order to ascertain the importance of the relevant feature to the 
overall vulnerability of the road freight transport sector. In the depth scan, the 
information that is collected on the micro level (the reference model analysis) is 
used to pinpoint those business processes within the road freight sector entities 
that create opportunities for (organised) crime. Therefore, each business process 
is awarded a ‘score’ which expresses the level of vulnerability of that business 
process. 
 
 
Broad scan 
 
The indicators developed for this exercise have been grouped and structured 
following a diagram. This diagram consists of four major branches, made up of 
indicators that are in some cases broken down into sub-indicators, drawing on 
information from earlier research into the vulnerability of legal sectors (Vander 
Beken, Cuyvers, De Ruyver, Hansen and Black, 2003). The four branches are: 
‘nature of the product’, ‘threshold’, ‘alternative markets’ and ‘international 
context’. Each branch is scored in terms of each of the indicators, the set of 
scores making up the vulnerability profile of the branch. 
 
Nature of the product 
The nature of the product refers to a series of qualities23 of the product that can 
make it particularly attractive to criminals looking to exploit it to their 
advantage. Although the indicators produce varying vulnerability scores in road 
freight transport, the overall score of the branch is labelled ‘high vulnerability’. 
 In terms of three of the vulnerability indicators, ‘integrity of the product’, 
‘product mobility’ and ‘elasticity’, the sector scores low to very low. The road 
freight transport sector offers a high level of ‘integrity’ of the product/service: 
either there is transport (physical movement of goods by road) or there is no 
transport at all. Although there is a high level of ‘mobility of the product’ in the 
transport of goods by road, this does not equal a high level of vulnerability, as 
mobility is a quality of all service sectors and as such mobility is not a feature 
which increases sector-specific opportunities for (organised) crime. In relation to 
‘elasticity’ it can be stated that, as a result of the broad range of possible 
substitution services, the road freight transport sector is very elastic. The 
consequence is a very low vulnerability score. 
 Apart from that, in terms of the three remaining indicators, ‘compatibility’, 
‘product differentiation’ and ‘stability of the value’, the sector has high to very 
high vulnerability scores. The occurrence of phenomena such as smuggling and 
                                                 
23  These qualities are: ‘integrity of the product’, ‘product mobility’, ‘elasticity’, ‘compatibil-
ity/flexibility’, ‘product differentiation’ and ‘stability of the value’.  
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‘Euro fraud’24 illustrates the very high ‘compatibility’25 of road transport, resulting 
in a very high vulnerability score in terms of this indicator. In terms of ‘product 
differentiation’, the sector is characterised by homogeneity. This offers interesting 
opportunities for crime, for criminal methods that are successfully used in the 
service of one market player can easily be transposed to another. This increase in 
opportunities results in a high vulnerability score. Finally, ‘stability of the value’ 
is high in road freight transport: as long as there are products produced, there 
will be a need to transport these products. Therefore, vulnerability is high at this 
point, as stability in the demand for (illicit) transport renders infiltration of the 
sector very attractive to criminals. 
 
Threshold 
The branch ‘threshold’ consists of indicators which express the accessibility of 
the sector to new-comers. Accessibility is determined by ‘regulation and 
enforcement’ on the one hand, and the ‘economic aspects: the market’ on the 
other. 
 
Regulation and enforcement 
The indicator ‘regulation and enforcement’ is further broken down into two sub-
indicators, which aim to assess both the quantity and the quality of regulation and 
enforcement. Concerning ‘regulation’, a very low vulnerability score is given in 
terms of quantity (as there is sufficient and specific legislation dealing with various 
aspects of the sector) but a very high score is given in terms of quality (since 
many issues on the European level are regulated by directives – which are 
binding only in terms of the results to be achieved. Therefore, few aspects will 
be dealt with in a harmonised way and criminals can and will abuse this lack of 
harmonisation). 
 In terms of ‘enforcement’, on the other hand, the sector is considered highly 
vulnerable in relation to quantity (since market liberalisation and the opening of 
European borders have resulted in a reductiopn in the number of controls, thus 
increasing the opportunities for criminal activity owing to a reduced  risk of 
exposure). It is also considered highly vulnerable in terms of quality (since 
control and enforcement are still national-level competences, with the result that 
enforcement is not at all transparent). As a result the sector receives high 
vulnerability scores in terms of the indicator ‘regulation and enforcement’. 
 
                                                 
24  ‘Euro fraud’ refers to all those types of fraud that are related to the misuse of European regula-
tions concerning subsidies and taxes. 
25  Compatibility refers to the degree to which the qualities of the product are compatible with 
other illegal activities. 
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Economic aspects: the market 
The indicator ‘economic aspects: the market’ is also broken down into two sub-
indicators. These are, ‘market structure and market concentration’, and ‘required 
capability’. 
 The sector is given a high score in terms of the sub-indicator ‘market structure 
and market concentration’ owing to the high scores it receives in terms of the 
indicators,‘market type’ (an open market with large numbers of small companies 
without the power to influence prices and which deliver rather homogeneous 
services) and ‘competition’ (the market for the transport of goods by road is very 
competitive, with thousands of companies of various size, each representing only 
a small percentage of the total supply) and the very low score for ‘market 
saturation’ (access to the market is difficult and unattractive for criminals as much 
as for anyone else due to the high level of saturation). 
 In terms of the sub-indicator ‘required capability’, on the other hand, the sector 
receives a high vulnerability score as few ‘knowledge’ (contacts and experience) 
or required ‘production’ factors are needed (labour, capital and raw materials) to 
obtain access to the market. As a result, the indicator ‘market’ is given a high 
vulnerability score. 
 
Alternative markets 
A high vulnerability score is given for the branch ‘alternative markets’, which is 
evaluated in terms of two indicators: ‘legal alternative markets’ and ‘black 
market’. 
 
Legal alternative markets 
Criminal groups do not necessarily focus all their activities on one specific 
market, but can, for instance, engage in poly-commodity trafficking etc. 
Involvement in different domains and markets limits their risk of getting caught. 
On the other hand, the more alternatives open to crime there are, the lower the 
chances that the sector under study will eventually be chosen for exploitation. 
 Although few vulnerability studies currently exist, there are some indications 
that other transport sectors are equally susceptible to crime. For the road freight 
transport sector, various alternative legal markets can be thought of, such as 
short-sea-shipping, transport by inland waterways, and rail transport. Information 
from the environmental scan, in particular from the White Paper, reveals that 
there is a felt need, as well as the political will, to reduce the share of road 
transport in favour of these alternative transportation modes. An increase in the 
importance of these modes is likely to be accompanied by a growing interest in, 
and infiltration of, these sectors on the part of criminals. Therefore, in terms of 
the indicator ‘legal alternative markets’ the sector is given a high vulnerability 
score. 
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Black markets 
Illegal markets tend to be subjected to the same market principals as legal 
business activities, except that transactions on the black market are informal and 
have no formal dispute-settlement procedures at their disposal. The black market 
for the transport of goods by road can be supplied by private passenger transport. 
The expansion in passenger transport by car thus creates many opportunities for 
black- market operators. Although these black markets are interesting objects of 
study in their own right, they are not really related to the sector under study: the 
road transport sector is interpreted as a licit commercial sector, whereas these 
possible black markets are part of the private sphere. More relevant for our study 
is the so-called ‘grey economy’. In road transport, ‘grey’ activities are mainly 
undeclared work and unregulated or undeclared self-employment. Because of 
the high frequency of these activities, the step towards other criminal activities is 
a small one. Especially in a highly competitive environment like the transport 
sector, where companies experience difficulties in remaining viable, it is 
tempting to gain extra profits from illegal activities. Therefore in terms of the 
indicator ‘black markets’ the sector receives a very high vulnerability score. 
 
International context 
‘International context’ serves primarily as a policy indicator. Concretely, the 
indicator is assessed using, on the one hand, relevant data on policy aspects such 
as regulations and control, and on the other hand, data on economic aspects. 
European road freight transport however is mostly influenced by EU and 
national regulation. Other superpowers, like the US, have a minimal interest in, 
and influence over, how the sector is organised and controlled. Road freight 
transport is not likely to be intercontinental and therefore, in terms of the 
indicator ‘international context’, the sector is given a very low vulnerability 
score. 
 
 
Depth scan 
 
At this stage, the information gathered, processed and meaningfully ordered in 
the preceding reference model analysis, is used to perform the vulnerability 
assessment in depth. Again, the exercise is performed using a list of indicators. 
However, instead of evaluating the sector in terms of one indicator based on 
information from different sources (width scan), in the depth scan each of the 
selected business processes is evaluated in terms of one or more indicators. 
 The business process ‘purchase’ has been given a low vulnerability score as in 
terms of the indicator, ‘costs’, it scores low (very limited opportunities for fraud) 
and in terms of the indicator, ‘transparency’, it scores very low (the possibility of 
leasing vehicles detracts from clarity in terms of ownership and can make control 
more difficult). 
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‘Sales’attracts a high score since, among other things, it is very highly vulnerable 
in terms of the ‘transparency’ criterion. As sales policies are mostly influenced by 
each customer’s specific requirements, and as these each have their own very 
specific features, one can hardly speak of a transparent sales policy. A high score 
has also to be given for the indicator, corporate culture. Due to the highly 
competitive nature of the transport market, and low wages, there is a growing 
tendency of drivers and/or transport companies to engage in illegal activities to a 
certain extent. 
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The business process ‘book-keeping’ also attracts a high vulnerability score due to 
the high scores for the indicators ‘transparency’ (cost data are pretty vague within 
most transport companies, due to the stochastic character of demand and the 
resulting price differentiation) and ‘solvency’ (with many companies being 
unable to pay their debts). 
 The business process ‘administration’ has been given a low vulnerability score 
based on the limited risks in terms of the indicator ‘transparency’.  
 
BUSINESS PROCESSES Vulnerability score 
• PURCHASING  LV 
o Costs 
o (transaction) Transparency 
VLV 
LV 
• SALES  HV 
o (transaction) Transparency 
o Corporate culture 
HV 
HV 
• BOOK-KEEPING HV 
o (transaction) Transparency 
o Solvency 
HV 
HV 
• ADMINISTRATION  LV 
Transparency LV 
• PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT  VHV 
o Costs 
(transaction) Transparency Corporate culture 
HV 
VHV 
VHV 
• SERVICES OPERATIONS  VHV 
o  (transaction) Transparency 
o Chain integration 
VHV 
HV 
 
‘Personnel management’, on the other hand, is given a very high score as the scores 
in terms of the indicators, ‘costs’, ‘transparency’ and ‘corporate culture’ are, 
respecitvely, high (many opportunities for activities characteristic of the ‘grey 
economy’ and for fraud) very high (lack of standardisation in relation to the 
checking and screening of potential employees) and very high (the corporate 
culture, among both employers and employees, is not characterised by an 
aversion to cheating and avoiding control). 
 Finally ‘services operations’ scores high owing to the very high score in terms of 
‘transparency’ (though new technologies make it possible to track and trace 
cargo and vehicles, the techniques are expensive and therefore unavailable to 
many companies, especially the small ones) and the high score in terms of ‘chain 
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integration’ (the orientation to the needs of each individual customer, together 
with the increasing competitiveness of the environment in which transport 
companies have to operate, offer many opportunities for crime). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Studies of the vulnerability of economic sectors arise from the need to 
complement existing crime analyses focusing on perpetrators and groups by 
analysing the risk or opportunities provided by the economic task environment 
in which these persons and groups act. Such vulnerability studies are also 
considered to be an instrument with which to support policy discussions due to 
their capacity to reveal potential malpractices and counter-productive 
regulations, or the need for additional rules. 
 At the same time, the future- and risk-oriented character of vulnerability 
studies is to be considered their most important weakness. The collection and 
the analysis of information using a set of indicators cannot be considered as an 
exact science providing quantifiable results. Vulnerability studies are instruments 
to be used to order and rank information and to facilitate decision-making, 
nothing more and nothing less. 
 The case study of the road freight transport sector reflects the strengths and 
weaknesses of such an approach. Much relevant information on the sector was 
collected and ranked in order to give a clear insight into the operation of the 
sector and its context. In the width and depth scan, the information was used to 
score the sector in terms of a set of indicators. On that basis, a vulnerability 
profile, which led to the conclusion that the sector was highly vulnerable on a 
number of points, was drawn up. Although the specific scores allocated can 
undoubtedly be questioned, we believe that vulnerability profiles can function as 
a guide to the actions and initiatives that are appropriately taken by 
governments, law enforcement agencies and the sector itself.  
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Controlling the flow of money or  
satisfying the regulators? 
Controling the flow of money 
Jackie Harvey1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Money laundering has been in existence for a very long time.  It involves ‘the 
processing of criminal proceeds to disguise their association with criminal activities’ 
(Boorman and Ingves, 2001: 3). Concern over money laundering (heightened 
by its association with financing terrorism) arises because it is seen as facilitating 
illegal activity: in theory, cutting off access to the funds, combined with the legal 
seizure of the proceeds of criminal activity, removes the financial incentive to 
commit organised crime. 
 A major problem for researchers within the field is that limited data and the 
resultant lack of understanding of the criminal fraternity, hamper the 
development of academic analysis of the true extent of money-laundering 
activity. In consequence, the ‘alarmist’ notion of it being of major significance 
cannot be objectively challenged. Unable to measure the true extent of money 
laundering means that it is equally difficult to determine the effectiveness of 
policy measures advocated to deter money launderers. It is proposed that there 
has been a shift away from reducing opportunities for money laundering (and 
predicate crime) towards an emphasis on the demonstration of compliance with 
systems and procedures (the ‘tick-box’ culture) put in place with the expectation 
that they will prevent money laundering from occurring. 
 Internationally, the fight to contain money laundering has focused attention 
on countries identified as ‘weak links’, primarily because of their inability 
(whether or not voluntary) to demonstrate internationally acceptable standards of 
compliance.  This chapter considers the impact and cost of money laundering 
regulation and looks at the rationale and implication of the focus on ‘weak links’ 
in the international financial system. In particular, a preliminary investigation is 
carried out into the specific characteristics of countries that have been targeted 
by the international community. 
 For the purposes of this research, information has been compiled from a 
range of recognised international sources for some 224 countries and territories 
for which data was available. Within this, countries have been grouped into 
three different classifications according to whether they have been identified as: 
                                                 
1  Jacky Harvey is Principal Lecturer in Finance at the Newcastle Business School, Northumbria 
University, United Kindom. 
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‘opaque’; as an identified money laundering country; or, as neither of these. 
Various economic, financial and political characteristics of these groupings are 
then considered in order to identify common features. It is recognised that this is 
very much an initial survey and that the level of analysis remains superficial; 
however, the intention is to identify areas that might warrant more detailed 
investigation in the future. 
 
 
Money laundering – estimates or guesses 
 
The economic analysis of money laundering is academically challenging: 
launderers and their activity are not captured through normal statistical 
techniques.  It is argued, therefore, that global ‘estimates’ are little more than 
informed ‘guesses’. 
 Thus we are faced with a fundamental problem that underlies all research 
into this field: there is very little empirical data on the overall magnitude of 
money- laundering activity.  As can be seen from Table 1, various estimates of 
the size of the problem have been provided, with many of the international 
agencies quoting each other’s figures. These ‘guesses’ have then been reproduced 
in countless other papers and commentaries without either question or 
verification and in the process have undoubtedly acquired some form of 
statistical accuracy. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is probably the most 
quoted source and they estimate that money laundering on a global scale is 
worth between 2% and 5% of world GDP, or in dollar terms, in 1999 prices, at 
between $0.62 and $1.55 trillion. 
 
Table 1. Estimates of the scale of global money laundering 
 
Insitution Estimate Year 
IMF 2% - 5% GDP;  $0.62 – 1.55 trillion 1999 
UN Up to $1.5 trillion 1999 
FATF 2% global GDP up to $1.5 trillion 2001 
OECD $1.1 trillion (drug money) 1995 
IBRD $300 – US$500 billion 1995 
Sources: various 
 
The important point to note is that in all cases, the scale of activity is assumed to 
be significant and a real problem for the financial sector. Indeed, van Duyne 
(2003: 68, 74) points to the tendency to assume that money laundering is of such 
a magnitude and scale that it is a ‘global menace’. He also draws attention to the 
ability of the authorities to expand the amount of laundering activity thought to 
be taking place by simply expanding the definition of what constitutes laundered 
funds, a point borne out by the introduction in the UK of the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 2002. 
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There is a clear assumption on the part of authorities that there exists a linear 
inverse relationship between the amount of regulation and the volume of money 
laundering. Constant tightening of the regulatory constraint will eventually 
remove any opportunity for laundering (irrespective of the economic 
inefficiency imposed by such a burden). This relationship is explained by 
Masciandaro (1998: 4, 6) as ceteris paribus: 
 
“the costs of money laundering will, therefore, depend on the effectiveness of 
anti-money laundering regulation: the more effective the latter is, the more 
expensive it will be for criminal agents to undertake the activity of money 
laundering” 
 
and  
 
“If we assume anti-money laundering regulation to have a significant impact on 
the cost of carrying out a criminal activity, then an effective system of rules will 
in fact reduce the ability of criminal agents to launder their illegal liquidity”. 
 
Of course, this assumed relationship does not take into account the actions of 
money launderers as they react to changes in legislation. As Harvey (2004: 335) 
points out, they may develop new methods of laundering to circumvent 
legislation, increase the amount of activity in order to restore underlying levels 
of profitability or become entirely barter based, removing the need to ‘clean’ 
funds.  So, whilst it is possible to establish the purpose and rationale for money 
laundering regulation, its effectiveness remains open to question. Again, van 
Duyne (1998: 370), states that there is no evidence that increasing costs (via 
increased regulation) has a deterrent impact on the amount of crime. On the 
contrary, ‘it is business as usual’. 
 
 
The international dimension 
 
The main international body engaged in continuous and comprehensive efforts 
both to define policy, encourage best practice and promote the adoption of anti-
money laundering measures is the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). This 
was set up by the G7 group of countries at the July 1989 Economic Summit in 
Paris and currently has representatives from twenty-nine member (primarily 
OECD) countries and governments, together with the Gulf Co-operation 
Council, and the European Commission. 
 A key component of its work concerns appropriate counter measures and 
these are set out in the ‘Forty Recommendations’ formulated in 1990 and 
THE ORGANISED CRIME ECONOMY; MANAGING CRIME MARKETS IN EUROPE 
 
 
 
46 
revised in 1996 and 2003.2 These recommendations essentially set out the 
measures that national governments should take to implement effective anti-
money laundering programmes and, in consequence, are used to evaluate the 
extent of compliance on the part of any country that the FATF chooses to 
investigate. The FATF requires the criminalisation of money laundering; the 
mandatory creation of a suspicious transaction-reporting regime; the 
establishment of a proper customer identification requirement; the elimination of 
excessive bank secrecy, and international co-operation. The stated purpose of 
these regulations is to reduce the vulnerability of the international financial 
system and to increase the worldwide effectiveness of anti-money laundering 
measures. 
 The work of the FATF obtained a far higher profile following the 1997 
Asian Crisis that precipitated a global financial-market crisis and widespread 
international concern that financial abuse could undermine the credibility and 
efficiency of the international financial system. It participated in what amounted 
to a ‘three-pronged strategy’ focused on (i) money laundering, (ii) banking and 
(iii) tax evasion, the results of which were reported to the G7 Summit in July 
2000 (Wechsler, 2001:44).  This strategy saw, for the first time, cooperation 
between the FATF – which reviewed nations’ efforts in combating both 
offshore and onshore money laundering – the G7’s Financial Stability Forum 
(FSF)3 – which had been established to promote international financial stability, 
improve the functioning of markets and reduce systemic risk – and the OECD. 
The latter tackled tax evasion and identified tax havens that exhibited a lack of 
transparency, a lack of effective exchange of information, and discriminatory 
regimes (i.e. differential treatment between domestic and non-domestic 
residents) that combined to undermine the tax bases of other countries. Each of 
these three bodies had their reports and recommendations endorsed by the G7 
finance ministers in July 2000, signaling the start of the ‘name and shame’ policy. 
Significantly, this was also the point at which the FATF started to look beyond 
purely member states to all nations’ efforts and, for the first time, specifically 
differentiated between on and offshore activity. It is suggested that this was, in 
part, driven by the heightened interest of the OECD (of which the FATF is 
operationally a part) in ‘tax havens’. 
 The FATF produced the first blacklist of non co-operative countries and 
territories (NCCT) in June 2000. This group of countries was considered not to 
have in place effective countermeasures against money laundering. Removal 
from this list is only possible after a country has provided practical evidence of 
effectiveness of their remedial action. Indeed, it has been observed that it is 
                                                 
2  There are, in addition, eight special recommendations on terrorist financing, formulated in 
2001. 
3  This forum comprises finance ministers, central bankers and supervisory officials from 11 
nations with advanced financial systems, along with representatives from the IMF, the BIS and 
other regulatory committees. 
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harder to get off the list than to avoid going on it in the first place. Basically, 
those countries listed as being non co-operative through either failing to 
participate, or indeed to improve, are subject to economic sanctions for non-
compliance that are equivalent to being cast into commercial darkness by being 
ostracised from the world’s financial system. 
 It is curious how the power of the FATF has evolved; indeed, van Duyne 
(2003:75) describes the FATF as a democratically unaccountable watchdog. 
There has also been the suggestion that the original development of the FATF 
was driven by the Clinton Administration who recognised it as an institution 
that could exert economic influence over countries normally beyond the 
influence of the US. It is, and remains, a voluntary organisation and thus 
implementation of the 40 recommendations is not mandatory although all 29 
members do commit to implementing them (Boorman and Ingves, 2001:28). 
Currently, only 15 of the FATF members have managed to implement all of the 
28 recommendations requiring specific action4 and this list does not include 
either the US (19 out of 28) or the UK (27 out of 28). 
 It is not surprising, therefore, that the FATF has been criticised for becoming 
more political and for seeming to operate dual standards, with more stringent 
requirements being placed on non-member than on member (OECD) states. 
This view is supported by Stessens (2001:208) who notes that the “credibility 
and success of the FATF’s efforts would have benefited if the FATF had been 
more critical of its own members as well”. Indeed, it has been pointed out that 
that chance of a country being targeted by the FATF is far higher if they are 
recipients of international aid, have small defence forces, and are not considered 
to be strategically important (Hampton and Levi, 1999: 2). 
 The effect of this ‘name and shame’ policy has been to focus attention on 
‘under-regulated’ financial centres, those countries that are not considered to be 
doing enough in terms of deterring potential money launderers and that lack the 
necessary commitment to systems and procedures. These countries have been 
identified as the ‘weak links’ in the international financial system, it being argued 
that cash will be exported to these countries for integration and subsequent 
movement through the international financial system (Stessons, 2001: 200). 
However, let us not lose sight of the fact that being identified as a ‘weak link’ 
due to inadequate regulatory control is not the same as being a country in which 
money laundering is actually occurring. Indeed much of the initial targeting of 
countries, was driven as much by the agendas of the FSF and the OECD (with 
their concerns over financial stability and tax revenues) as by the FATF, with the 
consequence that Offshore Finance Centres (OFCs) have featured quite 
prominently, particularly those located in less developed countries. 
 Unsurprisingly, many OFCs are located in small island countries which face 
limited opportunities for economic development emanating from the fact that 
size may give rise to important differences in economic structure, social 
                                                 
4   Information taken from the FATF Annual Report 2002 – 2003. 
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organisation, administration and government activity with the consequence that 
they are often heavily reliant on a single sector or product. An important and 
significant point is that, at least until the mid to late 1990s, many former British 
colonies and dependencies (primarily the small island economies of the 
Caribbean and Pacific) were actively encouraged to establish offshore banking 
and other activity by the UK government as a means of providing critical 
income-generating activities, employment and government revenue. Whilst 
numbers of such centres remained limited they had been considered to provide a 
useful service. However, once communications and other technical develop-
ments provided the means to link these remote financial centres with major 
onshore global centres, concern amongst the international community grew and 
attention shifted to the potential vulnerability of OFCs to money laundering, 
fraud and possible financial sector failure arising from the less transparent and 
more anonymous operating environment. 
 It is generally argued that the very conditions that attract legitimate business 
activity to OFCs (relative anonymity, low levels of taxation and a reasonable 
degree of political stability) are those that will attract illegal activity. This 
vulnerability is arguably greater for those OFCs where the value added to the 
domestic economy remains unsubstantial (activity is confined to ‘brass-plate 
companies’) and capital flows tend to be engaged in speculative activity rather 
than being committed to long-term investment. Such centres are in price-
competitive situations and suffer from any changing cost structure or change in 
demand. Indeed, profit-maximising banks and companies have engaged in fierce 
‘arbitrage’ between different host governments putting them under pressure to 
lower costs, and in some cases standards.5 Thus, the characteristics that make 
them vulnerable may well have been encouraged by international profit-seeking 
organisations. That said, it has also been pointed out by Masciandaro and 
Portolano (2003: 311) that as most OFCs are small islands, prevention of 
“criminal infiltrations (might be) easier” thus making them less attractive to 
illegal activity. 
 
 
Weak links – the findings 
 
The first group of countries to find themselves classified in such a way were 
those that were identified as ‘secrecy or financial havens’ by the UN (1998: 78). 
Many of these countries subsequently featured in the offshore finance centre 
classification exercise undertaken by the Financial Stability Forum in April 2000. 
Again, many of these countries were also identified as tax havens by the OECD 
in the report it compiled during the same year, and either at the time or 
                                                 
5  An article in the Economist noted that American corporations make extensive use of OFCs, 
earning almost 1/3 of their profits in such jurisdictions. 
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subsequently, as NCCTs by the FATF.6 One wonders just how widely the 
FATF cast its net when drawing up the very first lists of NCCTs or whether 
they were influenced by the interest of the OECD in tax havens with its obvious 
bias towards OFCs. 
 Collectively there are some 59 ‘opaque’ countries and territories. 42 of these 
were ranked by the FSF in accordance with the perceived quality of their legal 
infrastructure and supervisory practices and/or level of resources devoted to 
supervision and co-operation relative to the size of their financial activities or 
level of co-operation with other authorities. On this basis, countries were 
classified as: Group I (good quality, although continuing efforts to improve the 
quality of supervision and co-operation should be encouraged in these 
jurisdictions); Group II being higher than III but lower than I; and Group III 
being lower than group II (FSF 2000).  The UN also identified all of these 42 
countries (together with Liberia) as being ‘Secrecy Havens’. In its report, the 
OECD identified 35 countries and territories as tax havens and finally, the 
FATF, between June 2000 and 2004, identified 23 individual countries as being 
non-cooperative. To facilitate an initial comparison, in Tables 2 and 3, these 
countries are categorised according to both income and geographical location. 
 
Table 2. 59 ‘Identified opaque countries’ ranked by income group 
 
World Bank income group number of countries percentage of total 
High Income Non OECD 16  27.1% 
High Income OECD   3    5.1% 
Upper Middle Income 14  23.7% 
Lower Middle Income 23  39.0% 
Low Income   3    5.1% 
Total 59 100.0% 
 
 
Table 3. 59 ‘Identified opaque countries’ categorised by geographical 
   region 
 
geographical region number of countries percentage of total 
America 21  35.6% 
Asia & Pacific 15  25.4% 
Europe & Central Asia 15  25.4% 
Middle East & North Africa   4    6.8% 
Sub-Saharan Africa   4    6.8% 
Total 59 100.0% 
 
                                                 
6   For the purposes of this work all countries are shown that have been identified as NCCT 
(whether or not still on the list) from 2000 to date. This is because once identified, despite 
subsequent removal, a heightened level of interest will be shown. 
THE ORGANISED CRIME ECONOMY; MANAGING CRIME MARKETS IN EUROPE 
 
 
 
50 
In very broad terms, the initial emphasis was on a group of middle-income 
countries that were geographically close to the US (primarily Caribbean Islands). 
Within this overall group of countries and territories, some 10 countries had the 
distinction of featuring on all four international lists and these are shown in 
Table 4. It can be seen from this Table that all apart from Liechtenstein and 
Panama are island economies located in the Caribbean and the Pacific. 
Historically, they would have had a heavy reliance on copra, sugar and bananas 
as sources of export earnings. Details of the composition of GDP indicate the 
reliance that these countries have now placed on their services sector (financial 
and tourism) as a means of generating economic wealth. Possibly the most 
striking feature of this list is the small population size, with all the countries, 
apart from Panama, having populations of less than 300,000, although Panama, 
with a population of 3 million, is still classified as small by international 
standards. Clearly, the chances of a country being targeted are far higher if, in 
addition to the characteristics already identified, it has a very small population. 
 In order to look for further similarities, and in line with other studies, data 
has also been collected on the extent of cooperation exhibited by these 
countries. For this purpose, information was collected on whether or not the 
country had criminalised money laundering, the extent of cooperation with 
international law-enforcement agencies and membership of international 
organisations. Information has also been collected on the extent of integration 
with the international financial system by looking at gross private capital flows 
and foreign direct investment (discussed later) and at the size of the shadow 
economy, crime rates and corruption. Unfortunately, as can be seen from Table 
4, much of this information is currently incomplete, primarily because the small 
size of these countries means that they are seldom included in international 
comparative data. For example, detail on the size of the shadow economy7 is 
only available for Panama (51.1%) whilst information on the total recorded 
crime rate, expressed as a percentage of the population for 1997 or the most 
recent year8 is only available for the Bahamas (6.69), St Kitts and Nevis (20.06) 
and St Vincent and the Grenadines (7.24). Despite the absence of data, it is 
worth noting that, notwithstanding their status as ‘opaque’ countries, all have 
criminalised money laundering and, except for St Vincent, cooperate with 
international law enforcement agencies. Further evidence of cooperation is that 
most are members of one or more relevant international agencies. 
 If these ‘identified’ countries and territories have been targeted due to 
perceptions of vulnerability arising from their opacity, it must be re-emphasised 
this is not the same as being identified as a country in which money laundering 
is taking place. Masciandaro and Portolano (2003: 313) make a similar point 
                                                 
7  Taken from Schneider and Enste (1999), using average data taken across a range of years and 
calculated using a variety of methodologies: thus there may be issues over consistency. 
8  Data is for total recorded crimes and is taken from the UN Periodic Survey of Crime Trends, 
1997. 
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where they note that the list of NCCTs “is neither a list of countries that offer 
money laundering services, nor a list of offshore countries”. They further draw 
attention to the fact that non-compliance might very well be involuntary arising 
from a lack of the resources that would be required to implement the systems 
and procedures needed to meet international standards. 
 So what evidence is there that money laundering is occurring within such 
countries and territories? Reliance has been placed on circumstantial information 
made public by the US State Department and by the US Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) – both of which produce extensive information on countries 
identified as facilitating money laundering. Both agencies classify countries 
according to perception of the risk of money laundering, and they have ranked 
some 181 different countries between them. The CIA uses two classifications, 
these being ‘Yes’ (implying that there is positive evidence of money laundering 
activity within the country) and ‘Vulnerable’ (implying that the country displays 
characteristics that make it vulnerable to laundering). On this basis, the CIA has 
rated 38 countries as ‘Yes’ and a further 31 as ‘Vulnerable’. The US State 
Department applies a broader classification in which it assesses ‘vulnerability’ as: 
primary (53 countries); concern (49 countries), and monitored (76 countries). 
Within the broad classifications that these agencies use, they include all of the 
identified 59 countries except for Andorra and the US Virgin Islands. 
 It is interesting, however, to look at the characteristics of the much smaller 
list of countries that have been identified both as Money Laundering Centres by 
the CIA and as being of Primary Vulnerability to Money Laundering by the US 
State Department. Table 5 comprises some 19 countries. It is instructive to note 
that of the 59 countries that have been targeted by the international community 
as ‘weak links’, only 8 have been identified (albeit only by US institutions) as 
ones where money laundering is taking place. These include: Hong Kong, Israel, 
Myanmar, Nauru, Nigeria, Panama, Philippines and Singapore. All but Hong 
Kong and Singapore have also appeared on the FATFs list of NCCTs, but only 
Nauru and Panama have the additional distinction of appearing as part of the 
group of countries in Table 4. 
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Table 4a. The 10 opaque countries featured on all 4 lists 
 
Country  population(1) income 
group 
geographical 
region 
composition of 
GDP (2) 
criminalised 
money  
laundering (3) 
CIA money 
laundering 
classification 
(6) 
The Bahamas   300,000 High 
Income 
Non 
OECD 
America agriculture: 3%  
industry: 7%  
services: 90% 
 (2001 est.) 
 
Yes 
 
Vulnerable 
The Cayman 
Islands 
    43,100 High 
Income 
Non 
OECD 
America agriculture: 
1.4%  
industry: 3.2%  
services: 95.4% 
(1994 est.) 
 
Yes 
 
Vulnerable 
The Cook 
Islands 
    21,200 Lower 
Middle 
Income 
Asia & 
Pacific 
agriculture: 
17%  
industry: 7.8%  
services: 75.2% 
(2000 est.) 
 
Yes 
 
Unclassified 
Liechtenstein     40,000 High 
Income 
Non 
OECD 
Europe & 
Central 
Asia 
agriculture: 
NA%  
industry: 40%  
services: NA% 
(1999) 
 
Yes 
 
Vulnerable 
The Marshall 
Islands  
  100,000 Lower 
Middle 
Income 
Asia & 
Pacific 
agriculture: 
14%  
industry: 16%  
services: 70% 
 (2000 est.) 
 
Yes 
 
Unclassified 
Nauru     10,000 Lower 
Middle 
Income 
Asia & 
Pacific 
agriculture: 
NA%  
industry: NA%  
services: NA% 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Niue       2,100 Lower 
Middle 
Income 
Asia & 
Pacific 
agriculture: 
NA%  
industry: NA%  
services: 55% 
 
Yes 
 
Unclassified 
Panama 3,000,000 Lower 
Middle 
Income 
America agriculture: 7%  
industry: 17%  
services: 76% 
 (2001 est.) 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
St Kitts & 
Nevis 
    50,000 Upper 
Middle 
Income 
America agriculture: 
3.5%  
industry: 25.8%  
services: 70.7% 
(2001) 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
St Vincent & 
the Grenadines 
  100,000 Lower 
Middle 
Income 
America agriculture: 
10%  
industry: 26%  
services: 64%  
(2001 est.) 
 
Yes 
 
Unclassified 
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Table 4b. The 10 opaque countries featured on all 4 lists 
 
Country  US State 
Department 
classification 
(3) 
Transparency 
international 
score (5) 
Gross private 
capital Flows 
% GDP (4) 
Gross FDI 
% GDP(4) 
Cooperation 
with 
international 
law enforce-
ment (3) 
Membership of 
international organisa-
tions 
A,C,CE,O,OC,I,S 
(3) 
The  
Bahamas 
 
Primary 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
Yes 
 
C, O, OC, I, S 
The Cayman 
Islands 
 
Primary 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
Yes 
 
C, O, I 
The Cook 
Islands 
 
Concerned 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
Yes 
 
A 
Liechtenstein  
Primary 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
Yes 
 
CE 
The Marshall 
Islands  
 
Concern 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
Yes 
 
NONE 
Nauru  
Primary 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
Yes 
 
NONE 
Niue  
Concern 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
Yes 
 
A 
Panama  
Primary 
 
3.4 
 
69.4 
 
7.4 
 
Yes 
 
C, O, OC, S 
St Kitts & 
Nevis 
 
Concern 
 
N/A 
 
13.3 
 
9.5 
 
Yes 
 
C, OC 
St Vincent & 
the Grena-
dines 
 
Primary 
 
N/A 
 
3.4 
 
3.3 
 
No 
 
N/A 
 
1. Population Data taken from Population Reference Bureau, http://www.prb.org  
2. GDP Data taken from CIA World Fact Book:   
 http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/fact book 
3. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2001 (Bureau for International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, March 2002) 
4. IBRD 2004 World Development Indicators Table 6.1  
5. Transparency International Corruptions Perceptions Index 2003 (where 10 is highly 
clean and 0 is highly corrupt)  
6. CIA World Fact Book updated 11/5/2004 
 
International Organisations: C = Caribbean FATF; A = Asia/Pacific Group; CE = Council of 
Europe Select Committee on Money Laundering; I = Offshore Group of Insurance Supervisors; 
O = Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors; OC = OAS/inter-American Drug Control 
Commission; S = International Organisation of Security Commissioners 
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Table 5a. Countries in which money laundering is taking place  
     (identified by US authorities) 
 
Country  Identified 
on 
original 
list of 59 
countries 
Population  
(X 1 
million) 
(1) 
Income 
classification 
Geographical 
region 
Composition of GDP 
(2) 
Size of 
shadow 
economy 
(6) 
Gross 
private 
capital 
flows % 
GDP 
(4) 
Membership 
of interna-
tional 
organisations 
(3) 
 
Antigua & 
Barbuda 
No 0.1 Upper 
Middle 
Income 
America agriculture: 
3.9%  
industry: 19.2%  
services: 76.8% 
(2002) 
N/A 2.0  
C, OC 
Brazil No 176.55 Upper 
Middle 
Income 
America agriculture: 
8.2%  
industry: 37.8%  
services: 53.9% 
(2002 est.) 
33.4% 13.2 N/A 
Greece No 11.0 Upper 
Middle 
Income 
Europe 
& 
Central 
Asia 
agriculture: 
8.1%  
industry: 22.3%  
services: 69.3% 
(2002 est.) 
24.5% 22.6 N/A 
HongKong Yes 6.8 High 
Income 
non 
OECD 
Asia & 
Pacific 
agriculture: 
0.1%  
industry: 12.9%  
services: 87.1% 
(2002 est.) 
13.0% 92.4 A, O, S 
Israel Yes 6.7 High 
Income 
non 
OECD 
Middle 
East & 
N. 
Africa 
agriculture: 
2.6%  
industry: 36.2%  
services: 61.2% 
(2001 est.) 
29% 10.8 N/A 
Italy No 57.8 High 
Income 
OECD 
Europe 
& 
Central 
Asia 
agriculture: 2.4%  
industry: 30%  
services: 67.6% 
(2001 est.) 
21.7% 13.7 N/A 
Mexico No 104.9 Upper 
Middle 
Income 
America agriculture: 4%  
industry: 26.3%  
services: 69.7% 
(2003 est.) 
36.1% 6.3 N/A 
Myanmar 
 
Yes 49.5 Low 
Income 
Asia & 
Pacific 
agriculture: 
NA%  
industry: NA%  
services: NA% 
N/A N/A N/A 
Nauru Yes 0.01 Lower 
Middle 
Income 
Asia & 
Pacific 
agriculture: 
NA%  
industry: NA%  
services: NA% 
N/A N/A NONE 
Nigeria Yes 133.9 Low 
Income 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
agriculture: 
41.2%  
industry: 15.7%  
services: 43.1% 
(2002 est.) 
76.0% 0.03 N/A 
Panama Yes 3.0 Lower 
Middle 
Income 
America agriculture: 7%  
industry: 17%  
services: 76% 
 (2001 est.) 
 
51.1% 69.4 C, O, 
OC, S 
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Country  Identified 
on 
original 
list of 59 
countries 
Population  
(X 1 
million) 
(1) 
Income 
classification 
Geographical 
region 
Composition of GDP 
(2) 
Size of 
shadow 
economy 
(6) 
Gross 
private 
capital 
flows % 
GDP 
(4) 
Membership 
of interna-
tional 
organisations 
(3) 
 
Philippines Yes 81.6 Lower 
Middle 
Income 
Asia & 
Pacific 
agriculture: 
15%  
industry: 35%  
services: 50% 
(2003 est.) 
50.0% 41.2% A, S 
Singapore Yes 4.2 High 
Income 
Non 
OECD 
Asia & 
Pacific 
agriculture: 
negligible  
industry: 30%  
services: 70% 
(2001 est.) 
18.0% 47.8% A, O, S 
Spain No 41.,3 High 
Income 
OECD 
Europe 
& 
Central 
Asia 
agriculture: 
3.4%  
industry: 30.1%  
services: 66.5% 
(2002 est.) 
16.1% 26.9% N/A 
Thailand No 63.1 Lower 
Middle 
Income 
Asia & 
Pacific 
agriculture: 9%  
industry: 42%  
services: 49% 
(2002) 
71.0% 13.6% A, S 
UAE No 3.9 High 
Income 
Non 
OECD 
Middle 
East & 
North 
Africa 
agriculture: 4%  
industry: 58.5%  
services: 37.5% 
(2002 est.) 
N/A N/A N/A 
United 
Kingdom 
No 59.2 High 
Income 
OECD 
Europe 
& 
Central 
Asia 
agriculture: 
1.4%  
industry: 24.9%  
services: 73.7% 
(2000) 
10.3% 60.3% N/A 
USA No 291.5 High 
Income 
OECD 
America agriculture: 2%  
industry: 18%  
services: 80% 
(2002 est.) 
9.8% 9.2% N/A 
Venezuela No 25.7 Lower 
Middle 
Income 
America agriculture: 5%  
industry: 50%  
services: 45% 
(2001) 
N/A 15.4% N/A 
 
1. Population Data taken from Population Reference Bureau, http://www.brp.org  
2. GDP Data taken from CIA World Fact Book:  
 http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/fact book 
3. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2001 (Bureau for International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, March 2002) 
4. IBRD 2004 World Development Indicators Table 6.1 
5. Taken from Schneider & Enste (1999) “Shadow Economies around the World – Size, 
Causes and Consequences”, Working Paper No 196, CESifo Working Paper Series, 
Munich, using average data taken across a range of years and methodologies. 
 
International Organisations: C = Caribbean FATF; A = Asia/Pacific Group; CE = Council of 
Europe Select Committee on Money Laundering; I = Offshore Group of Insurance Supervisors; 
O = Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors; OC = OAS/inter-American Drug Control 
Commission; S = International Organisation of Security Commissioners 
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Table 5b. Countries in which money laundering is taking place  
     (identified by US authorities) 
 
Country  Gross FDI 
% GDP 
(4) 
Cooperation 
with interna-
tional law 
enforcement (3) 
Criminalised 
money 
laundering (3) 
Transparency 
international 
score (5) 
Total recorded 
crime rate (7) 
Member of 
FATF 
FATF 
compliant 
Antigua & 
Barbuda 
1.9% Yes Yes N/A 3.35% No  
Brazil 4.4% Yes Yes 3.9 N/A Yes 28/28 
Greece 1.0% Yes Yes 4.3 3.59% Yes 28/28 
HongKong 29.6% Yes Yes 8.0 1.07% Yes 28/28 
Israel 3.0% Yes Yes 7.0 6.28% No  
Italy 2.7% Yes Yes 5.3 4.24% Yes 28/28 
Mexico 2.4% Yes Yes 3.6 N/A Yes 12/28 
Myanmar N/A No Yes (drugs) 1.6 N/A No  
Nauru N/A Yes Yes N/A N/A No  
Nigeria 0.03% Yes Yes 1.4 0.26% No  
Panama 7.4% Yes Yes 3.4 N/A No  
Philippines 1.5% Yes Yes 2.5 0.14 No  
Singapore 11.7% Yes Yes 9.4 1.83% Yes 28/28 
Spain 6.2% Yes Yes 6.9 1.76 Yes  26/28 
Thailand 0.8% Yes Yes 3.3 0.46% No  
UAE N/A Yes No 5.2 N/A No  
United 
Kingdom 
23.8% Yes Yes 6.7 7.9% Yes 27/28 
USA 2.4% Yes Yes 7.5 9.62% Yes 19/28 
Venezuela 3.1% Yes Yes (drugs) 2.4 N/A No  
 
(1) Population Data taken from Population Reference Bureau, http://www.brp.org  
(2) GDP Data taken from CIA World Fact Book: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/fact book 
(3) International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2001 (Bureau for International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Affairs, March 2002) 
(4) IBRD 2004 World Development Indicators Table 6.1 
(5) Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 (where 10 is highly clean and 0 
is highly corrupt) 
(6) CESifo Working Paper Series, Munich, using average data taken across a range of years and 
methodologies. 
(7) Taken from the UN Periodic Survey of Crime Trends 1997, total recorded crimes. 
 
International Organisations: C = Caribbean FATF; A = Asia/Pacific Group; CE = Council of 
Europe Select Committee on Money Laundering; I = Offshore Group of Insurance Supervisors; 
O = Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors; OC = OAS/inter-American Drug Control 
Commission; S = International Organisation of Security Commissioners 
 
However, when the focus is on ‘money laundering activity’ it can be seen that 
we now have a far more disparate list of countries in terms of population, 
geographical location and income classification. This includes nine countries that 
are members of the FATF, five of which are fully compliant with the 28 
Recommendations requiring specific action. None of these nine countries find 
themselves the subject of sanctions. It is not particularly surprising that FATF 
members should be identified as countries in which money laundering is 
occurring, as it is well known that the proceeds of illegal activity (particularly 
drug-related activity) will be generated in the major economic areas, particularly 
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the United States and in Europe. Thus significant flows of illegal funds will take 
place through these areas. Moreover, as pointed out by the FATF, launderers 
will rationally prefer to move funds through areas with stable financial systems. 
However, is it not a little incongruous that the UK, identified as “the greatest 
devotee of anti-money laundering provisions within the European Union” (Levi, 
2003:111), should also feature on this list and remain, by demonstration of this 
devotion to the FATF, untouched by international criticism, secure in its 
membership of “the club of ‘virtuous’ countries” (Masciandaro and Portolano, 2003: 
322). 
  
Table 6. Money laundering countries ranked by income group 
 
World Bank Income Group Number of countries % of Total 
High Income Non OECD    5     4.0 
High Income OECD   20   16.1 
Upper Middle Income   14   11.3 
Lower Middle Income   43   34.7 
Low Income   42   33.9 
Total 124 100.0 
 
Table 7. Money laundering countries categorised by geographical region 
 
Geographical region Number of countries % of Total 
America   23   18.5 
Asia & Pacific   24   19.4 
Europe & Central Asia   43    34.7 
Middle East & North Africa   10     8.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa   24   19.3 
Total 124 100.0 
 
It is instructive to consider evidence of possible differences between the group of 
59 identified ‘opaque’ countries and the list of countries monitored for money 
laundering (having removed the group of 59). Again, these countries can be 
categorised according to both income and geographical location. In contrast to 
those in Tables 2 and 3, the majority of these countries are lower middle or low 
income and are located in Europe and Central Asia. 
 Given that the CIA and the US State Department have both classified so 
many countries in terms of money laundering, it is useful to consider a final 
group of countries: those that have been neither identified as ‘opaque’ nor 
broadly monitored for possible money laundering. As shown in Tables 8 and 9 
below, the majority of the remaining ‘non-laundering’ group of 38 countries are 
low income located in Sub Saharan Africa. This is potentially instructive, as 
rather than these non-laundering countries being classified due to the existence 
of excellent compliance systems that prevent such activity from occurring, they 
are classified as such because they are deemed to be too underdeveloped to be of 
use to launderers. 
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There might be two explanations for countries not being considered attractive 
homes for the proceeds of illegal activity. First, the financial system might be so 
underdeveloped as to lack any form of utility as a money laundering location; 
second, the country might be deemed too unstable or corrupt for criminals to 
feel confident of recovering ownership of laundered funds, for it has been 
pointed out that countries determined to be “corrupted or criminal” are unlikely to 
attract illegal funds (Masciandaro and Portolano, 2003: 318). 
 
Table 8. Non-laundering countries ranked by income group 
 
World Bank Income Group Number of countries % of total 
High Income Non OECD   9    23.7 
High Income OECD   0      0.0 
Upper Middle Income   0      0.0 
Lower Middle Income 11    28.9 
Low Income 18    47.4 
Total 38  100.0 
 
Table 9. Non-laundering countries categorised by geographical region 
 
Geographical region Number of countries % of Total 
America   4   10.5 
Asia & Pacific   7   18.4 
Europe & Central Asia   2     5.3 
Middle East & North Africa   3     7.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa 22   57.9 
Total 38 100.0 
 
 
Money Laundering, Corruption and Financial Integration 
 
For the purposes of this study, data was taken from the 2004 World 
Development Indicators report produced by the World Bank. This report 
provided details of both gross private capital flows and gross foreign direct 
investment for 2002 for a range of countries.9 It might be expected that 
countries that have liberalised their financial markets have a higher proportion of 
private capital flows. Globalisation of finance has opened up international capital 
markets to developing economies. Figures from the IMF indicate that between 
1970 and 2000, cross-border capital flows increased from less than 3% of GDP to 
17% for advanced economies and from virtually nothing to 5% of GDP for 
developing countries. As stated by the World Bank, it may be argued that gross 
                                                 
9  IBRD (2004) World Development Indicators, Table 6.1, pp. 306 – 309. The indicators are 
calculated as a ratio to GDP in US dollars. 
Controlling the flow of money or satisfying the regulators? 
 
 
 
59 
flows provide a more accurate measure of the extent of financial integration of a 
country with the rest of the global financial system as in the financial account of 
the balance of payments, inward investment is a credit, whilst outward 
investment is a debit. Net flows would, therefore, represent a balance in which 
many transactions are cancelled out (IBRD, 2004: 309). Information regarding 
corruption was obtained from Transparency International (TI), which produces 
an International Corruption Perception Index that relates to perceptions of the 
extent of corruption and ranges from 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). TI 
has produced the results of its surveys on an annual basis since 1995 and the 
latest version covered 133 countries. The average (unweighted) rating for all of 
the countries included in the 2003 survey (compiled using survey data covering 
a three year rolling average) was 4.2, ranging from 1.3 for Bangladesh to 9.7 for 
Finland. 
 A recent IMF paper provided evidence of a negative relationship between 
investment inflows and corruption. This paper noted that, “…recent research 
shows that corruption has a strongly negative effect on FDI inflows” (Prasad et 
al, 2003: 10). 
 It is interesting to determine, however, the extent of the relative relationships 
between money laundering, corruption and capital flows. This has been carried 
out by determining if there is any manifest difference for the groups of countries 
included in this chapter. There are two influences to consider. Whilst legitimate 
funds might well be deterred from entering countries deemed to be corrupt, 
there is the counterpoint that evidence of corruption might well be an attractor 
to illegitimate funds provided they can be sure of regaining control of them at 
the end of the process. It has been noted by the Department of International 
Development (DFID) that corruption and money laundering “form a cycle of 
interdependent and illegal activity” (2001: xliii). Unfortunately, there is no 
discernable difference in the data for corruption and capital inflows between the 
first two groups of countries. Those that are ‘non-laundering’ do appear 
different, although it should be noted that the availability of data to support this 
assertion is limited. 
 It can be seen from Table 4, that only one country from the list of opaque 
countries, Panama, was rated by TI and given a score of 3.4.10 The overall 
average for the group of money laundering countries appearing in Table 5 was 
4.8, ranging from 9.4 for Singapore to 1.4 for Nigeria. Within this, however, it 
should be noted that the average for the 8 countries included in Table 5 that are 
opaque was 4.2, whilst for the FATF members on this list it was 6.3. Is then a 
lack of corruption a more powerful driver in terms of the activity of money 
launderers? This is an interesting area for further work. 
                                                 
10  TI notes that the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, Liechtenstein, St Kitts and St Vincent had all 
been surveyed but were not given a rating as there were insufficient sources of data.  No sur-
veys had taken place in the Cook Islands, the Marshall Islands, Nauru or Niue. 
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 Countries with liberalised financial systems that are integrated with the world 
financial system might also be more attractive as a home for laundered funds. 
Thus it might be hypothesised that there is a relationship between capital inflows 
and money laundering, the supply side factors. It has been suggested that certain 
countries might be willing to accept inflows of cash (demand factors) into their 
economies without asking too many detailed questions as to the origin of the 
funds. In his study of 159 criminal recovery cases in the Netherlands covering a 
variety of illegal activities, van Duyne (2003:82) found that the most significant 
form of concealment was that of export – particularly where the criminal gangs 
were foreign nationals or had links with other countries. Further, the hard 
currency was gladly accepted in the receiving countries. For many developing 
countries, particularly those with over-valued currencies and associated shortages 
of hard currency, the importation of cash (in sharp contrast to its export) is 
subject to very little in the way of scrutiny. 
 Evidence of money laundering and capital flows is inconclusive. The average 
level of foreign direct investment for money laundering countries from Table 5 
was 6.4% (ranging from 0.03% for Nigeria to 29.6% for Hong Kong). The 
average for the opaque countries on the list was 8.9%, and for FATF countries it 
was 9.4%. However, a more relevant measure might be argued to be gross 
private capital flows. In terms of this measure, the overall average for money 
laundering countries was 27.8% (with a wide distribution from 0.03% for 
Nigeria to 92.4% for Hong Kong). The average for the 8 opaque countries was 
43.7% whilst for the FATF member states it was 32.5% 
 Looking at the information contained in Table 10, it would appear that the 
group of secrecy havens (including all countries classified as NCCT) are actually 
marginally less corrupt and thus it might be expected that they attract greater 
capital-inflows in comparison with that group of countries identified as money 
launderers. However, this is a very tentative observation. What is perhaps more 
relevant is the data for the group of ‘non-laundering’ countries. It was 
hypothesised that this group would have the least developed and least integrated 
financial systems and/or would be either too corrupt or in conflict situations. 
Indeed, for Table 10 it can be seen that this group have the lowest rating from 
Transparency International (the most corrupt) and have the least evidence of 
capital inflows. Again this is an area that demands further study. 
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Table 10. Corruption and capital inflows 
 
Group of countries Number Average  
transparency 
international rating 
Average gross 
private capital 
flows as % GDP 
Average FDI 
as % GDP 
Secrecy or  
financial havens 
 
59 
 
4.6 
28.7 
Excluding Ireland 
(1) 
18.3 
6.7 
Excluding 
Ireland 
5.0 
CIA/US State 
Department, other 
money laundering 
countries 
 
124 
 
4.2 
 
17.4 
 
5.4 
FATF member 
states 
 
 
29 
 
7.4 
 
40.5 
 
9.6 
 
FATF member 
states  
excluding those 
classified as secrecy or 
financial havens 
 
24 
 
7.2 
 
26.8 
 
7.0 
Non-laundering 
countries 
 
38 
 
2.4 
 
9.2 
 
4.1 
 
(1) Figures for Gross Private Capital Flows (278.2%) and FDI (47.1%) for Ireland were substantially 
higher than for any other countries and distorted the average  
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
It is arguable whether the countries targeted by the international community are 
actually those most at risk from money laundering, or indeed, whether 
compliance with internationally required counter measures actually prevents 
money laundering from taking place. Clearly, money laundering is an issue for 
many countries and some, particularly small developing nations, are far more 
vulnerable to the negative impact that money laundering can have on an 
individual economy. However, there is no statistical proof that this activity is 
any greater than for any other country with an active financial market. It is 
further suggested that the group of countries initially targeted by the 
international community were identified for reasons other than vulnerability to 
money laundering. 
 In its efforts to tighten up on ‘weak links’, the international community must 
bear in mind the very substantial costs related to the required upgrading of 
supervisory and regulatory systems that will be faced by some countries. For 
some, lack of cooperation may well be involuntary through insufficient resources 
to cope with the high burden of regulatory enforcement; for others, shortages of 
hard currency might reduce the inclination to stop suitcases of cash from 
crossing their borders. 
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Costs and economic reality will be compounded by an inevitable decline in the 
number of customers in the event that a host nation is no longer seen to provide 
an attractive location for legitimate business investment opportunities (Riechel 
2001: 10). Indeed, it has been suggested that the current approach of imposing 
negative sanctions needs to be accompanied by effective measures to replace the 
investment flows for many capital poor countries possibly through promotion of 
the entry of well-capitalised legitimate businesses (Rose-Ackerman 1998: 40).  
 In the event that governments adopt the countermeasures that have been 
recommended by the international community, it can be expected that their 
efforts to combat money laundering will affect the allocation of expenditure by 
diverting public funds into increased law-enforcement and regulatory activity 
and away from other socially desirable areas. Again this will have a far more 
visible impact on the public finances of small developing countries where the 
costs will have a far greater proportional impact on recurrent expenditure. 
 A problem highlighted in research for the UK points to the imbalance of 
public and private resources devoted to compliance with anti-money laundering 
activity. It is also apparent that the government was seen to have shifted the costs 
onto the private sector while at the same time failing adequately to resource the 
law- enforcement agencies to whom reports were made (Harvey, 2004: 341). If 
adequate resourcing by central government is a problem in the UK 
(Transparency International, 2003:7), what of other countries? Clearly, the 
policing of the regulations is an extensive and expensive task. Yet many nations 
are expected to show the same due diligence with a handful of staff and a limited 
budget.  
 In conclusion, there needs to be a clear understanding of the purpose of 
money laundering legislation. If its purpose is merely to demonstrate compliance 
with the international community, or indeed to evidence devotion to the cause, 
then the UK is particularly successful in this sphere. If it is to stop money 
laundering from occurring and thus reduce underlying crime then I would argue 
that there is no evidence to demonstrate success. The international community is 
misguided in focusing so much on money-laundering compliance. There is still 
too little information available as to the risk factors and characteristics of 
individual countries, and this is clearly an area worthy of further study. At 
present there is no evidence to suggest that countries that have been targeted are 
those most at risk from money laundering; nor is there evidence that high 
standards of compliance prevent money laundering from occurring. 
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Electronic payment systems  
and money laundering: 
beyond the internet hype 
Electronic payment systems and money laundering 
Ton Schudelaro1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the last ten years, the continuing dematerialisation of money and the 
advent of the Internet, electronic commerce, and mobile communications have 
led to the introduction of a myriad of new electronic payment systems. These 
systems have the potential to make payments more efficient and to enable 
anyone to carry out transactions with anybody from any location at any time. 
However, they reputedly also have the potential greatly to facilitate the crime of 
money laundering. In this respect, electronic payment systems have been called 
the greatest boon to money launderers and have even been presented as one of 
the four Horsemen of the Apocalypse. Now that the hype surrounding the 
Internet has subsided, the time is right to make an assessment of the true money-
laundering threat posed by electronic payment systems. 
 To address the issue, we will first give a definition of electronic payment 
systems, together with some background information. After that, we will take a 
look at transaction monitoring, which enables financial institutions to profile 
individual customer behaviour. Next, we will present a hypothetical example to 
illustrate how electronic payment systems supposedly enable criminals to launder 
their ill-gotten gains much more easily than before. We will then take a look at 
the available evidence supporting the claim that electronic payment systems pose 
a real money-laundering threat. Finally, we will analyse the issue of the supposed 
anonymity offered by electronic payment systems, and present some conclusions 
concerning the fight against money laundering in general. 
 
 
Definition and background 
 
Two kinds of electronic payment systems are usually distinguished, namely, 
remote access payment instruments and electronic money instruments.2 Remote 
                                                 
1  Ton Schudelaro is former researcher at the Faculty of Law of  the University of Tilburg, the 
Netherlands and the author of  Electronic Payment Systems and Money Laundering. Risks and 
Countermeasures in the Post-Internet Hype Era (Schudelaro, 2003).   
2  See, for instance, BIS (1996: 3), Commission Recommendation 97/489/EC of 30 July 1997 
concerning transactions by electronic payment instruments and in particular the relationship 
6 
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access instruments enable individuals to access funds held in their accounts at 
financial institutions. These funds often come in the form of traditional credit 
and debit facilities. Remote access instruments thus include credit and debit 
cards as well as phone, home, and Internet banking applications. To the extent 
that mobile phones are used to access funds held in an account, they can also be 
regarded as remote access instruments. Remotely accessing funds usually requires 
a personal identification number or code (PIN) or some other similar proof of 
identity.3 
 The second kind of electronic payment system consists of electronic money 
or e-money instruments. E-money instruments can be defined as payment 
instruments, other than remote access instruments, on which units of value can 
be stored electronically.4 These units of value can be stored either as an aggregate 
balance from which or to which units can be deducted or added, or as individual 
strings of computer data. In the latter case, each string represents a single unit of 
value, which, as far as the individual character is concerned, can be thought of as 
the digital analogue of a coin or a bank note. As electronic units of value can be 
stored in various media, electronic money instruments come in different forms. 
These include stored-value chip cards, also called electronic purses or e-purses, 
the memories of computers linked together in a network such as the Internet, as 
well as mobile phones, which may be used as an alternative to electronic purses. 
When electronic units of value are stored on a computer, e-money is sometimes 
referred to as digital cash, or by specific product names (BIS, 1996: 3). The 
terms electronic cash, or e-cash, network money and software money are also 
sometimes used. Together, remote access instruments and electronic money 
instruments form what are called cyber-payment instruments. 
 The development of cyber-payment systems has gone through several stages. 
The first stage, called the pre-history of cyber-payment systems, is said to have 
spanned the period from 1976 to 1992 (although credit cards were of course 
introduced much earlier than that). The period was characterised, among other 
things, by the development of fundamental technologies – like Diffie and 
Hellman’s (1976) public-key cryptography and Chaum’s (1982) blinded 
signatures – as well as the foundation of DigiCash (the firm to market Chaum’s 
eCash electronic money system based on the use of blind signatures (1989)) and 
the development of Mondex (a well-publicized e-purse scheme (1991)). 
Additionally, the pre-history phase also saw the rise of phone and home 
banking(Böhle, 2001: 8). Additional phases which have been distinguished and 
                                                 
between issuer and holder, OJ L 208, 2.8.1997, p. 52, Articles 2 (b) and 2 (c) and ECB (1998: 
7). 
3  OJ L 208, 2.8.1997, p. 52, Article 2 (b). 
4  A legal definition of electronic money is included in Article 1 of EU directive 2000/46/EC 
(OJ L 275, 27.10.2000, p. 39). The definition states that ‘electronic money shall mean mone-
tary value as represented by a claim on the issuer which is: (i) stored on an electronic device; 
(ii) issued on receipt of funds of an amount not less in value than the monetary value issued; 
(iii) accepted as means of payment by undertakings other than the issuer’. 
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described in the literature on the development of Internet payment systems are 
the pioneer phase, the roll back and forward phase, and the next generation, or 
second wave phase (Böhle, 2001: 7-18). 
 During the pioneer phase (1993-1995), various schemes were introduced to 
enable electronic or Internet payments, or to make them safer. Noteworthy 
developments during this period include the development of the SSL encryption 
protocol (1994), the foundation of First Virtual Holding, and CyberCash Inc. – 
two companies enabling credit card payments over the Internet – as well as 
pilots by both Mondex and DigiCash. The pioneer phase was dominated by 
start-up companies that were not always related to existing financial institutions. 
This situation caused some to think that, with respect to electronic payments, a 
whole range of new and possibly unregulated players could emerge which, in 
turn, might perhaps raise issues like control over the amount of money in 
circulation, as well as law enforcement issues such as money laundering. The 
anonymity supposedly offered by cyber-payment systems was also a factor in 
claims that such systems would pose a significant money-laundering threat. From 
the perspective of the banking sector, the pioneer phase can be seen as a period 
in which existing players were in danger of losing control and of being replaced 
by newcomers with respect to the provision of payment services. 
 During the next phase, the roll back and forward phase (1995-1998), the 
banking sector regained the initiative. This was accomplished by taking various 
actions, including the introduction of the SET encryption protocol, aimed at 
securing transactions and at obtaining control over the complete transaction 
chain in order to try to fend off new start-up companies. Payment schemes 
developed by the newcomers were taking over or adopted, and existing payment 
methods were adapted for use on the Internet. Also during this period, Mark 
Twain Bank in the United States started offering eCash and the first steps 
towards regulating electronic money institutions were taken on national (for 
instance, in Germany) as well as international (the EU) levels. In spite of earlier 
success, some pioneering firms ran into trouble towards the end of the roll back 
and forward phase. First Virtual was discontinued in 1998. The same year saw 
DigiCash go bankrupt. However, eCash Technologies, a firm based in Seattle in 
the United States, took over the eCash product and pilots continued, for 
instance, at Credit Suisse and Deutsche Bank. But in 2001, eCash Technologies, 
too, was forced to drop eCash. In 2002, eCash Technologies was bought by the 
company Infospace.(Infospace, 2002). 
 Following the roll back and forward phase, developments continued with the 
introduction of new adapted payment methods said to represent a second 
generation of electronic payment systems. These systems included payment 
instruments like Paypal. In 2000, the EU reached agreement on Directive 
2000/46/EC for e-money institutions.5 Through this directive, implemented 
                                                 
5  OJ L 275, 27.10.2000, p. 39. 
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through Directive 2000/28/EC,6 a new type of credit institution, the electronic 
money institution, was recognised, in addition to the already existing 
‘traditional’ credit institutions such as banks, and put under supervision. Anti-
money laundering regulations, such as the 1991 EU anti-money laundering 
directive, which was revised in 2001, were made to apply to this new type of 
financial institution. In March 2001, another pioneer, CyberCash, went 
bankrupt. 
 A survey of developments in Internet and mobile and electronic money 
payments published in 2004 indicates that, up to now, remote access instruments 
have generally been more successful than electronic money instruments.(BIS, 
2004) According to this survey ‘[p]ayments made using the internet and mobile 
phones have advanced rapidly and have become quite important in the field of 
electronic retail payments recently compared to e-money’ (BIS, 2004: 4). 
However, this does not necessarily mean that all projects meet with success as 
the survey goes on to note that ‘[w]hereas some products have been successful 
over the past few years, other initiatives are at an early stage of development. 
Some products have been discontinued after a short time’(BIS, 2004: 4). The 
success of electronic money instruments appears to be more modest (BIS, 2004: 
2-4). 
 Card-based e-money schemes have been launched and are operating 
relatively successfully in a sizeable number of the countries surveyed. (...) 
Comparatively successful are e-money products supported by public transport 
and public telephone companies, and parking meter or vending machine 
operators. Compared to card-based schemes, developments in network-based or 
software-based e-money schemes have been much less rapid. (...) Network-
based schemes are operational or are under trial in a few countries (...), but 
remain limited in their usage, scope and application. (...) A vast majority of the 
participating central banks have indicated that there are no plans to introduce 
network-based e-money products in their respective countries. 
From an anti-money laundering point of view it is also of interest that the survey 
notes that ‘the existing e-money products still do not operate on a cross-border 
level’ (BIS, 2004: 7). 
 It must be realised that the development of cyber-payment systems as 
outlined above is only the latest part in the long history of money. Over the 
course of many centuries, money has come in many different forms, such as salt 
in ancient Rome, tea in China, shells in Africa, and tobacco leaves in colonies in 
North America. Of much greater and lasting importance to the development of 
money, however, has been the introduction of coins, banknotes, and transferable 
money, which, in the end, has led to the creation of the modern financial system 
as it is known today. A constant factor during all these developments has been 
the desire to make payments more efficient, which has resulted in the ongoing 
                                                 
6  OJ L 275, 27.10.2000, p. 37. 
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trend towards the dematerialisation of money of which cyber-payment systems 
are only the latest manifestation. 
 Finally, it must also be realised that over the course of time the financial 
sector has become subject to an increasing range of supervisory rules and 
regulations in many countries. These rules and regulations relate to both 
prudential issues and to the issue of combating money laundering. Examples are 
given by the European first7 and second8 Council Directives on the coordination 
of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and 
pursuit of the business of credit institutions (which, together with a number of 
other directives, were combined into a single directive, Directive 2000/12/EC,9 
in 2000) and the above-mentioned 1991 European directive on money 
laundering. The latter directive, Directive 1991/308/EEC,10 was updated in 
2001.11 Directive 2000/12/EC deals with, among other things, requirements for 
access to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, and 
provisions concerning the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide 
services. The updated Directive 1991/308/EEC contains provisions concerning 
the issue of customer identification for a number of service providers, including 
financial service providers, and also requires the reporting of unusual or 
suspicious transactions, which may be an indication of money laundering 
activities. As we have already mentioned, in 2000 the EU issued two directives, 
Directives 2000/46/EC and 2000/28/EC, relating to electronic money. 
Through these directives a new type of credit institution, the electronic money 
institution, was made subject to the EU’s anti-money laundering directive. 
Taken together, the above-mentioned initiatives by and large cover the entire 
field of electronic payment systems, as far as the EU is concerned. 
 That issues can nevertheless sometimes still arise is illustrated by the fact that 
the definition of electronic money in Directive 2000/46/EC has led to a 
discussion as to whether or not prepaid mobile phone credits qualify as 
electronic money and thus whether or not mobile telephone operators should be 
subject to prudential supervision and anti-money laundering regulations.12 
Regardless of the question of whether or not prepaid mobile phone credits 
could be an attractive vehicle for money laundering, cases for and against 
qualifying prepaid phone credits as electronic money can be made (e.g. 
Schudelaro 2003). However, it should come as no surprise that mobile 
telephone operators are not keen on becoming electronic money institutions. In 
a February 2005 statement, the now defunct Dutch non-bank association of 
electronic money issuers even said (1.1a2, 2005: §2): 
                                                 
7  OJ L 322, 17.12.1977, p. 30. 
8  OJ L 386, 30.12.1989, p. 1. 
9  OJ L 126, 26.5.2000, p. 1. 
10  OJ L 166, 28.6.1991, p. 77. 
11  OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 76. 
12  For the definition of electronic Money in Directive 2000/46/EC, see note 4. 
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“[i]n time, we have come to notice that the big players in the market place 
have not made any serious effort to contemplate the compliance-issues for e-
money but focused on avoiding regulation instead. Informally they informed 
our association that they were confident that, through their lobby efforts, they 
would be able to avoid e-money regulation. This has indeed proven to be the 
case, both on the Dutch national level and on the European level.” 
 
In a 2005 guidance note on the application of the e-money directive to mobile 
operators, the Commission expressed the view that, at least for the time being, it 
did not want to dampen innovation in the mobile telephone sector by subjecting 
that sector to excessive regulation. The Commission also expressed the view that 
mobile phone credits might qualify as e-money in a limited number of cases 
only, but also that in future, when prepaid credits might be used for more than 
just micro payments, adequate money-laundering safeguards would need to be 
maintained (Commission Services, 2005: §§ 6, 12-15 and 22 ). The course of 
events described illustrates that regulating financial services, and subjecting 
organisations to regulations such as those designed to combat money laundering, 
is not always just a relatively straightforward matter of whether or not, in this 
case, a payment system falls within the scope of a specific directive, but that it 
can also involve matters of economics and politics.  
 
 
Transaction monitoring 
 
Technological developments have not only led to new ways in which people 
can communicate or carry out transactions, such as the Internet and electronic 
payment systems, they have also created new ways to record data and obtain 
useful information from those data. Systems capable of such data monitoring 
have many applications. They are, for instance, used in the detection of social 
and medical benefits fraud, of commercial opportunities, including cross-selling, 
pricing and customer-relations management, as well as for purposes of risk 
assessment. Assessing the risk of a terrorist attack on commercial airline flights is 
just one example of the latter application. 
 The monitoring of data can also be used to prevent and detect money 
laundering. The data generated by financial transactions for instance, can be 
checked for the presence of elements that might indicate money laundering. 
Electronic monitoring systems that check whether a specific transaction exceeds 
certain reporting limits, for instance, a maximum amount of money, have been 
used for many years. Of a much more recent date however, are transaction 
monitoring systems that can build profiles of the financial behaviour of 
individual customers of a financial institution. These behavioural profiling 
systems in essence compare all characteristics of a payment, not only to all 
characteristics of previous payments by the same individual or entity, but also to 
those of other, similar payers. Transaction monitoring systems can keep records 
of who made what kind of payment, for what amount, when, where, and to 
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whom. In this way, a kind of fingerprint of individual customer behaviour can 
be obtained. This in turns enables the detection of patterns that are unusual, for 
instance, because of the volume, the amounts, or the persons involved. 
Although, in the mid 1990s, behavioural transaction monitoring was deemed to 
be unfeasible because of the large numbers of transactions that are processed by 
financial institutions each day, nowadays systems exist that can handle tens of 
millions of transactions daily, and if necessary, multiple systems can be used in 
parallel. 
 Various reasons exist for financial institutions to use transaction-monitoring 
systems. They include both governmental and non-governmental initiatives that 
stimulate the use of transaction monitoring, as well as the interests of financial 
institutions themselves. With the current ‘War on Terrorism’ for instance, 
financial institutions are asked by governments to check whether they carry out 
transactions for suspected terrorists. Moreover, financial institutions are under an 
obligation to report transactions that could be indicative of money laundering. 
This requirement could arguably also be a reason to use transaction-monitoring 
systems. 
 Additional pressure on financial institutions to use transaction monitoring 
comes from organisations and institutions active in the financial world itself, such 
as the Bank for International Settlements, and supervisory authorities. The Bank 
for International Settlements has issued a report in which monitoring is called an 
essential element of know-your-customer standards, which in turn are said to be 
closely associated with the fight against money laundering. Supervisory 
authorities should ensure that adequate know-your-customer principles are 
adhered to. 
 Finally, financial institutions also have their own reasons to monitor 
transactions. One reason is that monitoring systems can help minimise losses by 
trying to detect fraud. However, monitoring for the detection and prevention of 
money laundering does not bring financial institutions such clear benefits, except 
where the protection of reputation or integrity is concerned. Currently, financial 
institutions across the globe are implementing behavioural transaction 
monitoring systems. 
 Monitoring the financial behaviour of persons and entities clearly has privacy 
implications. Over the past decades, various initiatives have been launched to 
protect the privacy of individuals. Examples of such initiatives are the Guidelines 
on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data of the Council of Europe, and the 1995 EU Data 
Protection Directive. Regardless of their legal status, all these initiatives, allow 
room for the prevention, detection, investigation, and prosecution of criminal 
activities. But in all likelihood, this room is not even needed to reconcile 
transaction monitoring with the issue of privacy. Even without the exceptions 
mentioned, current privacy provisions allow financial institutions to process 
personal data for purposes such as the observance of legal requirements, which 
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may include the reporting of unusual or suspicious transactions, the fulfilment of 
contracts that may involve requirements to protect the interests of customers, 
and for the upholding of the legitimate interests of the financial institutions 
themselves, which may include protection of a financial institution’s reputation 
or protection against fraud. Therefore, it seems unlikely that privacy 
considerations will hamper the use of transaction monitoring systems. 
 
 
The threat in theory 
 
Many have claimed that electronic money and on-line banking services pose a 
significant money-laundering threat. ‘Financial crime will be a severe problem 
with digital money’ (Bonorris and Coates: iv) ‘the potential for conducting 
financial transactions on-line (…) presents one of the most significant 
vulnerabilities to money laundering at present’ (FATF, 2000a: §104); ‘[t]he 
abuse of these systems by launderers is no longer a distant possibility’(FATF, 
1999: §87): these are just a few statements of this nature. Some have wondered 
whether Internet access might be ‘the new type of detergent which allows for 
cleaner laundry’ (Bortner, 1996), or have called the increasing utilisation and 
promotion of on-line banking and electronic payment systems ‘[t]he greatest 
boon to money launderers’ (Lilley, 2000: 114). Others have gone as far as 
presenting electronic money, together with tax evasion, as one of the horsemen 
of the Apocalypse, forgery, currency disruptions, and surveillance being the 
other three.13 
 How, then, could the supposed money laundering threat created by cyber-
payment systems become a reality? The following example describes how one 
electronic money system, the abovementioned eCash system, was thought to 
help criminals comfortably launder their ill-gotten gains (Bortner, 1996).14 
 
Doug Drug Dealer is the CEO of an ongoing narcotics corporation. Doug has 
rooms filled with hard currency, which represent the profits from his illegal 
enterprise. This currency needs to enter the legitimate, mainstream economy so 
that Doug can either purchase needed supplies and employees, purchase real or 
                                                 
13  Technology writer and, since September 1996, senior editor of Newsweek magazine Steven 
Levy as quoted in Hoogenboom (1997). 
14  This example was first presented by R. Mark Bortner in 1996 as part of a final paper require-
ment at the University of Miami School of Law. In his paper, Bortner analyses the potential of 
electronic money for money laundering purposes. Although, according to Bortner, electronic 
money systems generally lack anonymity, he notes one exception, namely, eCash, the pay-
ment system originally developed by the company Digicash (see section 5.6.4.2, example 1). 
This payment scheme is referred to in the cited example, although Bortner uses a somewhat 
different spelling than used in this study. Since it was first published, Bortner’s paper has been 
quoted or referred to in various publications about electronic payments and money launder-
ing, for instance, Richards (1999: 75-76), Solicitor General Canada (1998: section 2.3) and 
Hoogenboom (1997: section 5.3). As such, it might be said to have attained some status. 
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personal property or even draw interest on these ill-gotten gains. Of course, 
this could be accomplished without a bank account, but efficiency demands 
legality. Anyhow, Doug employs Linda Launderer to wash this dirty money. 
Linda hires couriers (“smurfs”) to deposit funds under different names in 
amounts between $7,500 and $8,500 at branches of every bank in certain cities. 
This operation is repeated twice a week for as long as is required. In the 
meantime, Linda Launderer has been transferring these same funds from each 
branch, making withdrawals only once a week, and depositing the money with 
Internet banks that accept e-cash. To be safe, Linda has these transfers limited 
to a maximum of $8,200 each. Once the hard currency has been converted 
into digital e-cash, the illegally earned money has become virtually untraceable, 
anonymous. Doug Drug Dealer now has access to legitimate electronic cash 
(…). 
 
Once the e-cash account has been established, digital funds can be accessed from 
any computer that is properly connected to the Internet. A truly creative, if not 
paranoid, launderer could access funds via telnet. Telnet is a basic command that 
involves the protocol for connecting to another computer on the Internet. Thus, 
Linda Launderer could transfer illegally earned funds from her laptop on the 
Pacific Island of Vanuatu, by telneting to an account leased from any unknowing 
Internet service provider in the United States and have her leased Internet 
account actually call the bank to transfer the funds, thus concealing her true 
identity. This would, of course, leave an even longer trail for law enforcement 
authorities to have to follow. Anyhow, e-cash, being completely anonymous, 
allows the account holder total privacy to make Internet transactions. Thus, the 
bank holding the digital cash, as well as any seller that accepts e-cash, has 
virtually no means of identifying the purchaser. Therefore, the combination of 
anonymous e-cash and the availability of telnet may give a launderer enough of a 
head start to evade law enforcement, for the moment (…). 
 
Above, the sky is a swirling mixture of pale blue and chalky white. Waves of 
liquid life endlessly wash ashore, greeting the soft warm sand. Palm trees 
gracefully sway in a quiet dance with the wind. Amidst this tranquil bliss, Linda 
Launderer sits on the beach with her laptop computer “jacked-in” to the 
Internet. Unlike the AT&T commercial which portrays an individual faxing 
messages from a sunny beach to a business associate in a cold northern state, 
Linda is simply transferring funds into anonymous e-cash accounts so as to 
conceal the illegally obtained profits of her employer, Doug Drug Dealer. 
Hence, Linda is laundering money over the Internet while sipping a Margarita. 
 
 
The threat in practice 
 
The most striking thing about the claims that new electronic methods of 
payment pose a real money-laundering threat is the lack of evidence supporting 
these claims. Ever since the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for instance, 
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began writing about electronic money (FATF, 1996: §§ 24-29) and on-line 
banking (FATF, 1997a: §14, §43 Annex C), it has not been able to come up 
with any clear, real-life case involving these kinds of payment systems. Instead, 
between 1996 and 2001, the FATF has repeatedly reported a lack of evidence by 
stating with respect to electronic money, on-line banking, or both that: ‘experts 
have no evidence to suggest that cyber-payments technologies [mostly electronic 
purses, AS] are being manipulated by criminal interests’ (FATF, 1996: §29); 
‘there have been no reported instances of money laundering through these 
systems’  (that is, electronic money systems) (FATF, 1997b: Appendix §6); ‘no 
case of laundering has been detected in this sector’ (FATF, 1998: §7) (that is, 
that part of the banking sector using new technologies); ‘[a]ll delegations 
continue to report that there have not been as of yet any investigated money 
laundering cases involving the new payment technologies’ (FATF, 1999: §27); 
‘there were no reported cases of this type of laundering [that is, through on-line 
banking] taking place at this time’ (FATF, 1999: §31); ‘no money laundering 
cases have been detected yet which involve [on-line banking]’ (FATF, 2000a: 
§104, 2000b: §94); ‘the FATF experts have seen few if any examples of on-line 
banking being used in money laundering’ (FATF, 2000b: §8); ‘the experts were 
not yet able to provide case examples of money laundering through on-line 
banking’ (FATF, 2001: §11). Moreover, in the FATF’s 2002 annual report, 
words like ‘the Internet’, ‘digital’, ‘electronic’, ‘smart card’, or ‘electronic purse’ 
are no longer even present (FATF, 2002a). In the 2001-2002 report on money-
laundering typologies, only one case was presented in which on-line banking 
might have been used by money launderers, but the link was weak at best. In 
documents about electronic money prepared by the G10 group of countries and 
the US Department of the Treasury, similar statements can be found (Us 
Department of Tereasury, 1996: section 3; G-10, 1997: 12). In more recent 
FATF publications, including the 2003-2004 annual report and the 2003-2004 
report on money laundering typologies, the situation of 2001-2002 has remained 
essentially unchanged and no new ‘evidence’ has been presented. 
 The FATF does not consider the apparent lack of evidence as indicating that 
no money laundering is taking place through on-line connections. Instead, 
‘some experts believe that adequate means of detecting this type of laundering 
activity have not yet been fully developed’ (FATF, 2001: §11, 1998: §7, 2002b: 
§8). Others have voiced similar opinions, as reflected in the statement: ‘The best 
fraud schemes are so good that they are not discovered. So, who can tell me that 
it is not happening?’15 
 One well-publicised case in which money was allegedly laundered through 
the use of on-line banking services, but in which no hard evidence of this was 
presented, involved the now defunct European Union Bank, based on the island 
                                                 
15  KPMG forensic accountant F. Hoek, as quoted in Van Dinther 2000, p. 40. In Dutch: ‘De 
beste fraudes zijn zo goed dat ze niet ontdekt worden, dus wie zegt mij dat het niet gebeurt’ 
(translation by the author).  
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of Antigua. Reportedly, this Internet bank ‘explicitly proposed completely 
anonymous investments’ (FATF, 1998: §11). Such offerings have been suggested 
to represent money-laundering services being advertised through the Internet 
(FATF, 2000b: §4). The story of the European Union Bank took place between 
1994 and 1997. In 1994, the East European International Bank was established 
on the island of Antigua, which is said to harbour more than 50 offshore banks, 
‘many consisting of little more than a telephone and a computer behind a brass 
plate on an office door’ (Rohter, 1997). Within a few months of its 
establishment, the name of the bank was changed to the European Union Bank. 
Having set up a site on the World Wide Web, the European Union Bank was 
called the ‘first offshore bank operating via the Internet’ (FATF, 1998: §72). 
According to this, now defunct, website: 
 
“[t]he European Union Bank strives to give our European and international 
clients easy, quick and secure computer access to European Union Bank’s 
complete range of offshore banking services. Incorporated in Antigua and 
Barbuda under the International Business Corporations Act (IBC) of 1982, 
European Union Bank provides multi-currency banking and financial services 
to clients throughout the world. With utmost privacy, confidentiality and 
security, European Union Bank clients receive excellent interest rates, offered 
in a stable, tax-free environment.”16 
 
Services available from the European Union Bank included numbered accounts, 
international wire transfers online, tax protection, and ‘[a] number of other 
specialised bank services to meet individual needs’.17 Through the European 
Union Bank, customers could also register within 48 hours and for USD 995, an 
Antiguan International Business Corporation. Such corporations were advertised 
as ‘a perfect privacy tool’, because of the allowed use of bearer shares, the 
absence of a public share register, no disclosure of shareholders, no disclosure of 
beneficial ownership, and the absence of a requirement to file any corporate 
reports. The website also pointed out that: 
 
“[u]nder Antiguan law, no person shall disclose any information relating to the 
business affairs of a customer, that he/she acquired as an officer, employee, 
director, shareholder, agent, auditor or solicitor of the banking corporation, 
except pursuant to the order of a court in Antigua. The court can only issue 
such an order in connection with an alleged criminal offence.”18  
 
Because of these advertisements, the European Union Bank was accused of 
being involved in money-laundering activities. In 1996, Lord Mancroft, then 
chairman of the bank and member of the British House of Lords, denied these 
                                                 
16  Website of the European Union Bank as quoted in Blum et al. (1998: 59). 
17  Website of the European Union Bank as quoted in Blum et al. (1998: 60). 
18  Website of the European Union Bank as quoted in Blum et al. (1998: 61). 
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allegations (Blum et al., 1998: 58), but the same Lord Mancroft has also been 
quoted as saying that financial regulation in Antigua comprises ‘literally two men 
in a Nissen hut. The country is too small and too badly run’ (Lilley, 2000: 101). 
In any case, the European Union Bank attracted the attention of money-
laundering watchers and, by mid-1995, auditors reported that they were unable 
to state whether the financial statements presented by the bank fairly presented 
the financial position of the company. At the end of 1996, the Bank of England 
advised potential depositors to exercise appropriate due diligence with respect to 
the European Union Bank, while, in early 1997, the State of Idaho issued an 
injunction ordering the bank to stop soliciting deposits though the Internet. Also 
in early 1997, the Ministry of Finance of Antigua told the European Union 
Bank that it was ‘not in good standing’ and a few months later, it issued a fraud 
warning (Blum et al., 1998: 58-62). In August of the same year, the two of the 
bank’s owners absconded with the its deposits, which were said to amount to 
$10 million (Bonorris and Coates, 1997: 41), apparently leaving a notice on the 
locked door of the bank’s office above a dentist’s office and Nio’s Bar and 
Restaurant, stating that ‘European Union Bank Inc. has been placed in 
receivership effective this eighth day of August 1997’ (Rohter, 1997). 
 Some have claimed that the steps taken by the Bank of England and the State 
of Idaho merely illustrate the inability of authorities to take effective action 
against the unregulated offering of services through the Internet, stating that the 
argument that existing rules and regulations apply to new electronic forms of 
payment ‘seems to miss the point by a long way’, and that ‘[t]he whole point 
about the Internet is that wherever you are based you can tout for business from 
anyone anywhere’ (Lilley, 2000: 115). Although certainly the latter claim may 
be essentially true, a number of arguments can be suggested that put matters into 
some perspective. 
 First of all, the question is whether money launderers want to deposit money 
with financial institutions with an unproven track record and an unknown 
management. After all, the story of the European Union Bank illustrates how 
members of the management can abscond with depositors’ funds. If, on the 
other hand, an Internet-based bank were owned or controlled by a money 
launderer himself, the question might be asked what the real benefits of having 
Internet access would be, as far as issuing financial services is concerned, because, 
in that case, the criminal would be able to deposit funds with and transfer money 
from his own bank. 
 A second issue concerns the funds that a money launderer would want to 
transfer to an institution like the European Union Bank. To deposit money, the 
money launderer would either have to transport his funds to the bank, for 
instance, in cash, make a transfer of giro money, or use electronic money. In the 
first case, the Internet would essentially not enter the picture, and therefore does 
not seem to pose an additional money-laundering risk. In the second case, the 
money launderer would already have to have his funds in some account, in 
which case he would already have succeeded in evading important anti-money 
laundering measures, such as the reporting requirements. In the third case, the 
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money launderer would have to buy electronic value first using traditional 
money, and if he succeeds in this, he has again succeeded in evading anti-money 
laundering measures, just as in the second case. 
 Thirdly, it must be realised that the example of the European Union Bank 
appears to be the only one of its kind to date. Following the case of the 
European Union Bank, it was reported that ‘entities are using the Internet to 
offer money laundering services – sometimes styling themselves as legitimate 
“offshore financial services” or “investment opportunities”, but no new concrete 
examples have been presented (FATF, 2000b: §4). Moreover, the owners of the 
European Union Bank escaped with a mere $10 million. If the aim of combating 
money laundering is considered to be the prevention of criminals attaining a 
position of influence in the legal economy, one example involving $10 million 
does not appear to be a great threat. 
 Fourthly, it can be argued that, even though warnings and injunctions may 
not prevent people from doing business with financial institutions of 
questionable repute, they can help to put pressure on local regulators to take 
action. In the case of the European Union Bank, the Antiguan authorities in the 
end took some action, which may have encouraged the bank owners to abscond 
(Blum et al., 1998:  6). Although it may not have been their aim, the authorities 
in this way put an end to the operations of the European Union Bank. 
 Fifthly, the possible ‘cascading downward’ of regulatory coverage, that is, 
strict and effective supervision being circumvented through unsupervised, or ill-
supervised issuers offering services in well-regulated territories, has been ‘argued 
to be worse in cyberspace, but hardly a unique problem’ (Mussington et al., 
1998: 47): it also exists in the world of bricks and mortar. 
 Finally, one may wonder if the case of the European Union Bank is actually a 
case of money laundering or rather a case of Internet-based fraud. After all, 
making off with depositors’ money appears to be more similar to plain fraud 
than to providing a seemingly legitimate origin to illegally obtained funds, which 
is the definition of money laundering. 
 
 
Analysis: anonymity 
 
From the examples in the previous two sections and from the literature, a 
number of interrelated issues emerge, each issue having been said to make 
electronic payment systems attractive vehicles for money laundering. The issues 
are: the anonymity supposedly offered by these systems; the (in)adequacy of rules 
and regulations with respect to electronic payment systems; the availability of 
adequate audit trails; the ease of use of electronic payment systems; the volume 
of transactions, and the use of the Internet as a platform for money-laundering 
activities, for instance, through Internet-based front companies or Internet-based 
gambling operations. A full discussion of all these issues is beyond the scope of 
this article. Therefore the discussion here will focus on the issue of electronic 
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payment systems and anonymity. All issues are discussed in detail in A. 
Schudelaro, Electronic Payment Systems and Money Laundering. Risks and 
Countermeasures in the Post-Internet Hype Era (Schudelaro, 2003). 
 Many have claimed that electronic payment systems enable anonymous 
transactions. The literature seems to suggest that anonymity in electronic 
payment systems is more or less taken for granted. The issue of anonymity is 
connected to that of electronic payment systems and money laundering in a 
number of ways, including: the identification of customers; the ability to carry 
out transactions anonymously; non-face-to-face transactions and know-your-
customer principles; encryption, and the use of the Internet as a means of 
communication and a platform for economic activities. These subjects will now 
be discussed. 
 
 
Customer identification and anonymous transactions 
 
In general issuers of electronic payment systems will be regulated and will 
therefore be subject to reporting and identification requirements. Electronic 
payment systems will have to function within the regulatory framework to 
which their issuers are subject. As far as regulated issuers are concerned, the issue 
of customer identification should therefore not be too problematic, or at least 
not more problematic than with respect to traditional means of payment. This 
point of view can be defended best with respect to remote-access instruments. 
Credit and debit card payments, as well as on-line banking services are, for 
instance, generally regarded as not being anonymous as these forms of payment 
enable their holders to access funds held in accounts the opening of which 
involves standard customer identification procedures. It must also be borne in 
mind that the use of credit and debit cards, as well as that of on-line banking 
services, only means that transfer orders are generated and communicated 
electronically, a process that could also be accomplished through more 
traditional means, such as paper transfer forms. With remote-access instruments, 
no value is transferred over open networks, such as the Internet, but only 
payment messages. The actual payments are cleared and settled using the 
existing, traditional banking infrastructure. Moreover, as the use of remote-
access instruments by definition involves the use of bank accounts, the issuance 
of such payment systems will be a right reserved to ‘traditional’ credit institutions 
like banks, as such institutions are the only ones allowed to receive repayable 
funds from the public and accept deposits. 
 With respect to electronic money systems, the situation is different to the 
extent that such systems can be account-based, though they are not necessarily 
so. In account-based electronic money systems value is debited from existing 
accounts to which generally standard identification rules apply. This value is 
stored on a device after which it can be used to make payments. In the past, 
such payments have been called anonymous, or as anonymous as cash payments. 
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With respect to, for instance, card-based electronic money systems, however, it 
turns out that, in practice, the cards and other hardware used in such systems 
carry unique identification numbers. Moreover, transactions are often also given 
unique transaction numbers (BIS, 1996: 25). In this way, it is possible to track 
individual payments and to establish the value stored on each individual card. It 
must also be realised that most electronic money systems are single-loop systems, 
that is, systems in which electronic value can be used to make only one 
payment, after which the value must be redeemed with the issuer, or another 
institution must accept the electronic value. 
 In non-account-based electronic money systems, money is not deducted 
from any account. In such systems, users can purchase cards already loaded with 
electronic value, for instance, at news stands or from vending machines. Insofar 
as such systems are multipurpose, that is, insofar as the electronic value in such 
systems is accepted by more institutions than just the issuer, the question is to 
what extent existing identification measures apply. If, for instance, within the 
territory of the EU, a chip card loaded with electronic value can be used to pay 
for both car parking and telephone calls, the EU Electronic Money Directive 
appears to apply. However, in general, cards used to pay parking fees and make 
telephone calls will usually have quite low value limits and it is questionable 
whether shopkeepers, let alone vending machines, will ask users to provide any 
identification. However, the associated money-laundering risk appears to be very 
limited to almost non-existent, as it is difficult to see the benefits for money 
launderers of prepaid cards loaded with, for instance, €50 over banknotes of the 
same denomination. Should criminals be the issuers of electronic money instead 
of users of electronic money, existing rules such as the EU Electronic Money 
Directive and parts of Directive 2000/12/EC apply, making it unlikely that a 
financial institution subject to supervision would fall into the wrong hands. The 
existing rules allow for requirements to be waived with respect to small issuers, 
or single-purpose systems, but using such schemes to launder money would be 
the same as using a front shop, such as a restaurant or bar for the same purposes. 
The point of view that the issuing of on-line services by regulated financial 
institutions does not pose a problem is acknowledged by the FATF itself in its 
statement that ‘[t]he Internet sites opened by duly authorised banks are not 
particularly disturbing in themselves’ (FATF, 1998: §11). 
 The only remaining potential problem then lies in the offering of financial 
services through the Internet by unregulated or ill-regulated entities in areas that 
do have strict financial regulations. This situation was already discussed above in 
connection with the example of the Antigua-based European Union Bank. In 
this respect, it must be borne in mind that, in principle, criminals have always 
been able to use services offered in ill-regulated areas, either by directly 
depositing funds in cash with entities located in these areas or by transferring 
money to bank accounts held with such institutions. These possibilities have 
existed and still exist, regardless of the introduction of the Internet. The question 
then is what the additional benefit of having the Internet is to money launderers 
if they either have to transport cash to ill-regulated territories or channel their 
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proceeds into the regular financial system before transferring them to ill-
supervised financial institutions. If money launderers were to succeed in 
channelling their funds into regulated financial systems prior to transferring their 
money to ill-regulated areas, existing anti-money laundering measures would 
already have failed. Any additional money laundering risk posed by Internet-
based payment systems would therefore appear limited, as long as these systems 
are single-loop systems without the capability of transferring value between two 
parties without the involvement of a financial institution. 
 
 
Non-face-to-face transactions and know-your-customer 
principles 
 
A second way in which the use of new forms of electronic payment could 
arguably lead to users remaining anonymous is the fact that electronic payment 
schemes allow transactions to be carried out in a non-face-to-face manner. To 
carry out transactions customers, including money launderers, no longer need to 
go to a branch office. As a result of this, an important point of initial suspicion is 
lost (FATF, 2000b: §9; Bonorris and Coates, 1997: 38), know-your-customer 
principles are difficult to enforce (FATF, 1997b: Appendix §21; Lilley, 2000: 
117), and, regarding Internet banking applications, problems concerning 
anonymity are reportedly aggravated if procedures allow accounts to be opened 
without any face-to-face contact, or without a link with already existing 
accounts (FATF, 2001: §8). 
 What can be said against these arguments? First of all, the question is to what 
extent transactions still needed to be carried out face-to-face, even before the 
advent of the Internet and new means of electronic payment. After all, it has 
already been mentioned that, in a constant drive to make payments more 
efficient, the dematerialisation of money and the diminishing need for face-to-
face contact have been constant factors. Once an account is opened for instance, 
transactions can be carried out using traditional paper transfer forms and, using 
debit cards, cash can be withdrawn from ATMs, all without any interaction 
between customers and employees of a financial institution. Neither traditional 
transfer forms nor debit cards are regularly associated with money-laundering 
risks. According to some, a comparison with more traditional means of payment 
is incorrect, as ‘the crucial point with on-line banking is that the customer can 
conduct transactions without any employee interaction at all’ (FATF, 2000b: 
§9). It is difficult to see, however, how traditional means of payment, such as 
those just mentioned, would force a criminal intent on hiding his identity, 
physically to contact a financial institution. Moreover, the FATF has claimed 
that, with new electronic payment systems, financial institutions can only assume 
that following its issuance an instrument is only used by the nominal holder 
(FATF, 2000b: §11); but this situation, too, is not different from that 
encountered with respect to traditional means of payment. Using front 
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companies, front men, false identification, etc., it has always been possible for 
criminals to mislead financial institutions about the beneficial owners of 
accounts. That this situation is not entirely uncommon is illustrated by the fact 
that, in 2001, it was reported in the Netherlands that criminals paid youngsters 
for control of their accounts for fraudulent purposes. The youngsters would give 
the criminals their bank cards and PIN codes, after which the criminals would 
channel funds, obtained through fraud with transfer forms, to the youngsters’ 
accounts. The funds would subsequently be withdrawn, leaving the account 
holders with a debt, and the risk of criminal prosecution(NVB, 2001: 2). 
 Secondly, the question can be asked whether the introduction of electronic 
payment systems really leads to the loss of an important point of initial suspicion. 
Anti-money laundering measures in well-regulated areas have been known for 
more than a decade now, and if these measures have any effects, it stands to 
reason to assume that, by now, money launderers will have taken their own 
countermeasures, for instance, by moving cash depositing activities to less 
regulated territories. In this way, indicators of suspiciousness, such as a customer 
being nervous for no apparent reason, have, over the years, probably lost some 
of their effectiveness. However, the introduction of transaction monitoring 
software opens new possibilities both for obtaining investigative leads and for 
enforcing know-your-customer principles. 
 That monitoring systems, or at least the types of information that can be 
obtained through the use of such systems, are useful can be illustrated by an 
example given by the FATF itself. In this example, the FATF described how a 
bank’s suspicions regarding certain transactions were raised by such factors as 
‘numerous large volume wire transfers, frequent transactions following unusual 
repetitive patterns (…), and the fact that the direction of the wire transfer often 
did not appear to correspond to normal or expected business activity’ (FATF, 
2002b: §30). As recently as 2000, however, the FATF still wondered whether 
the effectiveness of monitoring systems might not be limited (FATF, 2001: §9). 
Even if this should turn out to be the case, the automated monitoring of 
transactions is likely to be more effective than manually checking an ever-
growing number of transactions, a number that had reached an average of several 
millions per day per financial institution even before the new forms of electronic 
payment were introduced. 
 The possible counterargument that, in a digital age, cash is no longer 
important appears to be untenable. Of course, it is true that criminal activities, 
such as fraud and the looting of accounts by corrupt political leaders, produce 
proceeds in the form of transferable money that do not need to be placed 
separately in the financial system. This situation, however, already existed before 
the introduction of the Internet and electronic payment systems, and has not 
changed since. Moreover, it appears that cash is still an important means of 
payment in criminal dealings. After all, cases in which drug dealers are paid with 
chip cards or in which substantial amounts of electronic cash are found on a 
criminal’s computer have not materialised yet. The FATF itself indicates that 
cash is still important in relation to certain forms of crime, such as the drugs 
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trade. Here, it should be remembered that it was especially the ‘War on Drugs’ 
in the 1980s that initiated the fight against money laundering.  
 It has been reported, for instance in the German magazine Der Spiegel 
(Knauer, 2000), that nowadays certain types of drugs can be ordered over the 
Internet and paid for by credit card. This may be true, but it should also be 
realised that, in this report, the names of the Dutch companies involved as well 
as those of the employees interviewed were explicitly mentioned so that, had 
they been desired, counter-measures would not have been too difficult. 
Moreover, one is tempted to think that, with drugs being sold over the Internet, 
delivered by mail, and paid for by credit card, thus generating an audit trail, 
there would have been sufficient leads for law enforcers to start working with. 
 With respect to a person located in one country wanting to open an account, 
via the Internet, with a financial institution situated in a second country, it can 
also be pointed out that in such a case the financial institution could make a deal 
with organisations in the first country, for instance, the postal services, to have 
them carry out identification procedures with respect to potential customers in 
the first country. 
 
  
Encryption 
 
A third way in which anonymity has been said to arise from the use of new 
electronic payment systems concerns the use of encryption techniques in such 
systems. The fear existed that data encryption would lock out law enforcement 
access to financial information (FATF, 1999: §§ 27 and 33; G-10, 1997: 17) 
while digitised money, if encrypted, would supposedly be unseen so that trying 
to trace and control it would be an absurdity (Rahn, 1999: 71). These general 
remarks do not do justice to the various applications of data encryption 
technologies in electronic payment systems. Data encryption can be used to 
ensure data security and to create various levels of anonymity. 
 With respect to data security, the aim of encryption is to prevent eaves-
dropping on and alterations being made to messages while in transit. An example 
of encryption technology for data security purposes is the SSL protocol that 
nowadays is widely used to secure credit card data to allow purchases on the 
Internet and prevent credit card fraud. The use of data encryption for security 
purposes is therefore based on good grounds. And certainly if encryption is used 
in remote access instruments in which there is a link with an account held with a 
financial institution, there is little reason to believe that the use of encryption 
technologies would hamper money-laundering investigations. After all, just as 
paper transfer orders can be sent to financial institutions in sealed envelopes, 
which financial institutions have to open in order to carry out the actual 
transactions, data encryption is used in remote access instruments to ensure that 
messages can be sent safely between users and issuers without eavesdropping. 
Issuers still have to decrypt and open the messages, however, in order to know 
what users want them to do. In their turn, these financial institutions are 
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generally subject to unusual or suspicious transactions reporting requirements 
and, at least in well-regulated areas, cooperate with law enforcers. In this respect, 
when confronted with the US Commerce Department’s encryption rules for 
banks and the suggestion that Columbian drug lords in Cali could use 
unbreakable encryption to conduct money laundering through Citibank in New 
York, the then director of the FBI, L. Freeh, said: 
 
“[t]he law enforcement community requires the “plaintext” version of records 
and documents in order to investigate criminal activity. Banks and financial 
institutions, bound by established laws and statutory requirements (…), have 
historically cooperated with law enforcement in providing such records during 
an ongoing investigation. The FBI encourages the use of robust encryption by 
these institutions for authentication and to protect the security of the financial 
transaction. Banks and financial institutions, in concert with approved 
government regulations and statutory requirements, allow for immediate law 
enforcement access to the “plaintext” version of any encrypted information 
requested pursuant to proper legal authority” (Freeh, 1998). 
 
It is also interesting to note that, at a time when some governments have placed 
restrictions on the export of certain robust encryption systems, the US 
government has granted licences for the export of strong encryption systems for 
use in the financial industry (Bonorris and Coates, 1997: 41). 
 As indicated above, data encryption techniques can also be used to achieve 
various degrees of anonymity in electronic payment systems. A protocol that 
creates a limited form of anonymity is the SET protocol. When using this 
protocol in consumer-to-merchants payments, merchants have access to 
customers’ purchase information but not to their financial data, whereas the 
situation with respect to the financial institutions settling the payment is just the 
other way around. The important thing here is that there is a clear audit trail, 
comparable to that generated during the traditional use of credit and debit cards. 
 An example of an electronic payment system in which cryptography provides 
stronger anonymity is the eCash electronic money system. It has been said of this 
system that its encryption is ‘so powerful that it cannot keep track of how its 
customers spend their money’(Welling and Rickman, 1998: 322). Payer 
anonymity is indeed a unique feature of eCash. However, the literature suggests 
that the anonymity available in the eCash system is taken to be representative of 
electronic money schemes in general, a point of view that is incorrect. It should 
also be realised that, in principle, the eCash system was a single-loop system, and 
that eCash value was issued in specific currencies. In an internationally operating 
eCash scheme, mechanisms for clearing and settling transactions, redeeming and 
exchanging different currencies should therefore be available, leading to the 
question of whether well-regulated financial institutions would want to 
participate in an international system of which less well-regulated entities might 
also be part. Although it would have been possible in the eCash system to 
download value onto computer hard disks and then physically transport these 
hard disks to any desired location, criminals would still have to redeem value and 
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exchange currencies. It is also important to note that the eCash system is no 
longer available and that it never operated internationally. Just as in the case of 
cash, withdrawing or depositing large amounts of eCash might also lead to the 
reporting of unusual or suspicious transactions, triggered by the use of 
monitoring software. In this respect, the eCash system has been said to be 
compliant with existing reporting requirements (Edgar, 1999: 25). If nevertheless 
problems arise with respect to electronic money systems and money laundering, 
it should not prove too difficult to apply the anti-money laundering measures 
aimed at cash to digital cash systems, especially in view of the analogy between 
the two means of payment.  
 
 
Use of the Internet 
 
Finally, it has also been claimed that the use of the Internet as a means of 
communication and platform for economic activity can assist transactions 
involving electronic payment systems to remain anonymous. Electronic 
commerce for instance, supposedly could not flourish without anonymous 
means of payment. From a more technical point of view, it has also been said 
that, for instance, the use of Telnet, anonymous re-mailers, and a lack of 
uniformity in maintaining on-line communication records by service providers 
(FATF, 2001: §14) may all help criminals, such as money launderers, hide their 
identities. Internet service providers have no means of identifying persons 
accessing bank accounts through the Internet (Lilley, 2000: 115). The remarks 
concerning e-mails and the inability of Internet service providers (ISPs) to 
identify persons accessing accounts in particular appear somewhat odd and have 
to be viewed against the background of the issue of data encryption. Encrypting 
data to protect it from alteration and eavesdropping while in transit has been 
compared to putting a letter into an envelope in order to prevent unauthorised 
persons from gaining access to the content of the letter. This parallel can be 
extended, because just as employees of postal services do not have access to the 
information contained in closed letters, ISPs do not know who is accessing on-
line bank accounts through their systems. It should be sufficient, with respect to 
remote access instruments, that financial institutions know with whom they are 
doing business. If need be, checking information concerning Internet traffic, 
such as log-in data, with ISPs might give investigators some information, but 
because of the possible use of mobile communications and dynamic Internet-
addresses, that is Internet addresses that are not unique to specific devices 
connected to the Internet, the value of this information may be limited. Any 
remaining potential problems again appear to lie in the offering of financial 
services from unregulated areas through the Internet. 
 As regards the issue of the supposed anonymity offered by electronic payment 
systems, it certainly looks as if the anticipated problems have failed to materialise, 
or at least as if money laundering risks are limited. It should also be noted that, 
even in the absence of electronic payment systems, there are various alternatives 
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for money launderers to conceal their identity, including the use of front men, 
front companies, false identification, International Business Corporations, etc. 
The discussion of the issue of anonymity in relation to electronic money systems 
therefore seems to have been conducted on the basis of false premises.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Are electronic payment systems really a new type of detergent allowing for 
cleaner laundry, are they really the greatest boon to money launderers, and do 
they really herald a money-laundering Apocalypse? Judging from the material 
presented, the answer at present is no.  
 With the benefit of hindsight, the conclusion that electronic payment systems 
do not present the money-laundering threat once thought should perhaps not 
come as too much of a surprise. First of all, it was not obvious as recently as five 
years ago that the development of new, often Internet-based forms of electronic 
payment would take the course they did, a course different from what was 
expected originally. For various reasons, many Internet-based electronic 
payment systems have failed to achieve broad customer acceptance as is 
evidenced by the failure of many start-up companies active in the area of 
payments. It has turned out that, in the end, large, established financial 
institutions with a proven track record and sufficient economic muscle are better 
placed to issue payment systems than smaller, high-tech start-up companies 
which have sometimes come forward with innovative payment solutions. 
 Secondly, it appears that the characteristics of electronic payment systems 
have often been misrepresented in the literature. Electronic payment systems are 
generally not as anonymous and difficult to track as people have been led to 
believe. In the vast majority of cases, anonymity in electronic payment systems 
either does not exist or is limited to merchants having access to order 
information and financial institutions having access to customers’ financial data. 
Encryption is used to ensure the security of transactions, or provide some level 
of anonymity, but this technology does not tend to make transactions 
untraceable. 
 Thirdly, the financial industry is a sector that, typically, is heavily regulated. 
Perhaps again with hindsight, it might have been expected that possible legal 
loopholes created by the issuance and use of new electronic means of payment 
would, in most cases, be taken care of without too much delay. Certainly in 
financially well-regulated geographical areas, the suggestion that, in addition to 
supervised financial institutions, an unregulated sector offering electronic 
payments could develop seems unlikely. 
 In addition to considerations concerning the development of electronic 
payment systems, their general characteristics, and the financial institutions as the 
issuers of such systems, it must be noted that, since the late 1980s, anti-money 
laundering regulations have undergone considerable development. Whereas early 
anti-money laundering initiatives were solely, or primarily, aimed at funds 
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generated by drugs-related offences, the scope of such initiatives has been 
extended over the years, both with respect to the types of predicate offences 
underlying money-laundering activities and the parties addressed. Nowadays, the 
scope of anti-money laundering regulations often includes a whole range of 
serious crimes, while institutions and persons that have to comply with these 
regulations include financial institutions and, at least in the European Union, also 
lawyers, the sellers of valuable items, etc.  
 Moreover, the events of 11 September 2001 have played their part in putting 
money laundering and terrorist financing in the spotlight, and have resulted in 
various initiatives affecting the financial sector and the issue of money 
laundering. Together with the already existing fight against money laundering 
and issues of consumer protection, these terrorist attacks have also stimulated the 
use of transaction monitoring systems. These systems, which enable financial 
institutions to keep records of who made what kind of payment, for what 
amount, when, where, and to whom, are currently being implemented by 
various financial institutions worldwide. Even if this kind of monitoring turns 
out to be less than 100 percent effective in detecting money laundering 
activities, it still seems likely to be more effective than going through the 
millions of transactions which financial institutions process each day manually. 
 Furthermore, the apparent lack of evidence supporting any claim that 
electronic payments currently pose a money-laundering threat should be noted. 
Some say this lack of evidence only shows that proper detection techniques have 
not yet been developed or that the best fraud schemes are so good that they are 
not discovered. Of course, the absence of evidence is not the same as evidence 
of absence. But the statement that good fraud schemes remain unseen almost 
seems to suggest that absence of evidence is a kind of proof of existence, and 
clearly this can never be the case.  
 The conclusion that electronic payment systems do not present the money 
laundering threat once thought does not stand on its own, but is supported from 
various sides. In 1996, the Bank for International Settlements, for instance, 
concluded with respect to electronic money that, ‘in most cases, the security 
features that suppliers intend to implement (…) might make these products less 
attractive for use in criminal activities than many existing payment instruments’ 
(BIS, 1996: 25). In 2004, and thus with the benefit of eight years of experience, 
the Bank for International Settlements still supported this point of view as is 
clear from the following statement (BIS, 2004: 7). 
 Many of the security features of e-money schemes, including the limits on 
the value that can be stored on cards, make them less attractive for the purposes 
of money laundering and other criminal abuses. Laws combating money 
laundering are applicable to e-money schemes, as they are to credit institutions, 
which in many countries are the sole issuers of e-money.  
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Others have stated that ‘[o]nly fully anonymous digital cash stands much chance 
of aiding in financial crimes such as money laundering’.19 As explained, such 
systems do not exist and are unlikely to be introduced in the future. Moreover, 
the question remains which rational criminal would want to invest in expensive 
efforts to launder money in a new, well-secured electronic money system 
(Lelieveldt, 1998: 82). According to the FATF, ‘[t]here is no single design 
feature of the various e-money systems currently available or envisaged which 
will make them especially attractive to money launderers’ (FATF, 1997b: §64). 
Although this statement was made in 1997, there is no reason to believe the 
present situation is any different, especially when keeping the above-mentioned 
2004 statement by the Bank for International Settlements in mind. More in 
general, and also including on-line banking systems, the FATF has stated that 
measures like putting limits on the amounts of value that can be transferred using 
cyber-payment systems, linking usage of on-line payment instruments to 
accounts that have been established in a face-to-face manner, enforcing know-
your-customer principles, and developing information technology capabilities to 
detect suspicious on-line transactions could all help deal with the potential 
vulnerability of cyber-payments to money laundering (FATF, 2000b: §13). 
Moreover, certain money-laundering counter-measures, presumably such as 
those just mentioned, could be easily added to the systems, according to the 
FATF (FATF,1997b: §87). In 1997, the FATF wrote that ‘it is premature to 
consider prescriptive solutions to theoretical problems’(FATF, 1997b: §67). In 
2005, problems do not seem to have developed much beyond that stage. 
 It now seems safe to conclude that, at present, electronic payment systems do 
not pose the money laundering threat once thought, and that, with money 
laundering and terrorist financing high on the agenda and the availability of 
transaction monitoring systems, law enforcers are perhaps better positioned than 
ever in the fight against money laundering. 
                                                 
19  Mondex chairman Tim Jones as quoted in Froomkin (1996). 
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An assessment of prospective changes in  
cross-border crime after Estonia’s  
accession to the European Union1 
An assessment of prospective changes in cross-border crime 
Anna Markina 
Jüri Saar2 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Cross-border crime related to Eastern Europe was already an issue before May 
2004. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 created new opportunities and led to a 
considerable increase in, and diversification of, the phenomenon (Van Duyne, 
2001). To the newcomers, the biggest concern of the ‘old EU’ in this regard 
appeared to be the security issue. What would happen to cross-border crime 
after the accession of the ten countries, including Estonia and other former 
Soviet republics, was a question to which various answers have been given.  
 Cross-border crime related to Estonia and the other Baltic states has mainly 
been examined on the basis of the presumption that there would be a movement 
of offenders from these countries to the European Union and a resulting 
worsening of the crime situation in the old member states (Junninen and 
Aromaa, 1999). Such stereotypical assessments are prevalent both in Western 
European public opinion and among law enforcement professionals. The 
attitude they embody is not directed solely at Estonia but at the economically 
less developed newcomers from the East in general. It is an attitude according to 
which these states are seen as jeopardising the former idyll of Europe by bringing 
their problems with them. In it, we can perceive the application of older, but 
more or less similar views to new circumstances, that is, an unwillingness to alter 
earlier attitudes. This is illustrated by an organised crime report for 2002 
prepared by Europol, which concluded, among other things, that Estonian 
organised crime groups had taken complete control of the import of drugs into 
Finland (Europol, 2002). As van Duyne (2001) notes, “particularly the 
association of cross-border crime with organised crime evoked all sorts of 
nightmares” (p.1). Such an attitude is also manifested in popular images of the 
Russian Mafya, which have been successfully used to emphasise the extreme 
danger apparently posed by offenders from the ‘new’ states (Joutsen, 2001).  
                                                 
1  This chapter is based on the results of a research project conducted within the framework of 
public contract 03-175. The research was also supported by Estonian Science Foundation 
grant no 5108. An earlier version of this chapter was published in Iuridica International Law Re-
view, University of Tartu, Vol. 9, pp. 78-88. 
2  Anna Markina and Jüri Saar are respectively lecturer and Associate Professor at the Institute of 
Law of the University of Tartu, Estonia. 
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The research presented in this chapter was conducted in the autumn of 2003, 
several months before Estonia’s accession to the EU. The objective of the study 
was to analyse expert assessments of the state of cross-border crime and possible 
developments following Estonia’s accession to the European Union. The aim 
was not to provide a definitive view of the situation and its probable 
developments, but to offer a comprehensive analysis of expert evaluations on the 
assumption that this will provide a picture of the prevailing discourse on cross-
border crime. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
There are two main problems associated with the task of assessing cross-border 
crime. First of all, the phenomenon is vaguely defined. The concept could cover 
offences that range from shoplifting by Estonian teenagers in Stockholm to 
sophisticated schemes concerning tobacco smuggling through several countries. 
Another problem is the lack of agreement with regard to a method for assessing 
cross-border crime and (even more) with regard to a method for predicting 
future developments in the area. 
 The main problem associated with the task was estimation of the impact of 
the new socio-political situation on the development of crime. No previous EU 
enlargement had been as big as that of 2004, when ten states joined the Union. 
The economic and social conditions of the accession countries differed 
considerably from those of the already-existing members. The enlargement has 
affected conditions not only in accession countries such as Estonia but also in the 
European Union as a whole. In other words, all the factors that need to be taken 
into account to predict future trends in cross-border crime are characterised by a 
high degree of uncertainty. 
 From several possible approaches to the research, the Delphi method was 
selected. It is a method that involves questioning a group of top experts in an 
area, and is designed to be used when there is a lack of knowledge or a lack of 
agreement about an issue, or else when a structuring of individual 
communication is required. The main idea behind the method is that a group of 
experts yields a better result than the most competent expert belonging to the 
group (Powell, 2003).  
 As Lynn et al (1998) point out, the Delphi method is an iterative process 
designed to establish a consensus among the experts involved (cited in Keeney et 
al, 2001). The process begins with the administration of a questionnaire or an 
interview with the aim of collecting initial information about the issue being 
studied in order to generate ideas to be evaluated later in the process. Feedback 
from the first questionnaire is usually provided in a form of second questionnaire 
that summarises the issues raised during the first round; and in the second and 
subsequent rounds of the process members of the experts’ panel are provided 
with their own responses as well as with the responses of other panellists. The 
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experts then are asked to reconsider their opinions in the light of the other 
panellists’ responses. The rounds continue until consensus is reached (Keeney et 
al, 2001). How many rounds are required, depends on whether full consensus is 
needed, on the resources available to the researcher and so forth. Usually, there 
are two to four rounds of the process (Rowe and Wright, 1999). 
 Among the shortcomings of the Delphi technique is the decline in the 
response rate that takes place from one round to another (Rowe and Wright, 
1999), and a lack of evidence on the reliability and validity of the method 
(Keeney et al, 2001) – though Keeney et al, suggest that it should not be judged 
according to positivist research criteria. It has also been suggested that the 
method may do no more than tap collective biases or shared imagery. 
 The present study included interviews with officials drawn from Estonian law 
enforcement authorities, such officials all being senior policy analysts and senior 
operations managers working in areas related to cross-border crime. Thus they 
comprised the leading officials of the relevant departments of the Police Board, 
the Security Police Board, the Border Guard Administration, customs, the court 
system, the Prosecutor’s Office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of 
Justice, and the Ministry of Finance. 
 Information on the problem being examined was first gathered separately 
from each expert. The information thus obtained was summarised, and an 
overview of the group’s perception of the problem was prepared. This process 
included the highlighting of areas on which the experts agreed and those where 
dissenting opinions were expressed. The dissenting opinions were transcribed 
and fed back to the experts so that they could express their opinions about the 
causes of the dissenting opinions and argue their case. Given the aim of the 
study, as well as the time and resources available, it was not considered necessary 
that consensus among the experts should be reached. 
 In the initial stage, we distributed 64 questionnaires. These were sent out via 
personal e-mails as we wished to ascertain the ideas and beliefs of the experts 
individually considered, rather than tapping the official positions of the 
institutions for which they worked. The experts from the Ministry of Finance 
either did not reply or said that they had insufficient knowledge of issues of 
cross-border crime, maintaining that they did not consider such matters as falling 
within their area of competence. Though in the end some answers were 
obtained, it was relatively difficult to elicit replies from the officials belonging to 
the Security Police (KAPO) and the Tax Fraud Investigation Centre of the Tax 
Board (MUK), and we were unable to obtain any opinions from experts 
belonging of the Border Guard Administration. 24 questionnaires were returned 
in total. 
 The questionnaire distributed at the first stage contained eleven open 
questions, the aim being to collect information on how cross-border crime was 
defined by the experts working in the field. 
 For the second stage, the information collected at stage one was summarised 
and used to prepare three survey instruments. One questionnaire focussed on 
changes in cross-border crime following accession to the EU; another dealt with 
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co-operation with other countries and EU institutions; the third was concerned 
with the efficiency of various agencies’ measures for controlling cross-border 
crime. In this way, members of the panel received generalised feedback about 
how the other experts in the field defined the problem of cross-border crime 
and what developments in cross-border crime they saw taking place in the 
future. The experts were asked to express their opinions on the issues raised, the 
questions sent to the panel at this second stage being pre-coded in order to allow 
us to obtain some quantitative data. Answers were obtained from 19 experts. At 
the third stage, the information gathered at the second stage was summarised and 
a consolidated report prepared.  
 
 
Changes in cross-border crime  
 
First of all, the majority of experts did not consider the date of EU enlargement 
to be crucial from the point of view of the development of cross-border crime. 
Estonia’s accession to the EU was the culmination of a process of integration 
that started at the beginning of the 1990s. In the experts’ opinion the critical 
date from the point of view of changes in cross-border crime will be Estonia’s 
expected accession to the Schengen border agreement in 2007. 
 In order to establish which phenomena fall into the category of cross-border 
crime, the experts were first asked freely to list forms of cross-border crime. The 
outcome was a list of types of criminal behaviour and criminal structures, which 
were divided into eight subgroups: migration of crime; criminal organisations; 
illegal migration and trafficking in women; drug related crimes; economic crimes 
and counterfeiting; smuggling; corruption, and other crime categories. The 
experts were then asked to assess what would happen with regard to each of the 
eight categories after Estonia acceded to the European Union. 
 
 
Migration of crime 
 
This category refers to criminal phenomena associated with the movement of 
people from one country to another. The experts assessed the migration of crime 
in great detail, and the majority of them predicted an increase in the migration 
of crime upon Estonia’s accession to the European Union. The experts expected 
that the greatest increases in this category would relate to the hiding of Estonian 
fugitives in other countries and to crimes committed by ‘new immigrants’ to 
Estonia. The immigrants referred to include persons from countries, such as 
China and other Asian countries, that are far away. Not very surprisingly, we 
find here the same stereotypical attitudes towards immigrants from poorer 
countries as those expressed in Western European countries with respect to 
Eastern European countries. 
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Table 1. Assessment of changes in migration of crime (N persons=19) 
 
  Considerable 
increase 
Some 
increase 
No 
change 
Some 
decrease 
Considerable 
decrease  
Hiding of fugitives 
from Estonia in other 
EU member states 
10 5 3   
Number of crimes 
committed by ‘new 
immigrants’ in Estonia 
4 11 3   
Number of crimes 
committed by Estonian 
residents in other EU 
member states 
3 11 5   
Number of crimes 
committed by residents 
of EU member states 
in Estonia 
3 8 8   
Involvement of citi-
zens of other EU 
countries as victims of 
crimes committed in 
Estonia 
 9 10   
Hiding of fugitives 
from other EU mem-
ber states in Estonia  
2 5 11   
Involvement of Esto-
nian citizens as victims 
in crimes committed in 
other EU member 
states 
 5 14   
Number of crimes 
committed by residents 
of CIS countries in 
Estonia 
 3 13 2  
 
The expected changes in the migration of crime are first of all related to the 
increased freedom of movement consequential upon EU enlargement. Since 
people will take advantage of enlargement to travel to other EU countries more 
frequently, the risk of becoming a victim of crime will increase as well. Experts 
predict that the abolition of border controls will induce criminals to travel from 
Estonia to other EU countries more frequently than law-abiding citizens. 
 An increase in the number of crimes committed by residents of the CIS in 
Estonia was considered least likely, due to the role of the Estonian/Russian 
border as a well-protected external frontier of the European Union upon EU 
accession. 
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Criminal organisations 
 
In the responses provided by the experts, cross-border crime was often associated 
with criminal organisations. The experts for the most part agreed that there 
would be an expansion in the area of activity of criminal organisations, seeing 
this as the natural consequence of an increase in the free movement of persons. 
The problems posed by ‘new immigrants’ were seen as being the formation of 
criminal organisations in Estonia by Vietnamese and Chinese etc. gangs, along 
with the merger of such organisations. According to the experts, the role of 
Estonia as a transit country would increase because of the activities, targeted at 
the West, of criminal organisations. An increase in the size of criminal 
organisations, specialisation in certain types of crime, and a growth in armed 
conflict among criminal organisation over the control of territory were all 
considered most unlikely. 
 
Table 2. Assessment of criminal organisations (N=18) 
 
 Considerable 
increase 
Some 
increase 
No 
change 
Some 
decrease 
Considerable 
decrease  
Expansion of areas of activity of 
criminal organisations 
3 13 2   
Formation of criminal organisa-
tions by ‘new immigrants’ in 
Estonia 
5 10 3   
Merging of criminal organisa-
tions from different countries 
4 10 4   
Role of Estonia as transit 
country in activities, targeted at 
the West, of Russian organisa-
tions 
3 8 7   
Specialisation of criminal units 
in particular types of crime 
1 6 10 1  
Armed conflict over control of 
territory 
3 3 10 1  
Increase in size of criminal 
organisations 
2 4 12   
 
The replies revealed that in Estonia, the prevailing opinion is that organised 
crime is, above all, a problem created by ‘outsiders’, rather than something to 
which given environmental conditions may be more or less conducive. All the 
areas of activity of criminal organisations that were expected to grow were 
related to people coming from outside Estonia. 
 
 
Illegal migration and trafficking in women  
 
The experts’ forecasts included predictions about the illegal inflow of immigrants 
and labour into the European Union. Estonia was predominantly viewed as a 
transit country, and in terms of the experts’ predictions of increases, illegal 
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migration from the CIS countries occupied first position. This was followed by 
illegal migration from other countries via Estonia into other Western countries, 
while the trafficking of women from Estonia into Western countries was ranked 
third. The trafficking of women from other countries into Estonia and illegal 
migration from other countries into Estonia were least likely to be predicted to 
increase. As to the reasons why Estonia was unlikely to be regarded as a very 
attractive destination for illegal immigrants in the near future, respondents 
pointed to the relatively low standard of living and underdeveloped social 
benefits system compared to the other member states of the European Union. 
 
Table 3. Assessment of illegal migration and trafficking in women (N=19) 
 
 Consider-
able increase 
Some 
increase 
No 
change 
Some 
decrease 
Considerable 
decrease  
Illegal migration from CIS 
countries via Estonia to other 
Western countries 
4 12 3   
Illegal migration from other 
countries via Estonia to 
Western countries 
3 11 5   
Trafficking in women from 
Estonia to other Western 
countries 
3 7 8   
Illegal migration from CIS 
countries to Estonia 
3 7 8 1  
Illegal migration from other 
countries to Estonia 
1 7 11   
Trafficking in women from 
other countries to Estonia 
 6 9 2  
 
The experts obviously considered the dangers related to trafficking in women in 
Estonia to be less significant than might have been expected on the basis of the 
international attention paid to this matter in recent years. The institutions that 
have been most active in studying, and providing information about, trafficking 
in Estonia are the Nordic Council of Ministries and the International 
Organisation for Migration. The objective of the recent campaign aimed against 
trafficking in women in the Northern countries and the Baltic states, was “to 
map the readiness for recognition of trafficking in persons as a social problem 
and combating it, as well as notification of strategically important social groups 
of the reasons for the phenomenon and other accompanying problems” (Nordic 
Council of Ministries, 2002). The report on the campaign notes, among other 
things, that the quantity of available information concerning the nature of 
trafficking in persons in Estonia is rather limited and that understanding of the 
negative effects of trafficking in persons and prostitution on society is insufficient 
and in some cases nonexistent. Yet it could be inferred that state officials were 
not considerably better informed than ordinary citizens. They did not perceive 
that combating the problem fell within their remit, and there was no national 
action plan for combating trafficking in persons. 
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Drug related crimes 
 
The experts clearly distinguished between the consumption, transit and 
production of drugs. The phenomena most likely to be predicted to expand 
were the transit of drugs from the CIS countries through Estonia to other 
Western countries, and the trade in drugs within Estonia. The experts also 
unanimously predicted the development of international networks of drug 
traders in Estonia and a growth in drug consumption. The production of drugs 
by Estonian people in other countries, and the transit of drugs through Estonia 
to the CIS countries were less likely to be predicted to increase. 
 
Table 4. Assessment of drug related crimes (N=19) 
 
 Considerable 
increase 
Some 
increase 
No 
change 
Some 
decrease 
Considerable 
decrease  
Transit of drugs from CIS 
countries through Estonia to 
other Western countries 
5 10 4   
Trading in drugs in Estonia  4 10 4   
Development of international 
networks of drug dealers in 
Estonia 
2 10 5   
Transit of drugs through 
Estonia from one EU country 
to another  
1 11 5   
Consumption of drugs in 
Estonia 
3 9 6   
Production of drugs in Estonia 4 5 7 2  
Transit of drugs from other 
Western countries through 
Estonia to CIS countries 
2 5 9   
Production of drugs by Esto-
nian residents in other coun-
tries 
3 3 12   
 
Experts’ assessments of the production of drugs in Estonia yielded contrasting 
results. Most thought that production would significantly increase or remain the 
same. Two experts, however, were convinced that such activities would decline 
in the future. The lack of consensus may be due to the varying degree to which 
the experts were informed about the problem and to the fact that the 
production, supply and consumption of drugs vary with the specific substance 
concerned. 
 
 
Economic crimes and counterfeiting  
 
Two types of economic crime were highlighted in the responses of the experts, 
namely misappropriation of money from EU funds and money laundering. The 
former was expected to increase significantly. The Director General of the 
European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) predicted that Estonia would experience a 
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considerable increase in the risk of fraud upon accession to the European Union, 
as attempts would be made to import goods from Russia via Estonia into the 
European Union, using forged documents. Meanwhile subsidies made available 
to Estonian agricultural producers would also be the object of fraudsters 
(Tänavsuu, 2003a). According to the data made available to the Ministry of 
Finance, at the end of 2003, no money had been misappropriated from EU 
funds in Estonia.  Despite this, the Agricultural Registers and Information Board 
had rejected 20 project applications and submitted them for investigation to the 
Security Police. It was anticipated that after the EU Structural Funds were 
opened to Estonia later, in 2004, the amount of attempted fraud would increase 
(Tänavsuu, 2003b). 
 
Table 5. Assessment of economic crimes and counterfeiting (N=19) 
 
 Considerable 
increase 
Some 
increase 
No 
change 
Some 
decrease 
Considerable 
decrease  
Misuse of money  
from EU funds 
11 5 2   
Money laundering 6 9 4   
Circulating of  
counterfeit money 
3 10 4 1  
Tax fraud 6 5 7   
Counterfeiting of passports 
and other documents 
4 7 7 1  
Counterfeiting of money 2 8 6 1  
 
The assessments according to which money laundering in Estonia is, above all, 
affected by relations with the republics of the former Soviet Union, are in line 
with the fact that all the cases of international money laundering that have 
reached the stage of investigation have been related to Russia or other successor 
states of the Soviet Union (Saar et al., 2003). Although the local situation with 
respect to money laundering is, in terms of international comparisons, seen as 
relatively positive, some areas remain insufficiently regulated. The progress 
report completed in July 2003 states that, with respect to attempts to combat 
money laundering, Estonia generally meets the criteria established in the relevant 
chapter of the EU negotiations. At the same time, attention was paid to the need 
for supplementary legislation on the supervision of gambling (European Union 
Secretariat of State Chancellery, 2003). Estonia does not have an official system 
for ensuring that financial institutions comply with the notification obligation, 
and the Financial Intelligence Unit lacks the formal authority to request 
additional information from banks (Tenusaar, 2002). 
 The experts predicted an increase in the spread and, to a lesser extent, 
production of counterfeit money. It is believed that as the result of Estonia’s 
accession to the European Union, the forging of passports and other documents 
may become more frequent, as residents of the CIS will make more intensive 
use of these counterfeit documents in order to reach Western European 
countries through Estonia. 
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Smuggling  
 
One type of criminal offence that is expected to undergo a significant increase is 
smuggling, especially that arising from the desire to avoid excise duties on 
tobacco, alcohol and fuel, and from differential rates of excise generally. The 
area that is least expected to expand is the smuggling of arms. At the moment, 
trafficking in arms is insignificant in Estonia, something that is also indicated by 
the information available to the Customs Board. For example, in 2002, customs 
officials seized two firearms and 21 cut-and-thrust weapons. The experts 
predicted a slight growth in fuel smuggling. The period 1999–2001 saw a 
considerable expansion of the trade in illicit fuel, while the volume of fuel seized 
by customs officials in 2002 decreased again. 
 According to the Europol report for 2000, commodity smuggling has grown 
exponentially throughout the EU since the abolition of intra-Community 
borders in 1993 (EU Organised Crime Report, 2002). The Estonian experts 
expected an intensification of alcohol and tobacco smuggling after accession to 
the European Union. According to the Estonian Institute of Economic 
Research, 37% of smokers in Estonia buy illegal tobacco products and the 
proportion of illegal tobacco products in domestic consumption amounted to 
approximately 26–27% in 2002 (Aherma et al., 2002). The excise rates for 
cigarettes and smoking tobacco will be harmonised with EU requirements by 31 
December 2009, those on cigars and cigarillos from the time of accession. The 
excise rates for cigarettes are being gradually increased in the period 2001 to 
2009. The Ministry of Finance has prepared a schedule for harmonising excise 
duties, while the excise rates presented in the schedule may be subject to change 
depending on consumer demand in the cigarettes market (Chamber of 
Commerce, 2003). According to the information available to the Customs 
Board, the smuggling of tobacco products has increased over the last few years. 
 
Table 6. Assessment of smuggling (N=19) 
 
 Considerable 
increase 
Some 
increase 
No 
change 
Some 
decrease 
Considerable 
decrease  
Illicit trade arising 
from varying tax rates 
in EU member states 
7 8 2 1  
Smuggling of tobacco 2 12 4 1  
Smuggling of alcohol 1 12 5 1  
Smuggling of fuel 1 11 6 1  
Smuggling of other 
prohibited goods 
1 9 8 1  
Smuggling of stolen 
goods and objects 
2 7 9 1  
Smuggling of arms 1 5 11 1  
 
The above-mentioned survey conducted by the Estonian Institute of Economic 
Research indicated that the share of the market of illegal cigarettes in Estonia 
was stable. Proceeding from that, one may claim that at least some illicit tobacco 
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remains in Estonia. According to the information of the Finnish researchers 
Junninen and Aromaa (1999), cigarettes are smuggled from Estonia into Finland. 
Larger amounts of illicit tobacco are transported from Estonia via Finland to 
Sweden. The scope of smuggling and the professionalism of these activities have 
increased in the past few years. 
 Van Duyne (2003) notes that within the European Union, cigarettes are 
transported from countries applying lower rates of excise duty to countries 
where higher taxes are imposed on tobacco products. The excise rates for 
tobacco will remain relatively low after Estonia’s accession to the European 
Union. Therefore, attention must be paid to the established network of tobacco 
smugglers, including the possible corruption of officials. All this allows one to 
predict a growth in the illicit trade in tobacco products as a consequence of 
Estonia’s accession to the European Union. 
 The market share of illegal alcohol is currently estimated to amount to 25–
30%, and the state loses about 200 million kroons (approximately 13 million 
Euros) in uncollected taxes each year (Josing, 2003). The smuggling of alcohol 
has, however, been decreasing (ibid). 
 
 
Corruption 
 
Corruption is a very complex phenomenon, one that not only involves legal 
regulations, but also perceptions, conventions, patterns of behaviour, and levels 
of trust in state officials. The experts’ assessments of corruption in relation to 
cross-border crime were contradictory. Some expected an increase in 
corruption, others thought that the situation would remain unchanged or 
improve. It was interesting to learn that there were no major variations in 
predictions concerning the level of corruption in the customs, border guard, and 
police forces. 
 
Table 7. Assessment of corruption (N=18) 
 
 Considerable 
increase 
Some 
increase 
No 
change 
Some 
decrease 
Considerable 
decrease  
Corruption in Estonian  
customs authorities 
1 3 5 6 3 
Corruption in Estonian  
border guard 
 3 8 6 1 
Corruption in Estonian police  2 9 6 1 
 
We would note in passing that that according to various data – e.g. police 
statistics, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), 
public-opinion polls and the GRECO report (Saar jt, 2003) – the level of 
corruption in Estonia is one of the lowest in the accession countries. According 
to public-opinion polls, levels of corruption are highest among politicians and 
police officers. However, the Estonian authorities find that the largest number of 
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corruption-related problems occur in local government, the Customs Board, and 
the Border Guard Administration (Open Society Institute, 2002). The European 
Commission has paid attention to the need to combat corruption in the police 
and customs service (EU Secretariat of State Chancellery, 2003). The GRECO 
report also expresses concerns about the vulnerability of customs officers to 
corruption and organised crime (GRECO, 2001). 
 Now that Estonia has acceded to the European Union, certain causes of 
corruption will soon disappear (e.g. privatisation has been completed; the local 
bureaucracy is becoming more transparent and easily controllable; as a result of 
training and EU requirements, standards of public service may change). At the 
same time, new opportunities for corruption will emerge. The state bureaucracy 
will be complemented by the European Union bureaucracy. Because of 
increases in transport flows, the free movement of persons and increasing EU 
subsidies, the opportunities for corruption will expand. It is important to note 
that, as a result of target-oriented ‘enlightenment’ in the area of corruption, 
people will be expected to be more sensitive to it. This may be reflected in a less 
favourable assessment of Estonia’s situation later on (e.g. CPI scores may 
decline). 
 
 
Other crimes 
 
In addition to the crimes discussed above, the experts also highlighted other 
specific crimes in their answers. Crimes related to the use of information 
technology were expected to increase most. Here it may be presumed that the 
predicted increase was related to the general development of technology rather 
than the enlargement of the European Union. 
 For a long time, car thefts have been the speciality of several criminal groups 
active in Estonia. In 2001, the courts for the first time applied the legal tests 
required to establish the existence of organised criminal activity, to cases 
involving the transport of stolen cars from Europe into Estonia. Given the 
absence of border controls between EU countries, it will in future be technically 
easier to bring stolen cars into Estonia. 
 
Table 8. Forecast of changes in crime related to car thefts, terrorism, and  
   use of information technology (N=19) 
 
 Considerable 
increase 
Some 
increase 
No 
change 
Some 
decrease 
Considerable 
decrease  
Crimes related to the use of 
information technology 
8 8 3   
Car thefts 2 8 8 1  
Terrorism 2 7 9   
 
According to some experts, the threat of terrorism will increase as a consequence 
of Estonia’s accession to the European Union; according to others, the level of 
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danger from this quarter will not change. The relatively slight importance of 
terrorism as a type of cross-border crime is to be attributed to Estonia’s relative 
distance and isolation from the major areas of terrorist activity. 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
In general, it can be concluded that, according to the majority of experts, 
Estonia’s accession to the European Union will not be accompanied by abrupt 
changes in cross-border crime. Accession has been a continuous process taking 
place over many years, one to which Estonia’s official accession was merely the 
formal culmination. Estonia’s expected accession to the Schengen border 
agreement in 2007 is considered most important, and this will entail major 
changes. Abolition of controls on internal frontiers facilitates the ‘migration’ of 
ordinary crime within the European Union, so we have to be prepared for the 
migration of crime from Estonia elsewhere and into Estonia from other member 
states. The opportunities for organised criminal groups to act will expand. 
 Estonia is seen as an important transit country in cross-border crime 
involving Russia and the European Union. Just as Western European countries 
perceive threats associated with the ‘strangers’ from Eastern Europe, the attitude 
of the Estonian experts implies a fear of influences from other countries (such as 
Russia and the Asian countries). The fact that the Estonian/Russian border is an 
external border of the European Union creates a growing threat of illegal 
migration and illicit traffic through Estonia, thus imposing great pressures on 
boarder guards and customs officials. The element most clearly conducive to 
Estonia’s development into a transit state for cross-border crime would be 
growing corruption of the employees of the local law enforcement authorities. 
 When considering cross-border crime, the experts primarily proceeded from 
the assumption that most attention would be focused on organised criminal 
groups. It was predicted that the ‘new immigrants’ might form criminal groups 
and that criminal organisations from several countries might merge. According 
to the foreign experts, cross-border crime primarily involves semi-professional 
groups whose activity is not centrally co-ordinated and whose activities are based 
on market developments. 
 Misappropriation of money from EU-related funds will be the most acute 
type of economic criminal offence, according to both local and foreign experts. 
Economic offences are often based on complicated financial schemes the 
detection and prosecution of which requires increasingly complex investigation. 
Specialists at the Ministry of Finance will play an increasingly important role in 
counteracting such crimes, which, it is thought, are not being dealt with 
adequately enough at present. 
 In handling cross-border crime, more emphasis should be placed on an illegal 
activities paradigm, as this would allow for a more adequate assessment of types 
of crimes, and for more efficient prediction and control in particular. In the case 
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of economic offences, attention should be focused on crime prevention strategies 
aimed at the reduction of opportunities. Attempts to limit criminal activities 
must be as broad as possible (not, for example, relying solely, or mainly, on 
police measures). To that end, it is necessary to increase the transparency of 
business activities and decrease the opportunities for committing economic 
offences. The relevant authorities must be constantly ready to identify and 
combat the activities of terrorist associations or networks in Estonia. 
 The main recommendation for the control and prevention of cross-border 
crime is that techniques of crime analysis should be developed, with a focus on 
the methods and mechanisms by which crimes are committed. Continuous 
analysis of crimes committed in the past will allow experience to be drawn upon 
more effectively and will improve the accuracy of predictions of the likelihood 
of offences being committed in the future. 
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The crusaders: Swedish companies in Russia 
and the Baltic states handling uncertainty and 
criminal threats 
Swedish companies in Russia and the Baltic States 
Nils Bagelius1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As a result of the liberation and the transformation process in the former USSR, 
Western companies gained access to new markets in the Baltic States, Russia and 
Ukraine, as well as gaining access to a supply of resources from the East. The 
commercial as well as the non-commercial environment indicates that there are 
large differences in the codes of conduct, traditions and values between the East 
and the West as well difficulties in generating information for Western firms. 
Lack of information creates uncertainty and can be a direct obstacle in the way 
of investment (Lowther, 1997). However, many companies in Sweden have 
invested in the East and have expressed their intention of committing themselves 
to the area on a long-term basis. 
 Internationalisation is one of the most risky activities for a company (Ansoff, 
1984; Young et al., 1989; Omsén, 1982). Despite extensive efforts, a general 
theory of internationalisation has not so far been developed. Most investigations 
of internationalisation (Miklos, 1998; Salmi, 1996) are decision oriented. 
However, internationalisation is a process (Johanson and Mattsson, 1990) rather 
than a single event. Therefore a longitudinal study could contribute to further 
development of a theory of internationalisation. 
 The high-speed economy of the West (Ekstedt et al., 1999; Nyberg, 2002; 
Kristensson Uggla, 2002) has encountered an equally high-speed economy in the 
East. After the liberation, politicians2 as well as firms in the East acted quickly in 
order to demonstrate that real changes had taken place in the lives of citizens and 
to facilitate the adaptation of local enterprises to Western commercial standards. 
In general, changes in traditions and values – the informal rules of the game – 
could not keep pace with politicians’ and authorities’ desire for rapid changes in 
the formal rules of the game, such as the law, and this created uncertainty. It 
would therefore be interesting to discover whether in the former planned 
economies Western companies implemented a strategy in action (Johanson & 
                                                 
1  Nils Bagelius is Management Consultant at the Stockholm International Banking Institute, 
Sweden. 
2   Interviews with Madis Üürike, Minister of Finance Estonia, Rudolf Jalakas, Manager in Han-
delsbanken and Malcolm Dixelius, researcher, author and reporter for TV4.  
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Mattsson, 1992; Håkansson & Snehota, 1995) or before action (Porter, 1985; 
Ansoff, 1984). 
 The power of the State was reduced after the Brezhnev era and later during 
the Gorbachev era. A dense network of coalitions and alliances, including 
criminal ones, was created for the distribution of goods and services. This caused 
distorted and illegal competition. A number of researchers (Leitzel, 1998; 
Lowther, 1997) argue that criminality has a negative influence on foreign direct 
investments. Brock (1998) found that criminality in Russia had curbed the size 
of direct investments. Dixelius3 argues that almost all companies operating in 
Russia are directly or indirectly influenced by organised crime. Aromaa and 
Lehti (1996) argue that foreign companies that invest in St. Petersburg sooner or 
later find themselves having to come to terms with criminal groups or organised 
crime. A number of other researchers have described the impact of crime in the 
East on society and on enterprises.4 
 Coercion is generally represented in the business literature as a tool used by 
the authorities. Coercion and especially criminal threats and violence in inter- or 
intra-organisational relations are rarely described in the literature on 
macroeconomics (Blomqvist & Lundahl, 2002) or microeconomics (Hamel and 
Prahalad, 1995; Humes, 1993; Kotler, 2003). However Sjöstrand (1997) and 
Castells (1998) to a limited extent, and Gummesson (2002) to a larger extent, 
have carried out studies of coercion in commercial life.  
 Estimates of risk and uncertainty have so far been dealt with as particulari-
sation5 in the literature. However firms are confronted with multidimensional 
country- as well as commercial risks (Oxelheim and Wihlborg, 1987; Miller, 
1993; Khoury & Zhou, 1999), which can be interdependent. Risk and 
uncertainty estimates are dynamic processes; for, when certain risks are reduced 
other risks can arise. The lack of uniform definitions of e.g. country risks 
(Oxelheim & Wihlborg, 1987; Miller, 1993) makes it difficult to implement a 
systematic analysis of risk and uncertainty. In the East the formal rules of the 
game and the available resources for law enforcement cannot guarantee that 
contracts will be fairly adhered to (Hendley el al., 1997). There is a need to 
investigate how foreign companies have in practice managed the multi-
dimensional country risks and commercial risks in an Eastern environment that is 
very different compared to what the Western companies experience at home. 
                                                 
3   Interview with Malcolm Dixelius 1999. 
4  Relevant works include: Dunn, 1997; Lowther, 1997; Rawlinson, 1997; Serio, 1997; 
Kryshtanovskaya, 1996; Handelman, 1997; Shelley, 1995, 1997; Dixelius and Konstantinov, 
1999; Volkov, 1999; Sutela, 1994; Galeotti, 1999; Dahan, 2000; Grossman, 1994; Leitzel, 
1998; Bäckman, 1998; Gilinsky, 1999; Repetskaya, 1999; Vilks and Bergmanis, 1999; Vo-
ronin, 1997; Boskholov, 1995. 
5  Particularisation researchers focus on particular perspectives or on selected risks and uncertain-
ties. A general theory, including country risks and commercial risks, has not been developed 
so far. 
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 Against this background the general research objective and four questions 
were formulated. The general objective is to generate knowledge about, and to 
increase understanding of foreign direct investment6 in the former Soviet Union, 
where planned economies are undergoing a process of marketisation. The 
investigation reviews Swedish companies and their direct investments in the 
East. The four research questions were formulated as follows: 
 
? By what means did the companies establish themselves and manage 
uncertainty during the period of transition from a command economy 
to a market economy in the East? 
? What differences between the West and the East have a strategic impact 
on companies’ decisions about uncertainty and risk in relation to their 
commitments in the East? 
? In what way can the companies reduce the degree of uncertainty 
surrounding their direct investment commitments in the transitional 
economies in the East? 
? Were companies’ commitments in the East the product of decisions of a 
long-term nature or were they the product of ad hoc decisions once 
liberalisation had opened the Eastern economies to foreign investment? 
If the latter, could the companies’ actions be explained as symbolic 
strategies? 
 
 
The environment in the East 
 
The industrial, commercial and legal traditions of the East differ from those of 
the West. Marketing and sales functions in the East are poorly developed. The 
often non-transparent infrastructure of industry in the East, and the lack of 
retailers and shops limit access to strategic products as well as general supplies. 
Too often, goods fail to arrive on time, to arrive at the correct destination, to 
arrive in the right quantity and to have the correct specifications (Brock, 1998; 
Lankes and Venables, 1996). This creates a high degree of uncertainty for firms 
used to operating in a much more predictable environment. 
 Despite this uncertainty, the potential market and low production costs in the 
East have been attractive enough for companies in the West to take a chance. 
However, productivity is generally low as is awareness of the importance of 
quality. This offsets the advantages of low production costs in the East. Weak 
payers; the loss of public sources of finance for local businesses; the speculative 
activities of banks: these have created a need for advance payments. 
                                                 
6  With direct investments means investments in wholly owned companies, majority and minor-
ity owned companies and alliances with capital infusion in which the owned share is at least 
10%.  
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 Mechanisms for the enforcement of commercial agreements are deficient and 
the security of written agreements can be questioned (Hendley et al., 1997; 
1998; Arino et al., 1997). 
 The need for rapid changes of formal rules such as laws and decrees, which 
could support the new market economy, and the slow pace of change to 
informal rules such as traditions, values and codes of conduct have created a 
disjunction between the formal and informal rules of the game (Rawlinson, 
1997; Neimanis, 1997; Rose, 1998; Piirainen, 1997). 
 The bureaucracy is frequently responsible for unpredictability, arbitrariness 
and slowness. Contacts with the tax authorities and customs as well as 
procedures to set up business in Russia are resource-demanding and time-
consuming obstacles. Officials in the bureaucracy have not been able to keep 
pace with all the formal changes, and this creates insecurity. Additionally, a lack 
of skills, low bureaucratic salaries, defective legislation, cumbersome administra-
tive procedures and  
traditions of non-transparency create fertile soil for corruption (Rawlinson, 
1997; Ledevena, 2000; Bäckman, 1998; Radaev, 2000). 
 An extensive informal economy and widespread barter trade were inherited 
from a command economy in which personal relationships were important as 
vehicles for getting hold of resources that the State could not offer. This 
relationship economy created a negotiating economy (Sutela, 1998).  
 After liberalisation, a focus on the market economy developed, and this 
contributed to the flourishing of commercial life. The environment in the East 
offered hidden vested interests, an archipelago of informal relationships and 
unfamiliar codes of conduct, which had been institutionalised during the 
seventy-year period of the command economy. These facilitated the acquisition 
of scarce products for consumption and the fulfilment of production plans issued 
by the authorities (Salmi, 1996). 
 Networks involving citizens, employees in companies, the authorities and 
government – so-called distributive alliances – were generated during the period of 
the command economy as means of acquiring scarce products and privileges. A 
number of new distributive alliances within the bureaucracy were created in 
order to further the members’ interests in the new market economy. Also, the 
distributive alliances, which had existed at the time of the command economy, 
attempted to broaden their collaborative networks and acquired a new interest in 
the market (figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Transition from command economy to market economy - and  
    the development of distributive alliances 
 
 
The Russian researchers Jakobson and Makasheva (1996) use the concept of 
coalition to refer to persons in smaller exclusive groups who use their 
relationships and friendships to explore ways of obtaining products and privileges 
or to protect themselves. The terms ‘alliance’ and ‘coalition’ are used 
interchangeably in the literature and the two categories blend into each other. 
Definitions of alliances or coalitions then depend on the personal preferences of 
the author. 
 As this investigation deals with positioning, uncertainty and risk reduction 
from an interdependence perspective, the term ‘alliance’ will be used instead of 
‘coalition’.  
 The formation of a distributive alliance can be oriented to the short as well as 
to the long term; it can be strategic or operative, and the alliance can be formed 
between individuals and groups who lack political ambitions. A distributive 
alliance can consist of vertical as well as horizontal relationships. Individuals from 
business, banks, the authorities and the political sphere can form a distributive 
alliance. One form of distributive alliance is the criminal one. 
 Coalitions and alliances consist of individuals or groups interacting with a 
deliberate purpose. They are issue-oriented with an external focus and built on a 
concerted membership (Stevenson et al., 1985) in inter-organisational and intra-
organisational contexts. Coalitions or alliances are to a varying extent broadly 
and loosely defined in sociology and social-psychology (Collins and Raven, 
1969), organisation theory, (Jones, 1995; Gupta, 2003), economic transaction 
cost theory (Coase, 1991) game theory and rational choice theory (Leiserson, 
1966; Riker, 1962), criminology (De Borchgrave et al., 1997), marketing 
(Gummesson, 2002) and strategy (Lorange et al., 1993; Håkansson and Sharma, 
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Market: 
short term 
impersonal
transactions
Network: 
Resource-dependent 
collaboration
Distributive alliancesBureacracy
Internal focus
Impersonal
rationality
THE ORGANISED CRIME ECONOMY; MANAGING CRIME MARKETS IN EUROPE 
 
 
 
112 
1996). Often a coalition is defined as an alliance of politically oriented individu-
als or organisations (Leiserson, 1966) for some specific purpose, an alliance as a 
close association of individuals or organisations with a common goal.  
 Some authors insist on distinguishing coalitions – which are seen as 
temporary, (Lacity, 1993), rapidly responding, instrumental groupings of actors – 
from alliances, which are conceptualised as deeper, more substantial and more 
permanent. Albrecht and Brewer (1990) argue that alliances involve 
commitments that are longer standing, not on a single issue, deeper and built 
upon more trusting political relationships. However coalitions can also be long 
lasting, while alliances can also be short-term oriented. Coalitions can, like 
alliances, build on informal rules of the game such as trust. Coalitions are not 
limited to a single issue and can manage multipurpose issues. 
 Alliances have increased in popularity in recent years and are mentioned in 
the microeconomic strategy-oriented literature. The term ‘coalition’ is 
parsimoniously represented in the strategic business literature; however it can be 
found in Porter (1985) and Porter and Fuller (1986). Theories of coalitions are 
concentrated primarily in the literature dealing with legislatures, parliaments, 
cabinets and studies of social movements (Gupta, 2003). Alliances can be 
strategic or operative and are institutionalised measures to reduce risks and 
uncertainties. Alliances are established to generate value-creating activities in 
order to develop, strengthen and defend positions. Alliances can be categorised 
and be placed on a continuum – with transactions on the free market at one end, 
and total integration or hierarchy at the other (Lorange et al., 1992). From a 
nano perspective alliances can endure for lengthy periods and can be family or 
kinship oriented. A family oriented hierarchical alliance is the clan and a 
network market oriented alliance is the circle (Sjöstrand, 1993).7 Alliances can 
also be informal. In the criminological literature Block (1983) divides criminal 
alliances into longer lasting enterprise syndicates and short-term power 
syndicates. In business, alliances such as collusions are fraudulent and illegal 
(Jones, 1995). Informal alliances are often invisible. 
 During the period of the rapid adaptation of the formal rules of a market 
economy, the authorities were unable to keep pace with new expectations, and 
political turbulence in the wake of liberation created decision-making uncer-
tainty, and weakened the power of the State (Karaganov et al., 1998). This 
development gave considerable encouragement to criminal activity, which 
became more visible (Serio, 1997; Shelley, 1997; Boskholov, 1995; Repetskaya, 
1999). The gap between the rich and the poor grew wider as the privatisation 
process proceeded. A number of oligarchs succeeded in gaining control of large 
parts of the economy (Hoffman, 2003). Large amounts of capital were invested 
or hidden abroad (Beare, 2000) and a cash-less society developed in the East 
                                                 
7  The Russian researchers Jacobsen and Makasheva use the concept ‘vertical clan’ for the hierar-
chy and ‘horizontal clan’ for the network configuration when they propose their concept of 
distributive coalitions. These, they mention, are small exclusive groups with “clan” qualities. 
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(Karaganov et al., 1998). The State could only collect a fraction of the taxes it 
needed (Shlapentokh, 1994) and a large number of employees had to wait long 
periods for their salaries. 
 Citizens and actors within the commercial sector responded to the weakened 
role of the state by inventing a number of creative procedures to avoid its 
interference and control in order to hide their money transactions (Birdsall, 
2000). Russia was affected by hyperinflation8 from 1992 to 1996, Estonia for a 
period of 2 years and Latvia and Lithuania for 3 years. A large number of banks 
were established in the four countries to manage the flow of money that was 
being created by the germinating market economy. However the local banking 
system could not offer firms services of the same standard as that found in the 
West. A parliamentary and financial crisis in 1998 had serious consequences for 
the financial sector and a large number of banks were liquidated (Pleines, 2000). 
 A lack of social capital (Hedlund and Sundström, 1996) – a consequence of 
the prohibition on the establishment of voluntary organisations during the 
communist regime – has had a negative effect on the level of trust in society. 
Mistrust and a lack of confidence in the official communist ideology and politics 
have left in their wake a general sense of insecurity. Due to the long period of 
isolation and the inward-looking attitudes fostered by communism, foreign 
actors have come to be looked upon with scepticism and mistrust. 
 After the crisis, greater commercial stability was experienced in the East. 
Representatives of foreign companies perceived a slight reduction in corruption 
as well as other criminal activities in the ten-year period after 1992.  
 
 
Theory 
 
The research applies a holistic9 and eclectic10 perspective. Four main theoretical 
frameworks, which partly overlap and partly complement each other, are used.11 
They are: 
 
? industrially oriented network theory (Johanson and Mattsson, 1990; 
Möller & Wilson, 1995);   
                                                 
8  Inflation more than 100 percent annually (European Bank for reconstruction and Develop-
ment, 2002). 
9  In a holistic view the researcher pays attention to the parts and the whole, constantly shifting 
attention from the detail to the whole and from the whole to the detail. According to classical 
mechanical physics the whole can only be understood through its parts. The holistic view 
maintains that details can only be understood through the whole. This is a systemic view 
where every detail is gradually understood within the context of a whole system. 
10   An eclectic perspective is one that draws insights from many theories. 
11   The company’s commitments are analysed from four intermixed theoretical perspectives, 
which implies that an eclectic approach has been employed in the study.   
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? competence-driven resource-based theory (Collis and Montgomery, 
1995; Chakvarathy and Lorange, 1991) 
? organisationally oriented resource-dependent theory (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978) and  
? relationship marketing theory (Grönroos, 1992; Normann, 1991) 
further developed in a many-to-many marketing perspective 
(Gummesson, 2004). 
 
Theoretical frameworks within criminology (Abadinsky, 2000; Naylor, 1997; 
Albini et al., 1995; Johansen, 1996), are used for support e.g. for the 
development of a network orientation to criminal activities. Perspectives on 
strategy (Porter, 1990; Stacey, 1993; Hamel and Prahalad, 1995) and uncertainty 
(Miller, 1993; Sjöstrand, 1997), which have also been used in the analyses, 
support the analysis of strategy in action, the need for flexibility, and the 
management of internal as well as external uncertainty in an integrated manner. 
 The main theoretical contributions come from the dynamic, socially and 
industrially oriented ‘business-to-business’ network theory. This theory explains 
the totality of relationships among firms engaged in production, distribution and 
the use of services in what might best be described as an industrial system 
(Easton, 1992). The basic assumption in the network theory is that the 
individual firm is dependent on resources controlled by other firms. The firm 
gains access to these external resources through its network position (Johanson 
and Mattsson, 1992). This theory applies to the process of internationalisation 
and the current reduction of uncertainty in exchange relationships between 
actors. The network theory has also been applied in the research’s description of 
the transformation of the societies in the East as well as the description of the 
distributive alliances and criminal groups. 
 The organisationally oriented resource-dependent theory focuses on 
dependency and interdependencies as well as interorganisational power 
relationships, strategy and reduction of uncertainty. The competence driven 
resource-based theory elucidates the need to establish structural innovations and 
develop competence in order to generate unique products or concepts to 
maintain a competitive position. Main concepts used by the theory are firm 
capabilities, advantages and mobility of resources. The marketing oriented 
relationship marketing theory is a more comprehensive theory than the 
industrially oriented, ‘business-to-business’ network theory. The relationship 
marketing theory focuses on relationships, networks and interactions 
(Gummesson, 2002) and is equally applicable to services as to industry. The core 
of the relationship marketing theory is interaction in exchange processes, 
creation of values and confidence. This theory describes the interaction, quality, 
retention and defection that are important in order for an organisation to 
cultivate a customer base. The theory focuses on a number of commercial 
relationships, including relationships on the ‘mega level’ above the market and at 
the ‘nano level’ within the organisation. In this study some of these relationships 
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are considered of great importance for an understanding of the company’s 
commitments in the East. 
 The four main theoretical frameworks take the organisation as the unit of 
analysis. They express the organisations’ dependence ‘upstream’ on suppliers, and 
‘downstream’ on the market. All four main theoretical frameworks express the 
need for the structural imperfection inherent in the organisation and the desire 
to control the imperfections of others. The four main theoretical frameworks 
deal with exchange processes. The relationship marketing, the network theory 
and the resource dependent theory focus on adaptation as well as the influence 
on the environment exerted by management and include competition as well as 
collaboration. However, the resource-based theory concentrates more on 
influence and is more oriented towards strategy before action than the other 
theories. The resource-based theory is closer to the industrially oriented 
paradigm and focuses on competition and competitive positions to a greater 
extent than the network theory, the relationship marketing theory and the 
resource dependent theory. 
 
 
Methodology  
 
The empirical core of the investigation consists of 13 in-depth case studies. 
Analyses of the cases cover a time span running from the company’s basic 
decision to invest in the East at the beginning of the 1990s, up until 2000. 
During this period six companies partially or wholly liquidated their 
commitments in the East. Given the need for comprehensive analysis of complex 
and dynamic issues, case studies were favoured over statistical sampling and 
formal questionnaire surveys. The study of the cases included interviews with 
about 100 key informants in addition to observations and action research during 
30 site visits. A large number of documents and 1,100 published sources were 
analysed.  
 I had an excellent opportunity to take advantage, for research purposes, of 
my involvement in missions to the East on behalf of a number of Swedish 
companies. In this way, through interaction with my Eastern counterparts, I was 
able to acquire an awareness of the backgrounds, assumptions and outlooks of 
business people from the East. 
 
 
The companies 
 
The investigation deals with establishment and development processes in the 
East of thirteen companies belonging to different industries. The companies are: 
ABB (a global engineering company), AGA (a producer of gas and gas appliances 
– one of the five largest gas companies in the world), ASG (concerned with 
transportation – by air, sea, rail and road), Baltica Finance (engaged in the trade, 
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storage and shipment of oil), Dagens Industri (producers of commercial 
newspapers, such as Delovoj Peterburg in Russia and Äripäev in Estonia), Ericsson 
(producers of telecoms), Hallberg-Sekrom (mechanical engineers), Nordic Tra & 
Bygg (manufacturers of wood processing equipment and suppliers of 
prefabricated houses produced in St. Petersburg), Primus (producers of gas 
appliances – including the Primus stove – for industry and for leisure pursuits), 
Pripps-Hartwall-BBH (brewery company of which Baltika Brewery in St. 
Petersburg is a large tax payer in Russia), Saturnus (a trade and venture company 
operating in Russia in the integrated forestry and wood processing industry, and 
in the mechanical engineering industry), Swedish Tobacco (producers of snuff, 
cigars and lighters) and Vin & Sprit (producers of alcoholic beverages such as 
Absolut Vodka and other brands).  
 
 
Research questions answered 
 
In the first section above we listed four research questions. 
 
1.The first question concerned the means by which the companies established 
themselves in the East and managed uncertainty as they began their activities 
there. The companies’ conduct can be described as follows.   
 The companies used a mix of ownership strategies12 and establishment 
strategies in making their initial commitments to the East. All of the companies 
agreed to an organic increase of their commitments in the East in order to avoid 
the conflicts that might otherwise have broken out had their commitments 
generated instant increases in capacity and dominant positions in the East. The 
larger companies acquired local companies in the East to a greater extent than 
did the smaller companies but acquisitions did not instantly add capacity. The 
more internationalised the companies, the more distinct was the desire to acquire 
local companies. The less internationally experienced companies started with 
green- field13 operations. 
 These findings correspond to the network theory and the findings by 
Forsgren (1989). The network theory and Forsgren explain this phenomenon in 
terms of a desire on the part of the internationally experienced companies to 
acquire positions in order to reduce their competitive interdependencies. For less 
internationalised companies the desire to go green-field could be explained by 
                                                 
12  Ownership strategies refer to the degree of the firms’ control of foreign units and can be 
divided in two ideal forms, total ownership, (internalisation) and varying degrees of involve-
ment of market actors (market). A joint venture ownership strategy is a hybrid and implies a 
jointly owned company.  
13  Green-field establishment strategies advance step-by-step, and offer firms the privilege of 
gradually learning about the conditions of the new market and avoiding the risk of commit-
ting larger resources in unfamiliar markets. Green-field entry strategies are usually much 
slower than acquisition entry strategies. 
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their desire to eliminate disturbances downstream and upstream in their domestic 
networks when new relationships are established abroad.  
 However, some of the more internationally experienced companies had to 
choose green field too, because of formal obstacles in the environment, lack of 
financial resources and lack of appropriate acquisition objects. The larger 
companies also established green-field operations to generate relationships and 
collect information in the opaque business environment before they made larger 
acquisitions. 
 Acquisitions that are initiated and driven by subsidiaries with local knowledge 
and market relations are more evolutionary, incremental and organic compared 
with acquisitions driven by business firms’ headquarters. Such acquisitions are 
more likely to have a revolutionary character due to their tendency to bring 
about almost instant adaptation on the part of the acquired firm to the codes of 
conduct of the acquirer, and to the fact that decisions are made at a distance. 
 During the development process, the companies increased their share of 
ownership both in their joint ventures with local entrepreneurs, and in their 
majority owned commitments in the East. Therefore companies preferred 
hierarchy14 to market. One of the reasons was that companies estimated the 
commercial uncertainty as large. However, if companies had estimated a 
country’s uncertainty as large they normally should have shared the risk and used 
the market as the default mode to managed their uncertainty. 
 Hierarchy also helped the companies meet the need for efficient coordination 
between their business units in the West and the East. The companies wanted to 
control the transfer of competence from the West to the East and to implement 
their own value-based norms. Hierarchy secured the transfer of resources from 
the West to the East. The companies diversified upstream to Western suppliers 
in order to avoid an uncertain and irregular supply of products of inferior quality 
from agents in the East. The lack of local companies in the East with the 
competence and ability to exploit the Western companies’ competitive 
advantages as efficiently as the Western companies was also a factor in decisions 
to internalise the Eastern companies’ operations. In Russia, strong protection of 
the interests of local minority shareholders was a final factor in the decision of 
companies to internalise their commitments in the East. 
 
2. The second question concerned potentially important differences between the 
West and the East that have a strategic impact on companies’ decisions about 
uncertainty and risk in relation to their commitments in the East.  
 Differences in commercial, industrial and judicial traditions; differences in 
citizens’ behaviour; foreign actors’ limited access to information; the influence of 
rapidly spreading and increasingly visible criminal phenomena: all these had an 
impact on companies’ behaviour. These differences correspond to variations in 
                                                 
14  Hierarchy means internalisation and market means that the company can take advantage of 
collaboration with others. 
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structural and natural imperfections, which are discussed in the traditional as well 
as the more modern dynamic internationalisation models, such as the dynamic 
Uppsala School of Internationalisation and the network theory. However, the 
influence of crime is seldom treated in the business, and the business research 
literature. 
 The foreign companies developed and maintained their positions in the East 
through the introduction of new, differentiated products, the development of 
local resources and local relationships, and the introduction of new inventions. 
Important inventions were activities (which the foreign companies executed 
with greater effectiveness than local competitors) such as quality assurance, the 
application of modern production processes and empowerment of employees. 
Other important inventions concerned activities within marketing and 
distribution. Pripps-Hartwall-BBH, for example, developed a local distribution 
system whereby beer and soft drinks could be conveyed from their breweries to 
shops so that customers did not have to fetch the products at the gates of the 
breweries, as had been the normal practice during the period of the command 
economy. 
 
3. The third question concerned the ways in which the companies reduce the 
uncertainty surrounding their direct investment commitments in the transitional 
economies of the East.  
 A summary of the more frequent activities used to manage dependencies and 
uncertainty are presented in figure 2. The main activities the companies used to 
manage interdependencies and uncertainty were as follows. The companies: 
 
? exploited the natural driving forces of local demand in the East and/or 
exploited favourable factors of production in related commitments in 
the East; 
? established strong links with parts of systems in which they could launch 
differentiated products and exploit current innovations downstream in 
the market in order to generate viable interdependencies and organic 
growth; 
? established loose couplings with segments of the environment that had 
an unfavourable influence or could generate conflicts of interest or 
other imbalances. They avoided any explicit connections with local 
crime; 
? invested in interorganisational relationships to reduce uncertainties 
arising from commercial, industrial, judicial, information and 
behavioural asymmetries between the West and the East; 
? invested in intra-organisational relationships in order to generate 
sufficient confidence to enable them to establish a foundation for 
transformation of competence and the integration of activities between 
East and West; 
? invested in the transfer and transformation of competence in the East; 
introduced norms and values in the East in accordance with their own 
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prevailing norms, values and codes of conduct in order to strengthen 
and develop the internal resources available to support and increase the 
performance of the external resources associated with their 
commitments in the East; 
? transferred resources in order to revitalise and develop local 
performance within production, processes, marketing and systems with 
the aim of supporting development and defending their structural 
imperfections in the East; 
? reduced intra-organisational hierarchies, empowered employees, and 
distributed information from the “top down” as well as from the 
“bottom up” in the East; 
? complied with local formal rules and procedures, established supporting 
tactical alliances for access to local professional knowledge and 
intelligence resources; 
? created links for the acquisition of resources from suppliers in the West 
in order to avoid over dependence on the supply of products of inferior 
quality from suppliers in the East; 
? reoriented commitments in the East or withdrew when environmental 
influences generally, or commercial relations specifically, no longer 
made possible a satisfactory level of performance. 
 
4. The fourth question related to the extent to which the companies’ 
commitments in the East were the product of decisions of a long-term nature 
rather than the product of ad hoc decisions. 
 Four companies, AGA, Dagens Industri, Swedish Tobacco and Pripps-
Hartwall-BBH, explicitly expressed a great deal of courage before they made 
their initial commitments in the East. This could be an indication that these four 
companies applied a symbolic strategy. However the four companies based their 
commitments on estimates and information collected in cooperation with for-
eign as well as local intelligence resources in advance of their commitments in 
the East. The four companies also had initial intentions and visions and therefore 
did not use symbolic strategies but had the courage to act at the moment of 
truth.  
 For all the companies, their direct investments in the East were of a long-
term nature. The companies were ‘doers’ and applied conventional strategies-in-
action, which resulted in considerable learning and exchanges of experience 
between themselves and local actors in the East. Eight of the companies could be 
characterised as pioneers and five of the companies could be characterised as 
followers. The pioneers had a strong desire to influence and change the 
networks that they were able to establish in the East. The followers adapted their 
commitments to the existing prerequisites in the East.  
 
 
THE ORGANISED CRIME ECONOMY; MANAGING CRIME MARKETS IN EUROPE 
 
 
 
120 
Development of relationships  
 
The companies created an influence with differentiated products, innovations 
and advantage packages. The companies established strong links with certain 
segments of the Eastern market to increase stability and control of performance 
and reduce uncertainty. The companies invested in portfolios of commercial as 
well as non-commercial relationships to achieve a controllable environment. 
The companies strengthened their relationships with local actors having power 
and influence in the East, in order to prove their presence. They established 
supporting tactical alliances with actors who could support them with 
information and expertise in relation to economic and legal matters in order to 
avoid disturbances and to cope with the formal rules and standards of business 
activity in the East. 
 The companies diversified upstream to suppliers in the West, and internalised 
their commitments in the East to an increasing extent. In order to minimise 
potential initial conflicts the companies undertook an organic expansion of their 
commitments in the East. In general, companies selling to local markets in the 
East developed local brands and introduced new products after they had trained 
local staff. Companies producing in the East developed the local competence 
that they had invested in the production of equipment; and if they exported, 
they selected a number of competitive products, whose range was later 
increased. 
 
 
Development of supporting resources 
 
In order to develop local supporting resources in the East the companies 
transferred resources and expertise there. The transfer of complimentary 
supporting products and local innovations helped to reinforce their competitive 
position and generated dependency on the companies’ products in Eastern 
markets. The companies transformed competence by having recourse to value-
based leadership at board meetings, in management and among employees in the 
East. 
 Representatives of the companies had a deep understanding of, and a firm 
commitment to the process of the competence transformation. The companies 
revitalised processes, production and systems in the East in order to reduce the 
gap in performance between the West and the East. The companies’ value-based 
norms stabilised the performance of business units in the East. 
 The development of human capital in the East was of vital importance. Social 
relations and trust created a foundation for the transformation processes and 
achievement of a level of local performance close to Western standards. 
Employees from the West who participated in the transformation process were 
dedicated, inspired, committed and keenly alive to the local individual’s desires 
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and competence. “It is important to put them on track and then they roll on by 
themselves” (Bengtsson, Manager of International Relations, AGA). 
Companies from the West sent representatives to the East to act as standard 
bearers of their own commercial culture. They broke down hierarchies and 
communicated information in a top-down as well as a bottom-up fashion. They 
empowered employees and encouraged them to act professionally in accordance 
with the standards and culture of companies from the West. The representatives 
trained and educated people in the East using hands-on educational techniques, 
and offered a great deal of feedback in order to transmit confidence and increase 
levels of organisational competence – which in turn was a foundation for the 
establishment of fruitful external relations of a commercial as well as non-
commercial kind. 
 The representatives supported management and participated in meetings of 
the boards of directors of the companies’ subsidiaries in the East. Most of the 
companies created a family atmosphere at board meetings, within management 
and among employees in their Eastern subsidiaries: “Employees from BBH 
formed a tight joint circle, almost a clan. The Russians could recognise the 
phenomenon, felt acquainted and we won their hearts” (Charles Eriksson, 
Manager of Finance and Administration on BBH). 
 The goal in the long run for the companies was to appoint local managers. 
However the lack of appropriate competence and the need for tight 
coordination in the initial stages led ABB, AGA, Ericsson and ASG to recruit 
leaders from the West for most of their subsidiaries in the East.  
 Swedish Tobacco, Dagens Industri, Pripps-Hartwall-BBH, Primus, and 
Hallberg-Sekrom recruited local managers for their Eastern subsidiaries. 
However, most of the companies recruited controllers from the West. Western, 
and the complicated Russian systems of financial control were executed in 
parallel with each other in order to control performance from the Western side 
and to meet Russian bookkeeping demands. 
 In order to adapt the supporting resources to the prevailing prerequisites in 
the East, the companies implemented simple surveillance and management 
systems to control the flows of products and remuneration. The companies 
adapted their performance in the East to the formal rules in force there. They 
paid taxes, fees and other impositions, and avoided financial exposure to criminal 
groups, investing in security and creating buffers for strategic supplies from the 
West. 
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Create innovations in functions, system and 
processes.
Develop and protect immobility in products -
with integrated resources and tacit knowledge.
Supply of Western management and leadership -
to create stability within the Eastern organization.
Invest in intra-organizational relations
– to create a foundation for change in the East.
Develop competence and local partners -supported 
by culture bearers from the West.
Thoroughful recruitments.
Develop and defend own advantageous 
imperfections.
Introduce innovations downstream. 
Exploit immobility as a countervailing power to 
inferior institutional protection of resources.
Establish strong ties in parts of the total system 
to create dependencies. 
Invest in a portfolio of external relationships 
and inter-organizational assets of relations.
Establish alliances with foreign and local
”intelligence” to do the home-work and to 
be an ”insider”.
Apply organic growth to achieve external stability..
Be keenly alive to informal rules of the game on
mega-, commercial- and nano-level. 
Create simple surveillance systems for control. 
of finances, payments and flow of products.
Be open for competence in the East to support 
the competence in  the West. 
Create buffers for strategic resources.
Avoid financial exposures to maintain secrecy.
Invest in security/protection.
Follow formal rules of the game and injunctions 
in order to legitimate the commitment in the East.
Firmly establish commitments in the East
at the home office in the West.
Invests in personnel relations, implicit contracts 
and  closure. 
Establish tactical alliances in the East to generate  
information, follow formal rules of the game.
If a large country risk  – establish  alliances for 
shared risk, preferably in related industry.
Internalize when commercial risk is high, risk for 
dilution of own competence and need of tight 
control of integration.
Acquire  assets instead of shares when facing risk 
for unknown future claims and contingencies
Allocate internal resources to other  
activities or markets  than the East
Avoid relations in the East
Internal resources External resources
Control liquidation of internal resources
Control liquidation of unfavorable relations
Avoid
dependency
(4)
Exit from
dependency
(5)
Avoid
dependence
(1)
Influence
dependency
(2)
Adjust to 
dependency
(3)
Establish lose ties with weak payers & criminal 
groups. Limit product and  geographic scope. 
Diversify upstream - suppliers in the West.
Figure 2. Summary of frequent activities to manage dependencies 
 
 
 
All the companies, with the exception of Baltica Finance, made relatively limited 
financial commitments to the East despite the fact that some companies, such as 
AGA, Swedish Tobacco, and Pripps-Hartwall-BBH, invested in local 
production in the East. The relatively small commitments could be looked upon 
as options with a reserved right to play and with a potential future leverage, if 
successful. The companies were seriously aware of the multidimensional 
uncertainty and risks involved in the transition economy. They used a variety of 
entry modes and made frequent adjustments to their commitments to secure a 
viable position in the East. They concentrated their behaviour on a selected 
number of critical factors, which they could control, and parry (figure 3). 
Besides they made purposeful investments in relationships and confidence. 
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Figure 3. Potential strategies employed by the companies 
 
THE COMPANIES THE BUSINESS 
ENVIRONMENT 
 Small amount of flexibility, 
considerable interdependence 
Considerable flexibility, 
little interdependence 
Low level of pre-
dictability 
Speculation Parry 
High level of pre-
dictability Planning Control 
 
Many companies from the West had quicker pay-offs on their commitments in 
the East as compared to the pay-offs on their commitments in the West. One 
reason could be that they were able to obtain a first mover advantage and did 
not have to capture market shares from institutionalised competitors, as is often 
the case in the West. Another explanation could be that they were able to offer 
rapid access to products which were in large demand in the East and which local 
competitors could not offer. 
 
 
Three main contributions to business research  
 
The importance of personal relationships 
The case studies revealed that personal relationships are of utmost importance in 
intra-organisational as well as inter-organisational relations in the East. The 
functional significance of personal contacts is much greater in the East (Salmi, 
1996). While in the West personal contacts are often a result of business, in 
Russia they are the prerequisites. In intra-organisational relations, personal 
relations were prerequisites for the creation of a foundation on which companies 
could change processes and begin the transformation of competence in the East 
(figure 4). The companies’ mission was to develop Eastern employees in such a 
way as to enable them to be insiders, thus enabling them to understand how to 
take care of, and to develop the advantages of the West and to coordinate 
resources between the West and the East. 
 From the inter-organisational point of view, face-to-face relationships allow 
rapid feedback and the establishment of mutual confidence, which can reduce 
the uncertainty deriving from the differences between the industrial, commercial 
and judicial traditions of West and East, as well as from differences in codes of 
conduct and access to information in inter-organisational exchange processes. 
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Figure 4. The importance of personnel relations in the East 
 
 
 
The informal archipelago of institutionalised networks in the East generated 
competitive advantages for persons with connections and information in the 
East. The companies from the West made efforts to get behind the curtain of 
hidden informal relationships. To do research in advance of any larger 
commitment was important for the companies from the West. They had to 
investigate dependence and interdependencies between local commercial 
counterparts, authorities and politicians in their due diligence studies in order to 
become insiders. 
In the West the companies know how to do business. In the East the 
companies had to know with whom to conduct business. In the East, informal 
structures were often more important than formal networks. 
 
The importance of judicial relations 
Legislation, institutions and informal practices could not keep pace with the new 
business conditions. Confidence, trust and privileged information about the 
companies’ counterparts in the East had greater instant value than written 
agreements, while self-enforcing mechanisms had priority in disputes. 
 The study has paid attention to the differences in legal behaviour and 
traditions between the West and the East. In the West the formal rules give 
commercial actors a degree of confidence in their business dealings. In the East 
the situation is different. For example, Russians’ interpretations of commercial 
agreements often led to particularisation (Burger et al., 2002). That is, when a 
dispute occurred, the Russians often focused on and wanted to re-negotiate a 
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certain issue instead of considering the agreement in its entirety.15 If a foreign 
company anticipated winning a dispute in court it could not be sure of being 
compensated because its commercial counterparts in the East could relatively 
easily redistribute their assets if they realised that they were going to lose the 
dispute. 
 If disputes could be settled formally, commercial actors had to rely on courts 
or arbitration courts in the East or in the West. The study reveals that the 
companies from the West had little confidence in the formal rules or 
enforcement mechanisms of the East. Disputes could instead be settled by self-
enforcing mechanisms such as are applicable in relational contracts in the West. 
Some of the investigated companies failed to settle the disputes and lost their 
investments in the East or they had to reconsider their commitments. 
 The study reveals that commercial rather than country risks – such as political 
and policy uncertainty, macro-economic and social uncertainty and uncertainty 
due to the influence of nature – were the companies’ main concerns. As a 
consequence of the risk and the legal turbulence in the East, the companies 
preferred to internalise their commitments in order to retain control of their 
resources. The study elucidates the importance of fit between the informal and 
formal rules of the game. The rules of the game together with competition and 
cooperation govern the behaviour of actors both in the market and within 
organisations. The management of judicial relations and informal rules of the 
game therefore become important. Formal rules, such as laws and decrees can be 
changed instantaneously and on an ad hoc basis. Informal rules such as taboos, 
values, traditions, and codes of conduct are developed over long time spans, are 
transferred from one generation to the next, are path dependent and are 
institutionalised in society, which means they take longer to change (North & 
Naishul, 1992; Sjöstrand, 1993). In the East three gaps developed in the rules of 
the game due to the rapid changes during the transition from a command 
economy to a market economy (figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Gaps between formal and informal rules of the game and  
     resources for enforcement 
 
                                                 
15  Interviews with Kaj Hobér and Bengt Sjövall, lawyers employed by Mannheimer Swartling, a 
law office that deals with large numbers of cases on behalf of Swedish companies in the East. 
M oral &  Ethics
Form al Juridical Rules of the Gam e
Enforcem ent Resources
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A misfit developed between the formal rules, which could be changed quickly 
and in an ad hoc fashion, and the informal path-dependent rules subject to slow 
change. The misfit led to the development of insecurity. 
 Rapid change of an ad hoc nature in the formal rules, sometimes with 
retroactive effects, caused confusion and made it difficult for the authorities as 
well as commercial actors to adapt to the situation, which in turn generated 
insecurity. 
 A gap developed between the formal rules and the resources for enforcement. 
The courts, police and other enforcement resources were dependent on 
domestic actors and interest groups for retention of their positions and jobs. This 
interdependence generated vested interests and corruption (Dixelius and 
Konstantinov, 1999; Shelley, 1995). 
 The study has shown that a State with reduced power does not have 
unilateral control of the formal rules of the game. Coastal and Baltika Finance 
were able to establish new rules of the game in Estonia when local distributive 
alliances, which included representatives from industry and Parliament, tried to 
gain control of Baltica Finance and Coastal’s transhipment terminal in Tallinn. 
ABB in Latvia was asked to assist the Latvian State when new rules of the 
commercial game were to be established. 
 Mart Grosholm, a manager with responsibility for Swedish Tobacco’s 
operations in the East described how the company made adjustments to the 
formal rules of the game and avoided a lengthy and expensive liquidation when 
it sold its commitment in Nevo, Russia, to an ostensible buyer without giving 
notice through the pages of the business press: “If you live among wolves, then you 
yourself will turn into a wolf”. 
 
 
The influence of crime 
 
The power of the Soviet State declined during the Brezhnev era (1964-1982) 
and more rapidly so during the Gorbachev era (1985-1991). During the 
investigation it was noticed that this encouraged the formation of coalitions in 
the distribution of goods and services, but that it also encouraged criminal 
practices and organised crime (Jacobson and Makasheva, 1996; Serio, 1997; 
Voronin, 1997). This gave rise to a distorted form of competition, unrestrained 
by norms of loyalty, and this had an influence on many of the companies’ 
commitments in the East. 
 Members of coalitions used mechanisms other than the official rules and 
enforcement mechanisms of the state in order to resolve commercial conflicts. 
Informal groups with limited public control and shielded from observation were 
able to have an impact on the establishment of formal rules, and an influence on 
commercial life. The performance of these groups also influenced citizens’ codes 
of conduct in the East. The presence of these hidden legal or illegal groups had 
an influence on most of the companies’ commitments in the East. Because of the 
deterioration of proper law enforcement and security the companies had to 
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strengthen security and increase surveillance. Some companies hired 
international professional intelligence investigators to acquire information 
concerning hidden networks. 
 The well-known national diamond (Porter, 1990) describes the four 
determinants that create a supportive environment for firms in one industry but 
not for those in other industries. The four determinants are a) factor conditions, 
b) demand conditions, c) related and supporting industries and d) firm strategy, 
structure and rivalry. In a revision (Sölvell, Zander and Porter, 1991), influences 
deriving from government and chance were considered. The diamond should 
again be revised (figure 6) to include the influence of distributive alliances and 
crime on commercial actors. 
 As the study reveals, legal and illegal distributive alliances can have an 
interactive impact on commercial actors, demand and factor conditions, related 
and supporting industries, and the government. Crime has been brought to light 
in large commercial organisations. It also appears in symbiotic relations with the 
authorities and government in the East as well as in the West. A number of 
newspapers mention that corruption has been revealed within the organisations 
of such well-known global actors as the European Union (EU) and the Olympic 
Committee. Also, well-known companies in countries that are known to be free 
of corruption, such as Sweden, have recently been exposed as acting in collusion 
and in conflict with the law. 
 In order to combat corruption and to enforce anticorruption strategies, there 
is a need to strengthen local and international resources and competence. 
Corruption, which is a frequently occurring phenomenon in many countries in 
the East as well as in a number of nations in the western hemisphere 
(Transparency International, 1999) could, if it grew in significance and became 
more widespread in the future, be looked upon as an institutionalised 
commercial factor. 
 Distributive alliances and criminality had a specific influence on seven out of 
the thirteen companies that were investigated: ASG and AGA in Moscow, 
Baltica Finance in Estonia, Orimi Wood in St. Petersburg, Saturnus in 
Archangels, Swedish Tobacco in Latvia and Russia and Vin & Sprit in Russia. 
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Figure 6. The Determinants of Competitive Advantage 
 
 
 
The case of Swedish Tobacco 
 
The development of Swedish Tobacco is one example of the dynamics of the 
internationalisation of foreign companies in the East and of their interaction with 
distributive alliances. The company had direct relations with a number of 
important counterparts in the East. Relationships with the general environment 
and other commercial actors such as competitors, suppliers, the authorities, the 
mass media and others were analysed in the case study when they had an impact. 
In the figures below, these relationships are represented as a frame, within which 
the focal company, Swedish Tobacco, acted. 
 Swedish Tobacco, with production facilities in Sweden and in the 
Netherlands, produces and markets pipe tobacco, snuff, cigars and lighters for 
the international market. Until 1999, it produced cigarettes mainly for the 
Nordic market. In 1992, the company initiated collaboration with the Estonian 
state-owned tobacco company, Tobacco Leek, which produced and marketed 
cigarettes in Estonia. In the same year, Swedish Tobacco also initiated 
collaboration with a large Russian company based in St Petersberg, Nevo, which 
had a broad range of tobacco products (figure 7). Then, in 1993, Swedish 
Tobacco and the Estonian government established the joint venture, Eesti 
Tubakas, for the production and sale of cigarettes in Estonia and for the future 
export of cigarettes to Russia. In 1994, Eesti Tubakas and Swedish Tobacco 
acquired a joint stake in a tobacco company in Tver, Russia, which would 
produce cigarettes for the Russian market. 
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Figure 7. The focal network 1993 for Swedish Tobacco 
 
 
The network in the East grew rapidly (figure 8). Swedish Tobacco established 
the joint venture, Baltic Tobacco, with the Russian company, Nevo, in St. 
Petersburg in 1995. 
 
Figure 8. The focal network 1995 for Swedish Tobacco 
 
Baltic Tobacco would develop, produce and market certain new tobacco 
products, which would be sold in the St. Petersburg region, and Swedish 
Tobacco would supply the knowledge to develop these products. Baltic 
Tobacco would also sell goods produced by Swedish Tobacco.  In Lithuania 
Swedish Tobacco established an outlet for tobacco products produced by Eesti 
Tubakas. 
 In Latvia criminal groups offered Swedish Tobacco an opportunity in 1996 
to establish facilities for the production of cigarettes for the Russian market. 
However after a number of meetings Swedish Tobacco politely refused. In 
1996, a merger between Swedish Tobacco and Swedish Match took place. 
Following the cessation of cigarette production by Tubakas Leek in 1997, 
winding up of the joint venture in Tver and a break with Nevo, both in 1996, 
Swedish Match/Swedish Tobacco established sales offices in Estonia and 
changed the name of its sales office in Lithuania. Swedish Tobacco had since 
1997 planned to introduce the cigarette, ‘Blend’ in Russia and worked out a 
resource-demanding marketing plan. This led to the installation of sales 
representatives in Moscow in 1998. 
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In Russia, the local companies Olbi and Neska marketed Swedish Match 
cigarette lighters. Swedish Match had established this collaboration already in 
1992. Swedish Match/Swedish Tobacco sold their cigarette division to an 
Austrian company in 1999. The sales representatives in the Baltic States and in 
Russia were withdrawn. As a result of pressure from criminal distributive 
alliances, Swedish Match decided against introducing a new brand of cigarette 
lighters, which would have competed with existing brands marketed by Olbi 
and Neska.  However Swedish Match continued its collaboration with Olbi and 
Neska for the purposes of marketing of the actual cigarette lighters (figure 9). 
 
Figure 9. The focal network 1999 for Swedish Tobacco 
 
Swedish Match/Swedish Tobacco made parallel commitments in the Baltic 
countries as well as in Russia. The company’s stepwise retreat from the East 
occurred as a consequence of parliamentary, commercial, criminal and internal 
disturbances. Important occurrences for Swedish Match/ Swedish Tobacco’s 
commitments in the East:  
   
? Refusal of an offer from criminal distributive alliances to establish 
production in Latvia; 
? Retreat from the joint venture, Eesti Tubakas, in Estonia due to 
parliamentary vested interests and an unfavourable tariff policy 
? Retreat from Tver in Russia due to limited accessibility of information 
and potential influence of criminal distributive alliances; 
? Retreat from Baltic Tobacco in Russia due to the influence of legal and 
semi-legal distributive alliances in Nevo; 
? Retreat from the marketing of cigarettes in Moscow due to a strategic 
reorientation within the group Swedish Match/Swedish Tobacco when 
the parent company sold its cigarette division in Sweden to Austrian 
Tobacco; 
? Pressure of criminal distributive alliances on Swedish Match to focus on 
two brand names of cigarette lighters and to avoid introducing other 
brands of cigarette lighter in Russia. 
 
 
The case of ASG 
 
Swedish Match/Swedish Tobacco is an example of expansion and contraction of 
a foreign company’s commitments in the East. ASG on the other hand is an 
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example of continuous expansion of a foreign company’s commitments. 
However, ASG had to make retreats in the East or secure their commitments to 
avoid pressure from illegal distributive alliances. Important occurrences for 
ASG’s commitments in the East: 
 
? Liquidation of shares in a Moscow joint venture due to the influence of 
criminal distributive alliances. ASG lost all its investments in Moscow. 
ASG had made the deal with three representatives who, though they 
claimed to be the owners of the joint venture, were, in fact, only 
representatives of the owners. Disputes broke out between ASG and the 
representatives and ASG tried to contact the owners. Unable to make 
contact with them, ASG had to settle the dispute in a Russian court. 
ASG lost and its representatives were accused of being criminals; 
? Establishment of a company in Ukraine together with two local experts 
who managed the local relationships and local business in order to allow 
the company to avoid direct pressure from criminal distributive 
alliances; 
? Establishment of an own terminal in Latvia in an area where most of the 
customers were located to avoid pressure from criminal distributive 
alliances.  
? Establishment of a terminal in Hamina in Finland for luxury products in 
order to avoid customs procedures in Russia, certain transport 
assignments and pressure from criminal distributive alliances; 
? After an initial time period ASG curtailed the transport of goods having 
a certain value for criminal distributive alliances, such as spirits and 
cigarettes. 
 
 
Changes in the thirteen companies’ networks 
 
Changes having great influence on actors can occur as a consequence of inter-
organisational disturbances in market and mega relationships, or as a 
consequence of intra-organisational disturbances in the relationships of an 
organisation or group. A combination of disturbances had an influence on the 
companies’ focal networks (figure 10). 
 The companies managed the pressure exerted by criminal groups in different 
ways (figure 11). Dagens Industri sought to influence public opinion with its 
many newspaper articles about the pressures of legal and illegal distributive 
alliances on commercial actors in the East. Dagens Industri’s local papers in the 
East were charged and their representatives summoned to appear before the 
courts 57 times, however the papers won all the legal cases.  
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Table 10. Changes in the thirteen companies’ networks 
 
Due to intra- or inter-organisational relations 
Inter-organisational 
(between external actors) 
 
 
Changes in 
focal* net-works 
in the East 
during the 
process 
Intra-
organisational 
(within the 
company or 
group) 
Commercial 
 
Parlia-
mentary 
From criminal 
distributive alli-
ances in: 
AGA X X X X  
ASG X X X X Russia 
Baltica Finance X  X X Estonia 
Dagens Industri X  X X Latvia 
Saturnus Russia X  X  Russia 
Swedish 
Tobacco 
X X X X Russia and Latvia 
Hallberg-
Sekrom 
     
Nordic T & B16 X  X  Russia 
Primus Russia X X X X  
ABB Baltikum X X X X  
Ericsson X  X X  
Pripps-
Hartwall-BBH 
X  X X  
Vin & Sprit X  X  Russia 
*) The focal network is the network that the company can enact. 
 
Pripps-Hartwall-BBH created a countervailing power against criminal 
distributive alliances when it appointed representatives from the Russian tax 
authorities to the board of its brewery, Baltica. Swedish Tobacco created a 
similar countervailing power when representatives of the Estonian government 
were appointed to the board of Eesti Tobacco. Together with its collaborating 
partner Coastal, Baltica Finance was able to create a countervailing power against 
local criminal distributive alliances which included business persons as well as 
state officials. Coastal had a large and important network of relationships in the 
international oil market and among international authorities such as IBRD, the 
World Bank and the IFC, and it could influence the deliveries of oil from 
Estonia to the West. 
 
                                                 
16  Nordic T & B is Nordic Tra & Bygg. 
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Table 11a.The management of criminal interference 
 
Company Negotiations 
 On own 
merit 
Support 
from local experts 
Support 
from 
intelligence 
Support 
from 
institutions 
AGA  X X X X 
ASG  X  X X 
Baltica Finance X X  X 
Dagens Industri  X X   
Saturnus X X   
Swedish Tobacco X X X X 
Hallberg-Sekrom     
Nordic T & B X X   
Primus Russia X X   
ABB Baltikum   X  
Ericsson   X  
Pripps-Hartwall -BBH  X  X  
Vin & Sprit X X  X 
 
Table 11b. The management of criminal interference 
 
Company 
Security 
forces 
or 
police 
Re- 
grouped 
Ceased operation sold out 
or 
liquidated 
Moulded 
public opin-
ion 
Established 
counter- 
veiling 
power 
AGA  X     
ASG  X X X   
Baltica Finance  X   X 
Dagens Industri  X   X  
Saturnus  X X   
Swedish Tobacco  X X  X 
Hallberg-Sekrom      
Nordic T & B  X X   
Primus Russia  X X   
ABB Baltikum X     
Ericsson X     
Pripps-Hartwall -
BBH  
X    X 
Vin & Sprit  X X   
 
Most of the companies used self-enforcing mechanisms to resolve conflicts with 
distributive alliances. ASG however failed to solve its problems in Moscow after 
intense negotiations and then had recourse to lawyers. The Russian lawyers had 
close relationships with local invisible structures. ASG lost and was forced to 
leave the jointly owned terminal in Moscow. AGA, Baltica Finance, Dagens 
Industri, Saturnus, Swedish Tobacco, Nordic Tra & Bygg, Primus and Vin & 
Sprit on the other hand made extensive use of local experts in parallel with self-
enforcing mechanisms and became successful in their management of all kinds of 
relationships with legal and illegal distributive alliances. Local experts could call 
on their experience and local contacts. They knew the implicit rules of the 
game, collected information, delivered messages and influenced commercial as 
well as non-commercial counterparts. After some period the foreign companies’ 
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representatives learned from them in a process of trial and error and were able to 
develop their negotiation skills and sensitivity. The larger companies used 
foreign and local intelligence in order to get behind the hidden local 
relationships and to mobilise pressures. A limited number of the companies 
turned to institutions or to the police force. 
 Six out of thirteen companies wholly or partly liquidated their commitments 
in the East. ASG liquidated its joint venture in Moscow 1997. Vin & Sprit was 
forced to change its agent in Russia in 1994. Petroprimus sold its business to its 
Russian partners in 2000. Saturnus moved from Russia and established businesses 
in Estonia in 1992. Swedish Tobacco ceased operation in Estonia in 1997 and in 
Russia in 1999, and Nordic Tra & Bygg ceased collaboration with Orimi Wood 
in St. Petersburg in 1998. AGA wanted to sell their production units in 
Kaliningrad and Russia. However it could not find local buyers and the 
production units were mothballed. 
 Five out of thirteen companies, wholly or partly liquidated their 
commitments in the East due to interference from criminal groups. These 
companies were ASG, Vin & Sprit, Saturnus, Nordic Tra & Bygg and Swedish 
Match/Swedish Tobacco. Primus closed its unit in Moscow and smaller 
distribution centres in Russia due to interference from distributive alliances 
whose backgrounds, motives and relationships are unclear, though suspicious. 
Dagens Industri in Latvia, AGA and Pripps-Hartwall-BBH in Russia were 
threatened. Ericsson, AGA, ASG, ABB, Dagens Industri and Pripps-Hartwall-
BBH increased and strengthened their security and also hired professional 
security guards. 
 Three of the companies suffered interference from Eastern criminals in 
Sweden and one company suffered the loss of an employee who was murdered 
in Sweden by gunmen. Other Swedish investigations (OMA, 2000; Ådal & 
Anisimov, 2000) as well as a number of international investigations indicate that 
organised crime had an influence on foreign companies’ commitments in the 
East. 
 
 
Conclusions: the moral 
 
The focus in this study has been on how Swedish companies capture commercial 
positions and how, from a dependence perspective, they manage uncertainty and 
risk. The research shows that in general companies are loosely coupled with 
their environment and want to act so that they can foresee and control events. 
Predictability, however, requires strong links and commitment to certain parties 
in society and the business community, which leads to dependencies and 
reduced flexibility. The companies deliberately selected relationships and 
commitments, managing interdependencies and power asymmetries mainly 
through adaptation or control. They implemented a strategy-in-action; they 
were doers. 
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 In the early stages, the Swedish companies applied a mixture of establishment 
and ownership modes. The need for control of resources, in accordance with the 
network oriented theory; the need for protection of resources, in accordance 
with the resource based theory; the need for reduction in the level of 
dependence on Eastern suppliers for strategic resources of uncertain availability, 
in accordance with the resource dependent theory: all this increased the rate of 
internalisation of the companies’ commitments in the East during the 
development process. 
 The companies strengthened and developed their internal resources to 
support marketing investments and relationships. Although they had initial 
advantages as a result of their products, their competence, their financial 
positions and their relationships in the West, they continuously launched 
innovations to strengthen dependencies and improve and defend their positions 
in the East. The companies’ commercial advantages were difficult for Eastern 
competitors to imitate. They were also a protection against opportunistic 
commercial behaviour and enabled institutionalisation in the East with its weak 
formal rules and corrupt systems of enforcement. The cases revealed 
simultaneous penetration and integration activities in the East as a consequence 
of the demand for large resource transfers and the Swedish companies’ 
demanding resource transformation in the East. The findings are a contribution 
to theories of internationalisation, and complement the more common decision-
oriented studies. 
 Three main conclusions from the investigation concern crucial relationships 
whose significance is underestimated in the literature on strategy, marketing and 
internationalisation: 1. the importance of personal relationships; 2. the demand 
for self-enforcing legal control over commercial disputes; and 3. the influence of 
crime.When making commitments in the East, Western actors should be very 
keen to investigate with whom they establish relationships in order to become 
insiders. Confidence, trust and privileged information about counterparts in the 
East had greater instant value than written agreements. The same applies to self-
enforcing mechanisms in disputes. 
 Further observations include the Swedish companies’ employment of 
“irrational-oriented rational mechanisms”, an expression for the social exchange 
of trust, shared values and ideals in commercial, mega, and nano relationships 
and interactions. Through personal relationships, confidence and trust the 
Swedish companies created platforms for intra-organisational changes in relation 
to their investments. Meanwhile, their counterparts in the East could act as 
insiders. Personal relationships reduced the effects of industrial, commercial, and 
legal asymmetry between the West and the East, as well as of differences in codes 
of conduct and access to information in inter-organisational exchange processes. 
 The contemporary high-speed economy – with its rapid technological 
development, its rapid access to information, its heightened internationalisation, 
its integration of national economies and global financial systems – together with 
increased international competition, create gaps between formal and informal 
rules of the game as well as in the enforcement of agreements within and 
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between nations. Networks are organisational forms which are familiar to 
criminals who are not concerned with the absence of regulations but instead 
utilise this special experience as a competitive advantage in relation to the 
authorities and commercial actors. This development occurs because supporting 
administrative sectors in the societies cannot keep pace with the high-speed 
development of the commercial sector. 
 In the light of growing corruption in Russia and in the West it may be 
necessary to reconsider the rules of the game if legality is to prevail. It may be 
necessary to change definitions of organised crime because corruption is one of 
the most important contemporary factors as far as organised crime is concerned. 
Corruption, the threat of violence and criminal monopolisation are recurring 
features of the definitions of organised crime offered in the Anglo-American 
literature and they are also found to a certain extent in the definition of 
organised crime offered by the expert group on organised crime in Europe.17 
With increased levels of corruption, it may be necessary to reconsider the 
prerequisites for legal business, and it may in future be necessary to have 
recourse to alternative mechanisms for the regulation of interactions between 
commercial partners. Such developments have been revealed in the East and 
recently revealed also in the West in larger corporations such as: Royal Ahold in 
the Netherlands; Xerox, Enron and Worldcom in the US; Parmalat in Italy; ELF 
Aquitaine in France; Skandia in Sweden, and the Yukos Oil Company in 
Russia.  
 This investigation has for the first time integrated theories drawn from 
business with theories drawn from criminology. The cases that have been 
studied strongly indicate that criminal actors and illicit distributive alliances had 
an impact on many of the Swedish companies’ commitments in the East. 
                                                 
17  For a discussion of the definition of organised crime that emerged from the Expert Group on 
Organised Crime of the Council of Europe in 1997, see Van Duyne (2003). 
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Adventure capitalism and economic crime in 
the countries of transition:  
The case of the Czech Republic 
Adventure capitalism and economic crime 
Miroslav Scheinost 
Vladimir Baloun 
Drahuse Kaderabkova1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
It is not easy give a short description of the development of such a complicated 
phenomenon as economic crime in a changing society and an economy in 
transition. That is why this chapter will limit itself to the presentation of some of 
the characteristic features – which will be described rather than analysed – of an 
economy in transition, and to the presentation of some selected items of 
information that have been generated by a research project on economic crime. 
This project was carried out by the Institute of Criminology and Social 
Prevention in Prague between 2000-2003 and was based on the statistical 
analysis of government databases; on the analysis of other available sources and 
studies; on the analysis of the development of relevant legislation, case studies, 
and court files, and finally, on interviews with judges, public prosecutors and 
police officers. Some of its interim results have already been published (see 
Scheinost et al. 2002/3/4). This chapter seeks to update the picture by reporting 
on the current incidence of economic crime (stressing, in particular, its likely 
true extent, over and beyond the crimes that are known to the authorities). In 
addition, it describes the characteristics of Czech financial markets as a means of 
illustrating the development and characteristic features of economic crime in 
general. Finally, it reports some findings from an analysis of the files of offenders 
focussing particularly on interesting differences between the results of such 
analysis and the results obtained from the interviews with the professionals.  
 
 
Changes in the economic and legal landscape  
 
In the Czech Republic, the economic crime of the 1990s was not only a burden 
for the Czech economy, but was, in a certain sense, also a reflection of the 
specific political and policy perspectives adopted by the authorities in relation to 
                                                 
1  Miroslav Scheinost  is Director of the Institute of Criminology and Social Prevention, Prague, 
Czech Republic. Vladimir Baloun and Drahuse Kaderabkova are senior researchers at the 
same institute. 
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the economy and to society. The authorities were keen to ensure that the social 
and especially economic transformation at the beginning of the decade took 
place as quickly as possible. They were therefore impatient and underestimated 
the need, when designing policies, to take into account all the relevant social 
and economic circumstances surrounding the transition. 
 Since the socialist assumption of power in 1948, the structure of ownership 
had been simplified due to the process of nationalisation, which for more than 
four decades thereafter formed the basis of the theory and practice of the 
planned economy. It was necessary not only to return this structure to its pre-
nationalised form by a reverse transformation, but also to upgrade it so that, 
together with newly created economic interests, it would correspond to the 
principles of free-market economics. 
 In a very short time, ownership of the lion’s share of what had formerly been 
state property, changed hands. This encompassed property owned by various 
types of co-operatives and a substantial amount of property administered by 
municipalities (chiefly communal undertakings). These property transfers were 
implemented either by various forms of privatisation – such as transformation of 
utilities into new types of business company and the public sale of specific 
companies – by the offer to citizens of the co-ownership of selected entities 
(coupon privatisation), or by restitution, where the state returned nationalised 
property to its original owners. 
 Transformation of the ownership structure inevitably impacted on other 
related phenomena, such as the dissolution of existing state corporations and 
organisations, the rapid and in some cases frantic formation of new private 
companies and other legal economic entities. Last but not least it stimulated the 
equally massive and rapid creation of a significant group of self-employed 
individuals. 
 Changes of this nature naturally led to high levels of labour and professional 
mobility. Parallel with this movement of labour forces there was also a change of 
personnel in existing state administrative institutions, including law enforcement 
authorities. It was also necessary to staff new institutions of the state 
administration. As in the economic sphere, new people were recruited who 
often had little or no practical experience with the specialist tasks they were 
required to perform. The emerging new business community (including many 
banks) required time to learn how to use the tools available in the developing 
liberal market. This, and the state’s lack of specialist staff, which could have 
protected its economic interests, opened the way for widespread economic abuse 
of a criminal kind. 
 The liberalisation of economic life clearly had to be accompanied by changes 
in the legal environment, covering both economic and commercial law and the 
revision of penal law to protect changing economic interests. In the case of 
economic crime, penal law enforcement was forced to undergo a major change, 
with a shift of priorities from the protection of ‘property in socialist ownership’ 
to protection of the rights and legitimate interests of private economic entities. 
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It is well known that penal and other legislation bear all the marks of the 
conditions in which they were transformed at the beginning of the 1990s. 
Regulations were prepared hastily, new instruments lacked the test of legislative 
experience and last but not least specialist know-how was in short supply. In 
addition there was a lack of practical experience in enforcing these measures. 
Obviously, there were also different political approaches concerning the process 
of economic reform. These differences had to do with the principle of reform 
itself, its speed, and the strategy and specific measures for achieving it. In general, 
the prevailing opinion was that for the success of the process of transformation 
speed was more important than the systematic drafting of legal regulations. 
Though the historical distance separating us from the reform period is small, its 
highlights and contours allow us to assess the legislative reforms concerning the 
economic sphere, including the changes in the penal law that were designed to 
protect economic interests often in an ex post, rather than an ex ante fashion. 
 In the above-mentioned research we asked professionals employed by law 
enforcement authorities to express their opinions of both penal and non-penal 
itsems of legislation related to the commercial sphere. The majority of judges 
and public prosecutors we interviewed regarded the existing commercial 
legislation as imperfect. 58% of the judges and 66% of the public prosecutors 
expressed the view that it suffered from many shortcomings. 72% of the judges 
and 67% of the public prosecutors thought the correlation between the quality 
of such legislation and the occurrence of economic crime noteworthy. The 
respondents even thought that in some case, the poor quality of commercial 
legislation provided an encouragement to economic crime (Scheinost, et al., 
ICSP 2004). 
 With regard to penal legislation, the Criminal Code was expanded by 
incorporating new economic and property crimes in response to transgressions 
that were previously unknown in the Czech Republic (or, rather, were 
unknown in the conditions of state ownership and planned economics) and 
which could not be prosecuted under existing legislation. 
 Between November 1989 and the end of 2003, the Criminal Code was 
amended forty-four times and underwent many substantial changes, the majority 
of which concerned the prosecution of economic crime. The new and partial 
amendments, however, solved only urgent problems. As a result of the frequent 
and diverse partial modifications and additions, the Criminal Code became 
‘congested’ and could hardly be enforced consistently. 
 For domestic and foreign economic entities, the complicated and sometimes 
confusing legal situation is extremely burdensome, while also creating an actual 
incentive to commit economic crimes. As an example we may refer to the case 
of light fuel oils (which gave rise to tax frauds that took advantage of imperfect 
tax legislation and incoherent regulation of the designation of oil products). 
 It is true that over the past few years there has been a positive change both in 
the quality of legislation and in the activities of the regulatory bodies and law 
enforcement authorities. This change entails that certain dubious business 
activities from the ‘founding period’ cannot be repeated anymore. Cases from 
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this period concerned large privatisation investment funds – such as V. Kozeny’s 
Harvard Investment Funds, the Trend fund, or CS Funds – which took 
advantage of coupon privatisation to amass huge quantities of investors’ property 
and, through a range of different financial operations, to transfer this property 
out of the funds. Deliberate and serious economic criminal activity is gradually 
being brought to light and the culprits have been prosecuted, even if, 
particularly in major cases involving significant damage, the criminal proceedings 
have been extremely protracted. 
 
 
Current incidence of economic crime 
 
The essence of the threat and expansion of economic crime, as well as the 
difficulty of obtaining evidence of it, lies in the similarity of legal and criminal 
economic conduct in terms of the commercial instruments used in both cases. 
Schemes of criminal economic activity are, in terms of their instruments and 
courses of action, practically identical to schemes of legal economic activity. Of 
course, legal behaviour abides by the law, but due to this ‘commercial similarity’ 
it is sometimes very difficult to prove that the law has been broken. Both with 
regard to the drafting of laws, and with regard to their application, the boundary 
between licit and illicit activity in the economic sphere is often difficult to draw. 
Therefore, in speaking of recorded economic crime, we have to take account of 
the possibility that a significant portion of it is hidden as a result. 
 Therefore, we may only guess at the true extent of economic crime, over 
and above the crimes that are known to the authorities. In our research, the 
opinions of professionals employed by law enforcement authorities were sought 
by means of a questionnaire. The professionals were asked what portion of the 
economic crimes committed each year they thought remained undetected. 
 
Table 1. Extent of undetected economic crime per year (% of respondents  
   who estimate this proportion to be . . .) 
 
Profession up to 20% up to 40% up to 60% up to 80% over 80% no answer ∑ 
Judges 
(n=105) 
1 5 13 18 5 58 100 
Public 
prosecutors 
(n=82) 
0 6 17 24 9 44 100 
Police officers 
(n=32) 
0 3 25 31 6 35 100 
 
It is evident that a majority of respondents from all three professions considers 
the proportion of economic crime that goes undetected to be very high. Only 3 
to 6% of respondents consider the proportion to be below 40%, while 23% of 
judges, 33% of public prosecutors and 37% of police officers believe it to be over 
60%. 
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Of course, these are only estimations based on subjective feelings and personal 
experience, not exact and reliable data concerning real situation. Nevertheless, a 
majority of those questioned were specialists in dealing with perpetrators of 
economic crime. Therefore, judging from their responses, we might presume 
that the proportion of economic crimes that remains undetected each year is 
about 50%. We must be similarly wary of the figures for recorded economic 
crime bearing in mind that its real extent is likely to be greater. Figure 1 shows 
trends in economic crime in relation to total recorded crimes. 
 
Table 2. Economic crime as a proportion of total recorded crime 
 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
4 5 5 7 6 7 8 10 10 10 10 
Source: Crime statistics in the CR. Police of the Czech Republic.  
 
During the 1990s economic crime increased consistently as a proportion of total reported crime 
until in 1999 it represented one tenth. In 2002 recorded incidences of economic crime stood at 
10.8%, the highest proportion yet registered. The following table illustrates the eleven-year 
development of this proportion. 
 
 
Figure 1. Trends in the total of reported crimes and in economic crime 
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The financial damage inflicted is a function of the substance of the crimes rather 
than their number. In 2002, total financial damage caused by all kinds of crime 
amounted to the sizeable sum of CZK 43.3 billion (i.e. about €1.5 billion), of 
which economic crime was responsible for about CZK 29 billion (€1 billion), 
i.e. 67%, disproportionate to its relative frequency.  
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The financial market 
 
Many of the problems, endemic in recent times, can be illustrated by what can 
be observed in financial markets. Since November 1989, financial markets in the 
Czech Republic (or Czechoslovakia) have developed extremely inconsistently. 
This can be explained by the fact that in Socialist Czechoslovakia (as in other 
countries of the former Soviet bloc) financial institutions were either liquidated 
completely or distorted for purposes of the ‘planned’ economy. One example is 
the capital market, while the role of banks was similarly distorted, with banking 
houses coming to be used more or less exclusively as clearing centres for national 
(later state) companies. 
 After 1989, therefore, on the one hand the distortion of this segment of the 
market economy had to be remedied, and on the other hand, rules essential for 
economic conduct had to be reconstructed, both in an organisational and legal 
sense. The conduct of entities on the financial market is, however, not only 
guided by formal but also by ethical norms. These are of equal importance and 
involve compliance with modes of behaviour which may not be formally 
sanctioned but which are essential for the operation of the financial sector and 
the economy in general. The absence of such unwritten norms or a failure to 
observe them, were and remain one of the key problems of the emerging 
business environment in the Czech Republic as elsewhere in the transition 
countries. To give one example of the many possible: whereas in the developed 
economies the payment of liabilities and compliance with contracts in general is 
taken for granted, and while an entity that acts otherwise finds itself almost 
spontaneously removed from the market without the intervention of law 
enforcement authorities, in the Czech Republic this social-economic mechanism 
does not work. Since the beginning of the transformation period, the problem of 
non-payment of liabilities has been so great that it has almost become the norm. 
This is the case both between business entities and between business entities and 
the state, and even between the state and state companies. This also led and still 
leads to a form of ‘self defence’ on the part of sellers, who require payment in 
cash – a practice that still persists in the Czech Republic, despite it being not 
only unusual in the established and developed economies but also highly 
regulated by anti-laundering provisions (it is viewed a priori as a way of 
legalising the proceeds of crime). When the Bill on the Limitation of Cash 
Payments was debated in the Chamber of Deputies, some opposition MPs 
argued that the strict limitation of payments in cash might mean the liquidation 
of businesses. Given what we have said, this argument was not entirely 
unreasonable. A specific feature of financial crime is that it affects areas where 
people work: money (including securities) represents a commodity that can be 
easily misappropriated without it being difficult to use it again anywhere on the 
market; most often it involves someone else’s money (money invested or 
entrusted to the perpetrator by other persons) when, with a relatively small 
amount of capital of one’s own, it is possible to control disproportionately larger 
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amounts of other people’s capital (either in the form of deposits or capital 
holdings etc.). 
 This fact also explains the differences between perpetrators and victims of this 
form of economic crime: perpetrators are usually people who have decision-
making powers in relation to the relevant financial matters (either as direct 
owners or as members of management), while the victims come from all social 
groups and backgrounds and suffer quite catastrophic economic damage as a 
result of this form of crime. It has been found, however, that to commit 
financial crime in the Czech Republic does not require any particularly expert 
knowledge and that the ‘modus operandi’ does not – unlike what is usually 
presumed to be the case with white-collar crime – need to be particularly 
sophisticated. The most well known perpetrators of financial crime thus far have 
by no means come only from the ranks of university graduates with an 
education in economics. They have also been apprentices, high school graduates 
and university graduates in disciplines other than economics. Likewise, the 
Czech experience shows that the victims of such criminal schemes, including 
relatively transparent financial crimes, are not only people with low levels of 
education, but also such highly educated people as economists and lawyers. The 
findings from the file analysis and from interviews with experts show that in 
some types of financial fraud these groups actually predominate, either due to 
their ability to deposit large sums of money or because they were intentionally 
targeted in advance by advertising campaigns. 
 Both of the aforementioned characteristics (namely, the prevalence of cash-
based transactions and the possibility of gaining control of other people’s money) 
led to the phenomenon that, in the Czech Republic, is referred to as tunnelling 
(asset stripping). This is a transaction whose purpose is to siphon off funds from a 
prosperous, legally functioning company with the aim of self-enrichment.  
 As is evident, a person or persons who exert control over the relevant 
company, whether this is proprietary or managerial, may only perpetrate 
tunnelling. (Scheinost c.s. 2002: 3). 
 
 
The banking system 
 
After 1989, and following approval of the measures that laid the foundations for 
social and economic reconstruction, the banking system was the first that 
required reform. It should be pointed out that the incidents that were later 
referred to as ‘tunnelling’ originated in the banking sector. It is estimated that 
cleaning up the banking sector cost the State CZK 170 billion (this might not be 
the final figure. As a comparison, state budget income for 2004 is expected to be 
around CZK 754 billion). From the start we should make it clear that these 
losses are not caused exclusively by criminal activity; the problem is deeper than 
that. 
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At the beginning of the transformation period, the five main state-owned banks 
were joined on the financial market by the first entirely private banks. By law 
these were subject to the licensing regulations of the Czechoslovak State Bank, 
although this had neither sufficient source documents from the banks nor 
sufficient experts to perform due diligence. The lack of experts was a problem 
experienced by banks generally: some criminal cases which later found their way 
into the media relied heavily on the understandable lack of knowledge of bank 
officials, although we can also assume that some small banks were deliberately 
established for fraudulent purposes. 
 At the same time, many new entrepreneurs were desperate to obtain funds, 
which, with few exceptions, were very scarce. The demand for bank loans was 
such that banks needed to increase their disposable capital and did so almost 
exclusively by attracting depositors through the offer of high rates of interest. In 
the first place this led to higher interest rates on loans granted. In the second 
place it meant that, due to their low capital coverage, the banks almost inevitably 
found themselves in difficulties with regard to harmonising the timing of 
payments of interest on deposits and the receipt of accrued interest on loans, or 
the need to reconcile the immediate repayment of deposits with expiration of 
the repayment terms of loans.2 Banks had to develop their business activity, 
which in their case rests chiefly on the provision of loans; on the other hand 
they could not allow their major clients (still state enterprises) to go bankrupt 
without at the same time writing off their debts. 
 The pressing demand for loans led directly to a criminality: among other 
things it was generally known (although understandably unproven) that bank 
officials (so-called loan officers) requested ‘tithes’ for the allocation of loans (that 
is, 10% of the amount loaned); that business plans were not checked sufficiently 
thoroughly; that highly questionable guarantees (the precious stones case) or 
guarantees that were criminal in nature (the Barak Alon case) were accepted for 
loans.3 This led, in a short space of time, to a banking crash. The first bank had 
its licence withdrawn in 1993, and this was followed by a chain of crashes. The 
result was legislative reform (including several amendments to the Act on Banks 
and the setting up of a deposit insurance fund) on the one hand, and a shake up 
of the whole banking market (with particular reference to mergers and take-
overs of bankrupt banks by other banks) on the other hand. Ultimately the 
whole banking sector was privatised with varying degrees of success (the IPB - 
Nomura case is an example)4 and the effects of this are still being felt today. 
                                                 
2  At that time it was common to provide the vast majority of loans for a 4-year period (without 
distinction), which in itself is absurd and lacks economic logic.  
3   Precious stones were accepted by several banks as loan guarantees, but the value of such stones 
was over-estimated by the authorised experts. The B. Alon case consisted in the acceptance of 
a worthless financial instrument by an important Czech bank as guarantee for manifold higher 
credit. 
4  The problem with this transaction was that NOMURA did not join IPB as a strategic partner 
but evidently did so for illegitimate reasons.  
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At the same time, however, special forms of financial crime, which came to be 
referred to as tunnelling, emerged. This was the allocation of loans by a bank’s 
owner(s) or its management either to companies in which they had a personal 
interest, or to companies acting in collusion with them. This was relatively 
common, particularly in the case of small banks. 
 
 
Savings and Loans Associations 
 
A tightening up of the rules governing the formation of banks, and fresh banking 
legislation in general, led to stricter rules for the provision of loans etc. At that 
time, banks were relatively uninterested in so-called retail banking. This may 
have been the reason for the parliamentary initiative to authorise the setting up 
of savings and loans associations (SLAs), which had a tradition dating back to the 
time of the Austro-Habsburg monarchy. The Act on SLAs was passed in 1995. It 
was, however, extremely imperfect, perhaps because its provisions were based 
purely on the experience of the monarchy and the first Czechoslovak Republic, 
and it made possible many activities that were potentially subject to abuse. 
 The development of SLAs essentially mirrored the development of the 
banking system – undergoing rapid initial expansion followed by the first 
problems and then a crisis of the entire system. We should add that unlike banks 
(whose problems were not exclusively due to criminal activities) some of the 
associations directly offered the opportunity for tunnelling. Their initial ‘start-up’ 
had the character of pyramid companies. The purpose of SLAs was to gather the 
liquid funds of its members and provide them with cheap and accessible credits 
and loans (to serve more or less as non-profit institutions for their members), but 
nobody saw anything strange in the fact that certain SLAs tried to recruit 
members (it is very important to remember that they were members and not just 
depositors) with promises of interest rates of 20 to 25% on their deposits (or 
more accurately their membership shares). Neither the new SLA Supervisory 
Office, nor the CNB (Czech National Bank, whose powers, it must be said, did 
not directly cover SLAs) nor the Ministry of Finance objected to the fact that 
many associations ran very aggressive campaigns (involving celebrities from the 
world of politics and show business). Nor did they object to the fact that 
associations pursued activities (involving exchange rate transactions, securities 
market transactions etc) which, although not prohibited by law, were 
nevertheless on the edge of legality. The result was the truly massive criminal 
tunnelling of many of the SLAs, which the Czech State both de facto and de 
jure acknowledged to have taken place when it offered compensation to the 
members of such associations.  
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Securities market (capital market) 
 
Privatisation in the Czech Republic took place in two stages:5 the so-called small 
privatisation (which consisted of the direct sale of small business outlets or shops, 
or of long-term leases of premises suitable for small business outlets), and the so-
called large privatisation (the privatisation of large, state enterprises, whether 
industrial or business companies). The latter took a number of forms – from sales 
to  specific interested parties, to auctions (such transactions often being affected 
by the problems of the banking system due to the absolute lack of licit capital), 
although large privatisation was mainly accomplished by means of so-called 
coupon privatisation. 
 The coupon privatisation was based on the correct premise that the relevant 
companies had originally been national and subsequently state enterprises, which 
over the course of 40 years had been in so-called public ownership. This 
pseudo-ownership was to be replaced by real ownership and it was expected 
that, through the coupon scheme, citizens of the Czechoslovak Federal or Czech 
Republic (this phase occurred during the break-up of the joint Czecho-Slovak 
state) would ‘buy’ shares in selected companies, which would thereby be 
privatised (this was basically meant to be a fast-track route to share-ownership). 
It was obvious that this was rather a ‘de-nationalisation’ and only the first step 
towards real privatisation. In this first stage no one anticipated the massive input 
of privatisation investment funds in the process (this was meant to take place in 
the second stage, when the minor shareholders were meant to come together in 
the actual exercise of ownership rights). From the very beginning the public 
found it difficult to grasp this concept, until the appearance of the financier 
Viktor Kozeny and his so-called ‘guaranteed ten-fold valorisation’.6 His 
Harvardské privatizační investiční fondy (Harvard Privatisation Investment 
Funds) became market leaders and as a result were copied by other privatisation 
funds. Investment funds themselves were in some cases established by banks. As a 
result, an extremely non-transparent environment developed including, in many 
cases, so-called cross ownership. Cross-ownership means that banks (or their 
management) own themselves via their investment companies.7 Alternatively 
banks owned companies and at the same time provided these companies with 
credits. 
                                                 
5  This excludes restitution, which is also a method of privatisation consisting in the return of 
state property to its original private owners. 
6  Mr. Kozeny promised coupon investors that he would obtain ten times more money than the 
original administrative fee they had to pay for the possibility of taking part in the coupon pri-
vatisation. The fee was CZK 1,000. In other words, they were promised the sum of CZK 
10,000, if they invested their ‘coupons’ in the Harvard funds. The promise itself was formu-
lated ambiguously, but it motivated many people to take part in the coupon privatisation 
process. 
7  This was the case of IPB, which was in this way privatised by its management. 
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This stage resulted not only in extremely murky activities on the capital market 
but also in the relatively high-profile international failure of the new Prague 
Stock Exchange, which had ambitions to become the most important stock 
exchange in Central and Eastern Europe. Real investors still generally avoid the 
Prague Stock Exchange – the Czech equity market depends on a limited 
number of securities, or companies, and the stock exchange is only used for 
speculation and is most definitely is not a source of capital for companies. These 
choose rather to obtain funds through bank loans, and such preference has to a 
certain degree become a typical characteristic of the Czech Republic.  
 A further possibility for illegal activities at the expense of small shareholders 
arose shortly before passage of the amendment to the Act on Investment Funds 
and Investment Companies, which understandably imposed stricter conditions 
on their operations. Unfortunately, before the amendment came into force, 
many investment companies managed to transform themselves into holding 
companies, not covered by the amendment. The result was a mass of legal 
disputes, for example: the protracted dispute between shareholders in 
Harvardský průmyslový holding (HPH) and the holding’s own management; the 
dispute between the annual general meeting held by one section of shareholders 
against the annual general meeting held by a second section; a prohibition issued 
by the Ministry of Finance on the payment of stock interest; a protest by another 
section of shareholders; an international arrest warrant for Viktor Kozeny and 
some others of the holding’s statutory representatives. When this dispute will 
end it is impossible to say. 
 There was also the notorious case of the CCS funds, where more than CZK 
1billion were removed from the Czech Republic at the expense of fund holders, 
and the case of the funds owned by the former tennis player Šrejber, who was 
even put on trial and convicted, although the conviction was overturned on 
appeal. Such were the consequences of this stage and the most famous cases, 
which attracted much media interest at the time. In addition there were also 
many smaller investment companies, which followed the same modus operandi. 
 Cases such as these, although often still unresolved legally, now belong to the 
past in terms of their modus operandi. Since then, we have witnessed the 
appearance of criminal activities (which will certainly continue into the future) 
more familiar in the old established market economies and which can be 
regarded as ‘classic’ crimes, such as insider trading. For the reasons mentioned 
above, the Czech capital market plays essentially only a minor role (acting as a 
place for people to deposit their savings in order to earn interest on them, not as 
a place where firms can raise capital). Therefore we do not anticipate, in the 
Czech Republic in the near future, crimes of the type that involve 
manipulations of share values (cf. the well-known example of Enron, the 
Californian energy company). Financial crime in the Czech Republic was so 
idiosyncratic and essentially unrepeatable that it did not occur on such a scale in 
other post-Socialist countries. As a matter of fact the perpetrators of many of 
these crimes were not even charged, let alone brought to trial, and in 
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comparison with the extent of the damage inflicted, the number of persons that 
has actually been convicted is negligible. 
 
 
Criminals, their targets and behaviour 
 
In 2002, the numbers of persons convicted of economic crimes included only 45 
re-offenders, or 3.1%, whereas the proportion of re-offenders among persons 
convicted of property crimes was 18.8%, and 16% for the total offender 
population. In 2002, the largest group of persons convicted of economic crimes 
(501) came from the 30-39 age group, which is 53 more than the previous year. 
Unconditional sentences were imposed on 110 people, and conditional 
sentences on 1,007 people. Other sentences included three prohibitions on 
persons convicted of economic crimes from operating in specific areas of 
activity. 186 people received fines; 48 people were ordered to perform 
community service; 67 received another sentence, and a further 67 had their 
sentences waived. 
 
Table 3. Numbers of prosecuted, charged and convicted persons in 2002 
 
 persons prosecuted persons charged persons convicted 
Economic crime 3542 2805 1452 
Property crime 46691 40579 29991 
Total crime 93378 77210 65098 
Source: Crime statistics yearbook 2003. Ministry of Justice of the Czech Republic. 
 
We may add to this statistical overview some of the results of our own research. 
In this research project a sample of 115 cases of economic crime that were 
brought to justice (at the level of regional and district courts) in 2000 and 2001, 
was analysed. With regard to the victims, analysis of the sample showed that in 
29 cases a financial institution had suffered damage; in 23 cases the victims were 
self-employed persons; in 39 cases economic entities (companies, joint-stock 
companies etc.) outside the financial sphere were prejudiced financially; in 29 
cases the state had suffered damage (through the non-payment of tax and other 
levies etc.), and in 5 cases the victims were other institutions from the non-
financial sector. 
 These figures indicate that economic crime is spread relatively equally over all 
four main economic sectors – self-employed persons, institutions in the financial 
sector, companies outside the financial sector and the State. The data do not 
allow us to determine whether, in terms of the extent of damage inflicted, any 
one of these sectors suffered significantly more or less than the others. 
 In seven cases institutions were damaged by attacks from inside. In two cases 
the offenders were employees; in four cases members of the institutions’ 
management, and in one case a co-owner. Thus, attacks on institutions by 
‘insiders’ were not very frequent, but happened nonetheless and were mostly 
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carried out by people in senior positions. In three cases, an attack on the same 
institution caused damage exceeding CZK 5 million. 
 
Table 4. Damage caused in relation to the damaged entity 
 
Damaged entity 
under 
 CZK 100,000 
over 
CZK 
100,000 
up to 
 CZK 1 
million 
up to  
CZK  5 
million 
over  
CZK 5 million 
Bank 0 0 0 3 9 
Insurance 
company 
0 2 1 6 0 
Savings and 
loans 
association 
0 0 0 0 1 
Savings bank 0 0 0 2 1 
Other fin. 
institution 
0 0 0 2 2 
Company, firm 2 2 4 22 9 
State 3 3 0 14 7 
Other entity 0 0 1 2 1 
Natural person 1 2 1 12 7 
Total 6 9 7 63 37 
 
The table demonstrates that damage most frequently ranged from CZK 1 to 5 
million. It is clear that damage caused by economic crime is significant and 
extends to many millions. In 82% of the cases investigated, damage exceeded 
CZK 1 million. Although these high levels of damage are chiefly characteristic 
of banks, savings companies and other financial institutions (which did not suffer 
lower levels of damage in the cases examined), they dominate among all types of 
damaged entity. 
 In the cases analysed, 155 offenders were charged and 148 convicted, of 
which 90% were men and 92% citizens of the Czech Republic (apart from 6 
citizens from Slovakia, the numbers of foreigners are minimal). Twenty-four of 
the above cases (i.e. 20%) involved more than one offender, although no charges 
were brought against an organised group or criminal association. Only a small 
number of cases (i.e. 35, or less than one third) concerned a one-off criminal 
offence (the other cases concerned continuing criminal activity). Only in a very 
small number of cases (12%) was the crime committed spontaneously; the vast 
majority (80, or 70%) of crimes were committed intentionally and were planned 
in advance (the remainder were committed under the pressure of a specific 
situation, i.e. the perpetrator had debts – 10% – or the available information did 
not allow for the crime’s classification). 
 Law enforcement practice thus demonstrates that the perpetrators of 
economic crimes are generally prosecuted as individuals. The cases analysed did 
not include prosecutions involving organised crime, although the findings 
display a large degree of deliberate and planned criminal activity on the part of a 
number of cooperating perpetrators. The UN or the EU definition of organised 
THE ORGANISED CRIME ECONOMY; MANAGING CRIME MARKETS IN EUROPE 
 
 
 
156 
crime would certainly have been applicable. The number of foreigners involved 
would also indicate that economic crime is almost exclusively the domain of 
Czech criminals. 
 These findings tend to contradict the opinions of the law enforcement 
professionals, as revealed in our questionnaires. Such professionals should, 
however, be regarded as competent as all police officers who responded to the 
questionnaire stated, with one exception, that they specialised in economic 
crime, while 93% of the public prosecutors we questioned, and 45% of the 
judges, were also specialists in this area. 
 Respondents were asked to estimate the proportion of economic crimes that 
involve organised groups (lower level of organisation), and also to describe their 
own experience with cases of economic crime that could be characterised as 
involving criminal conspiracy (that is, as involving higher forms of criminal 
organisation as defined by the Section 89 (17) of the Czech Criminal Code). 
Tables 5 and 6 show their responses. 
 
Table 5. Estimated proportions of economic crimes that involve organised  
   groups (% of respondents) 
 
Profession 
Up to 
20% 
Up to 
40% 
Up to 
60% 
Up to 
80% 
Over  80% No answer Total 
Judges 
(n=105) 
9% 10% 13% 1% 0 67% 100% 
Public prosecutors 
(n=82) 
13% 13% 7% 4% 0 53% 100% 
Police officers  
(n=32) 
9% 22% 12% 19% 0 38% 100% 
 
Table 6. Personal experience with cases of economic crime that could be  
   characterised as criminal conspiracy (% of respondents) 
 
Profession 
Yes, more 
than once 
Yes, once No Don’t know Total 
Judges (n=105) 13% 9% 77% 1% 100% 
Public prosecutors (n=82) 23% 17% 59% 1% 100% 
Police officers (n=32) 61% 10% 23% 6% 100% 
 
The views of organised economic crime of law-enforcement professionals differ 
substantially from what in practice emerges from the documented proceedings of 
criminal trials. Representatives of all three professions believe that organised 
groups (as defined by the Criminal Code, which describes the organised group as 
a lower level of organisation) play a quite significant role; while a large number 
of them even state that they have dealt with cases which could be described as 
instances of criminal conspiracy. 
 This difference must of course again be evaluated critically. It is true very few 
cases in general have been prosecuted under the Section 89 (17) of the Czech 
Criminal Code. The number of cases prosecuted under this section has gradually 
increased over the last three years and there now exist some instances of 
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economic crime that have been prosecuted as criminal conspiracies. As this 
provision was introduced into the Czech Criminal Code in 1995, it took some 
time to learn how to apply it. It was (and still is) not easy to prove all the 
constituent elements stipulated by the legal definition of criminal conspiracy. It 
seems that for law enforcement authorities is less complicated to prosecute and 
sentence perpetrators as individuals than to try to prove the organised character 
of their activity. 
 We may conclude that the legal instruments allowing the prosecution of cases 
under the organised crime clause are available, but that their application lags 
behind, especially with regard to economic crime. One of the reasons could be 
the conviction or experience of law enforcement authorities that to prove the 
existence of organisation in economic crime cases is so complicated that the 
prosecution and punishment of offenders as individuals is sufficient. A second 
reason could lie in the character of economic crime itself. Perpetrators usually 
misuse existing formal structures and often do not need to create special criminal 
structures with a division of tasks, roles and so forth. 
 On the other hand, we must also take into account the possibility that 
respondents have overstated the involvement of organised structures in 
economic crime. They may incorrectly generalise their specific personal 
experience or feelings (opinions, even those of experts, are still a fragile kind of 
data).  Nevertheless, our analysis of court proceedings showed that in the 
majority of cases, offenders were prosecuted as individuals, even in cases in 
which several offenders acting in concert were involved. Therefore, it is 
probably not possible to make a reliable estimate of the involvement of organised 
groups in economic crime, though it seems that organised criminal activity in 
the economic field might not be as rare as is suggested by the statistics 
concerning the prosecution and sentencing of perpetrators of economic crime. 
 Information obtained from respondents also suggests that involvement on the 
part of non-Czech nationals is more frequent than suggested by analysis of the 
criminal records available. Respondents were asked whether over the last five 
years they had dealt with a case of economic crime in which a foreign national 
had been involved; and they were also asked for their opinion on the proportion 
of economic crime that extended beyond the borders of the Czech Republic. 
Tables 7 and 8 provide the findings. 
 
Table 7. Cases involving foreign nationals during last five years (% of  
      respondents) 
 
Profession 
Yes, more 
than once 
Yes, once No No answer Total 
Judges 
 (n=105) 
38% 15% 46% 1% 100% 
Public prosecutors 
(n=82) 
61% 15% 22% 2% 100% 
Police officers 
 (n=32) 
63% 9% 25% 3% 100% 
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Respondents are clearly of the opinion that economic crime is not exclusively 
the domain of domestic criminals, as might appear to be the case from the 
documents we analysed. More than half of those questioned from all professions 
have handled at least one case in the last five years in which a foreign national 
has been involved. This is remarkable in light of the figures for sentenced 
offenders that emerge from the case analysis. A partial explanation might lie in 
the possibility that foreigners that have anything to do with such cases are often 
not sentenced – perhaps because they are frequently not identified or captured 
by the police, manage to leave Czech territory and so forth. 
 
Table 8. Estimated proportions of criminal activity where offenders’  
   activities cross the borders of the Czech Republic (% of  
   respondents) 
 
Profession 
Up to 
20% 
Up to 
40% 
Up to 
60% 
Up to 
80% 
Over 
80% 
No 
answer 
Total 
Judges 
 (n=105) 
11% 9% 4% 0 0 76% 100% 
Public rosecutors  
(n=82) 
9% 16% 4% 2% 0 69% 100% 
Police officers 
(n=32) 
9% 34% 16% 3% 0 38% 100% 
 
Table 7 shows that the proportion of respondents, particularly judges and public 
prosecutors, who failed to answer the question on which its figures are based, 
was very high. Based on the opinions of the rest, we may presume that a certain 
portion of economic crime is committed on an international or cross-border 
scale. This is not a dramatic revelation: it merely illustrates that in the Czech 
Republic too economic crime has begun to be organised across international 
borders.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
There is no need to emphasise again the dangers that economic crime represents: 
its modus operandi is hard to distinguish from ordinary economic activities, a 
feature that makes it very difficult to identify and successfully to prosecute. More 
than other types of crime, economic crime also typically blurs the boundaries 
between conduct that is legal but unethical, conduct that exploits opportunities 
at the boundaries of what is legal, and conduct that is unambiguously illegal. 
 One of the most important developments since 1989 has been the removal of 
the distinction between different types of ownership, something that did away 
with the need for any special legal protection for social ownership. On the other 
hand, too few regulations and penalties have been introduced to prevent abuse 
of the transfer of social property into private hands and to regulate effectively the 
fundamental transformation from a planned to a market economy. 
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The sudden freedom to do business without proper determination of the 
boundaries of economic competition; the real and sometimes hasty support for 
certain ‘enterprising’ individuals at the beginning of the 1990s: all these factors 
created the conditions for unlawful financial machinations and various new 
forms of economic crime (so-called tunnelling, property and tax fraud). 
 It is also important to bear in mind that the penal law does not have the 
means to eliminate or substantially reduce the impact of the factors that give rise 
to economic crime in the first place. In this respect it has only a residual role. 
This means that penal repression is only applied under extreme circumstances, 
where other instruments, chiefly of an economic nature, are inadequate. 
 Fully functioning market economies have adequate self-regulating 
mechanisms, but these are absent in the Czech Republic. This results in the 
need to ‘manage’ the economy by legislation and where possible to define 
exactly forms of criminal activity in this field. In reality, however, this approach 
can be counterproductive if it produces too much complexity, something that is 
confirmed by constant criticisms of the apparent inadequacy of Czech legislation. 
Indeed, one may suggest that the more detailed the attempts to define different 
types of economic crime, the easier it becomes to find ways to get round the 
letter of the law. 
 Definitive answers to this problem have to be found outside the sphere of  
legal instruments. Of crucial importance is the quality of the environment in 
which commercial competition take place. This should include the relevant 
regulation of the legal relations associated with business and economic activity in 
general, and should include rules that make it possible to respond to breaches of 
the law as quickly as possible. Factors such as adequate control mechanisms and 
the quality of the state apparatus also have a crucial role to play. The existence of 
effective non-punitive sanctions for breaches of legal and ethical norms and an 
emphasis on their enforcement would thus play a key role in preventing 
economic crime. 
 An analysis of the available material allowed certain more general observat-
ions concerning economic crime, showing, in particular, that there are a number 
of phenomena that either assist the perpetrators of economic crime, or 
accentuate the negative impacts of this form of crime. 
 The widespread incidence of economic crime that goes unreported is 
evidently accompanied by some degree of criminal organisation and by 
international involvement, although it is also true that economic crime is 
generally quite primitive in nature and relies on rather simple patterns of 
behaviour for its execution. Our study has also revealed that economic offences 
involving organised crime are rarely prosecuted or proven, and that damages of 
many millions are as likely to be inflicted by simple fraud as they are by more 
organised approaches. In addition, economic crime damages not only the entities 
that are directly targeted by criminals, but it also indirectly affects a wide range 
of other entities (employees whose insurance has not been paid, investors who 
lose deposits or shares, clients of banks that have suffered damage etc.). 
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Recent years have seen an increase in the numbers of people prosecuted for 
most forms of economic crime, suggesting greater effectiveness both in the 
prosecution of such crimes and in the work of law-enforcement authorities. It is, 
however, true that the number of criminals convicted of economic crime as a 
proportion of people prosecuted is still much lower than for property crime, or 
compared to the numbers of people prosecuted and convicted in general. For 
example, even though comparison within a single year is potentially misleading 
and can only be illustrative, we may note that in 2002 the conviction rate for 
persons prosecuted for economic crime amounted to 40%; for property crime 
the figure was 64% and for the total number of persons prosecuted 70%. This 
only confirms the complexity and the difficulties that attend criminal 
proceedings in cases of economic crime. 
 As far as the perpetrators of economic crime are concerned, our research has 
confirmed that they are intelligent, and that they tend to have above-average 
levels of education; but our research also shows that economic crime, at least as 
far as the Czech Republic is concerned, is by no means restricted to such people. 
A significant proportion of offenders obtained their knowledge not through 
formal qualifications but through their own business experience. It is also 
evident that even people with low educational levels are able to cause great 
damage. Alarming is the fact that approximately one-fifth of criminals re-offend, 
which suggests that even persons who have been convicted can regain access to 
the field of commerce relatively easily. It would seem that until recently in the 
Czech Republic the relative success of this type of crime had been facilitated less 
by high qualifications and creative ability on the part of criminals than by 
credibility and inexperience on the part of its victims. The general ‘simplicity’ of 
the criminals is attested to by the fact that the in the majority of cases they have 
used the proceeds of their criminal activities to finance their own personal 
expenditure – rather investing the proceeds with a view to expanding their 
current activities, or creating new legal economic activities. 
 In the future it will be interesting to monitor the extent to which economic 
crime is affected by the new forms of criminal behaviour that are anticipated 
following accession to the European Union. 
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Criminal sub-contracting in the Netherlands: 
The Dutch ‘koppelbaas’ as crime-entrepreneur 
Criminal sub-contracting in the Netherlands 
Petrus C. van Duyne 
Mark J. Houtzager1 
 
 
New concerns about an old phenomenon 
 
The recent expansion of the European Union has given rise to a very sensitive 
controversy: the free movement of labour. Many ‘old’ member states have 
expressed their concerns that influxes of cheap labour from Poland, Hungary and 
other new member states will increase pressures on the employment situation. 
This concern may be justified, but it ignores the existence of a traditional 
underground, ‘black’ labour market in the European Union (Esope Project, 
2004). 
 The black labour market is a common phenomenon in all industrialised 
countries in which labour relations are extensively regulated. Such regulation 
usually takes place for social security and labour safety reasons. As social 
insurance contributions are paid by employers as well as employees, both have 
an economic incentive to evade these expenses. This evasion is a broadly 
ingrained phenomenon, ranging from households hiring a ‘black’ cleaning lady 
to construction firms using fraudulent subcontractors to reduce their costs and 
maintain competitive advantage, excusing such behaviour by means of the 
familiar references to ‘cut-throat competition’. Mateman and Renooy (2001) 
provide a sketch of the black (undeclared) labour situation in seven EU-member 
states. Though estimates of the financial impact of the problem are inevitably 
subject to much uncertainty, the fact that such estimates typically fall within the 
range of 3 to 15% of Europe’s GDP suggests that the impact of the problem is 
large. Given increased mobility Europe-wide after 1989 (Höhnekopp, 1997), it 
is unlikely that this impact will decline. 
 The diversity of labour-related tax evasion indicates that the black labour 
market is a many-faceted economic and social phenomenon. This does not 
imply that it is a disorderly or disorganised market. As a matter of fact, whether 
it concerns the undeclared cleaning lady fostering her network,2 or illegal aliens 
being hired by a subcontractor, organising reliable labour has the appearance of 
an orderly process. Some manifestations may even be qualified as ‘organised 
                                                 
1 Petrus C, van Duyne and Mark J. Houtzager are respectively Professor of Empirical Penal 
Science and doctoral student at the University of Tilburg, the Netherlands. 
2 It is interesting to observe the narrow price ranges in this domestic market, and the ‘invisible’ 
way in which yearly increases in hourly pay are adopted regionally within a few weeks. 
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crime’, if we abstract from the controversy around this ill-defined concept (Van 
Duyne et al., 2002; Van Duyne, 1996). 
 Despite this ubiquitous phenomenon affecting so many people and 
enterprises, little is known about its structure and organisation. There are sectors, 
like the construction industry, agriculture and catering, where the phenomenon 
has traditionally been concentrated, but they are too diverse to allow cross-sector 
generalisations. Moreover, apart from the involvement of the construction 
industry, which rates high in every country, the importance and order of the 
industrial sectors may vary. From the perspective of market organisation the rate 
of concentration of required labour is important. Moonlighting in the catering 
business may be as widespread as in agriculture, but only a few workers are 
engaged per enterprise. Recruitment usually occurs on the basis of networks of 
friends and acquaintances. During harvest time farmers need to recruit larger 
crews, for which they may need middlemen. This requires more market 
organisation than recruiting a Saturday-evening bar tender for a pub. Such 
market organisation is not only directed at connecting labour and employer, but 
also at fending off the law – a function that is an inherent component of any 
crime-market (Van Duyne et al., 2002). The nature of the connections between 
this entrepreneurial ‘underworld’ and the ‘licit’ upperworld is only roughly 
known. Apart from frequent revelations in the press, case descriptions, like the 
‘building mafia’ in Germany, are less empirical analyses than they are public 
warnings and expressions of indignation on the part of the law enforcement 
authorities.3 There are fraudulent (sub)contractors, while the phenomenon of 
empty front firms, behind which such (sub)contractors hide, is well known 
internationally (See, 1992). Nevertheless, these general notions are no substitute 
for more detailed insight into questions like: ‘How do they operate in the 
various business sectors?’ and, ‘How do they interact with the labour laws and 
the bodies of law enforcement?’ 
 In order to answer such questions empirically, researchers at the University of 
Tilburg undertook a project to collect and analyse data, which were gathered by 
the competent law enforcement agencies. The findings should be viewed against 
the backgrounds of this dynamic underground ‘human capital’ market. 
Therefore we describe these backgrounds and some of their Dutch history first. 
 
 
Backgrounds of an unruly commodity  
 
The reasons for the existence of the black labour market are, as mentioned 
above, obvious and unvarying across time and place. The costs of labour account 
for the lion’s share of the costs of many production processes. Labour costs do 
                                                 
3  The indignation does not appear to be shared by unions, labourers or citizens (Mateman and 
Renooy, 2001). 
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not just consist of the net earnings of employees (their market value), but also of 
the accumulated costs of the welfare state. Employer and employee share these 
‘social’ costs through the direct contributions paid by employers to the tax 
authorities and social insurance agencies.4 This simple financial picture makes it 
clear that we have at least two ‘obvious suspects’: the employer and employee, 
both engaged in a perfectly consensual, ‘victimless’ crime. They may not be the 
only beneficiaries, as together they may provide cheap services to other market 
players in need of fulfilling, in complex or swiftly changing market situations, 
contractual obligations requiring the ad hoc deployment of much labour. 
Examples are business sectors like agri- and horticulture, the building industry, 
the garment and catering industry. Builders have to meet contractual deadlines; 
farmers need to harvest crops during unpredictable good weather spells; 
innkeepers may expect sudden rushes of tourists. To meet these entrepreneurial 
demands many are frequently willing to hire moonlighters, either on a personal 
basis or from subcontractors. 
 Meeting this demand there is a regular supply of workmen/women of a very 
heterogeneous composition, ranging from highly skilled operators and craftsmen 
to unskilled labourers in agriculture or the cleaning business. Skilled labour may 
be a scarce ‘commodity’ during economic booms. For example, skilled 
bricklayers were scarce in West Germany during the 1990s, which induced 
Dutch craftsmen to seek employment with Dutch criminal subcontracting firms, 
which then lent the craftsmen to German builders (Van Duyne et al., 1990; Van 
Duyne, 1995). Among unskilled labourers we often find very high degrees of 
mobility, with workers moving to seek their fortunes or to flee from 
unemployment in poor regions, often in countries outside the European Union 
(Hönekopp, 1997). Some of them enter the EU legally on tourist visas and find 
temporary (illegal) jobs for the period specified by their residence permits. Other 
foreigners are asylum seekers (genuine or otherwise) whose applications have 
been rejected. Very few return to the countries from which they flee, instead 
remaining to eke out a living in the ‘grey’ economy, often in the illegal labour 
market. With the message about stricter asylum rules in the Netherlands having 
spread to the countries of origin of asylum seekers (or economic refugees), many 
may have decided to try their luck with tourist visas. To this segment of the 
underground labour market we should add the numerous resident workers, who 
are officially unemployed and receive social security benefits, but who 
‘moonlight’ illegally. Finally, there are workers whose employment is partly 
undeclared: ‘licit’ workers who receive substantial parts of their payment (such as 
                                                 
4  Such contributions are related to wage levels and to occupations. For example, as the chances 
of suffering disability are higher in construction than in the catering industry, construction 
employers have to pay larger insurance contributions. It was for this reason that a motel chain 
in the Netherlands had its bricklayers fraudulently registered as cooks. 
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overtime) ‘in cash’.5 Some workers prefer to remain unregistered altogether. 
 It is clear that the supply side of mobile, illegal labour is very complex and 
difficult to determine. Based on various studies, the numbers of illegal workers 
in the Netherlands in the last five years have been plausibly estimated as 60,000 
in 1999 and 78,000 in 2004 (Zuidam and Grijpstra, 2004). 
 To connect demand and supply a host of employment agencies offer their 
services. The legally operating temporary (‘temp’) employment agencies, about 
2,500, deal with approximately 650,000 persons. These registered agencies do 
not provide regular employment for illegal job seekers. This service is provided 
by the approximately 5,000 unregistered ‘temp’ offices, which apparently 
provide an unknown number of employers with about 80,000 illegal workers. In 
addition to these illicit enterprises, an unknown number of registered temp 
offices systematically dodge their social security obligations. Apart from the firms 
that engage workers ‘unintentionally’, because the latter submit false identity 
documents or otherwise incidentally avoid their obligations, some systematically 
devise complex constructions designed to mislead tax inspectors and social 
security agencies. Though carefully disguised as legitimate firms, they actually 
operate as ‘crime-enterprises’. 
 As remarked above, the Dutch situation is merely an example in a continuous 
European-wide flow of cross-border labour supply and demand. The flow of this 
commodity perpetuates itself, despite the efforts of the agencies of law 
enforcement. Strictly regulated (or rather enforced) economies, like those in 
North-western Europe, face illegal labour markets that are similar to those faced 
by countries, like Italy, that are more tolerant of the informal economy. The 
local or temporary employment situation may add different shades and colours, 
but it does not change the phenomenon itself. On the one hand, unemployment 
will increase the number of available (illegal) ‘fortune seekers’ (regional as well as 
international). On the other hand, full employment may be accompanied by a 
scarcity of labour, which will encourage workers and employers to meet 
obligations ‘in cash’. It may also stimulate illegal subcontractors who succeed in 
organising this labour supply more efficiently. The labour commodity remains 
difficult to control in virtually any regulatory regime as will be illustrated in the 
following sections. 
 
 
Criminal subcontractors in Dutch history 
 
The history of the phenomenon of illegal subcontracting in the Netherlands 
covers about 35 years: from about 1970 until the present. During that period the 
phenomenon waxed and waned, to re-emerge again at the turn of the century. 
                                                 
5 In the Netherlands and Germany (fiscally) unrecorded work is called ‘black’: ‘zwartarbeid’ and 
‘Schwarzarbeit’, respectively. 
 Criminal sub-contracting in the Netherlands: The Dutch ‘koppelbaas’ as crime-entrepreneur 
 
 
 
167 
It never really disappeared, even if the authorities seemed to have succeeded in 
subduing it for much of the time. 
 The terms ‘subcontracting’ and ‘subcontractor’ are misleading substitutions 
for what in Dutch is called ‘koppelbaas’. As a matter of fact, there is no real 
subcontracting: all a koppelbaas does is to match or couple (‘koppelen’) the 
demand for temporary labour to a crew of workers he is able to deliver. So he is 
actually a ‘matching’ or ‘coupling-boss’. What about that ‘subcontracting’? 
 During the 1960s koppelbazen (plural of koppelbaas) played a significant role 
in the quickly expanding economy in the Netherlands. This expansion exceeded 
the available labour supply, which was only partly met by an influx of migrant 
labourers from Turkey and Morocco: the ‘guest labourers’ (‘gastarbeiders’). The 
guest labourers proved to be anything but guests, because they did not leave, as 
guests do. However, providing only unskilled labour, they could not meet the 
demand, which was continuous in the construction industry, for people to carry 
out more skilled tasks. Skilled tilers and bricklayers, among others, were in 
especially short supply in Germany, where the building industry was booming. 
As the German construction firms valued the Dutch tilers and bricklayers, there 
was a strong economic incentive for these workers to move to Germany, joining 
the massive illegal labour force flowing into that country (See, 1992). This 
supply was legitimate as well as illegal. The latter manifested itself in various 
ways, from efforts of individual workers to defraud the Social Security Service 
and the Industrial Insurance Board, to the organised forms of labour supply 
arranged by the Dutch koppelbazen. The latter were especially active in the 
eastern Dutch provinces of Limburg and Gelderland (Meurs and de la Combé, 
1993; Reijntjes, 1988; Van Duyne, 1983). 
 Meanwhile, by the later 1960s, the koppelbaas phenomenon had spread, for 
example, to the harbour in Rotterdam, where it created labour unrest, because 
of wage differences. The labourers hired by these entrepreneurs got higher 
wages than employees on regular payrolls, and this led to a strike. In order to 
stem such unrest and the spread of small labour intermediaries, who often 
dodged their fiscal obligations and subsequently went bankrupt, in 1970 a new 
regime of licences was introduced through the ‘Labour Availability Act’ (TBA).6 
The TBA was effective in the sense that the koppelbazen did not get licences. 
However, its success was undermined by the response of the koppelbazen, who 
started to operate under the guise of subcontractors. Instead of issuing an invoice 
for the number of working hours, they drafted invoices for contract work: a 
fictitious amount of work replaced the total of working hours. Already working 
on (or partly over) the edge of legality, the koppelbaas became an illegal (labour) 
‘subcontractor’, though he did not mention any labour in his contracts or 
invoices. This implied that he did not pay his social contributions. If possible, he 
also evaded paying VAT. 
                                                 
6 Wet Terbeschikkingstelling Arbeidskrachten. 
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Within the social-fiscal system, the first signs of a potential scam are bound to 
come to light because of the VAT balance. Entrepreneurs (e.g. the main 
contractor) who pay VAT to another entrepreneur (subcontractor) are entitled 
to reclaim it. This means that the tax office know the names of firms receiving 
VAT. The latter are obliged to hand the money over when they settle their 
VAT obligations. However, the fraudulent subcontractor has no intention of 
settling anything with the authorities. While receiving various summons to 
submit his tax forms, he is already in the process of setting up new (limited 
liability) corporations to take over the business of the firm that is about to be 
‘besieged’ by the usual debtors: the tax office and the Insurance Board, which 
has not received its share either. These institute bankruptcy proceedings and, 
entering the premises, they find them deserted or else, if the firm is still 
operating, they find the proverbial drunk straw man, who only knows that a 
man called ‘John’ had him sign blank invoices. 
 This is the basic pattern of fraud which emerged in the 1970s and which is 
the trusted method of VAT, excise or long-firm fraudsters alike (Levi, 1981). 
The basic requirement is the ability to juggle ‘front firms’, which are destined to 
go bankrupt, and to staff them with ignorant straw men. For this reason, these 
entrepreneurs have been nicknamed ‘front firm jugglers’ (Van Duyne, 1997). 
Various factors contributed to the success of the koppelbazen. In the first place, 
there was much tacit complicity among building contractors. As long as their 
obligations to the principal were met by whoever subcontracted the work 
cheaply and delivered it properly, they benefited handsomely. ‘Black’ labour was 
the responsibility of the ‘subcontractor’, who submitted ‘real’ invoices, including 
VAT. In the second place, at that time, the authorities did not show much 
alertness either. Fraud in general and fraud against the public fund in particular 
was and still is (internationally) an undervalued problem (Levi, 1995; Ludwig, 
1992, Savelsberg, 1987). As far as fiscal and social security fraud was concerned, 
it took years before the responsible ministries (Finance and Social Affairs) 
reluctantly admitted that there was a problem at all (Van Duyne, 1983). That 
admission was not followed by an active law enforcement policy, but by verbal 
proclamations of concern and the announcement of ‘stern measures’. Six years 
passed before legislation to stem the koppelbaas problem was forthcoming (1982). 
A factor that almost paralysed the will of policy makers was the social and 
economic aspect of the fraud problem. Clamping down on fraud would have to 
be directed against employers as well as employees. However, both parties are 
represented on the Insurance Boards7 and in the political parties. This induced 
them to ‘pass the buck’, while exhausting themselves in blaming each other for 
‘not doing enough’. The parties on the political right did not like increased anti-
fraud measures directed against the entrepreneurs. Among the parties on the left, 
                                                 
7 The Industrial Insurance Boards are private entities endowed with powers to execute social 
insurance regulations. Each industrial sector has its own Insurance Board. Employers have to 
contribute to these boards a certain percentage of the wages of their employees.  
 Criminal sub-contracting in the Netherlands: The Dutch ‘koppelbaas’ as crime-entrepreneur 
 
 
 
169 
there was concern that the financial misdemeanours of the ‘weaker members of 
society’ would be more vigorously pursued than the crimes of the powerful. 
Later developments proved these concerns not unrealistic.8 
 In the third place, the competent law enforcement agencies, like the fiscal 
police (FIOD) and the Insurance Boards (which have investigative powers), as 
well as the regional police forces, were divided. Organised subcontracting fraud 
schemes can be very time-consuming to unravel. While local police forces were 
frequently not unwilling to invest time and labour in the investigation of such 
schemes, they tended not to have the technical know-how to collate relevant 
evidence from the confiscated remains of the unsorted paper work of suspect 
firms. In addition, they tended to consider the Inland Revenue and the 
Insurance Boards to be the real victims. Hence they would ask these ‘victims’ to 
invest investigative capacity too – which typically resulted in the formation of 
multi-disciplinary teams of variable cohesion. Sometimes the teams would 
disintegrate with their work only half complete, because of the emergence of 
diverging interests during the protracted investigations. Detectives from the 
contributing agencies would sometimes be withdrawn as it was realised that 
continued investigative effort could yield no more added value for the fiscal 
service or the Insurance Board. The police force and an (often) non-specialist 
public prosecutor would then have to cope with what was left of the 
investigation. If, after one or two years, they finally succeeded in initiating court 
proceedings, they would find that the koppelbaas was already operating his 
successor schemes.9 
 A contributing economic and social factor in the south of the Netherlands 
and nearby in Belgium was the closing of the coal mines in Limburg, creating 
many redundancies.10 Dutch koppelbazen operating in Limburg had the advantage 
of easy access to the nearby German market, which they could supply with 
cheap Dutch and Belgian miners, complementing their social benefit. 
 In the second half of the 1970s the problem grew worse and attracted more 
attention. A factor that helped to raise public awareness was the supposed 
involvement of ‘organised crime’, though at that time few knew anything about 
the organised crime phenomenon. Actually, most of the koppelbazen were lower 
class figures, and many had criminal records as well (Berghuis et al., 1985). Such 
                                                 
8 A similar ambiguous situation about legislative measures against fraud and business crime was 
observed by Savelberg (1987) in Germany. 
9 In fraud cases suspects are rarely remanded in custody when the police have seized all the 
paper work. After all, the evidence must be constructed from inconsistencies in the bookkeep-
ing rather than from interviews with usually silent suspects. At that time suspects had available 
an effective legal instrument with which they could delay proceedings. This consisted in rais-
ing objections against the preliminary charge, pursuing matters as far as the Supreme Court, a 
process which could easily take two years to complete. 
10 Limburg has consisted, since 1838, of a Belgian and a Dutch province. From the point of view 
of illegal cross-border undertakings, Dutch Limburg, bordering Belgium in the west and Ger-
many in the east, is ideally situated. 
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unsavoury entrepreneurs could easily be portrayed as representatives of 
‘organised crime’ – which could in turn thus be portrayed as having penetrated 
the construction industry – and this helped to raise public awareness of the 
problem (Brants and Brants, 1984). A few vigorous public prosecutors succeeded 
in attracting public and therefore (temporary) political attention. The cases they 
handled were big indeed. These concerned well-organised labour subcontracting 
schemes, involving strings of front (bust) firms and having extensive 
ramifications. A number of the leading figures had careers of fraud and deceit, 
and most were well acquainted with the building industry.  
 Acting as a koppelbaas is not a leisurely job: it involves the supply of many 
workers to impatient contractors, while new projects have to be brought in 
continuously (the task of the ‘pit-seeker’). Meanwhile workers have to be 
moved from the firms that have just gone bankrupt to new corporations, which 
in their turn will be busted in the future. At the same time, the movements of 
the fiscal police, Insurance Boards and Social Services have to be watched in 
order that incriminating evidence (like invoices and payrolls) can be destroyed in 
time. Being a koppelbaas is tantamount to the continuous organisation of crime. 
 The on going, large-scale labour subcontracting frauds; the perceived 
audacity of the koppelbazen; the complexity of the problem (for which, despite its 
sensitivity, an inter-ministerial commission was established); the increased 
workload of the public prosecution office and the courts: all these factors 
contributed to maintenance of public and political awareness of the problem 
(Brants and Brants, 1984). The inter-ministerial commission drafted proposals 
designed to sever the profitable symbiosis between the main contractors and the 
fraudulent subcontractors. Three ‘anti-abuse’ laws were proposed. 
 The ‘Law on Chain Liability’, made the contractor financially liable for the 
non-compliance of any of his subcontractors, unless he had displayed due 
diligence. This liability was applied to the whole ‘chain of subcontracting’: each 
‘link’ could be held liable for the unpaid dues of any subcontracting firm lower 
in the chain. Creating strings of ‘bust firms’ did not provide protection 
anymore.11 
 The law on fraudulent bankruptcy was tightened too: the term of imprisonment 
for illegally prejudicing creditors was extended retrospectively to one year from 
the moment the bankruptcy became unavoidable. 
 The third law made the managers of the boards of corporations personally 
liable for ‘apparent’ mismanagement, and applied a retroactive term of three 
years. They could no longer hide behind the veil of their corporations or behind 
straw men, unless they had planned their fraud scheme three years in advance. 
Few fraudsters think that far ahead. 
                                                 
11 In principle the WKA only applies to activities on Dutch territory. However, the European 
Court of Justice made an exception in the Rheinhold-Mahla case: the WKA has a cross-border 
application if fraudulent conduct can be demonstrated. 
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As far as the illegal labour market was concerned, the most important ‘disruptor’ 
was the civil liability of contractors for the unpaid taxes and social contributions 
of any firm lower down the chain of subcontracting. Suddenly the mutual 
interest of subcontractors was broken up. Indeed, as soon as the three ‘Abuse 
Laws’ came into force in 1982, the koppelbaas phenomenon waned. Though 
loopholes continued to be taken advantage of, the problem receded (Berghuis et 
a., 1985; Van Duyne et al., 1990; Van Duyne, 1995). Surveying the 
documentary evidence, in the second half of the 1980s the problem no longer 
figured as a social or economic problem. 
 Had the koppelbaas really disappeared or was it only a matter of shifting 
priorities or a decline in the attention being paid to fraud? After the mid 1980s 
fraud as a public and policy issue was actually losing priority (Brants and Brants, 
1991). The koppelbaas was no longer mentioned: ‘organised crime’ had taken his 
place. In addition, there were also other, more mundane personal reasons for the 
waning attention to (organised) fraud. Many highly motivated public 
prosecutors, who had upheld the ‘anti-fraud banner’, shifted their attention to 
other issues. Tired of fighting for basic material support and being promoted to 
higher positions, they were not replaced by equally ardently motivated 
successors. With this outflow of ‘problem owners’ it proved difficult to sustain 
anti-fraud efforts at the same level. Perhaps the koppelbaas survived ‘unobser-
ved’,12 lingering on in the border regions, roaming around his traditional regions 
in Western Germany and Limburg, as described ten years ago in Van Duyne 
(1995). He would emerge again as soon as the social and economic environment 
grew more favourable. 
 
 
Investigating the re-emerged koppelbaas 
 
As mentioned above, the three ‘anti-abuse laws’ disrupted the illegal labour 
subcontracting market. Nevertheless, the significant contribution to labour costs 
made by taxes and social insurance payments continued to structure the 
incentives operating on employers and workers. Apart from this, the 
economically successful 1990s witnessed a labour shortage in some countries, on 
the one hand, and an increase in the supply of illegal labour, on the other. Illegal 
labour was partly offered by indigenous residents, partly by non-EU migrant 
labour roaming all over Europe. Residents engaged in ‘black labour’ range from 
students supplementing their allowances to recipients of social/unemployment 
benefit who defraud the Social Service or the Insurance Board. Foreigners, 
seeking out a (temporary) livelihood, come from all quarters and backgrounds. 
Most attention is devoted to rejected asylum seekers and economic fortune-
                                                 
12 This is only partly correct: signs of (cross-border) koppelbazerij continued to be registered by 
the Insurance Boards, indicating the abuse of foreign ‘legal persons’ and the European posting 
system to be discussed later (Meurs and de la Combé, 1993). 
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seekers who smuggle themselves or are smuggled by others into Europe. We 
have also mentioned the many visitors on tourist visas or legal project workers, 
who remain after their terms of residence have expired. Particularly significant 
was the increase in the supply of labour from Central and Eastern Europe after 
1989 (Hönekopp, 1997). 
 The social-demographic, economic and law-enforcement aspects of this 
development attracted a great deal of attention. However, few detailed empirical 
studies have been carried out. Statistics are scarce and by their very nature 
unreliable as far as the illegal side of the labour market is concerned. The 
receiving economic sectors are roughly known (construction, agriculture, 
catering and in some countries the garment industry), but neither studies, nor 
reports from the competent departments, clarify the organisation or structure of 
the illegal labour market. The reports mention that illegal subcontracting plays 
an important role, and they continue to outline plans of action against the illegal 
hiring of labour. But who does what and how, remain only vaguely known. 
 
 
Method 
 
To obtain insight into the phenomenon, which is geographically widespread and 
covered by various agencies, we approached three of the most important 
investigative services: the fiscal police (FIOD) office operating in South 
Limburg, the FIOD office in Rijswijk near The Hague, and the International 
Bureau of Fraud in Arnhem. The Ministries of Finance and Social Affairs as well 
as the Public Prosecution Office allowed us full access to their criminal files. The 
only condition they imposed was the usual one concerning the anonymity of the 
persons involved, that is, the suspects, investigators, prosecutors and judges. All 
names were coded and in the descriptions were replaced by pseudonyms. 
 The material that was available for our analyses varied according to the 
agency concerned. The South Limburg unit of the FIOD, which initially raised 
our interest, had a few very large cases with many ramifications. Because of the 
extensive networks of those under suspicion, the unit’s investigations proceeded 
so slowly that earlier observations and information became too old to be of use 
in construction of the evidence required for a successful prosecution. The 
investigating team therefore thought that it had to re-launch its investigations 
from the start and as a result, it constantly discovered new ramifications and front 
firms. Therefore, while it was able to give us only one big case, the case was one 
that touched almost every sector of the construction industry in South Limburg.  
 The FIOD Rijswijk had formed an intervention team against koppelbazen in 
the Westland. In the course of about five years it carried out about 45 criminal 
investigations. From these we selected 10 cases, which had been brought to trial. 
After a short introduction by the team leader we selected and studied the cases, 
starting with the most extensive and ramified ones. 
 The fraud department of the UWV mainly handles cases with cross-border 
ramifications, and from these we also selected 10 cases. 
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Given the ever changing criminal landscape and the fluidity of illegal labour 
relations, it is difficult to determine the extent to which this selection was truly 
representative in a statistical sense. Given the decentralisation of information and 
cases over many agencies, at the time of the research representative sampling 
(random or stratified) proved not to be feasible. 
 The cases described below have been anonymised by changing names or 
recognisable features. Investigations have, in all the cases considered, now been 
finalised, and at the time of writing the cases had either reached the prosecution 
phase or had already been dealt with by the courts. 
 
 
Findings 
 
General features 
The population of perpetrators differed according to the investigative agency and 
the region involved. The criminal actors in the Westland consisted mainly of 
male ethnic Turks and Kurds, administratively assisted by a few Dutch 
accountants. The average age of the 54 suspects was around 30. There were 16 
legal entities (legal persons) involved as suspects. The recorded offences took 
place between 1998 and 2001. 
 The age of the small population of suspects in South Limburg – 7 persons – 
ranges from 40 to 70, testifying to the unabated criminal drive of some senior 
crime-entrepreneurs. They handled 6 legal persons. Though there are no 
indications that these veterans ever interrupted their criminal exploits, the 
observations of the FIOD started in 1995 and resulted in prosecution. 
 The group of suspects investigated by the fraud department of the UWV 
consists of 16 persons and 14 legal persons. The average age of the suspects is 50 
and their nationality is Dutch, German, Belgian and British. The investigations 
started in 1998 and are still in progress. 
 The evidence provided by the fiscal police (FIOD) and the criminal cases we 
analysed confirmed the re-emergence of the koppelbaas phenomenon (or at any 
rate the renewed attention paid to it). However, this does not imply a simple 
repetition of the patterns of the 1970s and 1980s. Actually, the methods of 
abusing the fiscal and social insurance regime had become more diversified, 
mixing the trusted juggling of ‘front firms’ with new approaches. The main 
observations are: 
 
? alongside the ‘old’ koppelbaas method of bringing labour into contact 
with licit entrepreneurs, there is now a more intricate  involvement of  
‘licit’ entrepreneurs, with the latter creating or shaping their own 
koppelbaas, in this way reflecting the existence of a new symbiosis 
between the entrepreneurial underworld and upperworld; 
? foreign legal persons are frequently used, demonstrating an international 
use of legal security measures; 
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? fraud constructions are keenly adopted by colleague-koppelbazen; 
? more cross-border fraud constructions, particularly abusing the EU 
posting regulations: the E101 posting; 
? the Dutch, indigenous koppelbaas appears to be accompanied by Turks, 
particularly in the labour intensive horticulture of Western Holland 
(‘Westland’). 
 
Making your own koppelbaas 
One of the most remarkable findings is not that the koppelbaas is lingering at the 
margins, ready to expand his operations again in a more favourable economic 
climate, recruiting new staff and ‘subcontracting’ to indifferent principal 
contractors. We found that too, but more surprising were the licit entrepreneurs 
who were being served by their ‘own’ koppelbaas. In its essentials the system 
works as follows. Builders who want to reduce their staff but nonetheless like to 
have them to hand, transfer their employees onto the payroll of an employment 
agency, which (for a fee) will handle the taxes and social contributions. The 
workers are subsequently ‘loaned’ back to their original employees at an 
attractive rate, due to non-payment of the taxes by the employment agency. 
This means that the latter accumulates huge debts with the authorities, which 
eventually institute bankruptcy proceedings. The manager appears to be the 
traditional know-nothing straw man. Needless to say, there are no assets left 
with which to recover the debts. The following case description clarifies the 
method and describes the actors involved. 
 
The Limburg Matrix 
An entrepreneur in the office cleaning business, William Sweep, decided to 
shift his interests to the field of ‘employment and personnel service’. His friend, 
Bert Blister, specialised in the creation and delivery legal entities of any 
nationality, wherever registered. So they established the Belgian corporation, 
Matrix NV, in Antwerp, which specialised in handling the fiscal and social 
insurance obligations of a number of building companies. They were facilitated 
in this endeavour by the person who was actually the main figure in this 
quickly ramifying enterprise: Dorus Darkman, the leading background figure, 
who looked after the books, and Paulus the Deutscher, who established 
contacts with building firms in Germany. Darkman liked order and regrouped 
the executive subcontracting firms into sections. 
 German contracts were valuable, because they provided opportunities to 
move the ‘white’ and ‘black’ labour employed by legitimate Dutch building 
firms. The latter required ‘white’ workers to be legitimately employed in 
Germany, while their social security-fiscal codes were used to cover 
moonlighters employed in the Netherlands. It goes without saying that the 
turnover in Germany was unrecorded. An important major builder who used 
Matrix NV was Barend Builder. To provide for a smooth flow of invoices, he 
provided a cover in the form of a financial consultancy firm. 
 The accumulation of debts resulted in the predictable bankruptcy. While 
the investigators and the receiver were still sifting through the unsorted paper 
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work of Matrix NV, Dorus Darkman and Barend Builder continued business in 
the name of a resurrected Matrix: ‘Matrix NV Inc.’, a corporation established 
in Nevada (US) by an octogenarian Dutch fraudster. Though it was somewhat 
daring to do so, they preserved the name, because it was known in building 
circles and few would notice the ‘Inc’ added to it. Neither would anyone meet 
the new director, an alcoholic picked up near Antwerp railway station. 
Whether the principals who dealt with the subcontracting koppelbazen were 
aware of their illegal nature, remained uncertain. 
The resurrected Matrix NV Inc met the same fate of insolvency and 
bankruptcy, after which Dorus Darkman and Paulus the Deutscher went their 
own (fraudulent) ways.  
 
Actually, legitimate building firms, like those of Barend Builders, maintain(ed) a 
separate fraudulent ‘invoice processing firm’, headed by their own koppelbaas. 
The latter was well connected with numerous building firms in Limburg and 
Germany and did not need to wander around, chasing contracts by offering 
workers. On the contrary: he was frequently offered the opportunity of putting 
employed construction workers on his firm’s payroll in exchange for a ‘head-
fee’. Apart from the change in the stamp on their pay slips (the reason for which 
they were aware of), the workers’ jobs did not change very much. 
 The koppelbaas is not only a fraudulent ‘false invoice processor’ for building 
firms. Traditionally he is well integrated into the local construction workers’ 
society, where moonlighting and social insurance/security fraud is considered a 
normal way of supplementing one’s income. In this position the koppelbaas can 
also offer personal services, such as the fabrication of a pay slip if needed to 
obtain a mortgage, for example. The workers themselves often operate within 
family circles, passing their craft from father to son, or in small crews of 
craftsmen. They are not exclusively tied to any one koppelbaas. Among them 
there is much social control, which may become intimidating for those who 
want to be employed in accordance with the legal requirements. ‘You won’t get 
a job anywhere around here’ is likely to be considered a friendly reminder to 
step into line. As there are many illegal, but well-connected, subcontractors in 
the region, the worker who refused to step into line would indeed find it 
difficult to get a job. 
 
Fleecing the E101 
The E101 is not one of the main motorways connecting European countries or 
cities, but a certificate concerning applicable legislation. It concerns the 
temporary posting of staff to other countries in the EU, where the E101 
confirms that the legislation of the posting country will apply. This declaration 
can be obtained if a number of conditions are met. For the purposes of our study 
three conditions are important: (a) the employing firm must undertake a 
substantial part of its activities within the country from which the posting of 
employees takes place; (b) workers cannot be given an E101 certificate if they 
are not insured in the posting country prior to posting, and (c) in order for an 
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E101 to be issued, there must exist a direct relationship between the employer 
and employee concerned. In addition, the E101 can be given to subjects of third 
countries based on EC-VO 859/2003. These conditions aim to prevent the 
evasion of social insurance payments in countries where such costs are lower. As 
the reader will already have surmised, fraudulent entrepreneurs aim to reduce 
their social insurance expenses by the misuse of E101 certificates and the 
manipulation of issuing agencies. This requires deceit within two countries. 
Country A, the posting country, must not be aware that it has issued E101s for 
workers who are never in the country. This is only profitable if country A can 
be further cheated through the contribution of low premiums or nothing at all, 
the choice depending on perceptions of the likelihood of being detected. 
Country B is cheated because the E101 declaration prevents it from receiving 
employer’s contributions. This profitability will be enhanced if the cross-border 
information exchange between insurance authorities is poor. This proves to be 
the rule rather than the exception. 
 Abuse of the E101 regulation by koppelbazen is not restricted to the building 
industry. The cases under investigation by the Dutch fraud department of the 
UWV also concern shipping companies involved in European inland navigation. 
In addition to the traditional Dutch-German interconnection we also discovered 
the involvement of Britons and a posting of Poles in Belgium. This indicates that 
abuse spreads beyond the provincial koppelbaas phenomenon in Limburg. From 
the cases being investigated we have selected three extensive cross-border crime 
operations. The first case description involves an overlap with the previous 
category: fleecing the E101 regulation by a company’s ‘own’ koppelbaas. 
 
White Mountain Ltd 
The Dutch brothers De Blanck are well acquainted with British construction 
workers residing in the Netherlands and with the German construction market. 
Hence, they decided to take advantage of the situation by requesting the issue 
of E101 certificates for a few hundred British workers who are self employed 
and working in Germany. As the self-employed undertake no activities in the 
UK, they are not entitled to E101 certificates. The brothers established 
numerous UK corporations, each of which succeeded the other to mislead the 
Inland Revenue, the British issuing agency. Their staff in Britain amount to 
about 3, with a turnover of £15,000, while about 400 persons are employed in 
Germany with a turnover of about €1 million. The large turnover in Germany 
is kept partly unrecorded, while the declared wages are much too low, even 
being below the official minimum wage. After the scheme was unveiled the 
brothers shifted their activities to Belgium. 
 
Given the mobility of labour within Europe, the koppelbazen are not only 
interested in workers from the ‘old’ EU member states. Since the coming into 
force of EC-VO 859/2003, and the ruling of 21October 2004 in the 
Commission versus Luxembourg, it has been possible for workers from third 
countries also to be posted. However, Poles, some of whom also had German 
nationality, previously figured frequently as workers for koppelbazen. 
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Poles on the Move 
The Dutch firm POM, belonging to the Polakki brothers, had relations with 
Poles carrying German passports. The brothers worked out a scheme by which 
the Poles could, under the E101 regulation, be posted as steelworkers to 
Belgium. They requested E101 certificates in the Netherlands for dozens of 
Poles, did not wait for the certificates to be issued and did not have the 
workers registered at the Dutch insurance board for the metal sector. In cases 
of detection, the registrations were made post hoc, though that implied that no 
E101 certificate could be issued. The Antwerp shipyards, where the Poles 
repaired containers, were happy to pay the Poles the low Polish salary levels, 
thus engaging in ‘social dumping’ at rock-bottom prices and certainly not 
showing due diligence. 
 
After detection and withdrawal of the licenses, the Polakki brothers continued 
with a German and a Luxembourg corporation, to which they transferred their 
Polish workers. 
 The overlap between the phenomenon of ‘creating your own koppelbaas’ and 
fleecing the E101 regulation was observed within the Dutch carrier branch of 
European inland shipping. A number of licit entrepreneurs apparently discovered 
how to reduce their labour costs by transferring their staff to a foreign company 
and hiring their employees back again on E101 certificates requested in 
Luxembourg. In this way a number of companies succeeded in keeping dozens 
of boats afloat without a single employee and therefore without paying any 
employers’ contributions. 
 
Rhine Barge Sarl. 
Mr. Sander owns a small shipping firm for the transport of dangerous 
substances on the Rhine and for the provision of staff to other companies. In 
Luxembourg, he and his wife established another shipping (postbox) company, 
which provides the same service as the Limburg koppelbazen: taking the staff of 
numerous other shipping companies onto their payroll and posting them again 
on E101 certificates requested in Luxembourg to the very companies from 
which they received the employees. The employees have never been to 
Luxembourg and no contributions, or inadequate contributions are paid. 
 
After it had discovered some other cases, the fraud department of the UWV 
launched an investigation into the whole of the inland shipping sector, the 
investigation being still in progress at the time of writing.13 
 Though these observations are too limited to allow more general conclusions 
about criminal labour schemes and illegal labour mobility, they nevertheless 
reveal a high degree of geographical mobility and flexibility on the part of the 
                                                 
13 At present this fraudulent method has been made more difficult due to an agreement of the 
‘Rhine states’ which stipulates that the social security legislation to be applied to employees 
will, irrespective of their nationality, be the legislation of the country where the company 
owning the ship is registered. 
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workers. This is matched by the koppelbazen who operate flexibly in a number of 
different countries simultaneously. To a certain extent this is reflective of a 
sophisticated attitude. However, the koppelbaas phenomenon is not necessarily an 
instance of ‘transnational’ crime, to use that popular but worn term. Depending 
on the circumstances of the local market, it can be a quite circumscribed affair, at 
any rate at the level of the crime entrepreneurs, as was revealed by the Turkish-
Kurdish entrepreneurs in The Hague. 
 
Turkish koppelbazen 
The criminal commercial activity of koppelbazerij is not the preserve of 
indigenous Dutchmen. Ethnic minorities look for opportunities on the other 
side of the blue line as well. Though the illicit exploits of Turks are usually 
associated with drug trafficking, the more integrated (or more intelligent) Turks 
venture into other types of commercial crime. Many of their countrymen, 
residing legally or illegally in The Netherlands, are desperate to be employed and 
are easily recruited. The urban agglomeration of Western Holland in particular 
has a sizable Turkish minority: young, often badly educated and ready to be 
recruited. When the law on temporary employment agencies was relaxed in July 
1998, new opportunities arose. Establishing a ‘temp’ office does not require 
much capital, which means a low threshold for newcomers. This offered 
opportunities for Turkish entrepreneurs to enter this sector. And why should the 
Turkish ‘temp’ offices not recruit their unemployed countrymen for work in the 
greenhouses in the nearby Westland and other horticultural areas near The 
Hague?14 During the 1990s, when unskilled labour was scarce, the economy was 
booming and prices were high, many market gardeners took whomever they 
could get to pick tomatoes and cucumbers or to cut lettuce. 
 This social and economic situation led to the kind of scenes familiar to the 
inhabitants of American border towns near Mexico. Early in the morning just 
after sunrise, in the quiet ‘civil service’ town of The Hague, an unusual scene 
could be observed in the working-class ‘Painters Quarter’ around the market. 
The streets bristle with the first wave of workers looking for, or going to, their 
jobs. These men and women are not regular workers but Bulgarians (of Turkish 
descent) and Turks/Kurds timorously looking around to see whether the passing 
minibus of some koppelbaas, like Mahmut or Selim, might stop to pick them up. 
 Most of the Turkish koppelbazen in our investigation operated effectively, but 
with little sophistication. With one exception, they did not use limited liability 
corporations, but partnerships, which made them personally liable for the debts 
the firm accumulated. This did not deter them. Perhaps they (correctly) thought 
that the collection of debts by the Inland Revenue would yield little anyhow, as 
most of their personal assets were usually transferred to Turkey. It goes without 
                                                 
14 The Westland is a district between The Hague, Rotterdam and the North Sea, where many of 
the vegetables for the Netherlands and (particularly) for export to Germany are grown. Tradi-
tionally it offers many temporary employment opportunities, such as holiday jobs for students. 
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saying that firms that succeeded in expanding their operations, required more 
robust management. The need for ‘support firms’, for example for sub-
subcontracting and the delivery of false invoices to cover wage expenses grew 
along with the increased turnover and the number of workers. This, in turn, 
increased the need for pliable accountants. 
 In accordance with Turkish traditions, the enterprises were mainly composed 
of members of the ‘extended family’: one of the older or most business-oriented 
males headed the firm, aided by his brothers, nephews and other relatives. This 
did not imply that the enterprise was an entirely closed circle. Pragmatic 
relationships had to be maintained, for example to exchange invoices with other 
firms or to engage a straw man for some front firm. The Turkish entrepreneurs, 
who displayed few administrative skills, turned to a variety of administrative 
offices to handle their paper work and their tax declarations. Many of these 
offices knew, or at least should have known, that the turnover and payroll data 
they received were flawed. Despite that, few Turkish customers were turned 
away and in a few cases the administrative office was clearly accessory to the 
scheme concerned. In one large case the administrative office was evidently a 
part of the criminal organisation, sitting alongside the koppelbaas and the 
principals during secret meetings to discuss strategy. 
 As many workers were either illegally resident in the Netherlands, had no 
work permit, received social security benefit, simply worked without declaring 
it, or were not allowed to work for other reasons, the registration of their 
identity had to be tampered with. Employers have to identify and register each 
worker, supplying in the process his passport and social security-fiscal (SoFi) 
numbers. This problem was solved in various ways. During house searches, 
many false passports were found. The SoFi numbers were also fabricated or 
simply ‘stolen’: ads would be placed in local newspapers, inviting applications for 
a job. During the interview the ‘candidate’ would be asked to show his or her 
passport (or provide the number) and supply his or her SoFi number. The 
candidate would never hear anything further – apart from when the Inland 
Revenue gave notice that s/he had not mentioned his or her employment in 
some horticultural firm the person had never heard of. Needless to say that this 
would cause much embarrassment and potential problems in applications for 
social-security benefits or rent subsidies. 
 Again, the most important symbiotic relationship was the one that existed 
between the labour providers – the Turkish koppelbazen – and the labour hirers 
– the market gardeners. The latter could not have been unaware that many of 
their labour providers were bending the rules. Newspaper stories about Turks 
and Bulgarians roaming the streets for work in The Hague at dawn, were 
published regularly. Knowing this, the market gardeners stated that they ‘had 
taken due action to prevent the hiring of illegal labour’. In their statements to 
detectives they outlined extensively their companies’ strict control procedures to 
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prevent this kind of abuse.15 The practice in the greenhouses proved different 
though, and provided a livelihood to thousands of Turks, Kurds, Bulgarians and 
other migrant labourers. 
 Of the 45 ‘Westland cases’, we selected ten for further analysis. Some of the 
general characteristics have already been outlined above. The exploits of two 
Turkish koppelbazen (operating on a middle-ranking and a large scale), in 
addition to those of one of their ‘administrative service providers’, are described 
below. 
 
The Ali-brothers 
The 35 year-old Mehmet Ali Pasha ran a number of partnerships, one of which 
was owned by his brother Murat. He was supported by a fellow-countryman 
who played an important executive role. In addition, he had a changing staff of 
about six persons,16 three of whom performed managerial tasks, such as 
maintaining relations with the customers, solving problems with the employees 
and so forth. Two of them were his nephew and brother-in-law. His wife and 
a handful of female staff looked after the paper work. 
 
His enterprise did rather well. He supplied to market gardeners in the Westland 
some 50 to 70 workers who were employed to pick tomatoes and cut flowers. 
In order to reduce the turnover recorded in his accounts, he ‘subcontracted’ 
work to a value of about €250,000. Actually, false invoices for this amount of 
money were found, along with letter headings for five shell firms. The firm’s 
paper work would be submitted on disk to an administration office, where no 
checks were made, but where the employees merely processed all the data 
passively. Afterwards they expressed their amazement about the colossal losses 
inflicted on the Inland Revenue. His brother operated a (semi) independent 
firm, which appeared to have a hidden turnover of about €225,000.  
 It was difficult to estimate the damage to the Inland Revenue and the 
Insurance Board, as for several years no books were kept (or else were 
destroyed). The damage caused by Mehmet amounted to about €562,000; that 
caused by his brother to about €229,000. 
 The brothers had a history of criminal violence. Mehmet’s police record 
mentions: attempted manslaughter, robbery and grievous bodily harm. His 
brother’s merely mentions shooting on a public road. Given this background, 
when the police raided their premises at dawn, they were fully armed. If the Ali 
brothers could be rated as moderately successful, the Janissar enterprise with its 
800 employees could certainly be classified as one of the most successful. In 
addition to operating wholesale, the firm was well embedded in a criminal 
                                                 
15 One of the systems is the ‘pad-registration system’, in which the hours worked by each worker 
are registered. Pad registers must be kept for five years. 
16 Surprisingly, these were not designated as suspects. 
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conspiracy in which chartered accountants and five large market gardeners fully 
participated. 
 
Janissar Ltd 
Mustafa Kemal was the absolute controller of Janissar Ltd. Beneath this main 
firm a number of phony subcontracting firms were created by four previous 
employees for the sole purpose of providing false invoices to cover cash 
expenses. Tansu Çiller who headed a separate administration office (see below) 
functioned as ‘service provider’ looking after the ‘proper’ handling of the paper 
work. She was supported by two other administrative aids, who fabricated new 
and destroyed old documents. Çiller and her aids were not the only persons 
involved in the fraudulent administration of Janissar Ltd. A partner and a 
chartered accountant employed by the respected firm of accountants, Straight 
Line, kept an eye on the operations of Mustafa Kemal. They knew he had 
invoices and hour sheets destroyed. Two other employees of Straight Line 
were posted to Janissar to support the clerical staff. A Straight Line employee 
who objected to being asked to perform tasks that amounted to fraudulent 
accounting activities was soon replaced. The huge extent of the labour scam 
required closer cooperation and more mutual fine-tuning than was necessary in 
the other cases. In order to remain in control of the scheme the four principal 
market gardeners, the Straight Line accountants and Mustafa Kemal had three-
monthly meetings at the offices of the most important market gardener, who 
also chaired these meetings. For the market gardeners it was important that the 
percentage of false names did not exceed 20%. This did not imply that the 
correct names on the lists corresponded to the actual workers. Again many 
names and So-Fi numbers were simply stolen. Sometimes people who had 
once worked for Janissar or who knew Mustafa Kemal in another capacity, 
provided their names and IDs because they were in need of an employment 
record. In three years the Janissar firm inflicted a loss of €9.5 million on the 
public exchequer. 
 
The firms we investigated required large numbers of false invoices to cover their 
unaccountable wage expenses. Therefore, firms were established to create such 
administrative veils. Related to the first case are the statements of an imprisoned 
witness, who described the ways shell partnership firms were established and 
used for the selling of false or rather blank invoices carrying only the signature of 
the seller. The companies appeared to operate in the names of all sorts of 
marginal figures: psychiatric patients, tramps or simply non-existent people. The 
invoices were sold for 8 to 10% of the figure for which they were applied. 
Stealthily inserting a higher figure was definitely advised against, lest ‘you may be 
shot through the windows’. The invoices of one of the firms were used by an 
entrepreneur to cover expenses of €40,000 for the renovation of his office. 
Obtaining invoices for phony subcontracting or to justify cash expenses is an 
important facet of the fraud business and sometimes the koppelbazen ran out of 
firms to provide such a service. Hence, some of the fraudsters fabricated their 
own false invoices, sometimes even digitally counterfeiting existing false invoices 
they obtained from other Turkish koppelbazen, though without their knowledge! 
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This led to the detection of some koppelbazen as a result of inspectors recognising 
the invoices of front firms they had dismantled earlier. The crime entrepreneurs 
could also turn to the administrative office of the above-mentioned Tansu Çiller, 
who produced whatever false documents were required. 
 
The Docu-service firm 
Tansu Çiller is one of the many emancipated second-generation Turkish 
women who surfaced in the predominantly male circles of Turkish criminal 
activity in The Hague and surroundings. Intelligent, handsome, but with a 
keen feeling for the wrong business, she established an administration office, 
which provided any service the fraudulent among her countrymen needed. She 
‘ironed out’ inconsistencies in the paper work of many Turkish koppelbazen: 
payrolls were adapted, working hours and lists of names were ‘corrected’. Apart 
from that, she produced a massive quantity of false invoices, which service 
amounted to a figure of about €1.5 million.Her direct aids were a Dutchman, 
Hein Donner and a mentally unstable Surinam national, Sam Dropper, who 
thought the moon was made of cheese and who in the end died from an 
overdose of cocaine. She complained that she had been abused behind her 
back, but given the quality of her staff and her assertive nature, this statement 
appeared implausible. 
 
Having analysed the cases of about one quarter of the known koppelbazen 
operating in Southwestern Holland, we can conclude that within a relatively 
short time span a group of Turkish criminal entrepreneurs was able successfully 
to take advantage of the imbalance in the horticultural labour market. Having 
ample access to a host of unemployed men and women wandering the streets of 
the poor quarters of The Hague where they lived too, they could effectively 
meet a demand that was insatiable. Compared with the koppelbazen in the 
building market, they did not stand out for their fiscal or financial sophistication. 
Their backgrounds did not show much in the way of previous fraudulent 
commercial activity. Rather many of them had a background of violence and 
property crime. Despite this history they developed the entrepreneurial spirit 
that is typical of the koppelbaas: recruiting and supervising workers, sorting out 
problems with employers, finding subterfuges to keep up a legitimate 
appearance, and so forth. A few of them grew into major crime entrepreneurs, 
able to attract legitimate and ‘respectable’ market players as components of their 
organised fraud schemes.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The re-emergence of the illegal subcontractor as ‘employment office’ in various 
guises reveals the influence of tradition as well as innovation. Some regions and 
industrial sectors have known the phenomenon of koppelbazerij for decades. 
Being driven back for some time it expanded again under favourable market 
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conditions and established new symbiotic relations with upperworld 
entrepreneurs. Instead of being merely the ‘unknowing’ receivers of cheap 
workers, the latter now showed more initiative, dismissing their employees only 
to hire them again from fraudulent firms of their own making. These schemes 
were facilitated by veteran fraudsters from the old koppelbaas generation, and by 
local manpower traditionally used to moonlighting. However, this practice 
extended to inland shipping. Whether other industrial sectors adopted the 
practice is unknown, but there are few reasons assume that other labour 
intensive sectors will have been immune to this method of cost reduction. 
 When re-emerging, the ‘old’ koppelbaas found themselves in the company of 
birds of various feathers. Abusing the posting regulations and the E101 
certificate, Dutchmen together with Poles and Britons, could be observed at 
work in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. A number of indications 
(unfortunately without additional empirical underpinning) in reports about abuse 
of the EU posting system lend plausibility to the assumption that this 
phenomenon is not limited to the Low Countries, Germany or Britain. More 
extensive empirical research may very well reveal the phenomenon of 
koppelbazerij to be EU-wide. 
 It should be stressed that illegal labourers may or may not also be illegal 
immigrants. As a matter of fact, the involvement of illegal immigrants depends 
on the industrial sector and the skills that are required. In the building sector, 
koppelbazerij concerned scarce skilled labourers, who knew their worth and 
(black market) price. Only in the agricultural sector, in which the required 
education and skills are low, did we observe the systematic engagement of 
wandering illegal immigrants. They may be considered exploited, not only 
because of their working conditions, their miserable and expensive housing and 
the low levels of their wages, but also because they are excluded from any labour 
protection. However, it is a ‘consensual exploitation’. Sometimes employees are 
cheated by being paid less than their licit colleagues and sometimes they receive 
higher net wages than the latter. For example, the Janissar enterprise paid well 
above the union rate. Returning home, the employees of such firms invest their 
savings in local enterprises and show them with pride.17 
 The social or psychological characteristics of persons operating in this market 
are difficult to describe. Looking at the perpetrators from the outside, one 
observes a huge variety: legitimate entrepreneurs operating internationally (and 
remaining behind the scenes); straw men; crooked bookkeepers; local veterans 
for whom their place in the illegal labour market is just an economic way of 
(family) life; ethnic minority entrepreneurs. As the social and psychological 
backgrounds of suspects are usually only investigated in cases of violent and 
sexual crime, and such offences are rare in this field, we lack basic personality 
data. Apart from this lack of violence, another observation has to be made, and it 
                                                 
17 A television documentary portrayed a proud Bulgarian, who saved enough (living in miserable 
cheap housing conditions in The Hague) to start his own taxi firm.  
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is one concerning specialisation. Most fraud markets, whether they involve 
VAT, cigarettes, excise or labour, seem in principle to be open to newcomers. 
Nevertheless, in our investigations we found hardly any overlap, in terms of 
personnel, with the crime entrepreneurs involved in the drugs market (Van 
Duyne, 2003;Von Lampe, 2003). This contradicts the statements frequently 
made by detectives that criminals are always on the look out for new 
opportunities. That may be the case, but successfully seizing opportunities 
requires skills. Granted, it is somewhat speculative, but it is plausible to assume 
that the characteristics of the labour market are such as to require the deploy-
ment of skills that are different to those required in the drugs market. Leading a 
subcontracting firm entails the maintenance of daily labour routine and discip-
line, social skills for negotiating with the principals, supervision of the numerous 
employees, checking of the weekly payments, juggling with So-Fi numbers etc. 
A member of one of the Turkish family enterprises did not possess these qualities 
and failed as a koppelbaas. Instead, he preferred the drug market (where he failed 
too). Detectives observed that this switch was accompanied by a marked change 
in his conduct: a change that could be seen in the way he spent time, in his 
movements, and in his stealthier pattern of telephone communication. 
 Most of the cases we analysed could have been subsumed under the heading 
‘participation in a criminal organisation’, in short, organised crime. Nevertheless, 
this term was rarely used by public prosecutors. Only in the Janissar cases did the 
prosecutor decide to indict the defendant for ‘organised crime’, given the 
overwhelming evidence of well-planned cooperation between the koppelbaas, the 
market gardeners and the firm of accountants. Should koppelbazen be considered 
as organised criminals? Without reopening the fruitless discussion about the 
essence of organised crime (see Van Duyne, 2003), one can say that they could 
certainly be qualified as such if one wanted to maintain this concept. This applies 
particularly to the background entrepreneurs who either installed and/or 
maintained their own koppelbaas. It does not, however, add much to our 
understanding of the criminal behaviour typically found in this market. 
 The characteristics of the illegal labour market are determined by the 
demands of the entrepreneurial upperworld, and they are not likely to evaporate 
in the face of moral crusades on the part of the authorities.18 Most important is 
the repeated re-occurrence of opportunities for the establishment of symbiotic 
relations between the licit entrepreneurial community, illegal labour organisers 
(under a licit guise) and labourers. This symbiosis is rarely felt to be ‘criminal’: it 
is ‘doing business’; it maybe somewhat illegal – but can it really be described as 
‘organised crime’? The accountants in the Janissar case knew that they had 
                                                 
18 Recently the German authorities launched a campaign against black-market labour (Schwarzar-
beit), pointing to the damage done by such labour, while using a fiscal carrot in the form of  
tax reductions for ‘mini-jobs’, and intensified investigations of organised illegal employment. 
See: http:/www.mini-jobzentrale.de 
 Criminal sub-contracting in the Netherlands: The Dutch ‘koppelbaas’ as crime-entrepreneur 
 
 
 
185 
broken the law, but expressed extreme indignation at being charged with 
‘participating in a criminal organisation’. 
 An important facet of the perceived opportunities is the assessment of risk. 
According to the detectives we interviewed during our research, many 
entrepreneurs show little concern at the prospect of being held liable for the 
unpaid taxes of their labour providers, let alone at the prospect of penal 
sanctions. Actually, the procedure for reclaiming money in such cases, set out in 
the Law on Chain Liability, is time consuming and arduous, and by no means 
guaranteed to be successful. However, this is a matter of perception, which for 
some of the unconcerned entrepreneurs was distorted by a successful reclaim of 
taxes and a prison sentence. 
 Despite the small number of such successes, the licit entrepreneur hiring 
labour from a koppelbaas can rationally calculate his losses and benefits against the 
chances of a successful liability suit and perhaps criminal prosecution. On the 
one hand, the immediate rewards, cheap labour plus certainty that the work will 
get done, have to be set against the uncertain costs of a fine and reclamation. On 
the other hand, expensive, too few, or no labourers at all, are certain losses to be 
balanced against the likelihood of no fine and no liability proceedings. Weighing 
the odds, hiring from a koppelbaas may not be the worst bet. Granted, few 
entrepreneurs perform such cognitively precise acts of rational decision-making. 
More important is their assessment of the immediate gain (cheap labour) against 
the infrequently successful and therefore psychologically ‘distant’ threat of the 
law. For this reason the Law on Chain Liability has proved to be less of a 
deterrent than was imagined twenty years ago. It goes without saying that this 
law is certainly ineffective in the cases of organised business criminals, setting up 
their own koppelbaas. 
Economic regional approach 
 
Much attention has been paid in the recent literature to the dreaded 
phenomenon of ‘transnational organised crime’. Most of the attention has been 
directed at phenomena whose wickedness is taken for granted, such as drug 
trafficking and trafficking in human beings. Given national price differences and 
concomitant profit opportunities, one may wonder what is really special about 
‘transnational’ crime. Compared with this artificially stimulated concern, which 
has created its own stream of recycled quotations from policy makers and 
scholars alike, the daily business of cross-border (organised) economic crime, 
quietly pursued on an ongoing basis, has received little attention, or has simply 
been subsumed under less heavily value-laden titles, such as ‘corporate’ or 
‘organisational’ crime. Given the repetitiveness of this discussion, we shall not 
join this choric hymn.  
 It may be of more interest to approach these phenomena from the more 
mundane economic angle. Like prohibited or highly taxed substances, such as 
drugs or tobacco, labour is a highly taxed commodity which can be taken 
advantage of by taking a slice out of the ‘price wedge’. One of the smart ways of 
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doing this is to operate across borders, which reduces the chances of getting 
caught. This requires a fair degree of knowledge of the social and economic 
characteristics of regions extending across jurisdictions. It is within geographical 
‘orbits’ such as these that the ‘transnational’ crime-entrepreneur develops his 
activities. In the case of the labour market, such activities require the setting up 
of real criminal organisations, but with the carefully staged appearance of 
legitimacy and often with corporate structures that include off-shore compo-
nents. This multi-country regional crime-market phenomenon may be a com-
mon and natural way of doing illegal business, but this is not obvious: we have 
observed, for example, that the Turks in The Hague did not use this type of 
cross-border cover with its concomitant (international) corporate legal tools, 
maybe because they felt safe enough in their social environment and family 
networks. 
 If such crime-entrepreneurs are best described empirically as operating within 
an economic multi-country ‘crime region’, strategies to stem the phenomenon 
should also start from this notion. However, national authorities do not work 
from such a perspective. Koppelbazerij is defined as tax fraud and therefore the 
fiscal police and the Insurance Boards are regarded as the competent agencies. 
This has far reaching consequences for the speed and flexibility with which the 
koppelbazen and their international networks can be identified, investigated and 
terminated. The problem is not the will to cooperate on the part of individual 
criminal investigators. Things can be expected to go as well or as badly in 
individual or agency interaction as the quite unpredictable factor of personal 
rivalries will allow. Rather, the main problem lies in the management of 
information, that is, in the content of what is exchanged. For example: 
? there is a centralised database for the storage of information about 
administrative and criminal investigations, but it is not clear how 
efficiently it is used; 
? imperfect exchanges of information between agencies in different 
countries is impeding timely action;  
? such timely action is particularly required in cases which involve E101 
postings; 
? There is no central point for the storage of data concerning posted 
employees, causing delays in mutual administrative assistance.  
Needless to say, the koppelbaas enterprise known to the authorities continues to 
accumulate financial losses: its front firm is destined to go bankrupt anyhow. 
 Technically, the establishment of such a system is at present less of a problem 
than its legal foundation and its institutional acceptance. When we extrapolate 
our experience with data management in the area of money-laundering or VAT 
fraud to fraud in the field of organised labour, we conclude that institutional 
reluctance will prove harder to overcome than the potential legal problems. 
Until that time the illegal organisation of the commodity labour will continue to 
thrive.  
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Organised crime, Norwegian style 
Organised crime, Norwegian style 
Per Ole Johansen1 
 
 
“While other fluids follow the force of gravity and sink vertically, alcohol has a 
magical ability to spread horizontally and find invisible ways into society’s inner 
corners.” 
The Commander of Police, Southern Varanger 
 to The Regional Commissioner, Finnmark  
14 December 1919 
 
 
The Devil’s Mirror 
 
The legal consumption of alcohol in Norway is relatively low as compared to 
Europe in general. The Norwegian official consumption per capita in 2001 was 
4.4 litres of pure alcohol, compared to 9.5 in Denmark, 10.5 in France and 10.8 
in Ireland. The availability of alcohol in Norway is restricted and the level of 
taxation is high. Thus, a bottle of Balantine Finest, for example, costs 292 
Norwegian kroner (approximately €36), a bottle of Courvoisier V.V., 332 kroner, 
and a bottle of Smirnoff  349 kroner. The correlation between moderate alcohol 
consumption and heavy taxation looks pretty good then, seen from a 
temperance point of view. But ‘the Devil’s Mirror’ shows something else – or 
something more at least. ‘The Devil’s Mirror’, which I was told about as a child, 
was a mirror that showed the ugly and/or unforeseen parts of reality we would 
rather close our eyes to. Illegal alcohol market is such a mirror, in that it shows 
cheap, illegal and strong alcohol, including alcohol up to 96 % proof, being 
smuggled to Norway from Spain, Portugal and Italy. The illegal alcohol is 
distributed around the country and stored in private homes. It is consumed in 
huge quantities in closed circles, out of sight and out of control, far removed 
from licensed bars and restaurants. Smuggling of alcohol and illegal distilling has 
been the principal types of organised crime in Norway since the beginning of 
the Prohibition era, which lasted from 1917 to 1927 (Johansen, 1994, 2004). 
The history and the economics of the illegal alcohol market is the topic of this 
chapter. 
 The illegal alcohol market is partly a replication economy, due to the taxes, 
restricted availability and the state monopoly on the distribution and sale of 
wines and spirits. But it may be seen as a supplementary, an alternative or a criminal 
economy too, depending on the modus operandi and links to other networks. 
The stock of cultural capital, with a tradition of self-reliance stemming back to 
                                                 
1  Per Ole Johansen is Professor of Criminology at the University of Oslo, Norway. 
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the Prohibition era, has been another important stimulus to the illegal alcohol 
market. Political capital on the other hand is almost nonexistent due to Norway’s 
tradition as a civic society, with no demand whatsoever for organised criminals 
as ‘election workers’ or powerful middlemen in the local society, as in places like 
Sicily. Given the illegal nature of this market, some comparative comments will 
also be made on another illegal market, namely the drugs market, which in 
Norway is a much smaller and more recent market. 
 
 
Method of data collection 
 
The data for this paper were colleted from various sources. In the first place, for 
more than ten years I interviewed smugglers, illegal distillers, police officers and 
customs officers. The interviews were open and informal. Some questions were 
standard, while others were adjusted to the career of the individual bootlegger or 
officer. The majority were interviewed only once, a minority on both sides of 
the law being interviewed up to 10 to 15 times over a number of years. Some 
questions were more easily answered than others. Money laundering was a taboo 
for most bootleggers, while the police officers disliked talking about their failures 
before the courts. I told all my interviewees that I was talking with both 
bootleggers and officers, although not about what. I may have lost some 
information for that reason, but receiving information from both sides, 
prevented me from ‘going native’. Other data were obtained from historical 
archives and contemporary court files. 
 
 
Illegal alcohol from Prohibition to the present 
 
Fortified wines were prohibited in Norway from 1917 to 1924, and spirits from 
1917 to 1927, due to the very strong influence of the Norwegian temperance 
movement. The temperance societies had more members than any other 
organisation at that time, with several very influential politicians in the lead. 
Active support from both the leaders of the labour movement and the Christian 
middle class was an important reason for their political success. The labour 
leaders warned against alcohol as the “the class enemy”, while the Christians 
crusaded against “the Bottle of the Devil.” Consequently, a huge black market 
developed from a modest, amateurish start in 1917-1919, to a relatively well 
organised market in the mid 1920s with smuggling and illegal distilleries as the 
main channels for illicit alcohol. In this bootlegger’s market the Norwegians 
were the dominant force while some of them worked on even terms in teams 
with German businessmen, shipping people, and ex-officers from the German 
navy. Most of those Germans were ruined or unemployed after First World 
War, and eager to make new money by smuggling alcohol, which was very 
inexpensive in Germany at that time. The Germans shipped their spirits or 96% 
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proof alcohol from Hamburg and other northern German harbours to meeting 
points in international waters off the Norwegian cost, from where the 
Norwegians undertook the risky task of bringing the cargo ashore. 
 Prohibition was a violent period, compared to Norway’s tradition as a 
peaceful society. Norwegian customs cruisers had the right to use guns if 
smugglers tried to escape, and they were even more likely to open fire if the 
smugglers behaved in a way that cast aspersions on their honour. Experienced 
smugglers were not eager to shoot back, but they nevertheless had their own 
weapons, to fight off gangs that might try to steal their cargo on its way from the 
shore to the warehouse. The favourite scheme of these predatory gangs was to 
act as police officers – which placed real police officers in considerable danger. 
 Alcohol smuggling was not just a national issue. Norwegian shipping 
companies were also heavily involved in smuggling alcohol to America’s Rum 
Row in the 1920s. They never saw it as a crime, just ‘business as usual’ in a 
competitive, international market. Illegal distilling, which was an almost 
forgotten craft in most of Norway before the First World War, was reborn after 
the beginning of Prohibition, and it is still very much alive today. 
 The illegal alcohol market did not disappear after repeal in 1927 (Johansen, 
2004). Heavy taxes were imposed on legal alcohol and its distribution was 
restricted to a semi-state monopoly. But while an unholy alliance of Christian 
fundamentalists and teetotal labour-movement leaders tried their very best to 
keep farmers and workers away from alcohol, illegal distilling seemed to increase 
in the 1930s. For a shipping nation like Norway with its long coastline and 
excellent hiding places for illegal cargoes, smuggling was not much of a 
challenge either. The boys from Prohibition times were still alive and eager to 
make money, as were their friends in Germany, Britain, Holland and the Baltic 
countries. As mentioned above, Norwegian ship owners kept their American 
Dream alive by smuggling huge quantities of spirits to the East Coast of the 
USA. One of them was Hilmar Reksten, who became a well-known and 
controversial figure in European shipping after the Second World War. 
 Professional smuggling of alcohol in Norway was very limited during the 
Second World War. It was extremely dangerous to cross the oceans without 
legal papers. But new roles emerged for cunning smugglers who knew the coast 
and knew how to organise and handle stressful situations. Several veterans were 
recruited by German naval intelligence as infiltrators and provocateurs, drawing 
on ties between the German naval intelligence officers and Norwegian smugglers 
that had been established during the 1920s. A second group of Norwegian ex-
smugglers joined the resistance movement, while some worked on both sides 
alternately depending on who seemed to be gaining the upper hand. 
 Licit alcohol was rationed in Norway from the German invasion to the 
winter of 1946. Adults with a clean record received cards entitling them to 
purchase one or two bottles a month. The consequence of the rationing was a 
huge illegal market for the illegal re-sale of legal alcohol. The suppliers bought 
legal quotas and sold them illegally at much higher prices. Alcohol was used also 
in barter, where a bottle of spirits might exchange for a pound of meat or a 
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hundred cigarettes, for example. Forged rationing cards became a very lucrative 
side-business for printers in need of easy money, and a tempting business for 
professional criminals to join.  
 The supply of moonshine declined, but survived due to black market sugar, 
and organised stealing of sugar from German military stores in collaboration with 
German foremen. The illegal markets of the Second World War functioned as a 
link between the illegal markets of the 1930s and the illegal post-war markets, 
both in terms of networks and oral history.  
 The war did not change Norwegian politicians as far as their traditional belief 
in the heavy taxation of alcohol and restricted availability was concerned. 
Smuggling and illegal markets seemed to be concepts unknown to them. 
Consequently, it could not really come as a surprise when, in the 1950s, 
organised smuggling became a common occurrence on passenger ships, which 
sailed regularly from foreign ports. Likewise, it was forseeable that the end of 
sugar rationing in 1952 would mark the beginning of a high season for illegal 
distilling. 
 Several of my informants whom I have interviewed over the years, were 
freshmen in illegal alcohol in the early 1950s, with veterans from the Prohibition 
period serving as their role models. The freshmen from the early 1950s are the 
veterans of today, still active and more cunning, better organised and more 
effectively covered by their legal businesses than ever. No police officer or 
customs officer has been in business for that long. Guess who represents tradition 
and continuity! 
 The period from the early 1960s to the late 1970s was a mixture of tradition 
and modernity in the profession of smuggling. It says a lot about the smugglers’ 
ability to adjust. Civil airlines carried more and more passengers, while the 
trailers became involved in the transport of cargo from the continent to Norway. 
The smugglers adjusted either by switching to traditional smuggling with smaller 
ships bought just for that purpose, or by investing in trailers which combined 
legal and illegal shipments. A new generation of smugglers made their debut 
with the trailer business. They got pretty clever after a while, and they still are. 
The illegal distillers were expanding too – even in big cities – aided by modern 
technology and improved distribution (Johansen, 2004). 
 The year 1978 gave a new impetus to the black market when the employees 
of the Norwegian Wine and Liquor State Monopoly embarked on a long strike. 
Similar labour disputes ensued in 1982 and 1986. In the aftermath of these 
strikes, the volume of the illegal alcohol market grew even larger. The veterans 
got used to handling extraordinarily large orders, while young men acted as their 
assistants, or even acted on their own account, taking care of orders the veterans 
did not have time for. The huge illegal alcohol market of the 1990s owed much 
to the networks in existence prior to 1978, and to the knowledge and criminal 
capital that were acquired when the liquor workers went on strike in 1978, 1982 
and 1986. 
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A sidelong glance at drugs 
 
While illegal alcohol has a long tradition in Norway, illicit drugs are a more 
recent phenomenon. The marihuana market had a very modest start in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, amphetamines in the late 1970s and heroin in the 1980s. 
The market for cocaine and synthetic drugs did not emerge until the 1990s 
(Skog, 1992). The links between the black markets for alcohol and drugs are 
weak, confined for the most part to criminal generalists who dabble in both 
illegal alcohol and drugs, and a handful of drug dealers who converted to the 
smuggling of alcohol after a while, due to the lower risks involved, the higher 
status and the fact that it is at least as lucrative (Johansen, 1996; 2004). The 
alcohol market is still ‘ethnically Norwegian’, in spite of the immigration that 
has taken place since the 1970s, especially from Islamic countries. As Muslims 
have no relation to alcohol, drugs have been their obvious choice if they have 
decided to go into illegal business. The drugs market is more multi-ethnic today 
than it was at its beginning. Different immigrant groups and Norwegians work 
together, once trust has been established in deals made outside and inside the 
prisons, according to my interviewees. Norwegians are not very heavily 
involved in smuggling drugs, except hashish, which has been a Norwegian turf 
for years, but they are very important when it comes to supplying in areas where 
a foreigner would appear out of place. A fact often forgotten when blame is put 
on foreigners is that there would be no immigrant wholesaler or importer 
without Norwegian retailers (information from interviews). 
 
 
Alternative or supplementary economies? 
 
The Norwegian illegal alcohol market has no debt to other illegal markets. Its 
only “creditor” is the legal alcohol market. Prohibition, rationing, heavy 
taxation, restricted availability, and strikes have made smuggling and the 
production of moonshine into lucrative businesses. Smugglers and distillers have 
been aware of who their benefactors are. During the 1920s some of them gave 
anonymous financial support to temperance groups, which defended the 
Prohibition, and likewise to the liquor employees when they created the big 
slowdown in 1982.2 “The price of illegal booze is always related to the price of 
legal alcohol, about half of it in general,” according to Gunnar, a veteran 
smuggler. “I vote for the Christian Party,” says Tore, another informant, the 
Christian Party being against the EU and believing in expensive alcohol. “Cheap 
alcohol from the EU and the high taxation of booze in Norway gives me my 
living as a smuggler.” 
                                                 
2  B. Sveinung Berg: ‘Det er typisk norsk å kjøpe smuglersprit.’Aftenposten 25. oktober 2003. 
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Aside from the issue of the political context of the illegal alcohol market the 
question arises as to the nature of the relation between the black market and the 
legal economy: is the illegal alcohol market an alternative economy, or is it 
supplementary to the legal economy. 
 Stuart Henry is critical of the idea of an alternative informal economic 
system. What he sees is “a replication of the dominant capitalist structure” 
(Henry, 1982: 430). In the Devil’s Mirror the illegal alcohol market looks like a 
replication of the legal market, although not excluding other kinds of economies 
when it comes to sublevels and to the question of who is doing what and how. 
 The illegal alcohol market is a supplementary economy for an important group 
of smugglers, like the ‘company smugglers’ who are the top dogs in illegal 
alcohol, with their legal companies, infrastructure and business networks, which 
are excellent for importing, distribution and laundering. There is no success in 
business like a good old legal success (Johansen, 1996). It makes no sense to start 
a company with some strange kind of import just for cover, explains Gunnar 
who has been in business for almost fifty years: 
 
“Customs officers have everything on computer. What’s going to work is an 
old, legal company, which has been in business for many years. The first ten 
legal containers go in, and then the eleventh with illegal alcohol. Respectable 
companies with legal imports which the customs take no notice of”. 
 
Christian, another company smuggler, compares the legal and illegal alcohol 
businesses:  
 
“Just the same actually, it’s about a normal product, alcohol. A risk, yes, but 
one kind of product is just like another. We have importers, wholesalers and so 
on down the line; people with a discreet lifestyle. Duty and tax evasion, that’s 
the limit for what we are doing”. 
 
Peter, a car dealer and wholesaler in illegal alcohol, is not very secretive about 
how his illegal profit is used. “It is very nice to have my bills paid, the legal 
ones.” Investing “black” money in a legal company is very easily done, while 
ignored by the tax authorities. While there is a lot of concern among public 
officials about traditional forms of tax evasion – in other words, personal or 
company income that is hidden from the tax inspector – the laundering of 
“black” money through legal companies has never been a target, although 
known among criminals since the 1920s. 
 Money laundering has traditionally been seen as an exotic affair in tax havens 
in the sun. “Company smugglers” have been the winners in illegal alcohol since 
Prohibition, due to their legal covers and the way they have paid or manipulated 
assistants from labour-class districts to front for them in court. Some “company 
smugglers” have actually been caught though, because they have behaved like 
legal businessmen in their illegal businesses, with routines, archives and internal 
accounts. Doing time is not their strongest side. Nervous businessmen have a 
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certain reputation for “talking” their way out of custody (Johansen, 2004 and 
interviews with police officers and smugglers). 
 Illegal alcohol as a supplementary economy is common among middlemen in 
transport and distribution too. Truck drivers act as “supplementary” middlemen 
by smuggling part-time on behalf of professional smugglers or their bosses, or by 
smuggling on their own account while driving legal cargo from the continent to 
Norway. Smuggling of alcohol is something that comes extra depending on the 
available spare capacity and the outlook of the driver. Experienced drivers stick 
to small quantities smuggled over several trips rather than one huge, though 
profitable, shipment. “In the long run the small ones are usually just as 
lucrative,” according to one of them. The smaller ones are less risky, and not 
defined as “professional” crime by the courts. The police see more challenge and 
excitement too in going after the big crooks, as far as alcohol is concerned. 
 Wholesalers in illegal alcohol are often legal businessmen themselves while 
retail dealers may have various kinds of profession or business. What is important 
is that it brings them into contact with potential customers. “Cunning men, who 
are well connected and know their way around,” is Paul’s definition of ideal 
retail dealers. 
 In comparison to the illicit alcohol market, the illegal drug market is smaller, 
and so is the accompanying grey zone of drugs, here defined as a mixture of 
drug money and legal business. The grey zone of drugs is much more heavily 
concentrated in one or two sectors, first among these being the restaurant 
business where drug money may serve as starting capital. Big fish in that side 
stream are not always a myth. Occasionally they may actually make some pretty 
big money, like the team that in 2003 got caught in Oslo with 21 million kroner 
in untaxed profits stashed in bags in their flat. The small fish in drugs are 
typically former drug addicts and part-timers who, in a rather improvised way, 
combine sporadic dealings with ordinary jobs, social security and a variety of 
other criminal activities. 
 What about the alternative economy then? Jeremy Alden, among others, is 
sceptical of the reality of such an ‘alternative’ regarding moon-shining (Alden, 
1977). He argues that illegal extra jobs require particular skills, and are often of 
short duration. ‘Dynamic’ persons with legal jobs and time for extra work are 
more active in illegal markets than are the unemployed. ‘Black’ economies, as 
J.I. Gershuny sees them, ‘exist in the interstices of the formal economy, 
consisting largely of economic activities also undertaken in the formal economy, 
often by the same people’ (Gershuny, 1979: 7). Alden and Gershuny may be 
right and wrong at the same time when it comes to generalisations. Truck 
drivers and businessmen have a financial advantage with both legal incomes and 
the illegal incomes derived from alcohol smuggling. The illegal income itself is 
not always enough to make a living, but nice for extra luxuries or to have their 
bills paid. 
 At the same time it is possible to perceive parts of the black alcohol market as 
an alternative economy. There are probably between 150 and 200 professional 
smugglers of alcohol in Norway who used to derive all of their income from 
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smuggling. ‘Smugglers for life’ we may call them. They are proud of their 
profession, and they are willing to talk about it if they trust you. It goes without 
saying that these ‘smugglers for life’ are very familiar with the borders and the 
coast and know exactly where to drive or sail at what time without legal covers. 
Sensing danger, remembering faces, knowing people and ‘reading’ their 
characters are other talents that enable them to make a living out of smuggling. 
“I have smuggled for fifty years,” recounts Hans. “You may call it an immoral 
life, but it has been much fun too.” Bernhard, a former student of economics, 
who got a driver’s license and a truck to do professional smuggling, was rather 
philosophical about the risks:“We knew that sooner or later it would go to 
pieces, but it would not be a major disaster, not the end of the world!” “Why 
pretend to be someone else?” Gabriel, a veteran in illegal distilling, asked 
rhetorically. “With my reputation there is no sense in acting as if I have come 
up with something better. I have never sailed under false colours.” Money and 
knowing people is the formula, he goes on: “One has to have a lot of money in 
order to have a lot of contacts all around. Nobody is going to do anything for 
you for free. It is just like normal business. In the business community they sit in 
each other’s board committees. Between crooks, we do each other favours, but 
it is always a question of money.” 
 It is possible to work one’s way up from the bottom to a professional level, at 
least for a few talented ones. Skills may be learned while financial means do not 
constitute a real barrier to entry for smugglers either, provided they are willing 
to start small, and know subsequently how to reinvest their illegal profits. 
Whether the time scale is long or short is partly up to the smuggler or distiller. 
To quote one of them, “The demand is endless; it’s a market for everyone.” 
Almost, we should add, because it is a pretty tough game sometimes and there is 
no reason to buy into the romantic appeal of the informal economies. Stuart 
Henry properly warns that they “are themselves subject to some of the worst 
problems of formal institutions; inequalities, injustices and abuses…” (Henry, 
1982: 472). 
 Vincenzo Ruggiero’s top dogs and underdogs in organised crime are as well 
known in the illegal alcohol market as they are in legal business (Ruggiero, 
1996). Some of our smuggling ‘top dogs’ who engage in smuggling as an 
‘alternative’ economy have a past in legal business, while more of them have 
worked their way up from the bottom: 
 
“Dad was tired of slaving for other people, and started on his own, with fruit, 
cigarettes and booze. Mostly ‘black’. He had no driver’s license, by the way, 
and asked me to transport the booze for him. Here you see the coincidence of 
life. That’s how I got my start!” 
 
Other underground entrepreneurs start and end their careers in illegal alcohol on 
the same shabby level as low-paid drivers, “black” workers, “muscles” and retail 
dealers with no pension rights or other licit employee benefits. 
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Criminal economy 
 
Smuggling and illegal distilling are not seen as morally wrong by the 
professionals and their customers, although these activities are illegal and 
therefore constitute a criminal economy in certain ways. Smugglers and distillers 
have to take the precautions that are characteristic of an illegal market, and they 
have to keep a lower profile than legal businesses. The market is not really 
violent or tough. Customers have never posed a problem, and the elite of illegal 
alcohol smugglers used in the past – as one police officer explained in an 
interview – to be much harder on each other. Hijacking is a problem now and 
then, however. As the police officer complains: “no one calls us to inform”. 
Partners who cheat and mistrust each other are more important reasons for 
incrimination within illegal markets, even more so in the aftermath of arrests and 
interceptions. 
 The cumulative effect of prosecution efforts is well known. “Who will take 
the rap?” “Whose fault was it?” “Who has been informing?” are the questions 
that are asked. Buddies turn into enemies and hire “muscles” to fight each other. 
Trustful relations come to an end. Revenge and confrontation may take place in 
the worst of cases, but they are not common. The illegal alcohol market with its 
many ordinary, grown up and hardworking customers would not tolerate such 
situations for long.  Robert S. Davis and Gary W. Potter, among others, see 
employees as one of the major security risks. 
 
“Employees of illicit enterprises constitute the single greatest threat to their 
continuing operations because it is employees who make the best (and often 
the only) witnesses against the group. So, it is in the best interests of the illicit 
enterprise to limit the number of people who have knowledge about their 
operations” (Davis and Potter, 1991: 149) 
 
Norwegian smugglers, it seems, do not like to fire people, although they have to 
now and then. Informing on their employers may be the revenge of the sacked, 
a risk which can be lowered by reducing staff and remaining small.  
 There are individuals who combine different criminal modus operandi or 
switch from one criminal arena to another depending on profits and risks. They 
are known as ‘criminal generalists’ (Johansen, 1996; Morselli, 2002). Most of 
them are rather confrontational after years in gangs and prisons, with no more 
respectability to lose, spreading their violent methods and mentality from one 
milieu to the other. Illegal alcohol, with its low risks and high profits has always 
been a honey pot for this type of offender. Drug money is invested in alcohol, 
alcohol money in drugs, and money from fencing in both drugs and alcohol 
(information from court files and interviews). Of course, there is some 
disagreement between the alcohol and drug entrepreneurs: “You cannot trust 
criminals. They have no limits”, warns a company smuggler. “The criminals 
draw attention”. Bill, a generalist who is as familiar with the supply of drugs as 
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with the supply of alcohol, disagrees: “Suppliers of alcohol are hypocrites, 
blaming drug dealers while selling bad booze to elderly alcoholics.” 
 The heroin and amphetamine markets, in comparison, are closer to being a 
‘criminal’ economy according to some of the participants. Drug addicts may 
betray their best friends to free themselves from debts and prosecutions, says 
Rolf, a veteran supplier. Suppliers may sell fake drugs to addicts who are too 
weak to stand up for themselves. Bullies who specialise in hijacking are also a 
much bigger problem in the drugs business than in illegal alcohol. Rolf explains: 
 
“That’s not very risky. Who calls the police?  It is very easy to scare and rob a 
low class pusher who is scared as hell already. Cynical individualism is what 
counts. You can’t trust people.” 
 
Rolf gives an old buddy who is down and blue, some extra drugs to get rid of 
him. Further down on the street the buddy meets a police patrol who knows 
him: 
 
“He is high already, and can’t take another night in the cell. Police may have 
something on him, ratting or a crime he has not answered for, so he rats again 
to get off the hook.”  
 
Rolf is presenting his worst-case scenario here. Not all addicts behave that way. 
Even a junky has a reputation to maintain in small markets like the Norwegian 
one, but there are more of these worst-case scenarios in drugs than in the illegal 
alcohol market, according to insiders who are familiar with both worlds. We are 
talking about very different customers then. Illegal alcohol dealers usually shy 
away from alcoholics and minors, well aware of the risks they run if they do not 
stick to the unwritten rules of the market. As a matter of fact, many intermediate 
dealers do not like to sell to junkies either (Reuter and Haaga, 1989). But in the 
Norwegian drugs market at least, some do, among them dealers who are addicts 
themselves. 
 “Company smugglers” with legal companies and covers, “professional 
smugglers” who see their activity as their main source of livelihood, and 
“criminal generalists” who are willing to engage in most kinds of criminal 
activity as long as there is money in it, have been well known roles and niches in 
Norwegian bootlegging all the way back to Prohibition. The differences 
between these roles and the economic sublevels are not always clear cut 
however. Company smugglers, professional smugglers and criminal generalists 
may work on their own, they may compete, or they may cooperate. In part, the 
nature of the illegal alcohol economy depends on the efforts of the police. More 
than one ‘company smuggler’ or ‘professional smuggler’ of yesterday has woken 
up as the ‘criminal’ or amateur of today after the police really went after them. 
 Illegal enterprises seem to have been small scale, informal, flexible and short 
lived. Mark H. Haller gives an example in his classic work on illegal alcohol and 
Prohibition in the US. “Even activities involving large sums of money and 
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substantial profits are often carried out by relatively small and informally 
structured groups” (Haller, 1990: 228). Letizia Paoli s overview of European 
drugs markets in the 1990s makes observations similar to those of Haller: 
 
“In Germany as well as in Italy and in Russia, many drugs enterprises are 
‘crews’: loose associations of people, which form, split, and come together as 
each opportunity arises. In crews, positions and tasks are usually 
interchangeable and exclusivity is not required. Indeed, many crew members 
frequently have overlapping roles in other criminal enterprises” (Paoli, 2003; 
22)  
 
Klaus von Lampe has studied the illegal cigarette market: 
 
“Taken as a whole, the cigarette black market in Germany seems to be 
characterised by low-density networks comprising small, simply structured 
enterprises and individual entrepreneurs, who perform relatively simple tasks. 
Group structures, to the extent they become visible, in general display little 
vertical or horizontal differentiation” (von Lampe, 2003: 59)  
 
Small companies may have an advantage in having independent market positions 
and profitable subcontracting, which is one of the stated reasons for staying 
small, according to Linda Weiss (1987). 
 The stories about monopolistic criminal organisations in illegal alcohol in 
Norway are myths. “It’s not the way it works and not in our interest either”, a 
smuggler explained in an interview. “There has been enough for everyone and 
there have always been costumers who have asked for more”. Most smugglers 
and illegal distillers would agree, except for a handful in faraway districts with a 
limited number of customers. A regular business over time, monopoly or not, 
would be rather visible and risky. “There is no regularity in the transportation,” 
says one wholesaler. “That would have made the job too simple for the police. 
Irregularity is the answer, as much irregularity as possible”. 
 Small scale, informality, flexibility, decentralisation and coming and going are 
the main components of the picture of the illegal alcohol market, though not the 
whole picture either. Peter Reuter’s work on organised crime is interesting, but 
his concept of ‘disorganized crime’ (Reuter, 1983) is confusing in a way. Small 
size and flexible organisation may actually be the result of great organisational 
talent, and a very clever way of doing business in many markets, legal or illegal. 
A large, hierarchical organisation with factions difficult to control would operate 
very amateurishly in unpredictable markets like drugs or alcohol. The 
professionals among smugglers and distillers know exactly what they are doing 
when they prefer small scale and short time horizons. 
 Some regularity, at least in social terms, is not excluded though. Some teams 
have been in business with the same design and partners for a long while, even 
compared to legal companies. Ronny and his jailbird buddies were on the road 
with alcohol from Germany and to Norway for three or four years before they 
were caught. Edward and his sons and some old friends had a maritime alcohol 
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import undertaking going on from the Netherlands for at least three years. 
Christian, his partner and two drivers had imported 96 % proof alcohol from 
Spain for more than ten years prior to their downfall. Sales of illegal alcohol on 
the wholesale and retail levels show greater stability in districts where the police 
have been relaxed about illegal alcohol as long as certain unwritten rules have 
been respected (such as avoiding violence and the sale of narcotic drugs, and not 
selling alcohol to minors). 
 “The distribution level, that’s where you really see organisational stability, 
and even some hierarchy too”, says an insider. The wholesalers have for long 
periods been able to buy alcohol for a fair price due to their having a stronger 
market position than the importers. 
 Aside from stable co-operatives, many cunning smugglers change their 
criminal partners and organisational designs frequently for security reasons, 
starting over again with new partners, though from the same networks with the 
same kind of alcohol from the same contacts abroad. Veterans who have been in 
the business for more than a generation know how to start all over again after a 
break. What is of short duration and what is stable over time seen from that 
perspective? And what is the most interesting level of analysis, the single teams 
or the illegal alcohol market as a whole? Teams have been coming and going, 
while the illegal alcohol market has been in existence for more than seventy 
years, due to the competitive benefits such as the availability of alcohol at half 
the official price, the absence of taxes, sales to “dry” counties, workplace 
deliveries and some very liberal “opening hours.” 
 
 
Cultural and political capital 
 
Alcohol is legal in Norway, unlike drugs. Alcohol is Norwegian mainstream, 
narcotic drugs are “side-stream” and outlandish. The fear of drugs has grown to 
extreme proportions in Norway. About 100 officers worked in the anti-drugs 
division of the Oslo police in the 1990s, and only five in the team that 
investigated alcohol smugglers and illegal distillers. The maximum penalty for 
the smuggling of drugs is 21 years, while a professional smuggler of alcohol risks 
a maximum prison term of six years. 
 Illegal alcohol is an integrated part of mainstream culture in the way it is 
distributed via legal business infrastructures, to workplaces, voluntary 
organisations, sports clubs and other networks based on neighbourhood, kinship 
and friendship. It goes without saying that most of these networks were already 
there and smugglers and distillers began to ‘infiltrate’ them. Huge cargoes of 
illegal alcohol have been split up and distributed to customers through these 
networks, while the nature of the trade ranges from something ‘criminally 
organised’ to small-scale dealing or just a favour between friends. The low level 
of trust tends to be a problem in illegal markets, which Norwegian smugglers 
and dealers try to compensate for by “infiltrating” and recruiting partners and 
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customers from legal networks and meeting places where they are known and 
trusted as a result of activities other than the supply of illegal alcohol. (Von 
Lampe and Johansen, 2004). “No one in the business of illegal alcohol trusts 
each other unless they have been buddies for many years”, says Einar who has 
been importing for about 30 years. 
 Alcohol smuggling and illegal distilling have traditionally been viewed as 
having a ‘relative dignity’ compared to most other crimes. Traditional criminals 
see themselves as ‘rehabilitated’ after converting to illegal alcohol. Drug dealers 
sent to prison have been known to tell their families they were caught smuggling 
alcohol, knowing that illegal alcohol is less of a stigma for the family to have to 
bear. 
 Illegal alcohol has been associated with ‘relative dignity’ even among police 
officers who have observed cynical white-collar criminals victimise innocent 
people. Illegal alcohol was considered a ‘crime without victims’, until an import 
of methanol (instead of pure alcohol) from Portugal in 2002 cost 17 customers 
their lives. The smugglers lost face and prestige, but the market seems to be 
recovering again, as it has always done. The collective Norwegian memory is a 
very short one when it comes to alcohol. About 140 Norwegians died of 
drinking methanol in 1942 and 1943, when alcohol was rationed and much in 
demand. Those deaths did not have a substantial influence on the level of illegal 
demand either. 
 “Smuggling alcohol is the least criminal of the things we (the criminal 
generalists) are doing, the way we see it”, says informant Carl. The moral 
defence of the suppliers of illegal alcohol has always been ‘denial of injury’ and 
‘condemnation of the condemners’. High taxation has made ‘the drinking 
majority’ pretty upset, even more so since they started spending their holidays in 
southern Europe, where alcohol is cheap and available. However, Norwegians 
are rather timid about their politically ‘incorrect’ attitudes and illegal dealings, if 
an unknown interviewer knocks on their doors. Protestant Norwegians with 
their strong feelings of guilt have always been reluctant to expose their liberal 
habits if they are unsure about the attitudes of a stranger. What you say or do 
not say may depend on whom you are talking to. The willingness to buy illegal 
alcohol and the way Norwegians drink it, however, says a lot more about the 
illegal demand, and that is what matters when it comes to the economic realities 
of an illegal market. 
 Corruption is not completely unknown in the business of ‘organised crime’ 
in Norway, but there was more of it a generation or two ago, as a sub-cultural 
phenomenon in the customs service. Customs officers with ‘wet’ habits who 
worked the same pier year after year in the 1950s got too familiar with their 
clients and were easy to approach for a favour. Corruption related to organised 
crime is not a big issue at the present time. It is quite possible to make large sums 
of money through smuggling without the need for bribes or corrupt protection. 
 Contemporary smuggling enterprises are very mobile, and this too reduces 
the need for corruption. The logistics are impressive. 20,000 litres of 98% proof 
alcohol crossing the boarder in the morning may be taken over by the 
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wholesalers by noon, and the retail dealers the same night. A stationary illegal 
business has a much greater need for protection. Illegal distillers who expanded 
from small-scale operations to the industrial level in the 1990s were taught that 
harsh lesson in the form of arrests and disastrous seizures. An illegal distiller will 
be successful as long as he keeps his business small, and moves his premises after a 
while. 
 Most smugglers and illegal distillers are ambivalent about corruption. They 
know that bribes may work, but that a corrupt offer can be a trap too. A veteran 
smuggler explains: 
 
“I don’t believe in bribes. I want the police to be on one side of the wall, and 
my team on the other. The common customs officer does not have that much 
influence either, compared to the ‘Death Squadron’ with plans no one knows 
about.3 Guys who tell stories about corruption are liars who try to impress their 
crime partners.” 
 
Grassing is an alternative to bribing. A police officer who gets upset if a smuggler 
tries to bribe him may be quite keen on obtaining ‘inside information’ and will 
know how to pay for it. Sometimes it seems that the bigger the crook the bigger 
the snitch. Though there is no money involved, it may have a bear a certain to 
corruption, with information being exchanged for favours, though in such cases 
the officer agrees to the exchange for the sake of combating crime rather than 
for his or her personal benefit. Whether such information exchange is ‘corrupt’ 
will depend on internal regulations and the way it can be accounted for. 
Reformers may be upset the first time they learn about grassing and the deals 
between crooks and police investigators. Such deals are, however, informal and 
have been standard among police investigators in most countries for generations. 
(Johansen, 1996; Gunnlaugsson and Thorsdottir, 1999). 
 Norway has a long history as civic society with horizontal democratic parties 
and organizations, with leaders and members who believe in their political 
ideologies and the general rules for politics and government. The political system 
is characterised by a high level of trust. There are at least seven relatively strong 
parties, which respect each other’s rights and are willing to enter into the 
necessary compromises. Criminal ‘muscle’ has never been in demand in 
Norwegian politics or labour conflicts, not even in the 1920s, which were a 
rather antagonistic era. Police leaders, sheriffs, judges and public prosecutors are 
appointed. They have never been elected, unlike their American counterparts 
who made deals with gangsters to win their elections (Potter and Lyman, 1997). 
The revolutionary wing of the Norwegian labour movement was critical of the 
police in the 1920s as far as crowd control was concerned, but neither the 
movement nor its leaders were antagonistic towards the police as such. Political 
                                                 
3   The ‘Death Squadron’ is an investigative unit which employs covert tactics and has broad 
jurisdiction, and which smugglers can only dream about neutralising 
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activists who fought the police in demonstrations had no doubts about calling 
the local police if they were victimised by a criminal. Asking the police for 
assistance has been a natural thing to do for most people and it still is. 
 
 
The Norwegian peculiarity 
 
There are a few aspects that set the Norwegian, or more generally, the 
Scandinavian, experience apart from the organised crime experience of other 
countries: 
 
Principal organised crime problem 
Illegal distilling and smuggling of alcohol, not drug trafficking, has been 
Norway’s principal organised crime problem for many years. Finland and 
Sweden are not unfamiliar with illegal alcohol markets either. The Finns had 
their prohibition from 1919 to 1933 and the Swedes a rationing system for many 
years, and this too led to the development of black markets. Iceland banned 
fortified wines from 1915 to 1922, spirits from 1915 to 1933, and beer from 
1915 to 1988. The Icelanders have their own smuggling tradition, involving 
fishermen returning from England and Scotland or legal maritime transport with 
alcohol as an unofficial extra, but they have never had professional smuggling 
like Finland, Norway and Sweden. The drugs trade is a developing business in 
all the Scandinavian countries, but it is much younger and smaller compared to 
the illegal alcohol market. As far as the market for ‘private security’ is concerned, 
none of the Scandinavian countries have traditions of criminal extortion or 
‘protection’. Given the legitimacy and efficiency of the police and the courts, 
private protection is redundant. The few contemporary examples of ‘protection’ 
mostly concern immigrants with a tradition of mistrust of the police. 
 
Network-based organised crime, with something extra 
Most teams involved in the supply of illegal alcohol have been flexible, informal, 
autonomous and short lived, but there is something more to the illegal alcohol 
market, however. The scale of operations and the stability of a criminal 
enterprise depend, among other things, on the level of interest on the part of the 
police and the customs service, which has changed over time and from district to 
district. Attempts at control have been focused more on the importer than on 
the local wholesalers and retailers. Some teams have been in the market for long 
periods. Other teams have had their rise and fall, but the illegal market as such 
has been a ‘winner’ throughout the period since the start of the Prohibition era. 
 
Organised crime does not constitute a threat to Norwegian democracy 
The civic political system of Norway has always been free of ‘organised crime’. 
As mentioned above, politicians have never been in need of criminal muscle. 
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‘Organised criminals’ have not even dreamt about local power monopolies of 
the kind enjoyed by the Sicilian Mafia. 
 
Corruption has been a minor problem as far as organised crime is 
concerned  
The smuggling of alcohol or drugs can be fairly successfully organised without 
corrupt protection. Besides, criminals do not have that much to offer to officials 
and politicians either, except money. Corruption related to politics is not 
unknown, but then we have to turn to legal business and the bureaucracy to find 
the ‘meat-eaters’ of Norwegian corruption. High-level corruption in Norway 
seems to be concentrated in certain sectors, like shipping, oil and county 
administration (Andvig, 1994; Christophersen, 1997).  
 
A Scandinavian irony 
Ironically, the only significance case of alcohol related corruption in Norway so 
far occurred back in the early 1930s in the legal alcohol business. The sinners 
were the board of the Wine and Liquor State Monopoly. Most members were 
former wine importers who had been appointed because the Norwegian state 
wanted their professional expertise. Relatives and friends of these members, who 
were still in the private wine import business and depended on the State 
Monopoly for quotas, always got the best deals. As a result of the consequent 
scandal, the board resigned in disgrace. Another, contemporary, Scandinavian 
example concerns Systembolaget, Sweden’s state-owned monopoly for retail 
sales of alcohol. To be registered on the ordering lists and have their bottles 
displayed in Systembolaget’s stores has been a matter of life or death for private 
importers. Therefore they have been known to lobby the managers of these 
stores by offering dinners, luxury hotel weekends, tickets for sports events, free 
alcohol and some cash. The corruption is petty, but as long as it works, why pay 
more than you have to? 
 
 
What about the future, then? 
 
The long-established grey zone and the traditional collaboration between legal 
business and organised crime will probably grow in significance in the years to 
come. The grey zone has been well established in several legal branches for 
many years, and for new generations it is easy to enter. “That is my problem; I 
cannot see the difference”, a smuggler answered when I asked him about the 
morality of smugglers and legal businesses. “Legal business has dirty tricks and 
short-cuts of its own”. A successful legal entrepreneur was asked if he would 
ever befriend a business partner. “No, I don’t think so”, he answered after a 
moment of silence. “Sooner or later you may have to make decisions which are 
as cynical as they are unethical”. 
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There is no reason to think that there will be any increase in the level of 
violence in the illegal alcohol market in Norway, unless it is for short periods as 
the result of more aggressive police tactics, which may provoke conflicts among 
smugglers and illegal distillers. Organised crime has, however, recently taken a 
more violent turn in the area of armed robbery. About 100 hard-core veterans 
have been active in armed robbery for a while. Not surprisingly for a ‘profession’ 
of that kind, they are much more violent than the smugglers. They show less 
empathy and identify more closely with their criminal activities than the 
smugglers who are in their business for pure profit. 
 Talking of money, the two groups did actually ‘meet’ a short time ago, 
following a bank robbery in Oslo. One of the safes in the bank contained a 
million kroner belonging to an alcohol smuggler who became depressed and 
complained about his loss. The robber understood him very well and returned 
the money. Maybe there is some empathy and morality among crooks after all. 
 Apart from this heart-warming anecdote, when we view the two groups 
against the background of the traditional debate on organised crime, it is evident 
that alcohol smuggling and related crimes are still pretty peaceful in Norway, 
unlike crimes of commission, such as armed robbery which is a booming 
business. Of course, the latter has to be violent, at least potentially. But the two 
groups are still worlds apart. Neither has ever influenced the other, which casts 
doubt on the appropriateness of bringing them under the same confusing 
denominator of ‘organised crime’. 
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Explaining the emergence of the cigarette  
black market in Germany 
The emergence of the cigarette black market in Germany 
Klaus von Lampe1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The illegal trade in untaxed cigarettes has come to be recognised as a significant 
problem around the world. According to some estimates, almost one third of 
global cigarette exports is funnelled into black markets (Joossens and Raw, 1998: 
66), accounting for between 6 and 8.5 percent of all cigarette consumption 
(Merriman et al., 2000: 383). However, the problem appears to be unevenly 
distributed across countries and regions, with Germany, the focal point of this 
chapter, falling into a middle category of countries that experience a 
considerable level of cigarette smuggling but not as much as the countries that 
are most affected (European Parliament, 1997, 63; Merriman et al., 2000: 373-
374). 
 A number of factors have been identified to explain why cigarette black 
markets emerge and why the problem is more substantial in some countries than 
in others (Joossens et al. 2000; Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2003). The 
most obvious reason for cigarette smuggling in a broad sense is seen in the fact 
that cigarettes are typically subject to high taxation. The difference between net 
(duty-free) prices and legal retail prices provides an incentive for circumventing 
taxes. Those capable of procuring untaxed cigarettes for distribution can pocket 
a large share of the difference between the duty-free price and the duty-paid 
price as a profit. The profit margins are huge considering that the total incidence 
of tax on the purchase price of cigarettes in many countries, including Germany, 
exceeds the 70 percent mark and in some cases may even be above 80 percent 
(European Parliament, 1997: 61; Körner 1996: 30). A second major factor which 
is regularly named is the difference in retail prices between countries due to 
different levels of taxation (Beare, 2002, 2003; Van Duyne, 2003). Depending 
on the extent of the price disparity and on the transport costs involved, it can be 
lucrative to buy cigarettes in a low-tax country and to sell them in a high-tax 
country (Merriman et al., 2000: 366). 
 Other factors that have been linked to cigarette black markets include “the 
presence of informal distribution networks, organized crime, industry 
participation, and corruption” (Joossens et al., 2000: 403; see also Beare, 2002, 
2003). It is not clear however, to what extent these factors are causes of black 
markets or factors that only come into play in later stages of the developmental 
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process. While some argue that cigarette smuggling will almost automatically 
increase with increases in the levels of taxation and cross-national price 
disparities, others claim that the problem takes on substantial proportions only 
when smuggling activities move from small-scale ‘bootlegging’, meaning the 
smuggling of cigarettes purchased in low-tax countries, to ‘large-scale organised 
smuggling’ involving the diversion of container loads of untaxed cigarettes to the 
black market (Joossens et al., 2000: 398). According to this latter view, 
smuggling is not restricted to regions where taxes and prices are high, and it 
becomes a problem only when domestic brands become available to smuggling 
networks (Joossens and Raw, 2000: 949), which implies an open or tacit 
agreement between tobacco manufacturers and black marketeers. 
 The purpose of this chapter is to examine some of the factors that account for 
the emergence of the cigarette black market in Germany in the early 1990s. In a 
previous paper drawing on a variety of mostly open sources (von Lampe, 2002), 
the cigarette black market in Germany was described as an example of the social 
embeddedness of illegal markets; and in another paper, using a small sample of 
criminal files (n=14) as a primary data source (von Lampe, 2003), it served as a 
case study for examining the structure of criminal enterprises.2 This chapter 
explores the emergence of the cigarette black market in Germany using official 
statistics, unpublished law enforcement statistics, and a larger sample of criminal 
files (n=47). These data show some peculiarities in the temporal and spatial 
distribution of cigarette trafficking in Germany, and shed some light on the 
offenders and offender groups involved in black market activities. The evidence 
collected raises doubts about many assumptions concerning the root causes of 
cigarette smuggling on a grand scale. Specifically, it will be argued that high 
levels of taxation, cross-border price differences and the involvement of crime 
syndicates are not adequate or sufficient explanations. 
 
 
Historical origins of the German cigarette black market 
 
There are primarily two images associated with the illegal cigarette trade in 
Germany: one is that of Vietnamese street vendors openly selling contraband 
cigarettes in East Germany. The other image is that of huge amounts of 
contraband cigarettes being seized by the authorities in shipments ranging from a 
few cartons to entire container loads. Both images are closely linked to a specific 
historic period, namely the years following the fall of the Berlin Wall. As has 
been described elsewhere (von Lampe, 2002), the emergence of the cigarette 
black market in Germany can be pinpointed with some accuracy. While some 
cigarette smuggling, mostly involving merchandise purchased in Luxemburg and 
                                                 
2  For a similar study of the structure of illegal enterprises involved in the cigarette black market 
in the Netherlands, see Van Duyne (2003). 
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in Eastern European valuta stores, had existed on a small scale for some time, it 
was only in the years 1990 and 1991 that an extensive street market for 
contraband cigarettes developed and the numbers of seized contraband cigarettes 
skyrocketed (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2003). 
 Before the question of causation is addressed it appears appropriate briefly to 
examine the history of the large-scale black market, again drawing on previous 
discussions (Von Lampe, 2002). The origins of the cigarette black market as it 
developed in the early 1990s can be traced back to the winter and spring of 
1989. In January 1989 the visa obligation for Polish citizens travelling to the 
then capitalist enclave of West Berlin was lifted. This spawned an anarchic cross-
border trade with a wide range of goods being brought from Poland to be sold 
on the streets or at make-shift, open-air markets. These goods included 
electronic appliances, tools, alcoholic beverages and cigarettes. In June of 1990, 
immediately after the currency union between the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the German Democratic Republic, and three months prior to German re-
unification, the open sale of contraband cigarettes shifted and spread to other 
places in Eastern Germany while the open market in West Berlin was 
successfully curbed through rigid police intervention. A year later, the illicit sale 
of cigarettes had become an established part of the economy, allegedly 
accounting for up to one third of the cigarettes consumed by East Germans (Der 
Spiegel 26/1991, 56). By then, in the summer of 1991, Polish vendors had 
largely given way to former Vietnamese guest workers, who had been recruited 
by the East German government and had lost their jobs in the course of 
economic reconstruction following the collapse of the socialist regime (Krebs, 
1999). During the same period the annual number of contraband cigarettes 
seized by the Customs Service had risen from some 24 million in West Germany 
in 1989 to 260 million in unified Germany in 1991 and 346 million in 1992 
(Von Lampe, 2002: 145-146). 
 
 
Looking for explanations 
 
The price argument 
Having briefly outlined the origins of the cigarette black market, attention can 
be shifted to potential explanations. Let us begin with the price argument. We 
would expect the emergence of the cigarette black market to coincide with a 
marked increase in the price of cigarettes on the German retail market. 
 To test this assumption we are, as mentioned, in the advantageous position of 
being able to determine with some accuracy the point in time when the 
cigarette black market emerged as a large-scale phenomenon. When we look at 
figure 1 showing the trends in the per-capita consumption of taxed cigarettes, 
represented by the black line, and in the amounts of seized contraband cigarettes, 
represented by the grey broken line, significant changes taking place in the years 
1991 and 1992 become discernible. 
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Figure 1. Trends in Retail Price, Legal Per-Capita Consumption and  
    Seizures of Cigarettes 
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The drop in legal consumption (from around 1,900 in 1989 to around 1,600 in 
1992) and the increase in the number of seized contraband cigarettes (from 24 
million in 1989 to 346 million in 1992), which coincide with the mass 
appearance of street vendors of contraband cigarettes in East Germany, indicate a 
sudden growth in illicit cigarette trafficking. These developments, in turn, do 
indeed coincide with increases in the legal sales prices of cigarettes, represented 
in figure 1 by the dotted grey line. There is generally a high positive correlation 
of .94 (Spearman r) between legal prices and the number of seized cigarettes, and 
a high negative correlation of -.89 between legal prices and legal per-capita 
consumption in the time period to which this figure refers, 1986 through 1998. 
However, there is no sharp price increase in the early 1990s that would explain 
the turn of events that took place within this short time span. In fact, it is 
interesting to note that the price of cigarettes in East Germany was not affected 
by the currency union in June 1990 (Nierhaus, 1990). 
 
Cross-national price disparities 
Another factor seems to have more explanatory power: the increased difference 
between retail prices in Germany and neighbouring low-tax countries (figure 2). 
Whereas in the 1980s, the greatest price differential amounted to about 37 
percent in the case of Luxemburg, after the fall of the Berlin Wall the differences 
in price levels increased to about 65 percent in the case of Poland and about 57 
percent in the case of the Czech Republic (Eurostat, 1990; Körner, 1996). This 
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means that whereas in the 1980s, Germans could save only 37 percent on 
purchases of cigarettes in cross-border shopping, in the 1990s this margin 
increased to 65 percent. Quite obviously this has not only created incentives for 
shopping tours to neighbouring countries, but also opportunities for illicit profit 
making. However, the question remains: Does this sudden increase in cross-
national price disparity provide an exhaustive explanation for the emergence of 
the cigarette black market in Germany? This would be the case if the factors that 
transformed Germany into a comparatively high-tax country had led to a more 
or less even spread of contraband cigarette trafficking nationwide. But this does 
not seem to have been the case. 
  
Figure 2. Price Differentials between Germany and Selected Neighbouring  
    Countries (Germany=100) 
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It has already been emphasised that the visible black market emerged in West-
Berlin and later shifted to other parts of East Germany, but that it never took on 
similar proportions in West Germany. The available statistical evidence, derived 
from the Customs Service database INZOLL, confirms this geographical 
concentration. 
 
 
Geographical concentration of the black market 
 
The database INZOLL inter alia stores records on all cigarette-related 
proceedings initiated by the branches of the Customs Service across Germany. 
Apart from the investigations conducted by the central Customs agency 
Zollkriminalamt, which make up only a small share of the entire case load 
(between 0 and 5.5 percent per year), it is possible to determine the geographical 
THE ORGANISED CRIME ECONOMY; MANAGING CRIME MARKETS IN EUROPE 
 
 
 
214 
location of each investigation by looking at the branch office in charge. Using 
the records contained in the database as of November 2002 for the years 1989 
through 1999 (n= 216,612), we were able roughly to group the cases into two 
categories, one comprising the investigations conducted by branch offices 
located in West Germany and the other comprising the investigations conducted 
by branch offices located in East Germany including Berlin (table 1). The East 
German branches cover an area with a population of 17.7 million, whereas the 
West German branches cover a territory that is about twice as large with a 
population that, at 63.9 million, is more than three times as large. 
 
Figure 3. Dividing Germany for Analytical Purposes        
                     
 
 
The analysis (figure 4) shows that despite the significantly smaller territory and 
smaller population of East Germany, the number of cigarette-related 
investigations conducted by the East German branches of the Customs Service 
by far exceed the number of investigations in West Germany in every year 
during the 1990s. Within limits these figures permit the conclusion that the 
cigarette black market has indeed been far more prevalent in East Germany than 
in West Germany. 
 Of course, law enforcement statistics are not a pure reflection of the crime 
picture. Other factors come into play, like the motivation to report crimes to the 
authorities and the willingness and ability of law enforcement agencies to 
respond to these reports and to initiate investigations. But considering that the 
Customs Service underwent fundamental reconstruction in East Germany during 
the early 1990s and thus was less well prepared to investigate cigarette smuggling 
than the Customs Service branches in West Germany, one would have expected 
these factors to contribute to higher numbers of recorded cigarette-related 
crimes in the West than in the East. Another aspect that points in the same 
direction is the fact that most of the cases centrally handled by the 
Zollkriminalamt pertain to the investigations of a special unit (“SOKO Blauer 
Dunst”) which was formed to support the East German branch offices of the 
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Customs Service in the fight against cigarette smuggling. So in sum, the actual 
geographical concentration in the East is likely to be even more substantial than 
indicated by the data presented in figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Number of Cigarette-Related Investigations by Branch Offices of  
    the Customs Service in East Germany (incl. Berlin) and West  
    Germany, 1989-1999 
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A less dramatic but still considerable difference between East and West Germany 
exists when the analysis is confined to cases involving bulk loads of 150,000 
cigarettes and more (figure 5). This indicates that there is a higher regional 
concentration of the retail market than of the wholesale market. 
 At the same time, a comparison between the two graphs shows that bulk 
shipments make up only a small fraction of cigarette-related investigations by the 
Customs Service, which suggests that what has been termed ‘large-scale 
organised smuggling’ is not necessarily the dominating force in the German 
cigarette black market. 
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Figure 5. Investigations by Branch Offices of the Customs Service in East  
    Germany (incl. Berlin) and West Germany Involving 150.000  
             Cigarettes or more, 1989-1999 
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Given the fact that the price differentials between Germany and its neighbouring 
low-tax countries affect the country as a whole (because there are no regional 
price differences within Germany) it needs to be explained why contraband 
cigarette trafficking emerged primarily as an East German problem. There are, in 
fact, some at first glance plausible explanations (von Lampe, 2002, 148-149), 
including:  
 
? the greater geographical proximity of East Germany to the low-tax 
countries Poland and the Czech Republic; 
? lower income levels and higher unemployment in East Germany as 
compared to West Germany; 
? a legitimacy problem as regards the legal system which was quite rigidly 
transferred from West to East Germany; 
? the structural weakness of law enforcement in the period of transition; 
and 
? the existence of a Vietnamese community in East Germany that for 
peculiar reasons has provided a large workforce for the street sale of 
contraband cigarettes. 
 
Some of these explanations are less convincing than others because they cannot 
explain the differences between East Berlin, with its extensive street selling of 
contraband cigarettes, and West Berlin, where the open black market has all but 
disappeared since 1989 and 1990. This is the case with regard to the explanations 
Explaining the emergence of the cigarette black market in Germany 
 
 
 
217 
that refer to the geographical proximity to Poland and the socio-economic 
situation. Berlin as a whole is only about an hour away by car or train from the 
Polish border and the unemployment rate, to take one socio-economic indicator 
as an example, has consistently been above the national average in both parts of 
Berlin with the West Berlin rate even exceeding the unemployment rate in East 
Berlin by 1994. 
 Leaving aside the special case of West Berlin, the factors listed could explain 
the geographical concentration of the cigarette black market in East Germany 
only if there were an even distribution across that area, because all the factors 
would seem to apply equally to all parts of East Germany. But again, the 
Customs Service records show a different picture. When for analytical purposes 
the set of cigarette-related investigations is broken down into smaller territorial 
categories (see table 1 above), a more specific geographical concentration 
surfaces. 
 East and West Germany, respectively, can be subdivided along state lines into 
two territories of roughly equal size (table 1): Northwest Germany (population 
30.6 million) and Southwest Germany (33.3 million), and Northeast Germany 
(7.8 million) and Southeast Germany (9.9 million). On this level of analysis it 
becomes apparent that what at first had seemed to be an East-West difference is 
in fact to a large degree a difference between Northeast Germany and the rest of 
the country.  
 Figure 6 shows the number of cigarette-related investigations of the Customs 
Service branches located in Berlin, Brandenburg and Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania (Northeast) on one hand, and in Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia and 
Saxony (Southeast) on the other. As can be seen, by far the largest number of 
cigarette-related investigations in East Germany were conducted in the 
Northeast. In 1991, the ratio was 6,171 : 2,022; in 1992, 9,194 : 2,524; in 1993, 
18,392 : 7,611. Overall, the Northeast German branches of the Customs 
Service, which covered a territory with less than 10 percent of the national 
population, accounted for 43 percent of all cigarette-related investigations in 
Germany in 1989; 62 percent in 1990; 61 percent in 1991; 60 percent in 1992; 
58 percent in 1993; 66 percent in 1994; 75 percent in 1995; 74 percent in 1996; 
75 percent in 1997; 77 percent in 1998, and 74 percent in 1999. 
 The difference is less drastic but still considerable when we confine our 
attention to the up to 350 cases nationwide each year that involve bulk loads of 
150,000 cigarettes and more. Figure 7 shows the comparative figures for 
Northeast and Southeast Germany, suggesting that the geographical 
concentration in the larger Berlin area applies more to retail sales than to bulk 
smuggling and wholesale trafficking. 
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Figure 6. Cigarette-Related Investigations by Branch Offices of the Customs  
    Service in Northeast and Southeast Germany, 1989-1999 
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Figure 7. Investigations by Branch Offices of the Customs Service Involving  
    150.000 Cigarettes or more in Northeast and Southeast Germany,  
    1989-1999 
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Interestingly, the opposite picture is provided by the statistics for the Western 
parts of the country (figure 8). Here, the investigations are evenly distributed 
between the Northwest and Southwest. 
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Figure 8. Cigarette-Related Investigations by Branch Offices of the Customs  
    Service in Northwest and Southwest Germany, 1989-1999 
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However, a clear geographical concentration in the Northwest can be discerned 
for cases involving bulk shipments (figure 9). Without being able to go into 
details, we think it peculiar to find a concentration of bulk shipments in 
Northwest Germany from 1991 onwards – that is, long before a large scale black 
market for cigarettes developed in Britain and transit through Germany and the 
Benelux countries became a characteristic component of the cigarette smuggling 
picture in Northwest Europe (Joossens and Raw, 2000: 949).  
 
Figure 9. Investigations by Branch Offices of the Customs Service Involving  
    150.000 Cigarettes and more in Northwest and Southwest Germany,  
    1989-1999 
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The People Behind the Black Market 
 
Turning back to the situation in East Germany it appears justified to conclude 
from the available evidence that there is a concentration of trafficking activities 
in the larger Berlin area. This suggests that the conditions here are particularly 
conducive to the emergence of a cigarette black market even though it must be 
taken into account that a major share of investigations (about 20 percent in 
1993) in the Northeast relates to smuggling activities at the German-Polish 
border in and around Frankfurt (Oder) which has been one of the most 
important transit points for East-West commerce and travel.  
 Assuming that the basic socio-economic conditions are more or less identical 
across Eastern Germany there have to be other factors that come into play to 
explain the concentration in the larger Berlin area. 
 
 
The Vietnamese Community in East Germany 
 
One aspect that merits closer attention is the involvement of Vietnamese on the 
lower levels of the black market. The fact of the matter is that beginning in 1990 
and 1991 Vietnamese vendors by and large took over the street sale of 
contraband cigarettes. This development can be explained by a number of 
factors which have been detailed elsewhere (von Lampe, 2002). Briefly 
summarised, many of the Vietnamese living as guest workers in East Germany 
by the time the currency union made it lucrative to sell contraband cigarettes, 
were willing and able to enter the black market. They had the necessary 
experience from wheeling and dealing under the socialist regime, and faced with 
unemployment they had an economic incentive. But most of all they proved 
particularly resistant to law enforcement pressure. Investigations were hampered 
by the language barrier, by the spatial seclusion of the Vietnamese community in 
designated housing projects, and by the fact that Vietnam displayed great 
reluctance to accept extradited citizens. This effectively removed the most 
pressing burden that existed for non-German illicit cigarette vendors. Finally, 
Vietnamese had a competitive advantage over other ethnic groups because of 
their distinct appearance. They could be easily recognised as cigarette dealers and 
a Vietnamese standing by a subway station equipped with a plastic bag or a pack 
of cigarettes quickly became something of a trademark for the sale of contraband 
cigarettes. Retrospectively one is inclined to say that it was only because of the 
simultaneous visibility and relative immunity of the Vietnamese street vendors 
that a large-scale black market could develop. 
 Against this background it seems obvious to ask whether the geographical 
concentration of the black market in Northeast Germany is related to a similar 
concentration of the Vietnamese community. But the available evidence does 
not corroborate this assumption. On the contrary, figures provided by the 
German office of statistics (Statistisches Bundesamt) suggest that more 
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Vietnamese lived in Southeast Germany than in Northeast Germany. In 1991, 
the year when Vietnamese vendors took over the illegal retail market for 
cigarettes, 11,830 Vietnamese citizens officially resided in Berlin, Brandenburg 
and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, compared to 16,792 in Saxony-Anhalt, 
Thuringia and Saxony. 
 
 
A Sample of 47 Criminal Cases 
 
Having more or less exhausted the possibilities of finding an explanation for the 
apparent geographical concentration of the cigarette black market in Germany 
on the statistical level, attention can be shifted to the available qualitative data. 
These have been obtained from the analysis of a sample of criminal cases 
pertaining to cigarette trafficking in Berlin in the years 1990 through 1994. The 
cases were selected from investigations conducted by the Berlin branch of the 
Customs Service. Using the INZOLL database, the ten investigations involving 
the largest numbers of cigarettes recorded or seized, and at least three suspects, 
were selected for each year. These selection criteria were chosen in order to 
make it possible to examine cases that represent the highest market levels and 
that involve potentially the most complex detected offender networks, in order 
to gain insight into the operation of those actors that may be regarded as being 
among the key players in the black market. 
 Because for 1990 only few cases fit the criteria and overall the selected files 
were not always available for analysis, the sample contains different numbers of 
files from each year (1990: 3; 1991: 13; 1992: 14; 1993: 10; 1994: 7). Contrary 
to initial expectations the 47 cases that were eventually analysed do not pertain 
exclusively to high echelon groups. Rather, the investigations deal with 
networks from all market levels:  
 
? 4 cases involve suspects who smuggled cigarettes and then sold them 
directly to consumers; 
? 24 cases deal with the smuggling of cigarettes for the purpose of 
supplying wholesale and retail dealers in Germany; 
? 6 cases pertain to retail dealing; 
? 8 cases are about wholesale dealers who supply retail dealers; 
? and in another 5 cases smugglers were apprehended without the 
destination of the contraband cigarettes becoming apparent. 
 
It appears to be worth looking at these cases in search of answers to the question 
of why the cigarette black market emerged and developed primarily in 
Northeast Germany. While the cases do not allow a comparison with other 
regions, the analysis may hint at possible explanations in the sense that 
characteristic features of black market operations showing up in the analysis of 
the Berlin cases may be unique to this region. Against the background of 
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imagery linking large scale cigarette black markets with ‘organised crime’ the 
focus is on the individuals involved in the black market, the structure and 
sophistication of criminal enterprises and the linkage between different market 
levels. 
 
 
Personal Characteristics 
 
The 47 case files contain more or less complete information on 216 likely 
offenders. Drawing on the available information the average age of the suspects 
is 27 with a median age of 28. 11.7 percent of the suspects are women, mostly 
wives or relatives of co-offenders, and 93.4 percent are non-German nationals.  
 When we look at the nationality of these suspects (figure 10) we find two 
groups dominating: Polish citizens on the supply side and Vietnamese on the 
intermediate and retail levels. Typically, cases involve Polish smugglers supplying 
Vietnamese wholesale or retail dealers. 
 
Figure 10.  Nationality of Likely Offenders (n=216) in a Sample of 47  
       Cigarette Trafficking Cases from Berlin, 1990-1994 
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The clear dominance of these two groups is likely to conjure up images of 
ethnic mafias taking control of an illegal market and dividing it into zones of 
interest. But the information contained in the criminal files analysed paints a 
different picture. Most of the suspects do not seem to be hardened career 
criminals. According to the information contained in the criminal files, only 24 
of the 216 suspects had been involved in crimes other than cigarette-related 
offences. Of these only 11 had been involved in property crimes and/or violent 
crimes. The remaining 13 had been charged with offences such as traffic 
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violations and infringement of migration laws. More specifically, evidence of 
criminal involvement outside the cigarette black market could be found for only 
8 percent of the Polish smugglers and traffickers and for only 18 percent of the 
Vietnamese dealers. The shares for property crimes and violent crimes were 4.7 
percent in the case of the Polish suspects and 3.5 percent in the case of the 
Vietnamese suspects. This is in line with the findings of Van Duyne (2003) 
concerning cigarette smuggling in the Netherlands. 
 A similar picture emerges with regard to legal employment. Of the 126 
subjects for which the files contained information about their employment 
situation, there were 52 who held a legitimate job, went to school, or received a 
pension, and apparently used cigarette trafficking only to supplement their 
legitimate incomes. Interestingly, the share of suspects in this category was much 
higher in the first two years (77.8 percent in 1990 and 73.7 percent in 1991) 
than in the following three years (1992: 19 percent; 1993: 25 percent; 1994: 
35.7 percent). In the case of Vietnamese dealers this is probably due in part to 
the fact that Vietnamese who had originally come to East Germany as guest 
workers were laid off during the transition period. Partly it is due to the fact that 
newly arriving Vietnamese who went into cigarette trafficking, typically relatives 
of Vietnamese guest workers, had to apply for political asylum and were not 
permitted to work. 
 Overall, it seems that market participants were drawn into crime through a 
combination of push and pull factors more or less specific to the illicit cigarette 
business. 
 
 
Patterns of Criminal Cooperation 
 
The available evidence on the patterns of criminal cooperation corroborates this 
assessment. Cooperation seems to have been mostly opportunistic among actors 
who belong to fairly limited social networks. However, there appears to be a 
trend towards more durable and more complex patterns of cooperation over 
time.  
 In the 47 criminal files analysed, information was available concerning 51 
different sub-networks. These can be tentatively classified along two dimensions: 
authority structure, meaning a vertical differentiation between leaders and 
followers; and duration, referring to the lifespan of the network beyond a single 
endeavour. 
 Given the fact that the information contained in criminal files is often 
ambiguous, the classification refers to indicators that suggest the possibility that a 
given network has reached a certain level of structural sophistication. Figure 11 
lists the 51 identified sub-networks in chronological order and shows the 
presence or absence of information hinting at the existence of durable network 
links and authority relations. 
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Figure 11. Indications of Authority Structure and Duration for 51 (Sub-)  
      Networks (in Chronological Order) 
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A grey column with a value of 1 indicates that there is an evidence that in the 
particular network one member stands out as primus inter pares, whereas a values 
of 2 stands for an outright command structure, as is the case when a trafficker 
hires a helping hand to unload a shipment of contraband cigarettes. A black 
column with a value of 1 indicates that the offenders concerned cooperate 
repeatedly though sporadically, while a value of 2 stands for continuous 
cooperation. If no columns are assigned to a case it means that there is no 
evidence contained in the file that the cooperation was anything other than a 
one-off joint venture among equals.  
 The graph suggests mainly two things. First, that the overall structural 
sophistication of the networks involved in the cigarette black market was low in 
the initial phase of development between 1990 and 1994: 24 out of the 51 
identified networks show neither vertical differentiation nor existence beyond a 
single endeavour. Second, the graph hints at a trend towards increasing 
sophistication. The networks that fall into the period that runs from the second 
half of 1992 to the end of 1994 (networks 23 through 51) are more likely to 
show signs of some form of authority structure and/or a longer life span than the 
networks detected between 1990 and the first half of 1992 (networks 1 through 
22). 
 Given these tentative findings it seems that the black market is not so much 
the product of sophisticated criminal networks but rather, that the sophistication 
of market participants has increased over time along with or following the 
growth of the black market. We can also find evidence of this trend on the 
biographical level. In the 47 criminal files analysed there are several examples of 
market participants who originally started out as unsophisticated amateur black 
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marketeers and then moved up from small-scale smuggling and selling to bulk 
smuggling and wholesale trafficking. 
 Thus, the explanation for the emergence of the cigarette black market in 
Germany and especially in the greater Berlin area apparently has to be sought 
elsewhere than in the alleged presence of crime syndicates. 
 
 
The Link Between Polish Suppliers and Vietnamese Dealers 
 
While the analysis of case files does not produce any conclusive results, the one 
feature that stands out is the link between Polish suppliers and Vietnamese 
dealers. It can be hypothesised that this cooperation has been crucial for the 
development of the black market and that the best conditions for this supply 
channel have been in existence in the Berlin area. 
 Indeed, from a purely statistical point of view it is noteworthy that the size of 
the Polish community is a factor that distinguishes Northeast Germany from 
Southeast Germany. Whereas 32,800 Polish Nationals officially resided in the 
Northeast in 1991, most of them (25,800) in Berlin, in the Southeast the 
number was only 16,500 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1993: 72). Beyond pure 
statistics, the early history of the black market gives credence to the claim that 
the Polish-Vietnamese connection is vitally important. When the street selling of 
contraband cigarettes emerged in East Germany in mid 1990, supply lines from 
Poland had already existed in Berlin for more than a year while similar channels 
had yet to be established in other parts of the country. This probably allowed the 
black market to grow more rapidly in the Berlin area while also turning Berlin 
into a transhipment centre for contraband cigarettes going to other local black 
markets. In fact, in three of the 47 criminal files analysed, cigarettes were first 
brought to Berlin and then passed on to Vietnamese dealers in other cities, 
namely Halle and Magdeburg in the state of Saxony-Anhalt and Dresden in the 
state of Saxony, which are between 155 and 190 km away from Berlin. 
 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
According to conventional wisdom, high levels of taxation, cross-border price 
differences and the involvement of ‘crime syndicates’ explain the incidence of 
cigarette smuggling on a grand scale. The data collected for this study show that 
the emergence of the cigarette black market in Germany in the early 1990s 
indeed coincides with increasing discrepancies between duty-free and duty paid-
prices on the one hand, and between retail prices in Germany and neighbouring 
low-tax countries on the other. These factors, however, cannot explain the 
geographical concentration of the cigarette black market in Northeast Germany 
and more specifically in the greater Berlin area. The records on cigarette-related 
investigations conducted by the German Customs Service show that despite the 
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small territory and a combined share of less than 10 percent of the national 
population, the three states of Berlin, Brandenburg and Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerenia account for between 58 and 66 percent of all cigarette-related cases 
per year in the period from 1990 until 1994. This geographical concentration 
can neither be explained by price discrepancies, nor by the presence of ‘crime 
syndicates’, because the available evidence, drawn from an analysis of 47 
complex cases of cigarette trafficking in Berlin in the years from 1990 until 1994, 
suggests that more sophisticated patterns of criminal cooperation are a product of 
the emerging black market, rather than being the driving force behind it. A 
more prominent feature that surfaces in the case file analysis is the connection 
between Polish suppliers and Vietnamese distributors that in Berlin may have 
been stronger and more efficient than elsewhere. Supply channels for contraband 
cigarettes from Poland to West Berlin had been established as early as the winter 
and spring of 1989, i.e. more than a year before the sale of contraband cigarettes 
spread across the Eastern parts of Germany following the currency union 
between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. 
 The data presented do not reveal the role that legitimate tobacco manufactu-
rers (may) have played. While allegations of conscious or unconscious 
collaboration with black marketeers have repeatedly been raised, there are 
indications, such as the relatively broad brand diversity in the black market and 
the small share of bulk shipments of contraband cigarettes in the overall case load 
of the Customs Service, that at least in the first few years of the black market, 
large-scale smuggling with the tacit agreement of cigarette manufactures was not 
a dominating aspect. Even less is there any indication that links between illegal 
entrepreneurs and the tobacco industry can explain the geographical concentra-
tion of the black market. Likewise, there is no evidence that widespread 
corruption has facilitated the black market or contributed in any way to the 
apparent fact that the black market is far more prevalent in Northeast Germany 
than in any other part of the country. So, while these factors cannot be ruled out 
as having had an impact on the scale and shape of the German cigarette black 
market, in light of the geographical concentration of the latter, explanations 
must go deeper. 
 Without being able to give any definite answers, the following tentative 
conclusions can be drawn: 
 The difference between duty-free and duty-paid prices, and between high-
tax and low-tax countries, may be important factors, but they cannot fully 
explain the phenomenon because, at least in the German case, they are unable to 
account for the fact that the black market is highly concentrated in a particular 
region, namely the greater Berlin area. 
 It seems that factors other than price differentials have to come into play: in 
the case of Germany it appears that cooperation between Polish suppliers and 
Vietnamese retail dealers has been crucial in the creation of a large-scale black 
market. Given the fact that this constellation of ethnically defined supply and 
distribution networks, Polish and Vietnamese, respectively, cannot be found in 
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other retail markets, for example in the UK (Wiltshire et al., 2001), these 
additional factors obviously vary across space and time. 
 Consequently, predicting the emergence of a cigarette black market on a 
grand scale requires more than a foreseeable increase in price discrepancies: it 
requires an understanding of the general conditions under which the supply of 
and demand for untaxed or low-taxed cigarettes can be linked up in an efficient 
way, and it requires an assessment of the extent to which these conditions are 
concretely manifested in a particular jurisdiction faced with an increase in price 
differentials. 
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The ecstasy industry in the Netherlands 
 in a global perspective 
The ecstasy industry in the Netherlands in a global perspective 
Tom Blickman1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Most, if not all, law enforcement and international drug control agencies con-
sider the Netherlands to be the world’s major production and trafficking centre 
for ecstasy. According to the United States Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA), in its 2001 report ‘Ecstasy: Rolling Across Europe’, “80 percent of the 
world’s ecstasy is produced in clandestine laboratories in the Netherlands and, to a lesser 
extent, Belgium” (DEA, 2001a). The Netherlands is also alleged to be the main 
source in Europe for amphetamines. However, it was not clear on which basis 
this assumption was made. At the time, attempts to measure the global ecstasy 
industry were non-existent. Statistics relied on fragmentary information based on 
seizures, police operations against specific trafficking and production organi-
sations, and soft intelligence information. Notwithstanding the scant information 
available, the DEA’s ‘80 percent’ is still quoted almost everywhere nowadays.2  
 In the US, the numbers indicating the Netherlands as the source for ecstasy 
are uneven. For 2001, the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforce-
ment Affairs (INLEA) of the US State Department calculated a lower percentage 
than the 80% of the DEA. In 2001, more than 25,6 million ecstasy pills seized 
worldwide could be related to the Netherlands, either having been produced or 
merely transiting the country. Coupled with Interpol figures on world seizures 
of ecstasy for that year (over 37 million) that amounted to approximately 68%, 
according to the INLEA’s 2002 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 
(INCSR).3 
 The figures for the US market vary between US and Dutch law enforcement 
agencies. The DEA seized approximately 9,5 million MDMA tablets domest-
ically in 2001. According to figures of the Dutch USD, however, only about 4 
million pills seized in 2001 in the US could be related to the Netherlands (USD 
2001, 2002). This implies that approximately 42% of the pills seized in the US 
may originate from the Netherlands. Looking at the destination of the pills 
                                                 
1  Tom Blickman is researcher with the Crime & Globalisation project of the Transnational 
Institute (TNI) in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. He is working on international crime and 
drug control policies, drug trafficking and transnational organised crime. 
2  It is not always clear in subsequent testimonies of DEA officials if the 80% indicated the Dutch 
share of the global or the US market. 
3  In 2000 worldwide seizure amounted to about 30 million ecstasy pills (BKA, 2002). According 
to the USD 21,7 millions pills seized worldwide could be related to the Netherlands (USD, 
2002). That would imply that 72% of the pills originated in the Netherlands.  
THE ORGANISED CRIME ECONOMY; MANAGING CRIME MARKETS IN EUROPE 
 
 
 
232 
seized worldwide with a Dutch connection, about 6 million were bound for the 
US (63%), but not necessarily seized in the US. The example shows that 
different law enforcement agencies use different data, rendering a realistic 
estimate of market shares difficult. 
 Even in the Netherlands at the time, officials acknowledged they had no real 
overview of the ecstasy industry, despite the existence of a specialised inter-
agency law enforcement task force – the Unit Synthetic Drugs (USD). It was 
established in 1997 to combat synthetic drug production and trafficking. The 
USD became a centre of expertise and an information-clearing house for foreign 
law enforcement agencies. Despite the information gathered over the years, the 
public prosecutor coordinating the USD, Martin Witteveen, admitted the 
business volume or even identity of the major traffickers were still unknown 
(Witteveen, 2001). Though seizures connected to the Netherlands have increa-
sed considerably and many laboratories were dismantled,4 what happened else-
where in the trade flow remained generally unknown.  
 In 2003, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) tried to 
compose a global overview on ecstasy-type substances. Until then, the UNODC 
had been unable to produce reliable statistics due to incomplete reporting in 
which (meth)amphetamines was not differentiated. In order to obtain a clearer 
picture, the office undertook a global survey on amphetamine-type-stimulants 
(ATS).5 The first results were published in UNODC’s 2003 ‘Global Illicit Drug 
Trends’ (UNODC, 2003a) and its ‘Ecstasy and Amphetamines Global Survey 
2003’ (UNODC, 2003b). The latest figures were made available in UNODC’s 
‘World Drug Report 2004’. Despite the lack of valid data, in its 2003 global 
survey, the UNODC concluded that “until recently” the Netherlands was the 
world’s leader of illicit amphetamine and ecstasy manufacture and trade, but also 
that the Netherlands and Belgium are still “considered to be the major global source of 
ecstasy”. However, the figures produced by the UNODC seem to be over-
exaggerated.  
 Ironically, the paradox of successful law enforcement was that it triggered 
stigmatisation: the more you seize, the more you appear to be the source of the 
problem. In a recent threat analysis, the Dutch National Criminal Investigation 
Service (DNRI) – a newly established national police agency in which the USD 
was incorporated – estimates the Dutch ecstasy share at approximately 32-42% of 
the global demand (DNRI, 2004). Although the Netherlands and to a lesser 
extent Belgium (in particular the north bordering the Netherlands) are 
                                                 
4  Even before the creation of the USD in 1997 the seizures of ecstasy and amphetamine labs had 
increased. In 1995, 20 labs were dismantled while from 1998-2002 on average 16 ecstasy labs 
and 7 amphetamine labs were seized. (Van der Heijden, 2003) According to a law enforcement 
officer just as many labs were dismantled just before the creation of the USD, but the USD was 
more successful in its public relations efforts to claim achievements. 
5  Amphetamine-type-stimulants (ATS) are synthetic drugs including the chemically related 
amphetamine, methamphetamine and ecstasy and a range of analogues. 
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significant producer countries, their importance might be less than is generally 
assumed, or otherwise it is loosing its primary position. 
 
 
The labyrinth of global ecstasy production figures 
 
The UNODC calculates that nearly 8,3 million people use ecstasy (0,21% of the 
global population age 15-64), according the 2004 World Drug Report. More 
than a third is concentrated in Europe and more than 40% in North America. 
The industrialised states in North America, Europe and Oceania account for 
some 80% of global ecstasy use. According to the UN, the global market for 
ecstasy continues to expand, although at a much slower pace than in the 1990s. 
While there are signs of stabilisation or contraction in some of the more 
established markets of Western Europe and North America, and a loss of 
momentum in the increases reported from Oceania, the market is expanding in 
Eastern Europe as well as developing countries, notably in the Americas, 
southern Africa, and the Near and Middle East as well as South East Asia (UN-
ODC, 2004a). China’s synthetic drug market, which is relatively recent, has 
been characterized by a steep increase since 1997. There are indications that 
ecstasy might be overtaking methamphetamine (UNODC, 2004a).6 It is not 
always clear, however, what is considered ecstasy (known as yaotouwan or ‘head-
shaking’ pills) in China: ecstasy-type drugs or drugs that in some way lead to a 
state of ‘ecstasy’ (UNODC, 2004b).  
 
 
The ecstasy market 
 
Unlike traditional plant-based drugs, the production of ATS starts with readily 
available chemicals, in easily concealed laboratories. This makes an assessment of 
the location, extent and evolution of the production of such illicit drugs ex-
tremely difficult. Acknowledging the difficulty of quantifying the volume of the 
illicit ecstasy industry, the UNODC nevertheless made an attempt in 2003 and 
2004. Based on three estimates of consumption, pill seizures and precursor sei-
zures the office calculated an annual production of about 1,4 billion tablets (UN-
ODC, 2004a).7 Based on an average wholesale and retail price of respectively $ 7 
and $ 16,63 per pill that amounts to a wholesale market value of $ 9,8 billion 
and a retail market value of $ 23,38 billion (UNODC, 2003b). 
 
                                                 
6  According to the DEA, Chinese law enforcement officials report significant increases in domes-
tic production of ecstasy. Most production in China is for domestic consumption, but ecstasy 
tablets also are imported from the Netherlands into China to meet the demand. (DEA, 2004a) 
7  The UNODC estimates that 10% of pills and precursors are seized, which may be considered 
the generally accepted ‘golden 10% rule’, quoted since 1935 (Van Duyne, 1994, 2003). 
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Table 1. Estimated annual production of ecstasy (metric tons) 
 
Consumption 100 – 125  
Pill seizures 50 – 75 
Precursor seizures 130 – 200 
Mean and range 113 (50 - 200) 
1.4 billion tablets at 80 mg per tablet 
Source: UN World Drug Report 2004 
 
How reliable are these figures? Looking at the figures about consumption the 
estimate appears to be over-exaggerated. According to the UNODC, taking into 
account occasional, moderate and heavy use, studies show that, on average, 
ecstasy users consume about three tablets per week – or about 150 a year. This 
amounts to an annual requirement of about 1.250 million tablets, or 100 to 125 
tons of MDMA (each tablet contains 80-100 mg) (UNODC, 2004). However, 
the UNODC seems to confuse annual prevalence – that includes the one-time 
user taking a pill to experiment – with a much smaller group of ‘experienced 
users’. In a study on the Dutch drug market commissioned by the Dutch Natio-
nal Criminal Investigation Service (DNRI), it was estimated that the con-
sumption per user is more likely in the range of 20-40 pills per year, based on 
studies in Canada, the UK, Germany and the Netherlands (Van der Heijden, 
2003). According to experts that figure is much more realistic and would even 
lean to the lower end of the range. Using the UNODC’s estimate of 8,3 million 
users worldwide that would amount to a global demand of 166-332 million pills 
per year. This is significantly lower that the 1,4 billion pills per year of the 
UNODC.  
 Calculating market values depends on what is considered wholesale, 
intermediate or retail level and the different market settings around the world. In 
the Netherlands (after all, the largest producer according to the UN), wholesale 
prices are much lower than the $ 7 of the UN, which would be equal to the 
higher range of retail price in the Netherlands. According to the USD, ecstasy 
prices per tablet on the wholesale and intermediate markets are € 0,90 (from 
production ‘off tabletting’ locations), € 1,50 (wholesale) and € 2,70 (inter-
mediate level) (USD, 2002).8 During field research, informants said the price per 
pill depended on amounts purchased. At the wholesale and intermediate levels 
prices ranged between € 0,35–0,40 (for lots of 100.000 pills) and € 1,50 for 100 
pills (Blickman et al. 2003). Street prices in the major consumption countries are 
not a good indicator either, because it depends on the setting. Research in 
several countries found that users tend to buy larger quantities at a lower price to 
be distributed among friends and acquaintances, resulting in lower average retail 
prices in these circles. 
                                                 
8  Based on quantities of 750.000. 
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A rough estimate by an analyst of the Dutch USD calculated an annual world 
market of 500 million pills with a wholesale market value of € 0,8 billion and a 
retail market value of € 5 billion (Fossen, 2003).9 The average wholesale price (€ 
1,60) and retail price (€ 10) per pill used by the USD analyst are much more 
realistic. The study for the DNRI did not try to estimate market values, but 
using the figures of the USD analyst the market values would be a € 266-532 
million wholesale market value and € 1,7-3,3 billion retail market value. In 
other words, calculations are significantly lower than the UN estimates. 
However, scarcity of reliable data leads to generally inadequate guesstimates. 
 
 
Production and trafficking 
 
All the UN reports state that the Netherlands and Belgium still are the main 
centres of global ecstasy production. However, its relative importance seems to 
be declining as ecstasy production is appearing in other parts of the world 
(UNODC, 2003a: 9). In its 2003 Global Illicit Drug Trends the UNODC looked 
at three indicators:  
 
? detection and dismantling of laboratories; 
? seizures of precursors; and 
? seizures of ecstasy pills related to country of origin.  
 
On all three indicators the Netherlands, followed by Belgium, scores ‘best’. 
How reliable are these indicators? The global surveys are just an approximation, 
and the UN will be the first to admit that. First of all, the analysis depends on 
the completion of reporting obligations and how these obligations are met. Also, 
they are sometimes subject of negotiations with member states who fear to be 
pinpointed as ‘narco-states’, because of the UN reports. 
 According to the 2003 global survey “over the 1999-2001 period, 75% of all 
seizures of clandestine laboratories producing ecstasy took place in the Nether-
lands and 14% in Belgium. The two next prominent production sites of ecstasy 
are the UK (6%) and Germany (4%)”. The 75% of seized laboratories relates to 
the total seizures in Europe only. Curiously, the 2003 ‘Global Illicit Drug 
Trends’ report does not give percentages for worldwide seizures of laboratories. 
In that case the percentage would go down to 46%. The difference is largely due 
to laboratories in the US and Canada, where a third of all detected labs are 
found (1996-2001). A number of countries do not or hardly appear in the UN 
statistics while ecstasy production is suspected. For example, Australia does not 
appear in the UN statistics, but according to Australian Bureau of Criminal 
                                                 
9  Based on 40 million pills seized worldwide and average seized percentage of 8%, combined 
with a estimated weekend use of 10 million pills worldwide and 20% of the 200 tons of PMK 
illegally produced annually (according to the World Customs Organisation). 
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Intelligence (ABCI) at least 12 labs were dismantled in the years 1999-2002. The 
chemicals seized at the labs originated from locations throughout South-East 
Asia. 
 The UNODC’s ‘World Drug Report 2004’ looked at the years 2001-2002, 
the first years for which the results of the revised questionnaire were available. 
The most striking trend was the increase of ecstasy production in East and 
South-East Asia, while the number of dismantled ecstasy laboratories declined in 
Europe and remained more or less stable in North America.10 However, the 
number of laboratories seized is a poor indicator if one does not know the 
output capacity combined with the production time span as well as its nature 
(just tabletting or genuine MDMA production). For example, according to the 
UN, 25 ecstasy labs were seized in the Netherlands in 2001, while in fact only 
15 actually produced MDMA (USD 2001, 2002).  
 In terms of seizures of ecstasy precursors, the UN mentions that the highest 
figures have been reported in recent years from the Netherlands (63% of all such 
seizures over the 1999-2001 period), followed by Belgium (21%). As an 
indicator precursor seizures are not very reliable too. Seizure data typically reflect 
individual large seizures, or a small number of related cases, resulting in wild 
fluctuations in the statistics (UNODC, 2003b). Seizures often also take place in 
transit countries. For instance, most precursor seizures in Belgium and Germany 
have the Netherlands as their destination. However, it is difficult to calculate 
production figures based on seizures of precursors. Producers may order more 
than they need to have some reserve, as the UNODC (2003a) observed in the 
case of potassium permanganate.  
 Regarding the country-of-origin pill seizure indicator, the UN reported: 
“Three quarters of the countries reported that their imported ecstasy originated 
in the Netherlands. If only the responses of the countries within Europe are 
considered, the proportion of the Netherlands as a source country rises to 86% .  
 The next most frequently mentioned country of origin was Belgium, ap-
parently reflecting a shift of criminal groups from the Netherlands as controls 
were tightened” (UNODC, 2003a). Meanwhile, the relative importance of 
Europe may be declining. In the mid-1990’s West European countries reported 
around 80% of all ecstasy seizures; today that proportion is around 50% 
(UNODC, 2003b). However, once again, the statistics are not reliable and 
comparison of various national figures is difficult due to different means of 
reporting. 
                                                 
10  Of all the reported seized labs (128) in 2001-2002, 43 were in the Netherlands (34%), 26 in 
the US (20%), 14 in China and Hong Kong (11%), 11 in Indonesia (9%), 10 in Canada (8%) 
and 8 in Belgium (6%). 
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Missing links 
 
When one combines the quantitative information with qualitative data the 
picture becomes even more confusing. Without knowledge about the 
functioning of criminal networks involved in the illicit ecstasy industry 
quantitative data provide little insight. No single organisation controls all aspects 
of production, wholesale, midlevel, or retail sales – while the networks involved 
increasingly seem to globalise. Production and trafficking organisations arrange 
their activities across borders. Apart from trafficking ecstasy produced in Dutch 
laboratories, Israeli groups have been involved in production operations in the 
Netherlands.11 As Dutch law enforcement pressure mounts, some Dutch 
producers either look for Belgian producers or establish their own facilities in 
Belgium. Involvement of Dutch organisations with laboratories seized in 
Germany has also been reported. The dismantling of a major ecstasy production 
operation in Indonesia in April 2002 and one in Surinam in May 2003, appa-
rently to target the US market, indicates that significant production centres have 
been set up outside Europe with Dutch expertise. The DEA reports that Asian 
criminal groups also may be producing the drug in Belgian laboratories (NDIC, 
2004). 
 There seems to be an increasing diversification in production. Different stages 
of production are conducted at different locations, sometimes even in different 
countries. That trend was already observed in the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Germany. In Canada, three tabletting units were seized in 2003 in Toronto 
capable of producing more than 250.000 per day. A group of Chinese nationals 
was orchestrating the manufacture, made from powder allegedly imported from 
the Netherlands. At its height, according to law enforcement officers, the 
network was distributing a million ecstasy tablets a month, or about 15 per cent 
of all the ecstasy consumed in the US.12 
 Apparently, established criminal networks seem to add ecstasy to their 
repertoire using already existing trafficking routes. In June 2004 the first ecstasy 
producing unit in India was discovered using two ordinary pharmaceutical firms. 
The companies were manufacturing medicine such as paracetamol during day-
time and synthetic drugs in the night. They had connections with one of the 
major crime-enterprises in the region, India, Pakistan (Karachi) and Dubai. They 
seemed to use established mandrax (a variant of methaqualone) smuggling lines 
                                                 
11  In 1994, an Israeli group tried to set up a laboratory near Amsterdam, which was discovered 
when it exploded. (Jerusalem Post, 30 September 1994; Het Parool, 30 September 1994) An-
other Israeli group, together with Dutch, Turkish and British nationals were arrested in 2001. 
Their factory was equipped to produce 120.000 pills an hour. The Israelis were violently ex-
torting money in Israel to operate the lab. (Jerusalem Post, 1 March 2001; Haarlems Dagblad, 
9 May 2001) 
12  DEA and CFSEU Press Release, March 31, 2004; National Post, April 1, 2004; Globe and 
Mail, April 1, 2004. 
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to South Africa. Funds came from South Africa through ‘hawala’ brokers with 
Dubai as the nodal point.13 
 Another observation concerns the increased scale of production and grown 
professionalism outside the Netherlands. For example, in Canada clandestine 
synthetic drug laboratories are becoming larger and more sophisticated (RCMP 
2003, 2004). The European Union reports that the number of production 
facilities is relatively stable, but due to improved production techniques, they 
have become increasingly more efficient (Europol, 2004).  
 Finally, there seems to be a growing differentiation in pill quality in several 
countries, with high quality pills from the Netherlands and Belgium and low 
quality pills produced domestically (Russia, Hong Kong, Vietnam). In addition, 
some reports suggest the importation of MDMA powder to be adapted to local 
needs in terms of both strength (MDMA content) and composition, as 
discovered in Thailand, Cambodia and Canada. 
 
 
Production in the United States 
 
Reported lab seizures and other indicators such as MDMA levels in pills in 
North America do not seem to allow for the assumption that 80% of the ecstasy 
in the US originated from the Netherlands. The US and Canada account for 
nearly 30% of worldwide laboratories seizures. Despite the prominent position 
on the UN list, the US National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) in its ‘Natio-
nal Drug Threat Assessment 2004’ stated that: “Domestic MDMA production 
remains limited, as evidenced by very few domestic MDMA laboratory seizures” 
(NDIC, 2004; emphasis added). True, the amount of seized ecstasy laboratories 
dwarfs in comparison with seized methamphetamine labs (12 against 9.024 in 
2002), but is still substantive in a global context (20%). US authorities seem to 
suffer from a state of denial when domestic ecstasy production is concerned. The 
main concern is domestic methamphetamine production.  
 According to the NDIC, most clandestine ecstasy laboratories seized in the 
US are only capable of producing small amounts (gram quantities) per 
production cycle, although a few were capable of producing kilogram quantities. 
However, law enforcement information indicates the existence of large-scale 
laboratories capable of producing millions of pills.14 The NDIC admits that 
because of unsubstantiated or inclusive data concerning laboratory capacity 
estimates are highly uncertain.  
                                                 
13  Times of India, 8-9 and 12 June 2004; The Indian Express, 10 June 2004. 
14  In October 2001, the DEA seized a major MDMA lab in north San Diego County. The 
sophisticated laboratory was capable of producing 1,5 million ecstasy tablets a month 
(ONDCP Drug Policy Information Clearinghouse, San Diego, California, June 2004). In De-
cember 2002 a lab that had been operating for or at least two years buried in a mountainside 
near Allentown (PA) was discovered capable of producing million-tablet batches of ecstasy. 
(The Philadelphia Inquirer, 19 December 2002; DEA Microgram Bulletin, June 2003).  
The ecstasy industry in the Netherlands in a global perspective 
 
 
 
239 
Pill seizure data also show a sharp decline in imported pills. According to data 
collected by EPIC, the number of ecstasy tablets seized arriving from foreign 
source or transit countries has decreased sharply from 8 million in 2000, to 6.7 
million in 2001, to 3.4 million in 2002. (NDIC, 2004) That might indicate that 
more importation through unidentified trafficking networks or more supply 
from domestic production, or both. A growing number of tablets are being sold 
as ecstasy that contains varied substances, or combinations. According to the 
UN, “it may also be that, with increased competition, drug trafficking 
organizations are also importing ecstasy tablets from South-East Asia, where 
tablets are more likely to be multi-drug combinations.” (UNODC, 2003b) 
Moreover, conclusions on the share of Dutch ecstasy on the US market are 
drawn on a limited amount of ecstasy seizures, which means that the conclusions 
are based on only 7,5–15% of the market. 
 Nevertheless, the main emphasis of US law enforcement is on ecstasy from 
the Netherlands and Belgium. An explanation could be that law enforcement 
agencies in the US have a partial overview based on specific operations. For a 
while they mainly targeted Israeli trafficking networks with suppliers in the 
Netherlands, in close collaboration with Dutch police. One operation typically 
produces additional leads for other similar operations, resulting in a ‘snowball’ of 
cases with the same or connected suppliers and trafficking networks, as became 
clear from case analyses and interviews with USD officials (Blickman et al., 2003; 
Huisman et al., 2003). A particular case started in 1996, but spin-off was still 
being used in 2003, based on so-called free-evidence gained from the initial 
investigations (Graafland, 2003). Another explanation could be that singling out 
the Netherlands is politically biased. The profound differences in drug policy and 
law enforcement methods between the two countries create problems.  
 
 
Eastern Europe 
 
According to several sources, significant ecstasy production is taking place in 
Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries, although very few ecstasy labs are 
reported to the UN as seized in the region. Ecstasy is produced in significant 
quantities in Poland, and law enforcement officials estimate that Poland is one of 
the leading suppliers of amphetamines to European markets (USD 2001, 2002; 
INCSR 2002, 2003; UNODC, 2003a). According to the European Monitoring 
Centre for Drugs and Drugs Addiction (EMCDDA) synthetic drug production 
has grown in Central and Eastern European countries, due to weak control 
mechanisms (EMCDDA, 2002). 
 Organised crime groups in Poland produce some of the highest quality 
amphetamines in the world for both export and domestic consumption. These 
groups often make use of existing legal laboratories and employ experienced 
chemists to produce amphetamines that are 90-100% free of impurities. 
Synthetic drugs are sometimes produced in the legal, permanent laboratories of 
chemical companies and universities (INCSR 1999, 2000). European law 
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enforcement officials estimate that Poland fulfils more than 25 percent of 
Europe’s amphetamine demand (INCSR 2000, 2001). 
 Swedish government figures in 2000 showed only 50% of ecstasy pills there 
came from the Netherlands, down from 90% a few years before. A similar 
development had taken place earlier with amphetamine production. Until the 
early 1990s, the supply of amphetamines in North Western Europe was largely 
in the hands of Dutch citizens residing in the southern provinces of Brabant and 
Limburg. After 1989 and the concomitant political changes in Eastern Europe, 
the market started to change and the Poles proved to be skilled competitors. 
Their share of the market in Germany and Scandinavia rose from less than 10% 
to 20-26% (Van Duyne, 1996; CDPC, 1999). According to Polish law 
enforcement 60% of the seized amphetamines in Scandinavia is produced in 
Poland nowadays (BKA, 2002). This pattern may repeat itself in the ecstasy 
trade. According to the UNODC, an eastward shift of ecstasy production is now 
under way, similar to the spread of clandestine amphetamine manufacture a 
decade ago. One or two laboratories have been seized on average the past years 
in Eastern Europe (UNODC, 2003b). Small ecstasy labs and marijuana plots are 
being set up for the local market, sometimes in collaboration with Dutch citizens 
(Bruinsma, 2004). 
 Western law enforcement officers feared that after the fall of the Soviet 
Union, Russia’s thousands of experienced chemists would start mass producing 
synthetic drugs for the local and European markets. This hypothesis seems to 
have come true to a minimal extent, yet. Ecstasy is largely imported from 
Western European countries, particularly the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent 
from Poland (Paoli, 2000). However, the deputy head of the Russian Customs 
department predicted that the Baltic States would replace the Netherlands as the 
main supplier to Russia. The Baltic countries, formerly transit points for 
synthetic drugs, are evolving into major producers of ecstasy made from pre-
cursor chemicals imported from Russia. In 2003, there were reports by both the 
MVD and Federal Security Service (FSB) that MDMA laboratories now exist in 
Russia. Although ecstasy tablets produced in Russia are of low quality, the low 
prices (sometimes as low as $ 5) are attractive in comparison to the $ 20 typically 
charged for Dutch ecstasy tablets. In addition, a new trafficking route from 
Estonia has appeared, attracted by increasing demand and higher prices in Russia 
(INCSR 2003, 2004).  
 In 1999, the Estonian police found evidence of laboratories believed to be 
producing ecstasy. The region ‘may’ also be receiving ecstasy from nearby Latvia 
(DEA, 2001a; INCSR 2003, 2004). Ecstasy prices have remained low in 
Estonia; an indication of domestic manufacture. Finland fears that Estonia's 
accession to the EU and Schengen arrangements could lead to increased 
trafficking. In August 2003, Estonian officials seized a pill press, various 
chemicals and 150 kilograms of liquid MDMA in Tallinn that could have 
produced approximately 750.000 ecstasy tablets. The MDMA apparently origi-
nated in Russia. In the two-year period from 2000-2001, seven laboratories that 
were producing amphetamine, ecstasy, and precursor chemicals were shut down 
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in Lithuania. The labs produced for export and were well equipped, as were the 
ten labs dismantled in 2002-2003 (INCSR 2000-2003). 
 
 
China and South-East Asia 
 
Since the new reporting mechanism was introduced by the UNODC, the 
sudden appearance of China and South-East Asia – Indonesia in particular – as 
major producers is remarkable. According to the secretary of the INCB, H. 
Schaepe, Asian countries are gradually taking over ecstasy production from the 
Netherlands due to increased law enforcement.15 Europol noted that the 
involvement of organised crime groups in the production of synthetic drugs in 
China, while in general production in South-East Asia is likely to become a 
growing concern for global law enforcement agencies (Europol, 2004). 
However, very little information is available concerning MDMA production in 
Asian countries (NDIC, 2004). 
 As mentioned before, “ecstasy” in East and South-East Asia is used to 
describe any drug in tablet form, whether or not it contains MDMA. Reports 
indicate that tablets in the region contain mixtures of various substances and 
sometimes no MDMA at all. This contrasts with the situation in Europe and the 
US, where the trend over the past years has been towards high purity single 
entity ecstasy tablets. From a law enforcement perspective, the significant 
regional differences in tablet composition raises doubts about the widely held 
belief that the majority of ecstasy seen in East and South-East Asia, and in 
Australia, are imported from Europe, according to the UNODC. Evidence for 
MDMA powder manufacture in that region is still limited and anecdotal, 
suggesting a wide availability. In 2001, Hong Kong reported that cheap ecstasy 
tablets probably were manufactured in Asia rather than Europe, and that the 
amount of locally made tablets is increasing (UNODC, 2003b). 
 In 2000, the NDIC, the DEA and the US Customs Service (USCS) issued 
their ‘Joint Assessment of MDMA Trafficking Trends’ in which they voiced 
concern that crime groups from Mexico, Colombia, or China would become 
involved in ecstasy production and trafficking towards the US. Although, at the 
time, no organisations from these countries had made strong moves toward 
large-scale production, the same advantages found in the Netherlands – access to 
precursor chemicals and to smuggling routes to the US – were present in Mexi-
co, Colombia, and China. The profits and relatively low threat associated with 
ecstasy production and trafficking could encourage these groups to enter the 
market. Mexican groups were probably the greater threat because of their 
experience in producing and distributing amphetamine and methamphetamine 
(NDIC, 2000). However, there is still little evidence of Colombians and 
                                                 
15  Trouw, 23 February 2001. 
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Mexicans entering the ecstasy market on a large scale, while Chinese ecstasy 
production and trafficking groups, in and outside the People’s Republic, are 
increasingly involved. 
 Chinese crime groups have exceptional possibilities on the ecstasy market. 
Apart from access to essential precursors and trained chemists in China, there are 
connections with experienced producers in the Netherlands and distribution 
possibilities through Chinese communities abroad. Chinese groups are 
cooperating with Dutch groups supplying the precursors PMK and BMK for 
ecstasy and amphetamine production in the Netherlands and exporting pills.16 
The Amsterdam police noticed Chinese groups in the ecstasy business already in 
1997.17 A survey of organised crime in the Netherlands showed a mainly 
Chinese organisation (some with Dutch nationality), trafficking heroin from 
South-East Asia, diverging precursors, and producing and trafficking ecstasy and 
amphetamines (Kleemans et al., 2002). In 2003 a Dutch-Chinese national was 
arrested who had been importing precursors and might have been involved with 
eight ecstasy labs in the Netherlands.18 
 Nationals of East and South-East Asia are often involved in producing and 
trafficking in third countries with substantive Asian communities such as Canada 
and Australia. DEA offices throughout South-East Asia have reported an 
increase in ecstasy trafficking throughout the region, including the discovery of 
significant MDMA labs in China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia and, most 
notably, in Indonesia. The increasing demand for ecstasy and the availability of 
precursor chemicals from China and Vietnam – a major producer of sassafras 
oil19– support the premise that large-scale MDMA manufacturing in South-East 
Asia is rising. The Chinese kingpin in Canada was linked to the Big Circle Boys 
gang, a Triad-like organisation. Some ecstasy traffickers in China are linked 
directly to the US. Australian police also noted an increase in ecstasy imports 
with links to Triad groups from South-East Asia.20 Ethnic Chinese were invol-
                                                 
16  In 2001, ethnic Chinese were involved in shipping 14.000 litres of BMK and 3.000 of PMK 
to a lab in Limburg through the port of Rotterdam. (Rotterdams Dagblad, 11 January 2002 
and 10 April 2002). Established Dutch groups are importing precursors from China. A finan-
cial adviser to one of the major Dutch hash entrepreneurs of the 1990s was supplying precur-
sors from China to five ecstasy laboratories (Het Parool, 17 March 2001). 
17  Het Parool, 22 February 1997. 
18  BN/DeStem, 4 June 2003. In a court case in the Netherlands the public prosecutor alleged 
that a Dutch based Chinese laboratory operator in the Netherlands was instructing two Chi-
nese citizens to produce ecstasy for a fee of € 175.000 per person. Rotterdams Dagblad, 11 
April 2003. 
19  In Vietnam sassafras oil is illicitly produced and trafficked. Despite the government’s 1999 
export ban of sassafras oil, DEA information indicates that illegal harvesting of oil from trees is 
continuing. In 2002, Vietnamese companies were involved in sassafras oil production in Laos 
and Cambodia. Much of the illegal sassafras oil is bound for Europe. PMK is also produced in 
Vietnam (DEA, 2003). 
20  Sydney Morning Herald, 18 October 2001.  
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ved in a 340 kilogram MDMA shipment to Sydney, hidden in a container that 
originated in the Netherlands.21  
 A Dutch-Chinese operator who had been running the ecstasy laboratories in 
Indonesia that were seized in April 2002 had connections to Chinese in Malaysia 
and Hong Kong for the import of the PMK. Intelligence indicated that the 
laboratory had been in operation for about three years, processing about 3,5 
metric tons of PMK, sufficient for, cautiously estimated, some 43.750.000 pills. 
Additional investigations of the DEA indicated widespread distribution of these 
Indonesian produced tablets in the US, Australia, Burma, China, and else-
where.22 According to the UNODC, this case confirmed the growing coopera-
tion between criminals in the region (UNODC, 2003b). 
 Nine ecstasy labs were seized in 2001, among them only two that were 
classified as small-scale or ‘kitchen’ laboratories. Jakarta’s Police Narcotics 
Division chief Carlo Tewu remarked that many of the ecstasy pills were 
produced locally.23 The seizure of the large-scale unit in 2002 seems to have 
given rise to a cottage industry, often producing fake pills. According to Tewu: 
“Many of the ecstasy producers we arrested recently are not part of larger 
syndicates . . . They are freelancers . . . entrepreneurs who see potential in the 
ecstasy business while the larger ones are not running. . . it’s not mass 
production.”24 Nevertheless, occasional large-scale labs are still seized. 
 Other South-East Asian countries are also involved in ecstasy manufacturing 
often with a connection to Chinese nationals. An ecstasy-tabletting lab was 
seized in Thailand in 1999. Three Chinese citizens were arrested with 
connections to the Netherlands and Indonesia (USD 1999, 2000). There are 
unconfirmed reports that traffickers associated with the Burma-based United Wa 
State Army (UWSA), already involved in large-scale methamphetamine 
production, were producing ecstasy as well (INCB 2000, 2001; INCSR 2002, 
2003). According to the Bangkok Post, “a naturalised Dutch Chinese chemist … 
has spent nearly two years in Wa laboratories experimenting with the initial 
production and training local chemists.”25 Apparently, the Wa succeeded in 
upgrading their ecstasy to European standards. 
 
 
The ecstasy industry in the Netherlands 
 
After this excursion through the labyrinth of global ecstasy production figures it 
becomes clear that, although the Netherlands and to a lesser extent Northern 
                                                 
21  Australian Associated Press, 21 June 2004; Sydney Morning Herald, 22 June 2004. 
22  DEA Microgram Bulletin, January 2003.  
23  The Jakarta Post, 27 December 2001. 
24  Laksamana.net, 24 August 2002, quoting the The Straits Times from Singapore. 
25  According to unidentified security and narcotic officials (The Bangkok Post, 19 October 
1998). 
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Belgium are important production countries, their importance might be less than 
is generally assumed, or otherwise declining. According to a study that was com-
missioned by the DNRI, the Dutch ecstasy industry supplies approximately 78-
131 million pills annually worldwide (7-13 million for the domestic Dutch 
market, 43-73 million pills for the EU market, and 28-48 million pills to the rest 
of the world) of a calculated global demand of 155-310 million. Based on the 
consumed share of pills (on average 19 million are intercepted annually), the 65-
99 million pills that are not intercepted would amount to 32-42% of the global 
demand supplied by Dutch production (Van der Heijden, 2003).26 That is still a 
considerable amount and maintains the Netherlands at the top of the list of 
ecstasy producers.  
 Though the Netherlands seems to have lost some of its earlier leading 
position and original advantages, this will probably only lead to the displacement 
of laboratories to other regions abroad. Nonetheless, according to USD 
officials, the easy availability from local criminal groups and low prices of ecstasy 
in the Netherlands, as well as the connections to experienced trafficking 
organisations, are not always incentives for foreign ecstasy traffickers to set up 
their own production facilities (Blickman et al., 2003). On the other hand, 
more and more laboratories have been discovered outside the Netherlands 
(USD, 2002).27  
 According to the USD and Europol, Belgium, Germany and increasingly 
Poland are becoming more important production countries in Europe. Other 
countries in Eastern Europe also seem to emerge as producers. Outside Europe, 
the Dutch position is ‘challenged’ by increased production in China, South-East 
Asia and the Pacific, often with a link to Chinese crime networks and 
sometimes, Dutch expertise. North America seems to have maintained its own 
level of production. Nevertheless, supply in the Netherlands seems to be 
abundant and wholesale and retail prices dwindling (Korf, Nabben & Benschop, 
2001; 2002).28 The market in Amsterdam (allegedly one of the world’s major 
international marketplaces) is saturated and changing from a sellers market into a 
buyers market. Retail prices in Belgium and Germany are reaching the low price 
level of the Netherlands (Blickman et al. 2003). A restructuring of the global 
                                                 
26  The calculations were based on prevalence data combined with use patterns and analysis of 
chemical waste from ecstasy labs and illegal waste dumps. The lower estimate for global de-
mand than used in paragraph 2.1 is because the DNRI figures are based on the estimate in the 
2003 Global Illicit Drug Trends of 7.74 million users. 
27  Het Parool, 15 March 2002. The fact that Dutch citizens appear to be involved in ecstasy 
production abroad may also have to do with the assistance of the USD in dismantling labora-
tories across the border. 
28  According to an observer with contacts in the ecstasy scene in the south of the country and 
the Randstad the “business is on its beam ends”. At the wholesale level ecstasy pills go for € 0,45 
or € 0,90, while they used to do € 2,25 or € 2,75. “If you might sell them at all, because stocks are 
everywhere.” (BN/DeStem, January 4, 2001. 
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ecstasy market seems to be taking place with more regional producers supplying 
their adjacent regional markets. 
 Why Dutch groups have gained and maintained prominence on the global 
ecstasy market since the late 1980s is still not clarified completely. Assuming that 
Dutch criminals are no more entrepreneurial than those of other nationalities, a 
combination of structural and accidental factors has plausibly contributed to a 
(probably momentary) advantage and predominance in the illicit ecstasy. None 
of these factors are unique for the Netherlands, but the combination at the right 
time created and reinforced a dynamic that led to a much earlier and quicker 
development than anywhere else.  
 
 
The availability of ‘routine socio-economic activities’ 
 
The natural geographic position of the Netherlands has contributed to make it 
the distribution centre of (licit and illicit) goods inside Europe and to the rest of 
the world, and created a longstanding tradition as a trading and industrial nation. 
Excellent transport connections and several vital transport hubs along 
international trade routes offer traffickers great possibilities for moving illegal 
goods (Fijnaut et al., 1996). Rotterdam is the second biggest seaport in the world 
(and an important transit point for chemical products) and Amsterdam ranks 
fifth. Yet another major port lies nearby in Antwerp in the north of Belgium. All 
three are smuggling centres for PMK, hidden in large shipments of chemicals 
from China (Kleemans et al., 2002).  
 Schiphol International Airport near Amsterdam is a major hub and ranks 
fourth in Europe, behind London, Paris, and Frankfurt. These transport hubs are 
by nature extremely difficult to control due to the requirement of cargo rapid 
processing. In addition, there is an extensive logistics sector that redistributes 
goods overland throughout Europe via a large fleet of trucks. The Netherlands 
has a significant chemical production and trade sector with about 2.400 
companies. Tablet machines and laboratory equipment are not under a licensing 
system. Illegal use of chemicals makes up only a small percentage of licit use and 
too many controls would not be in industry’s interest. 
 Ecstasy producers set up front companies, such as paint factories or chemical 
waste removal companies, to acquire the necessary equipment and chemicals (or 
dispose of chemical by-products). The black market in precursors has become 
very lucrative because of administrative and police controls. Precursors are now 
purchased from chemical companies abroad: in Eastern Europe (sometimes co-
owned by criminal groups) and China. Some producers have shifted to 
manufacturing their own precursors with chemicals or pre-precursors not sche-
duled under the law (Houben, 1996). Producers and traffickers also use 
employees of legal companies. Chemists who worked in large chemical 
companies have helped mediate the supply of chemicals, and the contacts of one 
chemist with Chinese chemical producers were used. Another way of disguising 
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activities is to invest in a moribund bonafide company and force it to perform 
supporting services (Kleemans et al., 1998).  
This range of so-called ‘routine socio-economic activities’ contributed to the 
Dutch emergence as an illicit distribution centre for all kinds of drugs (Farrell, 
1998) even before ecstasy became a popular drug.29 The licit economic structure 
is tapped by criminal entrepreneurs and over the last 25 years a semi-licit grey 
infrastructure has developed that uses the facilities of the licit economic for the 
illicit one.  
The city of Amsterdam developed as an international marketplace for drug 
transactions (Huisman et al, 2003). With every kind of drug smuggling present it 
functions as an ‘an organisational centre, a central brokerage point and a safe haven” and 
a meeting point for potential partners, according to a DEA report of June 2000 
and Zaitch (2002, p. 252).30 The Netherlands is probably one of the most 
important drug trafficking and transiting area in Europe, according to the DEA 
and the British National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) (2002). The 
ecstasy business simply tagged along and Amsterdam became the ‘logistical 
centre’ for the ecstasy business. Because of the large number of different 
nationalities in the city, foreign export organisations have rather easy access to 
suppliers. Along with the goods, Amsterdam offers the necessary human 
resources, which makes it a ‘full service’ market. (Huisman et al., 2003) and the 
above-mentioned meeting point. 
Amsterdam is the centre of ‘organised crime’ in the Netherlands. The USD 
considers the local crime scene (mainly native Dutch at its top level) one of the 
world’s main ecstasy producers. USD officials say 70% of their ecstasy investi-
gations nationwide are linked with the Amsterdam area and production is 
shifting more and more to the capital and the adjacent region from the 
traditional southern provinces. International transactions, which are now the 
main outlet for the industry, are basically concentrated in the city (Blickman et 
al., 2003). The USD discovered an increase in so-called ‘cocktail’ drug transports 
(USD, 2002: 16), indicating the existence of specialised trafficking organisations 
stockpiling several kinds of drugs for further cross-border distribution, mainly 
the UK.  
 For those familiar with the drug business, it is a simple matter to find the 
contacts needed to set up a trafficking line. Pills need not even be physically 
available when conducting business. During an investigation into an Israeli traf-
ficking network, the main organiser acted as a broker arranging supply for 
                                                 
29  Farrell noted a connection between the low prices for illicit drugs in the Netherlands and the 
importation of these substances that could be related to the volume of licit international trade. 
The main principle behind the theory of ‘routine socio-economic activities’ is that crime starts 
in areas where there are potentially motivated perpetrators and suitable targets while proper 
surveillance is lacking. Under these circumstances the routine activities of potential criminals 
offer opportunities for crime. From this theory one can deduce that the smuggling of illegal 
goods ‘tags along’ with the trade in legal goods (Van der Heijden, 2001). 
30  The Guardian, 29 August 2000. 
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different trafficking operations and an intermediate between Dutch producers 
and clients based in the US, Canada and Australia. He basically called around the 
world with his six or seven GSM phones and likely never even saw the pills. 
“We see international traffickers fly in, check in to one of the top luxury hotels, 
make their deals and then leave,” says an Amsterdam criminal investigator 
(Blickman et al., 2003). Pills are sometimes produced and delivered ‘on request’. 
“This can take place at remarkable speed. Traffickers book a night in the Hilton 
and order pills in the evening which are subsequently produced and ready to be 
picked up the next morning after breakfast.”31 This pattern is not found only at 
the wholesale level. A police officer gave the example of a US citizen who tried 
to buy just 7.000 pills. 
 
 
The characteristics of organised crime in the Netherlands 
 
Organised crime in the Netherlands is mainly composed of frequently 
overlapping networks and is characterised by its entrepreneurial features, rather 
than by hierarchical or territorial bound structures. Given the nature of the illicit 
commodities and their price structure, it is hardly surprising that most of the 
trafficking implies cross-border trading movements. The exception may be the 
homegrown cannabis and stimulants, though a substantial part of these products 
find their outlet abroad as well (Van Duyne et al., 1990, Van Duyne, 1995; 
Fijnaut et al., 1996; Klerks, 2000; Kleemans et al, 2002). The traditional 
perception of organised crime had already been questioned based on field 
research into the local drug market in Amsterdam in the early 1990s (Korf & 
Verbraeck, 1993) and the first research projects on crime-entrepreneurs in the 
Netherlands (Van Duyne et al., 1990; Van Duyne, 1995). Cannabis and cocaine 
importing organisations and laboratories for amphetamines and ecstasy were not 
smooth running, long-term operations. Each import and production operation 
was a project in itself, which could function for some time (even years) within a 
set framework by the same people; in general they were temporary joint 
ventures.  
 As could be expected from previous research (Van Duyne et al., 1990), a 
much more diverse picture emerged: one of extended fluid networks of a mul-
titude of individuals, often formed into ‘cliques’ or groups, either connected by 
means of loose or close relationships or with the capacity to establish those kinds 
of relationships rather easily if necessary through ‘friend of friends’. Within those 
networks are ‘nodes’ and persons with more power than others. Many of these 
relationships are not very stable. Specific interests of groups and personalities of 
bosses can clash and lead to dissolving the cooperation or even violent conflicts. 
New ‘action-sets’ will arise to ‘do the job’ by means of shared investments or 
                                                 
31  Interview with a drug expert on the Rotterdam police force in Rotterdams Dagblad, 8 De-
cember 2000. 
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forming longer-term coalitions (Fijnaut et al., 1996: 55-56). Criminal 
cooperation is often directed towards gaining reciprocal benefits or resolving 
mutual problems. Especially at the production level, where the supply of raw 
materials and production tools are a problem, groups pool resources and contacts 
to obtain precursors and formulas. Semi-manufactured products are also 
exchanged. This way ‘buffers’ are created to counter the uneven supply of 
precursors. The synthetic drug market is a ‘free market’, according to USD 
officials. Anyone can move in with the right contacts. 
 One case description shows the level of cooperation and exchange at the 
production and ‘first hand’ distribution (i.e. first buyer from producer) levels. 
The case involved a group operating in the southern part of the Netherlands. 
Five individuals in this group were involved in synthetic drug production. They 
closely collaborated with about six other Dutch criminal groups also involved in 
producing and trafficking synthetic drugs, but who were implicated in other cri-
minal activities as well. Cooperation included supplying precursors, means of 
production and end products as well as exchanging staff and expertise. Various 
chemists worked for several groups. A chemistry professor taught one group to 
produce ecstasy while a lawyer provided another group with the formula for 
ecstasy he had found in court files. Some of the groups and individuals were 
large-scale suppliers of precursors and production equipment bought at ordinary 
chemical businesses, second-hand markets or through front stores in Eastern 
Europe. Deliveries were made from the southern provinces of Limburg and 
Brabant and the Amsterdam area. Some groups were also involved in setting up 
labs in Eastern Europe. One of the groups used a mobile lab in a steel container 
on a truck. Another group operated a very sophisticated laboratory built partly 
underground. Amphetamines were smuggled to Scandinavia, the UK, and 
Amsterdam markets. Ecstasy was mainly distributed to Amsterdam and the UK, 
but also Italy and Spain. When one group had a shortage, they bought from 
another, and batches of amphetamine were exchanged for ecstasy (Houben, 
1996). 
 
 
Historical advantages 
 
These patterns of organised crime activities and the existence of a broad set of 
beneficial ‘routine socio-economic activities’ in the legitimate economy were 
some of the preconditions for the emergence of a very dynamic and flexible 
illicit industry in the Netherlands in the late 1980 when ecstasy became a 
popular drug and part of new youth culture. Two historical advantages proved 
to be very beneficial. First, prior to the emergence of ecstasy as a popular drug, 
local criminal groups in the southern provinces of Limburg and North-Brabant, 
on the other side of the border in Belgium, had established a primary role in 
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producing and trafficking amphetamines to Scandinavia (where amphetamines 
were very popular),32 the UK and Germany in the 1960s and 1970s. These 
southern producers traditionally had ties with large-scale hashish traffickers in the 
west of the country in the Randstad33. These groups had managed to control a 
significant segment of international hashish trafficking during the 1980s (Fijnaut 
1996: 19ff).  
 Consequently, expertise in production and trafficking were available. 
According to one USD official, the amphetamine producers were a rather small 
sector at the time (Husken & Vuijst, 2002). Law enforcement identified four 
major professional amphetamine laboratories in the 1980s: three in the south of 
the Netherlands and one in the west. The names of those ‘amphetamine 
pioneers’ recur in a series of ecstasy investigation. One of the sons of such an 
amphetamine pioneer also entered the ecstasy business. The southern ampheta-
mine producers did not pioneer ecstasy production but learned quickly when 
ecstasy became popular (Husken & Vuijst, 2002). 
 Second, the Netherlands and Belgium were among the first countries where 
the new youth culture developed. Ecstasy came to the Netherlands in the 1980s 
through alternative circles and trend-setting globetrotters who had their first 
experiences in Goa or Ibiza and the subsequent ‘summer of love’ in the United 
Kingdom (Adelaars, 1991). The first dealers and producers were of the 
‘aficionado-type’, people who used ecstasy themselves and sold to friends and ac-
quaintances. The real expansion came in the late summer of 1988 when the first 
large scale house parties were organised in Amsterdam. People from this scene 
set up the first small laboratories in the Netherlands. There were virtually no 
links to the more traditional underworld. Some of the organisers of these house 
parties kept ecstasy distribution to them; either to launder their profits or ensure 
good quality ecstasy was available. Some of the house-scenes fell apart in those 
days because of bad quality pills (Korf & Verbraeck, 1993). Amsterdam also 
became one of the distribution centres for the rest of Europe. Pills were 
smuggled from Amsterdam to London and Ibiza, which was also supplied from 
Spain (Mareso et al., 2004).  
 Until 1988 and 1989 most ecstasy tablets in trend setting Amsterdam were 
still imported. In 1989, ecstasy in pills and powder came from Spain. Some 
MDMA was imported from the US in powder and tabletted in the Netherlands, 
                                                 
32  According to a Dutch detective this was furthered by coincidence: a Dutch criminal from 
Limburg spent some time in a Swedish prison and established contacts for an enduring outlet 
for amphetamine during the 1970s. After his relieve he became for two decades the prime ex-
porter of that product from Limburg. 
33  The Netherlands is a densely populated country of towns. However, none of the main cities, 
such as the financial centre Amsterdam, the government centre of The Hague and the eco-
nomic hub of Rotterdam, Europe’s largest seaport, has more than a million residents. These 
key national centres are concentrated in the western part of the country no more than an hour 
apart by train or car. This metropolitan area is often referred to as one single metropolitan 
area, the Randstad. 
THE ORGANISED CRIME ECONOMY; MANAGING CRIME MARKETS IN EUROPE 
 
 
 
250 
and there was also a small supply of powder, capsules and badly fabricated, 
crumbly pills from small domestic laboratories. In the spring of 1989, most 
ecstasy pills were so-called ‘Stanleys’ manufactured on a large scale by the 
German chemical company Imhausen just before its prohibition. That year, the 
police raided a ‘stash house’ with 900.000 Imhausen pills. They apparently did 
not manage to seize them all since ‘Stanleys’ were sold up until the summer of 
1990 (Adelaars, 1991; Korf & Verbraeck, 1993; Van Duyne, 1995). When 
ecstasy was put on the list of drugs with ‘unacceptable risks’ in the Dutch 
Opium Act in November 1988, observers at the time stated that ‘bonafide’ 
ecstasy producers, who were part of the rave culture at the time, increasingly left 
the market. Some of the initial dealers retreated from the open circuit of 
discotheques. The traditional amphetamine producers and experienced hash 
traffickers increasingly filled the gap. 
 The first professionally manufactured pills from illegal laboratories appeared 
on the Amsterdam market in the spring of 1990, according to observers at the 
time. From the summer of 1989 until the summer of 1990, real ecstasy was 
difficult to find. By the end of 1991, the supply of good quality pills was no 
longer a problem (Korf & Verbraeck, 1993). 
 In February 1992, a major ecstasy production and trafficking organisation was 
dismantled. Leaders of this group belonged to the established underworld of 
Dutch criminal organisations in Amsterdam and Rotterdam that had become 
major players in national and international hashish trafficking in the 1980s. The 
group owned laboratories, imported precursors from Belgium and ran export 
trafficking lines, mainly to the UK. It even ran a counter-surveillance operation 
to check on police activities. It had produced millions of pills within its ten 
months of operation and had an estimated business volume of € 135 million, 
according to forensic experts. Profits were estimated at € 33 million but in the 
end only some € 7 million were invested in the licit economy (Van Duyne, 
1995, 1997; Fijnaut et al., 1996). One of the key organisers was known as the 
‘ecstasy professor’ because he had apparently revolutionised the production 
process. He had learned the tricks of the trade from the southern ‘amphetamine 
cookers’ (Husken & Vuijst, 2002). He used to organise hashish transports with 
the established hash entrepreneurs of the 1980s, a clear indication of the 
‘traditional’ underworld involvement.  
 According to a police report, by the mid-1990s most producers were 
professionally in the business for the money (Houben, 1996). The bottleneck in 
the business was and still is the supply of hard-to-get precursors, in particular 
PMK. In July 1995 the law on ‘Prevention of Abuse of Chemicals’34 came into 
force. The law tightened controls of the trade in materials under a licensing 
                                                 
34  Wet voorkoming misbruik chemicaliën (WVMC). Even before the new law, precursor con-
trols in the Netherlands were stricter than abroad because of the country’s history as an am-
phetamine producer. Chemical companies required end-user certificates and would report 
‘suspicious transactions’ (Korf & Verbraeck, 1993: 175). 
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system. To obtain precursors, traditional amphetamine producers had the 
advantage of previous experience in obtaining the main precursor for amphe-
tamine, BMK, which is also a controlled substance. Ecstasy producers either 
needed contacts with the chemical industry or with companies abroad where 
controls were less strict or with the black market. The result was that small 
independent producers were even more marginalized, and the business became 
monopolised by big ecstasy producers with ties to ‘organised crime’ that were 
able to procure the required chemicals illegally.35 Another reason for the appa-
rent dominance of large-scale producers may be that they are simply more 
competitive. They lead the market because they are able to produce higher 
quantities at a cheaper price. Small laboratories have no substantial part of the 
market because they cannot produce in bulk. 
 The production and distribution chain is sometimes divided according to 
certain stages of the process (acquisition of precursors, production of ecstasy 
powder, tabletting, distribution, disposal of chemical waste by-products). Some 
of the groups involved in a particular stage do not necessarily know other parts 
of the organisation (Fijnaut, 1996; Houben, 1996; Kleemans et al. 1998). 
Synthesis often takes place at a different site than where the chemicals are 
processed, mixed or tabletted. Nonetheless, there are still also small groups of 
two or three people who manage the whole production process and initial 
distribution stage. According to one mid-level dealer, large producers with ties 
to organised crime presently have a monopoly, providing 90% of the Dutch 
domestic market and exporting some 80-90% of their production. Original small 
producers who manufactured small amounts for their own networks have been 
pushed out of the market, mainly because intensified precursor controls reduced 
the availability of raw materials. One informant stated that in the old days a few 
‘hobbyists’ might produce a few kilos of MDMA that were tabletted in a few 
runs. Nowadays, big producers deliver pills from 100 kilos of MDMA in just 
one run. (Blickman et al., 2003) 
 Most law enforcement officials agree there is a small, invisible group at the 
top that might finance and outsource synthetic drug operations. This group 
includes the ‘old guard’ of hashish entrepreneurs that is currently more involved 
in money laundering and real estate transactions. Groups that produce and distri-
bute synthetic drugs depend on them for financial backing, the import of 
precursors and/or export of pills (Fijnaut et al., 1996). According to law enforce-
ment officials involved in setting up the USD, some ten ‘top’ criminals financed 
the production of synthetic drugs in the Netherlands in 1996. They put up the 
money (sometimes hundreds of thousand of euros) to set up laboratories and 
collect millions in profits. These top levels sometimes work together, pooling 
their resources, trafficking lines and contacts. Other financiers were located in 
Spain and the United Kingdom. Together they dominated the European market 
in synthetic drugs. One USD officer reluctantly guesstimated there were appro-
                                                 
35  Interview with mid-level dealer, September 2002.  
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ximately 60 to 65 groups in the Netherlands with a total of about 500 people 
involved in ecstasy production and distribution on different levels. Another 
police officer estimated that the top level of the ecstasy business was in the hands 
of 80 or 90 people. Police continually run into the same people during 
investigations. Nowadays, most are around 40 years old and find it is difficult to 
get out. Experienced individuals are frequently dragged back in again (Blickman 
et al., 2003). 
 However, new individuals sometimes suddenly appear, young people in their 
mid-20s who in a short period of time succeed in creating new networks and 
alliances with dealers and production organisations. Thus the top level of the 
ecstasy industry seems to be very dynamic and flexible and composed of fairly 
loose coalitions involving established criminals in the Randstad and southern 
provinces of Brabant and Limburg. From time to time disputes result in lethal 
violence. Increased law enforcement against major ecstasy groups has had some 
success. But new groups quickly fill the gaps. Young adventurers step in where 
the older guard has been arrested or retired, but they do not have the same 
leadership capacities. The result is more tension in the milieu and violent 
liquidations, and probably also one of the reasons that production moves from 
the south to the western part of the country.36 These characteristics at the upper 
level are a barrier for some to move up. Two mid-level dealers that were 
interviewed started as retailers and moved up to the mid-level (10.000 pills) but 
said they did not want to move up to the wholesale level since ‘organised crime’ 
is involved and the business would no longer be ‘relaxed’ because too much 
money is involved.37 One mid-level dealer with some experience in the under-
world through relatives said however the really ‘big guys’ are not problematic 
types, but the level just below (Blickman et al., 2003). 
 
 
Specific law enforcement actions 
 
Paradoxically, Dutch police unwillingly promoted ecstasy production in the 
early mid-1990s. In an attempt to bring down criminal organisations involved in 
ecstasy production, some prosecutors and criminal intelligence officers allowed 
an undercover agent to infiltrate several organisations of ecstasy producers. This 
operation was part of a desperate attempt to crack down on drug trafficking 
networks after Dutch law enforcement authorities discovered in the mid 1980s 
that in the previous decade some rather large international hashish trafficking 
organisations had developed. At the time, these criminal organisations had also 
become involved in ecstasy production and trafficking. Initially, the cure proved 
                                                 
36  BN/DeStem, 22 March 2003. 
37  Another dealer interviewed in the mid-1990s also said he did not want to know wholesale 
dealers and producers because he was afraid of the very rough environment of producers 
(Houben, 1996). 
The ecstasy industry in the Netherlands in a global perspective 
 
 
 
253 
to be worse than the disease. Irregularities led to the biggest law enforcement 
crisis ever in the Netherlands. In their eagerness to get the ‘real’ kingpins, some 
prosecutors and detectives ignored the procedural code carried out controversial 
investigation techniques (involving criminal undercovers, large-scale uncontrol-
led drug deliveries, illegal phone taps, clandestine house searches, etc.).38 The use 
of undercover agents to incite people into trafficking is not allowed by Dutch 
law. A way to evade this constraint was to resort to long-term infiltration by a 
criminal informant, allowing criminal organisations to traffic dozens of tonnes of 
cannabis, sometimes with active support of the detective team. This support in 
the traffic was deemed necessary for enabling the criminal undercover to obtain 
trust from the top echelon. In the end it became unclear who was leading the 
operations: the police or the criminals. 
 Several major ecstasy transports to the UK were allowed to pass. More 
controversial was that in the beginning 1990s, criminal intelligence officers 
allowed a criminal undercover – a fairly small-time criminal known as The 
Snail39 – to infiltrate several organisations of ecstasy producers. First, he learned 
the tricks of the trade from one of the traditional southern amphetamine 
cookers. When that man was arrested, The Snail instructed others how to 
produce ecstasy, supplied precursors and laboratory equipment, even built 
laboratory himself (Husken 2000; Husken & Vuijst, 2002). The whole operation 
eventually backfired when the controversial investigation methods were 
denounced. Most organisations targeted by The Snail were initially dismantled 
but in subsequent court cases against some of the southern ‘ecstasy barons’ the 
controversial investigation methods were judged illegal and several of the 
ecstasy-gang leaders had to be released.40 The actions of the undercover helped 
to spread expertise on ecstasy production among criminal groups. Some of the 
major ecstasy producers in Limburg are still at large and ecstasy production 
expanded almost to the point of market saturation. 
 
 
Multiplier effect 
 
In a report on organised crime in the Netherlands, the Scientific Research and 
Documentation Centre (WODC) of the Ministry of Justice suggests an explanat-
ion for the rise of the ecstasy business in the Netherlands, specifically at its origin 
in the southern provinces. The WODC researchers point to a phenomenon 
from sociological research on the ‘social structure of entrepreneurial activity’: i.e. 
                                                 
38  According to observers, diplomatic and operational pressures from the US had led to the 
acceptance of these so-called pro-active policing methods in the Netherlands (Klerks, 2000). 
39  He got this nickname because he was slow to respond when propositions were made. He first 
had to consult his ‘runners’ at the Criminal Intelligence Division. 
40   De Limburger, 27 April 2001; 12 May 2001. Two of them recently were awarded € 45.000 in 
indemnity, see: De Limburger, 8 July 2003. 
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the importance of the existence of other, similar enterprises in the emergence of 
a new venture. In such an environment, new ventures develop because they 
have more chances of acquiring the necessary know-how, plus the essential 
social relations to expand and the basic confidence to start up an enterprise. 
Personal contacts and geographical proximity are essential (Kleemans et al., 2002: 
43).  
 In the early 1990s, the ecstasy market was still relatively new and open. 
Along with large-scale producers and wholesalers, a host of middle-size and 
small-scale amateur enterprises operated who were sometimes as dangerous to 
themselves as their direct environment: incidents such as exploding stills, leaked 
acid and ammonia emissions resulted in small environmental tragedies and the 
premature closure of laboratories which looked more like primitive, unhealthy 
sculleries than professional factories (Van Duyne, 1996). Apparently, ecstasy pro-
duction proliferated. WODC researchers point to a phenomenon which they 
describe as the ‘snowball effect’: individuals involved with criminal coalitions 
eventually become more and more independent from other people (and 
resources such as money, expertise and contacts) and start up their own venture. 
When they do so they involve new individuals from their own social 
environment and the process repeats itself in constant process of ‘cell partition’. 
(Kleemans et al., 1998: 55). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The Netherlands’ importance as major ecstasy producer is less than is generally 
assumed, or otherwise it is loosing its predominant position. There is no basis for 
the DEA’s claim that it is supplying 80% of the world market, and also not 80% 
of the US market. Source for supply of ecstasy are much more varied, and that 
diversity of sources is growing.  
 Statistics are still flawed, and suffer from a wrong line of approach. Instead of 
looking at the global ecstasy industry on a national basis it makes more sense to 
research the networks that are involved. No single nation or national 
organisation controls the industry. Organisations producing or trafficking ecstasy, 
sometimes composed of several nationalities, are links in cross-border 
multinational chains. National borders loose their importance as criminal 
networks involved in the ecstasy industry organise their supply internationally. 
While at a certain moment the Netherlands provided a set of beneficial 
conditions for the development of an illicit ecstasy industry, a different set of 
conditions could favour the development of production facilities and trafficking 
lines elsewhere. Without insight in the functioning of criminal networks 
involved in the illicit ecstasy industry it is not possible to understand the 
functioning of the market. 
 In contrast with traditional plant-based drugs, the illicit ecstasy industry is not 
bound to specific cultivation areas. Because the industry is very dynamic and 
The ecstasy industry in the Netherlands in a global perspective 
 
 
 
255 
flexible, it will adapt quickly to law enforcement actions, changes in drug 
consumption fashions and the resulting market transformations. There are signs 
that networks of Chinese nationals in different countries worldwide are 
acquiring a position on the international ecstasy market, while in Eastern Europe 
conditions also seem to offer opportunities. Nevertheless, the potentially 
favourable sets of conditions are difficult to predict as they depend on several 
factors occurring at the right moment in time. 
 Looking at the criminal networks would also avoid the pinpointing of 
specific countries as the source of global supply, based on flawed statistics and 
presumptions that often are more the result of political bias about general drug 
control policies of a specific nation rather than on reliable data. 
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Drugs and organised crime in Bulgaria 
Drugs and organised crime in Bulgaria 
Tihomir Bezlov1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Although Bulgaria is situated on the heroin route to Western Europe, prior to 
the collapse of the Soviet Bloc in 1990, no Bulgarians used heroin,2 or 
participated in drug trafficking, or were involved in organised crime. However, 
the end of the communist regime marked the beginning of a heroin epidemic 
and the emergence of the first organised criminal structures. At first, emerging 
Bulgarian organised crime took no interest in the domestic drug market due to 
its small size.3 Interest mainly focused on the huge opportunities involved in 
smuggling consumer goods,4 in protection and insurance racketeering (especially 
in relation to automobiles and commercial outlets) and in the manufacture of 
pirate CDs (CSD, 2002; CSD, 2004). 
 By the mid 1990s Bulgarian organised crime was controlled almost 
exclusively by two big ‘insurance companies’ that had nationwide reach and had 
infiltrated all the major institutions of government (CSD, 2004).5 As money 
laundering was in its infancy (petrol stations were a favourite then), initial 
‘investments’ went into typical criminal areas – drugs, gambling and prostitution. 
These criminal activities had to be run under tight control and required 
discipline and central command. As a result, the limited number of large crime 
groups were organised as hierarchical structures – with a small number of bosses 
at the top taking all the major decisions – resembling the model described by 
Cressey (1969). The centralised structures typical of legal corporate insurance 
businesses became the blueprint for the criminal organisations’ businesses. These 
differ from the floating criminal-network relationships frequently found by 
Western researchers (Reuter and Haaga, 1989; Morselli, 2001). 
                                                 
1  Tihomir Bezlov is Senior Analyst at the Center for the Study of  Democracy, Sofia, Bulgaria.  
2  Drug addicts were mainly people who used opiates designed for medical purposes, and accord-
ing to interviews carried out before 1990 very few had even seen heroin. It has been suggested 
that the credit for this is to be given principally to the efforts of the communist special services 
(see for more detail CSD, 2003). 
3  According to data of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Interior, the number of opiate 
users was between 1,300 and 1,500 in 1990. 
4  Massive as the opportunities already were to exploit the lack of consumer goods in an ex-
socialist country, the Yugoslav embargo increased them by several orders of magnitude. 
5  ‘Insurance’ rackets were initially the preserve of private security companies. At the end of 
1994, the government introduced a system of licenses. As most of the companies functioned 
illegally and could not be licensed, they moved into the insurance business. in this way they 
continued to blackmail businesses and citizens into buying their “services” – this time under 
the label of ‘insurance’, rather than ‘protection’.  
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The most lucrative line of development, however, became commercial 
involvement in the networks transporting and distributing heroin in Western 
Europe. At the same time the domestic drugs market had already become fairly 
sizeable and by the late 1990s the Bulgarian organised crime groups had it firmly 
under their control. Research provided evidence that in the large cities after 
2001, the market for drugs except marijuana was almost completely 
monopolised by the organised crime groups (CSD, 2003). In these respects, 
during the period of our research, from 2001 to 2004, the characteristics of the 
Bulgarian drug market appear to have diverged from what studies have shown to 
be the characteristics of the US and West European markets (Block, 1979; 
Reuter 1983; Paoli, 2002; Van Duyne and Levi, 2005). 
 A territorial organisation developed. Big cities were divided into areas where 
retail dealers reported to a wholesaler, with any ‘independent’ dealer that might 
appear being promptly ousted. Corrupt police officers, prosecutors and judges 
often provided immunity for individuals involved in such drug trade networks. 
The classic sign that the drugs market was being monopolised was the fact that 
prices in Bulgaria continued to grow while the quality of the drugs worsened. 
Elsewhere in Europe the price of drugs, with the exception of marijuana, tended 
to go down. Thus, unlike other illegal activities, such as the smuggling of 
consumer goods, the organisation of prostitution or the theft of automobiles, 
where in the late 1990s organised crime developed network types of 
organisation, the drugs market continued to develop as a typical hierarchy. 
 This chapter aims to provide a schematic review of the participation of 
Bulgarian organised crime groups in the domestic drugs market and in drug 
trafficking within Bulgaria. Regrettably, Bulgaria still lacks a tradition in 
organised crime research, and this means that reliable data are scarce. The 
surveys used here are the first of their kind in the country. Therefore, the 
scheme outlined is in many respects incomplete and should even be interpreted 
as a set of hypotheses for further research. 
 
 
Method of research 
 
The present analysis draws on four studies conducted between 2002 and 2004. 
The first is the Drug supply survey (2002-2003). Fieldwork was carried out in the 
period from June 2002 to November 2003 by the Center for the Study of 
Democracy. The method used consisted of in-depth interviews. The basic 
informant groups were: 
 
? representatives of citizen organisations and doctors working with 
drug addicts (30 interviews);  
? long-term heroin users, low- and middle-level dealers, police and 
special services officers (50 interviews). 
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In addition to in-depth interviews, specialised analyses were obtained from law 
enforcement officers, journalist investigations and media reports (CSD, 2003).  
 The second study is the Transport, Smuggling and Organized Crime Survey 
(2004) (CSD, 2004 b) the fieldwork for which was conducted in the period 
between September 2003 and September 2004 at four separate border-crossing 
points: Kulata, Kapitan Andreevo, the Port of Varna and Sofia Airport. The data 
was gathered by means of semi-structured interviews with law enforcement 
officials and transport professionals. Interviews were conduction with a total of 
700 officers including current and former officials of the Bulgarian Customs 
Agency (BCA), the National Service for Combating Organised Crime 
(NSCOC), the National Border Police Service (NBPS) and the Navy (which 
has responsibilities in the area of sea port security). Interviews were also 
conducted with transportation company owners, truck drivers and traders. 
 The third study is the Drug Use Survey (2003) based on the results of an 
investigation carried out by Vitosha Research. Fieldwork took place in 
December 2002 and January 2003. Data was gathered by means of the European 
Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) questionnaire 
administered through standardised face-to-face interviews. The survey included 
two independent sub-samples (derived from a two-stage national random cluster 
sample). The first sample is representative of the population above 15 years of 
age (N = 823). The second is representative of the group aged 15 to 30 (N = 
1098). 
 The fourth investigation is the Injection Drug User Survey (2003),6 for which 
fieldwork was conducted in the period July to October 2003. Data was gathered 
using standardised face-to-face interviews. The sample included 501 injection 
drug users in four cities – Sofia, Plovdiv, Bourgas and Pleven. Respondents were 
selected by means of quota sampling designed to take account of the size of the 
city concerned. 
 
 
Results 
 
Main findings 
 
The Domestic Drug Market 
The best way to analyse the structure and mechanisms by which the organised 
crime groups operate, is to obtain a proper understanding of how the various 
drugs markets functions. 
                                                 
6  The survey took place as part of the project, “From Pilot to Professional”, funded by the EU 
PHARE programme, and was carried out by four Bulgarian non-governmental organisations 
working in the areas of harm reduction. These included the NGOs “Initiative for Health” – 
Sofia, “A Shot of Love” – Bourgas, “Panacea” – Plovdiv, and “Pleven 21 Century Founda-
tion”, in cooperation with the Addiction Research Institute, Rotterdam – IVO, Rotterdam. 
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The domestic drugs market is divided into three sub-markets, namely, the 
markets for ‘grass’ or marijuana, for amphetamines, and for heroin. The nature 
and the scarcity of the product, consumption and demand patterns, together 
with other circumstances have a varying influence on supply mechanisms. Due 
to the high price of cocaine, its use in the country is limited. 
 
Cannabis 
Unlike in Western Europe, the drugs epidemic that started in Bulgaria in the 
early 1990s was focussed on heroin. For this reason, until a decade ago the use of 
cannabis was rare. Now, however, as in the rest of Europe (EMCDDA, 2004; 
UNODC 2004), users of ‘grass’ outnumber the users of any other illicit drug 
(CSD, 2003). The market for cannabis continues to be relatively open, with a 
significant share of acquaintance-based trade on all levels from manufacturing to 
retail sales. The reason for this is that the climate in Bulgaria allows cannabis to 
be grown anywhere, hence providing a continuous supply while keeping prices 
relatively low. In recent years, however, organised crime groups have shown a 
noticeable interest in gaining control of this market. On the one hand, heroin 
dealers, already under the control of organised groups, want to add cannabis to 
the range of drugs they offer; on the other hand, small independent dealers, until 
recently working among acquaintances only, are now being forced to accept the 
‘protection’ of , and the conditions imposed by the traditional networks for the 
distribution of heroin and amphetamines. 
 
Heroin 
The primary drugs market in Bulgaria, however, in terms of its value and 
significance for organised crime, is without doubt heroin. Surveys (CSD, 2003) 
have revealed that the country has been carved up into areas shared between 
three to four large criminal groupings around which some seven or eight smaller 
groups gravitate (see figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Controllers of the drugs market in Blugaria, 2002 – 2003: the  
    geographical division of control between individuals 
 
 
Source: CSD and National Service for Combating Organized Crime 
 
The principle of territorial division is best illustrated by referring to the example 
of the country’s capital city – Sofia. Sofia’s heroin consumption equals that of 
the rest of the country, while its population is only 14% of that of Bulgaria as a 
whole.7 The city has been divided into several areas (incidentally overlapping 
with police districts which should prompt inquiries into possible protection by 
police officers), each area having a boss.8 Many similarities can be found with 
recognised patterns of heroin distribution – such as those described by Preble 
and Casey (1969) for the city of New York. In the case of Sofia five relatively 
stable distribution levels are distinguishable. At the lowest level are the heroin 
users who also deal.9 For Sofia their number is estimated to be between 5 and 7 
thousand and for the whole country, including Sofia, between 15 and 25 
thousand.10  Each dealer has a certain area and ‘reports’ to the ‘holder’ of the 
area. Selling even just outside the area, supplying drugs obtained from external 
                                                 
7  National Statistical Institute, 2001 Census. 
8  In fact, not having ‘contacts’ in the relevant district means losing the area to competition. The 
typical fee payable to the police chief in charge of anti-drug operations in a police district 
amounts to some 15 to 20 leva (8 to €10) per dealer per week (for more detail see CSD, 
2003).  
9  Almost 10% of the people who have used drugs for more than 10 years say they have assisted 
the dealers or have been dealers themselves. 
10  Data from the Drug Injection Survey show that drug users in the capital consume on average 
about 50 to 80% more than drug users in other parts of the country. 
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sources, or working for another area chief, is punishable, starting with a fine, and 
ending with a beating or even mutilation. The next level is formed by the street 
dealers, each providing drugs to 25 to 30 drug users. The third level consists of 
the suppliers, who secure the drugs for the dealers. In 2002-2003 each supplier 
provided stock for between three and ten dealers. 
 The fourth level consists of the bosses of the Sofia region – in 2003 they 
amounted to 6 or 7. An important characteristic of the fourth tier is that it 
includes a variety of players, such as the so-called ‘black’ lawyers (working for 
drug bosses) and the hit squads. The ‘black’ lawyers typically have professional 
experience with the agencies of the Ministry of Interior, or as investigators, 
prosecutors, judges. The lawyers’ usual task is to secure protection for the 
criminal operations at all levels of law enforcement – from police districts where 
clients have been detained, through investigators, detectives, prosecutors and 
judges. 
 Especially important for the operation of the hierarchy and the area division 
are the hit squads.11 These are groups of three to four people, one or two of 
them possibly being the boss’ personal bodyguards. If a dealer breaks the rules he 
is typically scared off by a hit squad of two or three people. When ‘more serious 
measures’ need to be taken, a larger hit squad of up to ten individuals is 
assembled, gathering ‘staff’ from three to four areas.12 As such assignments occur 
only episodically, the hit squads often perform other jobs required by the rules of 
organised crime – they collect overdue loans, punish pimps, racketeer shop 
owners, etc.  
 The fifth level consists of the 2 to 3 big bosses13 who negotiate the areas, 
secure the imports and control considerable shares not only of the black 
economy in Bulgaria, but also of grey, and even white (legal) markets. In some 
of its analytical works on organised crime in Bulgaria (2002-2004), CSD 
distinguished between different ‘shades of grey’ in order to draw the attention of 
both law enforcement institutions and policy makers to the fact that organised 
crime uses various forms of legality in its business operations. The metaphor has 
also been used by law enforcement officials to describe the adaptability of 
Bulgarian organised crime. It is best exemplified by the distribution of activities 
at its two top-most levels. 
                                                 
11   The big hit squads of the 1994-1197 period, consisting of some 20 to 30 individuals have 
become too expensive and cumbersome to maintain. They have been replaced by a group of 
three to four: “a car load of people”. 
12  Punishments can be graded in terms of three levels: 1) fines – whose size, ranging from several 
hundred to several thousand leva, depends on the severity of the offence; 2) various degrees of 
beating – though the breaking of bones and heavy injuries are avoided; 3) mutilation – which 
ranges from the breaking of fingers to the breaking of one or both elbows, knees, etc. (that is, 
bones and joints that heal only with difficulty). 
13  This has been inferred from interviews with dealers and with police and special services offi-
cers that took place in 2003. The subsequent drugs-market war that took place in late 2003 
and early 2004 largely confirmed the existing hierarchy and the roles of most key figures. 
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At the fourth tier the most typical form of participation in grey businesses is 
through area chiefs’ ownership of pawn shops, exchange bureaus and restaurants. 
Some of their activities are unlawful, others fully legal. Usually only a small 
portion of the turnover is officially reported. During the period from the end of 
2003 until early 2005, a series of murders and abductions related to the top-most 
tier of bosses in Sofia revealed many details about the ways in which their 
business had been organised. Grey business operations included involvement in 
networks for the import of Chinese and Turkish consumer goods, where most 
import taxes were avoided. Legal business activities included investments in 
tourism, real estate, construction, parking lots, garbage collection, shopping 
malls, transportation, etc. 
 Such a structure can be said to have developed gradually and to have taken its 
final shape around 2001. Necessary for its operation are various models of 
negotiation to divide territories between criminal groupings. Just as necessary is a 
division of labour – the area bosses have their wholesalers, carriers, hit squads, 
black lawyers, etc. Elsewhere, depending on city size, there are one or two 
fewer levels, and smaller towns often become virtually the property of 
neighbouring large cities. The findings of the CSD survey of the country’s 
heroin market indicate that this is a model very different from that found in 
Western Europe, at least to judge from Letizia Paoli’s surveys of the Frankfurt 
and Milan markets (Paoli, 2002). 
 
Amphetamines 
The third domestic sub-market is the market for amphetamines. The 
manufacture of amphetamines has a long history going back to the Communist 
period when Bulgarian state-owned enterprises exported most of their 
amphetamine production to the Middle East. After becoming a party to major 
international agreements banning this production, Bulgaria stopped it in the 
middle of the 1980s. Following the closure of such factories, individuals who 
had gained experience and established contacts while working there, became 
involved in illegal laboratories. Due to its low quality most of the production 
was exported again, mostly to the Middle East. By the end of the 1990s, 
however, the low price and large volume of production attracted the attention 
of Bulgarian organised crime groups, who saw the amphetamine trade as an 
opportunity for additional income alongside that deriving from heroin. A 
considerable part of the domestic distribution of amphetamines today makes use 
of the networks associated with the heroin market.  
 Police detentions in the summer of 2003 provided evidence that the 
organisers of the amphetamine market were using existing domestic production 
capacity,14 thereby making obsolete imports through the expensive and risky 
                                                 
14  Although some smuggled BMK has been captured, there is reason to believe that considerable 
quantities are also produced in the country. There have been no seizures of ecstasy or PMK so 
far.  
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international supply routes of the heroin market. What is innovative is that in 
the criminal groups involved strive to maximize the number of laboratories 
participating in production. The structure resembles an hour glass. At the widest 
(uppermost) part of the inverted triangle are hundreds of labourers who receive 
cheap equipment, precursors and accurate instructions. The technology is as 
simple as the alcohol distillation technology massively used by the average 
Bulgarian. Many laboratories work only intermittently, thus achieving two 
simultaneous effects. Firstly, simple technology minimises errors. Secondly, the 
risk is minimised: if workshops are discovered they can easily be sacrificed as 
they are cheap and losing some of them does not bring the whole enterprise 
down. Below come the couriers shipping the precursors, sub-products and the 
amphetamine output. The penultimate level is occupied by the organisers of the 
import of precursors, the chemical engineers. The final level, the narrow part of the 
hour glass, is occupied by the bosses. The distribution part (the lower chamber 
of the hour glass) has the same pyramid structure as the one, described above, for 
heroin distribution. Despite the growth of the domestic market for 
amphetamines, 90 to 95% of what is produced continues to be exported. Unlike 
in Poland, where the synthetic drugs are of high quality and are mainly sold in 
Western Europe (Krajevski, 2001), Bulgarian produce goes East and is of very 
low quality and price (CSD, 2003). 
 
 
Drug Trafficking 
 
To complete the picture of drug-related organised crime the transit operations 
need to be described as well. Transit trafficking is typically associated with the 
traditional heroin route from Turkey to Western Europe. The 600 kg of cocaine 
seized by chance in the middle of the 1990s, the number of Bulgarian nationals 
who have been arrested transporting cocaine, and the 5 tons intercepted in 
Bolivia in 2003 (expected to pass through Bulgaria on their way to Western 
Europe) all provide mounting evidence that the experience gained in trafficking 
heroin is being utilised in the transport of cocaine to Europe. Interviews with 
police officers indicate that there are several dozen persons, recorded as former 
members of Bulgarian criminal groups experienced in the trafficking of heroin, 
who have been arrested in Western Europe and Latin America for trafficking 
cocaine. A number of people were detained after information was made 
available by the Bulgarian police services.15 
                                                 
15  A heroin-cocaine link is also reportedly traceable in the murder of Poli Pantev on the island of 
Aruba in February 2001, widely discussed in the media. Poli Pantev was one of the bosses of 
the former power insurance grouping, SIK, and held a considerable share of both the domestic 
heroin market and its transfer, while he was also linked to a shipment of Latin American co-
caine destined for Europe which disappeared in Bulgaria (hence his assassination).  
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The clear trend towards growing Bulgarian participation in international 
trafficking networks is indicated by the nationality of arrested drug traffickers. In 
2000, when some 2 tons of heroin were seized at Bulgarian borders, 17 
Bulgarian citizens were detained, as compared to 40 Turks and around 30 
Albanians (from both Albania and Macedonia). In 2003, the Bulgarian nationals 
numbered 41 as compared to 12 Turks and 10 Serbs. In 2004, the share of 
Bulgarian detainees set a new record as compared to other nationalities.16 
 An additional source of trafficking income for organised crime appears to be 
the export to Turkey of amphetamines and precursors. Since the mid-1990s, and 
especially in 2003-2004, Bulgarian criminal groups have actively participated in 
trafficking to the Middle East. According to a number of police sources, Turkish 
organised crime is interested in the exchange of heroin for amphetamines and 
precursors. Regrettably there has so far been insufficient data available to 
confirm this. 
 In the early 1990s, Bulgarian organised crime participated in international 
trafficking mainly by providing ‘mules’ and logistic support. Of late, the channels 
used for smuggling consumer goods – corrupt customs officers and border police 
– have been increasingly used for heroine as well. Two main schemes are used. 
The first is adopted when Turkish lorries containing drugs cross into Bulgaria 
and continue their journies to other parts of Europe (which is risky as they could 
be stopped at other European borders); the second is adopted when the 
shipments are split up into smaller parts in Bulgaria and shipped by Bulgarian 
mules. 
 Around 1999-2000, Bulgarian criminals became active at all levels of the 
European heroin trade, including the supply of precursors, the organisation of 
depots for reloading shipments, the financing of illegal operations, etc. Evidence 
of this development is the large amounts of heroin and precursors seized inside 
the country. According to sources from the NSCOC and the customs service, 
Bulgarian criminals buy heroin or sell precursors in Turkey on their own, and in 
turn arrange shipments to Western Europe via their own channels. In the 
opinion of the Ministry of the Interior’s Chief Secretary General, Boyko 
Borissov, the reason for the recent large number of high-profile assassinations 
and murder attempts (of which there were over 60 between 2002 and 2004) is 
the growing activity of Bulgarian criminal bosses in the West European drugs 
market. 
 Analysis of police and drug-crimes data from the courts show that despite the 
significant number of detentions, the Bulgarian security services are only able to 
reach the lowest levels – ‘mules’ and operative organisers. Higher-level 
investigations and discoveries are usually only possible with the assistance of the 
US Drug Enforcement Administration. 
 According to the special services and police experts, organised crime groups 
have put special efforts into isolating the channels and the persons trafficking 
                                                 
16  Source: Bulgarian Customs Administration, letter to CSD dated 30.08.2004 
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drugs through Bulgaria to European destinations, from the structures and the 
persons involved in the domestic distribution of drugs. CSD’s field research in 
many respects supports this observation. Hence, it could be said that transit 
trafficking on the one hand, and the Bulgarian drugs market on the other, 
function separately. 
 
 
Organised crime networks 
 
When describing Bulgaria’s drugs-related organised crime, one must emphasise 
that it does not consitute a special case. Although it obeys its own rules and 
requires its own types of organisation, it is still part of the broader system of 
criminal relations, which ultimately operate as a network. However, comparing 
it with the other types of organised crime such as prostitution, the smuggling of 
goods, or the production of counterfeit money and documents, it proves to be 
well related to, and integrated in, other international criminal organisations.17 It 
involves large numbers people and has very complicated forms of organisation. It 
is related to almost all the other forms of organised crime found in the country – 
from the theft of automobiles and human trafficking, to the export of valuable 
archaeological objects and the control of prostitution abroad. 
 According to experts from the police and customs drugs-related crime groups 
mostly use existing channels for the smuggling of goods, which ensures the 
import of heroin for domestic use and for transit. In the last couple of years these 
channels have also been used for the export of amphetamines and precursors. 
These channels usually offer a full infrastructure: transport companies, storage 
bases, and corrupt law-enforcement officers. Analysis of the killings of people 
known for their involvement in drug crime, has showed that those killed were 
people who at an earlier stage had been actively involved in the smuggling of 
legal goods. The criminal biographies of people arrested for dealing in drugs in 
Western Europe show that they have also been involved in car theft, human 
trafficking, the illegal export of art, etc. In most cases they have used the already 
developed criminal infrastructure (CSD, 2004 b; CSD 2004 c). 
 
 
Command or negotiate? 
 
The fixed hierarchical structures with high-level towering bosses appear to have 
been of a temporary nature. When in 2003 the CSD carried out the first study 
of the drugs market in Bulgaria, a very different picture of the shape of criminal 
organisations emerged. Analysis of the links between drug distribution within 
                                                 
17  There has been a lot of speculation about the connections between Bulgarian drug bosses and 
international crime organisations ranging from the Serbian Zemunski clan to the Columbian 
North Valley Cartel. 
Drugs and organised crime in Bulgaria 
 
 
 
271 
the country, and international trafficking, as well as of the links with other 
sectors of the black economy, revealed inconsistencies between the traditional 
model of organised crime, sketched above, and the actual operation and 
behaviour of the criminal structures. Tracing the various criminal schemes in 
operation, from the export of arms, to the import of stolen cars, it turned out 
that big criminal organisations were on the wane. 
 It appears that in the past ten years, a number of factors have been at work to 
bring about a transformation in the structure of ‘organised crime’. The advance 
of the rule of law and the increased effectiveness of law enforcement, albeit 
unevenly throughout the region, has increased transaction costs in the black 
economy in general and pushed many crime entrepreneurs towards greyer areas. 
In addition, the separate black markets in the country were insufficient to absorb 
the available human and financial criminal capital. As a result, Balkan crime 
groups became part of European networks dealing in drugs and prostitution, but 
also diversified their smuggling operations to include consumer goods. The 
liberalisation of trade combined with insufficiently effective border controls also 
contributed to this diversification. 
 Thus crime entrepreneurs found themselves in a new environment in which 
the old hierarchical structures were no longer as effective. Analysis of the 
smuggling of cigarettes and petrol products, and of the grey import of Chinese 
goods to the Balkans, for example, has shown that the presence of so many 
criminal offenders is only explicable in terms of their belonging to a network of 
numerous small relationships and ‘nodes’ (CSD, 2004 b). It gradually became 
clear that the model best depicting the current structure of organised crime was 
the network – a web of persons and organisations (Morselli, 2001; Reuter and 
Haaga, 1989). Operating as a network, rather than as a tightly disciplined clan 
taking orders from a small group at the top, has given crime entrepreneurs a 
number of advantages. It is more adapted to the requirements of international 
criminal trade, which demands the development of a flexible international and 
domestic wholesale and retail capacity. Political protection can be purchased ad 
hoc, which is important in the volatile political environments of the region as 
trusted persons can loose their power. And it has also allowed deeper penetration 
of the informal economy where access to a much broader range of services is 
needed – from political protection to administrative bribery. Functions like 
service bartering in the new economy of crime, previously taken care of by the 
Boss, is now performed at all levels and ‘switches’. There is no longer any need 
for authorisation from above for a criminal operative to trade favours with the 
police or with bureaucrats.18 
 Another factor contributing to the transition has been a change in the 
recruitment basis of crime. Social and economic deprivation in the early 1990s 
                                                 
18  In contrast with the famous ‘six degrees of separation’ experiment, a good shadowy networker 
in Bulgaria has to able to procure any service at a maximum of two ‘hops’ in the network. For 
network concepts see Travers and Milgram (1969) and Watts (2003). 
THE ORGANISED CRIME ECONOMY; MANAGING CRIME MARKETS IN EUROPE 
 
 
 
272 
supplied an abundance of lumpencriminaliat who saw in crime both glamour and 
opportunity at a time when crime seemed to pay. The growing effectiveness of 
the rule of law, rising income, even a nascent middle class, have narrowed this 
base. In this changed context crime is now increasingly in need of lawyers, 
accountants, IT experts and various other professionals to maintain a seamless 
continuum between its black, grey and legal operations.19 
 Thus, what we still inaptly term ‘organised crime’ is today in fact an intricate 
network of transactions and relations of a predatory nature. It bring together 
criminals, bureaucrats, judges and prosecutors, politicians and businesses 
operating in the informal economy (even sports clubs) in a web whose ultimate 
goal is to ‘redistribute’ by misappropriation national wealth outside the rule of 
law. The resulting forms of social interaction, which include patronage, bribery, 
intimidation, service bartering, etc., prove to be infinitely richer than the 
regulatory and policy frameworks, which tend to simplify this variety to a few 
clearly defined ‘organised crime’ violations of the law. 
 Anecdotal evidence of this change can be found in a quote, allegedly from a 
notorious Bulgarian criminal boss with a background in mathematics. He 
compared the operation of his organisation to the Internet. And indeed, analysis 
of his network sheds light on a particularly interesting intertwining of persons 
and companies. Several of the network’s organisations exist as perfectly legal 
commercial entities. The hundreds of staff members of the legal enterprises are 
obliged to register firms in their names, firms which are brought into play 
without them ever being informed. The bosses at the highest levels of this 
structure participate in dozens of commercial firms in various configurations 
involving as partners people of their rank, or of the middle level. These firms 
own other firms and thus a network is set up which can lose or sacrifice certain 
components, while the fabric as a whole remains intact. Whenever a part of the 
network is down, its functions are taken over by other components. There have 
been examples of arrests of scores of participants and their bosses involved in 
illegal imports, and yet despite this ‘success’, a couple of days later the import 
scheme has been fully restored. 
 In this context, the emergence of a significant grey zone between the black 
market of outright criminal operations, on the one hand, and the legal economy 
on the other, is also part of the indispensable mediation through which crime 
functions today. It is much easier for criminal networks to hide their activities 
amidst a large number of illegal – though not (overtly) criminal – transactions of 
the grey economy. Grey businesses are also much easier take-over targets for 
interested criminals as they operate at least partially outside the official set of 
rules and cannot call on the protection of the authorities. It is increasingly 
difficult, for example, to distinguish the cigarette smuggler and the fuel importer 
evading state revenue tax, from the investor in tourism and the criminal boss 
                                                 
19  Racketeering, for example, has been significantly reduced in Bulgaria as the generation of 
illegal profits has moved into more sophisticated areas. 
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holding the concession of a public beach. This allows criminals and shadowy 
businessmen to move between these economies. For example from the grey 
zone of the smuggling of Chinese consumer goods using established channels 
and corrupt customs officers, some criminals move into the black zone, where 
they use the same channels, but then for the transfer of heroin. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The emerging picture of the structure of organised crime in Bulgaria shows both 
hierarchical operations and networks. Although the drug bosses participate in 
many other grey and black operations organised as networks, within drug-
dealing organisations the hierarchical structure has been preserved. Completion 
of the survey, The Drug Market in Bulgaria, coincided with the culmination of 
the drug-market war (from the autumn of 2003, to the spring of 2004). It was 
waged by two gang leaders who fought for control of the markets of the capital, 
Sofia, and those of some smaller cities. The rivals resorted to assassinations, 
which included the use of explosives against some senior gangsters, and the 
attempt to force street dealers to change sides. It was expected that this war 
might remove the senior figures and make the country’s drug distribution more 
similar to that of Western Europe – with its many independent participants in an 
illegal but free market (Paoli, 2002; Van Duyne and Levi, 2005). Grounds for 
such expectations were the transitory nature of the large criminal structures of 
the 1990s. However, at the end of the drug-market war, the predictions were 
belied by the facts. Although some of the most influential drug bosses had been 
murdered, had disappeared, or had been arrested, the structures reproduced 
themselves within months. ‘Beheaded’ areas acquired new bosses, shattered hit 
squads in the capital city were replaced by others from the country. The crisis in 
the supply of heroin was overcome; the quality of street heroin came once again 
under ‘regular control’. Cash flows were centralised even further. 
 It is unlikely that these developments can be explained by a single factor 
alone. Probably one of the most important factors has been the weakness of 
government, and incompleteness in the reform of Bulgaria’s institutions of law 
enforcement. Another factor probably relates to the continuing influence of the 
large ‘insurance’ racket firms from the mid-1990s, known by their abbreviations, 
VIS and SIK. Although long gone, they had been so powerful and included such 
a large number of criminals, that they have formed a kind loyalty fault line in the 
underworld and today most gangsters still associate themselves with them. 
Various specifics of heroin supply and distribution have no doubt had an 
organisational impact. And last but not least, ironic as it may seem, imitation of 
the Italian-American Mafia model has also had its influence upon criminals as 
well. 
 In transition countries, and especially in Bulgaria, organised crime figures 
have evolved in parallel with the process of social transformation, and their 
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organisations have spontaneously been shaped to meet different objectives: 
becoming power centres, seizing parts of ‘their’ markets and gaining recognition 
in the wider organised-crime community. Image and public/political attitude 
was not an issue at all in the beginning; it has started to emerge as an issue only 
recently. Being elements of the transition, and not having a stable society to 
embed into, organised crime figures in Bulgaria have, because of the 
considerable resourses they have accumulated, spontaneously become power 
players, or at least important factors in the social, economic and political 
transition. An important aspect in this respect is that a substantial number of 
former security service officers have entered the  milieu of organised crime. 
 It is interesting to observe the high level of replacement of leading figures. 
‘Old’ bosses tend to enter, or to establish legitimate businesses and to develop 
positive self-images. Is this the ‘gentrification’ of organised crime-entrepreneurs? 
Not necessarily and not fully. The negative images of the networks they come 
from are still effective in terms of their capacity to arouse fear, and in terms of 
what they imply about connections etc. – for which reasons new crime 
entrepreneurs find it attractive to take the places of the ‘old’ bosses. At the same 
time the ‘modern forms’ (networks) have not fully succeeded in replacing the 
hierarchical structures, which control territories by using violence. In addition, 
the old bosses who acquire legitimate property cannot afford or do not want to 
leave the hierarchical structures to new marginal leaders. As one of the 
‘distinguished’ grey leaders, known for his love of chess put it: “… narco 
business is like the central parts of the chess board: if you neglect it you lose the 
game”. To avoid that they continue to operate in two worlds: organised crime-
entrepreneurs are hard to gentrify. 
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Trafficking in women in  
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Trafficking in women in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Almir Maljevic1 
 
 
Introduction: the fertile ground for crime entrepreneurs 
 
Before anything is said about trafficking in human beings in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, attention should be paid to certain features of the country that 
have had an enormous impact on the development and spread of crime in 
general. Bosnia and Herzegovina regained its independence in 1992 after the 
dissolution of the former Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. 
Unfortunately, the dissolution was followed by chaos, crises, and wars, which 
came to a head in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition to the 
almost unbelievable human losses, and the socio-economic damage that Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and its citizens suffered as consequences of the conflict, the 
1992-1995 war also resulted in changes that created fertile ground for the 
development and spread of criminal organisations that challenged the state’s 
capacity to combat crime in general. 
 Apart from trying to set up functional institutions of government, and to 
establish the rule of law, Bosnia and Herzegovina has also been going through a 
transition process – not only in the sense of a change from authoritarianism to 
democracy, but also in the sense of a change from a stringently controlled, to a 
free market economy. The disappearance of the absolute control over every 
feature of people’s lives (including the economy and crime) that was exercised 
between the War and the early 1990s, allowed new forms of crime to emerge, 
driven primarily by the desire for illegal profit. 
 Moreover, in accordance with the terms of the Dayton Peace Agreement,2 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided into two entities,3 – each with extremely 
extensive powers and a high level of autonomy – and one district.4 Though the 
powers of the central state extend to security issues – including the fight against 
criminal organisations, which have surfaced wherever opportunities have been 
                                                 
1  Almir Maljevic is Academic and Research Assistant at the Faculty of Criminal Justice Sciences 
of the University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
2  The Dayton Peace Agreement, which brought the war to an end, was signed on 14 December 
1995. At the same time, in order to preserve Bosnia and Herzegovina as one country it con-
tained very vague provisions defining very complex, completely decentralised, administrative 
structures  
3  These are the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina – which is administratively and territori-
ally divided into ten cantons with extensive powers, high levels of autonomy, and their own 
assemblies and governments – and the Republic of Srpska.  
4  The Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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favourable – the co-existence of two powerful entities has meant that the central 
state’s control has always been weak. This problematic situation appears even 
worse if one considers that no fewer than 180 ministries are responsible for 
governing Bosnia and Herzegovina – thus providing fertile ground for all types 
of corruption, including corruption of the police and the judiciary. 
 In addition, until recently there was no state-wide agency of law-
enforcement. This changed in 2000 when the State Border Service,5 the very 
first state-wide law-enforcement agency, was formed. It established 
comprehensive control over the country’s borders at the very end of 2002. This 
means that, due to the tensions that persisted in the aftermath of the 1992-1995 
war, the institutions of government failed, until 2002, to establish any serious 
form of police or judicial cooperation, or to exercise adequate control over the 
country’s borders. Another state-wide police force was established in 2004: the 
State Agency for Investigation and Protection (SIPA).6 
 In qaccordance with the country’s constitution, prior to March 2003, 
legislative powers, including those relating to criminal matters, belonged almost 
entirely to the entities.7 Given the differing political structures and philosophies 
of the two entities, this state of affairs resulted in the emergence of two different 
approaches to a number of issues. This was true even during the early stages of 
criminal law reform and especially when it came to the implementation of 
standards prescribed by international conventions ratified by the state of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.8 As a consequence, the two entities had systems of criminal 
law that were incompatible, not only as far as the definition of certain criminal 
offences was concerned, but also in terms of criminal procedure, thus rendering 
judicial cooperation difficult. 
 The lack of unified political leadership, of harmonised criminal legislation, of 
state-wide law-enforcement agencies and of judicial and police cooperation: all 
this was of considerable assistance to crime entrepreneurs, who were able to 
develop and to extend their activities easily throughout the country and the 
whole region. 
                                                 
5  The Law on the State Border Service, Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 19/2001 
6  The Law on the State Agency for Investigation and Protection, Official Gazette of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, No. 27/2004. Among other things, trafficking in human beings falls within its ju-
risdiction. 
7  The Office of the High Representative promulgated the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herze-
govina in January 2003. It has been published in the Official gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
No. 3/03 and it took effect on March 1st 2003 
8  From the very beginning the Republic of Srpska refused to acknowledge Bosnian and Herze-
govinian legislation and implemented laws defined and applied in the neighbouring Serbia and 
Monte Negro. At the same time the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina strove to bring its 
criminal legislation into line with various international conventions, regional and bilateral 
agreements. 
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Organised crime in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
Due to the fact that very little serious research is available on the number of 
criminal organisations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it would be highly speculative 
to say anything about their nature or extent.9 Nevertheless, some research 
projects focusing on criminal activities that can be related to organised crime 
should be mentioned. Criminal activities that have been the subject of research 
projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina are corruption and trafficking in human 
beings.10 Of course, this does not mean that other forms of organised crime, such 
as illicit drug trafficking, money laundering, computer-related crime (Budimlić, 
2003), child pornography, illicit trafficking of firearms (see Hajdinjak, 2002), 
cigarette smuggling (also Hajdinjak, 2002), or the smuggling of migrants, do not 
exist.11 On the contrary, such offences have been recorded in abundance, but 
research into them has yet to be carried out. Hence there are no valid scientific 
indicators that can be presented here.12 
 The only organised criminal activity to have been the subject of systematic 
research so far, is the trafficking of human beings, or, more precisely, the 
trafficking of women. This chapter will present some of the core findings from 
this research. 
 Although this chapter focuses on human trafficking in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, it goes without saying that this criminal activity extends to the 
whole region and beyond. Therefore, there is a need briefly to describe the 
wider Balkan-region context – within which the trafficking of humans in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina is just one instance. Owing to a number of local, regional and 
global factors (Nikolić-Ristanović, 2004, and 1998; Lewis, 1998; CSD, 2003), in 
recent decades the Balkans have become a centre for illegal trafficking in all 
kinds of substances from drugs (so called ‘Balkan route’, Wegner, 2004) and 
arms to cigarettes (Hajdinjak, 2002), but also for trafficking in humans (Ćopić, 
                                                 
9  Most of the available research has been carried out by individuals interested in the field on the 
one hand (the results of such research being limited as a result of scarce financial resources) and 
by non-governmental organisations on the other. 
10  Research on corruption has been conducted primarily by Transparency International Bosnia 
and Herzegovina using the well-known Corruption Perceptions Index, but also using the 
Study on National Integrity Systems. Using the same methodology in all cases, this is used to 
examine various institutions that should be combating corruption at a national level, by look-
ing at the legal framework regulating the work of such institutions and the practical imple-
mentation of that framework. Meanwhile, the Association of Criminologists of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is conducting research into the police and corruption, and is preparing research 
projects on corruption in the education system and in the judiciary. 
11  Although it is well known that Bosnia and Herzegovina lies at the heart of the (so called) 
Balkan route used for the trafficking of illicit drugs from East to West, the problem of drugs 
coming to and going through the country has never been researched! 
12  Between January 2003 and June 2004, the State Prosecutor’s Office initiated 79 investigations 
into allegations concerning the smuggling of migrants and 60 investigations into allegations of 
money laundering. 
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2002). Humans, predominantly women and children seen as a commodity 
(Williams, 1999), are being sold in all geographical directions: this has led to the 
Balkan region becoming widely known not only as a source, but also as a transit 
and destination region (Albania, 2003; Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2003; Bulgaria, 
2003; Croatia, 2003; The FYR Macedonia, 2003; Moldova, 2003; Serbia and 
Montenegro, 2003; Romania, 2003). 
 
 
Trafficking in women in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
In order to obtain more insight into the phenomenon of trafficking in women in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the US Embassy recently financed the research project, 
“Trafficking in women in Bosnia and Herzegovina”. The project was conducted 
by the Faculty of Criminal Justice Sciences at the University of Sarajevo under 
the supervision of Prof. Dr. Vladimir Obradović, from April 2003 until the end 
of the year. 
 The findings of the project are based on empirical data obtained from 691 
respondents who were the victims of trafficking in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
the period from 1999 to 2003. The sample included all recorded victims of 
trafficking in Bosnia and Herzegovina and was divided into two sub-samples: the 
first (N= 457) was used for social analysis, the second (N=238) for social-
psychological analysis. Quantitative analysis was supplemented by a qualitative 
approach based on analysis of oral life-stories provided by the victims themselves, 
a number of semi-structured interviews conducted with five convicted 
traffickers, six taxi-drivers (transport providers) and dancers in night clubs, but 
also through participant observation during raids, and analysis of available police 
and judicial documents. 
 
 
Results 
 
It is very difficult to say when the first cases of trafficking in women were 
recorded, as the activity was not defined as criminal in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
until 2003. Cases that could have been defined as trafficking in women, were 
prosecuted as prostitution or as cases of aiding and abetting prostitution. It is a 
plausible assumption that, although some isolated cases were registered earlier, 
trafficking really began to take off after the war began in the region. There is a 
strong belief that that its increase is to be explained, not only by the general 
causes described above but also by the growth in the number of foreign peace-
keeping military forces in the country (Obradović, 2004; Nikolić-Ristanović, 
2004). The increased numbers of foreign military personnel led primarily to an 
increase in the numbers of nightclubs and other establishments featuring exotic 
dancers. Due to the fact that most of these dancers were not residents of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, it was assumed that the women concerned were victims of 
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trafficking, which, as born out by the very first anti-trafficking police action, 
‘Macro’, in 1994, proved to be correct. 
 
 
Origin and routing of the victims 
 
In his research, Obradović found that 93% of victims of trafficking were 
residents of Moldavia, Romania and the Ukraine. The fact that victims of 
trafficking came predominantly from these three countries, makes it plausible to 
assume that Bosnia and Herzegovina serves as a destination country with very 
well established routes for trafficking in women for sexual exploitation of various 
kinds (Obradović, 2004). These routes are the following:  
 
? the majority (89.8%) travels on the route Moldavia-Romania-
Serbia-Bosnia  and Herzegovina and only 10.2% are  sent on  the  
      route  Moldavia - Romania -Hungary-Serbia-Bosnia and Herze-  
      govina; 
? the main routes for victims from Romania go through Serbia 
directly to Bosnia and Herzegovina (used in 94.2% of all these 
cases) or go from Romania to Hungary to Croatia to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (5.8%);  
? victims from Russia, Belarus and Ukraine come to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina through Romania and Serbia (58.6%) or through 
Hungary and Croatia (41.4%).  
 
Accordingly, it can be said that almost all routes to Bosnia and Herzegovina are 
via Serbia. Therefore it is justifiable to assume that one of the main organised 
criminal networks involved in human trafficking in South Eastern Europe is to 
be found in Belgrade. 
 
Table 1. The national origins of victims of trafficking 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total N % 
Moldova 7 97 80 109 10 303 44 
Romania 3 65 89 92 4 253 37 
Ukraine 2 31 15 32 4 84 12 
Russia - 2 6 11 1 20 3 
Byelorussia - 1 4 1 - 6 1 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
- 2 6 6 2 16 2 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
- - - 3 2 5 1 
Bulgaria - - - 1 - 1 - 
Hungary - 1 - - - 1 - 
Kazakhstan 2 - - - - 2 - 
Total 14 199 200 255 23 691 100 
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Recruitment 
 
Considering human trafficking as an enterprise, the first question to be addressed 
concerns the ways in which the ‘commodity’ is obtained. The next table 
provides an overview of how the victims were ‘recruited’. 
 Although almost one third of victims are recruited by someone they know, 
the figures in table 2 show that the majority of victims are recruited by people 
who, due to their active involvement in organised trafficking, victims define as 
traffickers. 
 Another finding that confirms the involvement of criminal organisations in 
human trafficking, is that a total of 71.6% of all journeys from the country of 
origin to another country were organised by known or unknown traffickers and 
only 10.3% by friends or acquaintances. If we assume that friends and 
acquaintances are not part of a criminal organisation (which may be entirely 
wrong), then we can suggest that in at least 71.6% of cases, victims were the 
objects of organised trafficking. The fact is that trafficking in women requires 
means of getting them out of a country, (forged?) travel documents, means of 
transport, temporary housing for the victim, and her sale on arrival at the pre-
arranged destination. It is plausible to assume that these requirements (Escaler, 
1998) are met by various criminal organisations.13  
 
Table 2. The ‘recruitment’ of victims 
 
Recruited by N % 
Acquaintances/friends, of whom: 148 32.3 
Female friends 92 20.1 
Male friends 56 12.2 
Traffickers/unknown 255 55.7 
Female trafficker 16 3.5 
Male trafficker 104 22.7 
Unknown female 64 14.0 
Unknown male 71 15.5 
No data 55 12.0 
Total N= 458 458 100% 
 
When it comes to means of recruitment, it was found that in 59.6% of the cases, 
traffickers used friends and acquaintances to provide prospective victims with 
information about seemingly attractive work abroad, and that they did this 
themselves in only 17.9% of cases. Another result worth highlighting is that 8.7% 
of victims found the information concerning work abroad from newspaper 
                                                 
13  Aronowitz (2001) points out that, according to Europol, there are several indicators that point 
towards a high degree of organisation in trafficking. These are: the fact that women of differ-
ent nationalities are smuggled together; the fact that a large number of persons are transfered 
over great distances; the large amounts of money that change hands; the fact that when things 
go wrong, legal assistance is immediately available. 
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advertisements.14 One of reasons why this did not have consequences might be 
the fact that, for example, in Moldova in recent years, remittances from migrant 
labourers have become a very substantial part of the country’s income. Migrants 
send home approximately $120 million each year, which is the equivalent of half 
the national income. Therefore, investigation of such advertisements seems an 
unlikely prospect (Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern Europe, 2003). 
 
 
Reasons for leaving home 
 
The victim’s journey is a long one, both in terms of time and distance. It is 
reasonable to ask why they do not try to escape and ask for help as soon as they 
became aware that something is suspicious or at least strange. There are several 
possible answers to this question. First, it is possible that they are treated well 
during the entire journey, appeased by deceiving and encouraging information 
about their future jobs or about good salaries. Second, some of the women are 
used to suffering at home at the hands of their husbands or partners; thus they 
may not perceive the violence or suffering to which they are subject while being 
transported as something that deviates unacceptably from what they are used to. 
According to IOM, more than 80% of Moldavian victims of trafficking had been 
subjected to domestic violence before their journeys began (Trafficking in 
Human Beings in South Eastern Europe, 2003). Third, it is possible that 
traffickers travel and cross transit-country borders by bribing police officials and 
border guards, so that victims have no chance to escape.15 
 
Table 3. Why did victims leave home? 
 
Reasons for leaving N % 
To work and earn some money 221 92.9 
Tourism 1 0.4 
Forced to leave her home 1 0.4 
To escape from parents 3 1.3 
Other 12 5.0 
Total N =238 238 100 
 
As the figures in Table 3 show, when asked about their reasons for leaving 
home, almost 93% of the victims said they had wanted to work abroad in order 
to earn enough money to make a decent living.16 
                                                 
14  This deserves special mention because one would have expected at least these 8.7% of cases to 
have been easily traced, investigated and prosecuted. 
15  During an interview, one of the convicted traffickers said that in order to cross a border with-
out any difficulties, he usually paid €250 to a border guard. 
16  55.9% of the victims agreed to travel to the former Yugoslav countries, 37.4% to Western 
Europe and only 6.7% to Greece, Turkey or Israel. 
THE ORGANISED CRIME ECONOMY; MANAGING CRIME MARKETS IN EUROPE 
 
 
 
284 
Most victims (55.4%) were expecting (that is, they were promised) work as 
waitresses, shop assistants or something similar. A total of 23.6% were expecting 
to be employed in a factory, to work in a household or as baby sitters, while a 
total of 21% of victims assumed they would work as dancers (16.4%) in 
nightclubs or as sexual workers (4.6%). Although only 4.6% of the victims 
openly declared that they were aware of the possibility that they would get 
involved in some kind of sex-related work, one wonders how many more, if any 
more, of the victims were aware that there was a risk of becoming involved in 
work of this nature. 
 
Table 4. Treatment of victims 
 
Nature of treatment N % 
Physical abuse 116 25.4 
Sexual abuse 41 9.0 
Threats/blackmail 82 17.9 
Freedom of movement restricted 49 10.7 
Good relationship/Treated well 125 27.4 
No answer 44 9.6 
Total: N = 457 457 100 
  
Given that 79% of the victims ended up in a business that they did not want to 
become involved in, it is interesting to see how they perceived the way they 
were treated by their owners or their co-workers. It should be noted that 34.4% 
of victims were abused either physically17 or sexually.18 In other words, more 
than one third of the women were subjected to serious violence. Another 17.9% 
was subjected to mental abuse. 10.7% was not allowed to move freely. 9.6% did 
not want to provide an answer, probably due to the fact that they were under 
stress and afraid to do so. Thus one can suggest that a total of 72.6% of victims 
was exposed to inhumane living and working conditions. At the same time, 
surprisingly, almost 27% of the women perceived their relationships with their 
owners as good. This may mean that they really were treated well – or that they 
were afraid to tell the truth.19 
 
 
Revenues 
 
Another interesting finding is that women are frequently sold more than once in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. More precisely, 46.3% of those who responded (55.6% 
                                                 
17  The most horrifying example of physical abuse recounted in the course of the research, was 
the case of an owner who shot a victim in the stomach nine times. She survived, though re-
mains permanently disabled. 
18  Sexual violence was usually perpetrated by violent and drunk clients, but also by owners when-
ever victims requested something (to visit their families, to see a doctor, to go shopping etc.). 
19  There was one case, in which the victim stated in court that her owner treated her just like any 
father would treat his daughter! 
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did not want to say how often they had been sold) said they had been sold once; 
30% had been sold twice, and 23.7% had been sold three or more times. This 
means that almost every fourth woman, after becoming a victim of international 
trafficking, was re-sold at least once on the internal market in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
 As far as the prices they were sold for are concerned,20 these varied from 
KM250-8000 (€127.9-4092).21 As most of victims were sold for prices between 
KM1500 (€767.3) (the first quartile) and KM3500 (€1790.3) (third quartile), 
they were sold for an average price of KM2643 (€1351.9). Since they had an 
average of four clients a day,22 each paying an average price of KM100 (€51.15), 
their buyer made good on his investment within four to nine days. One of the 
outcomes was that owners usually had 5 to 17 women (with an average of 7) in 
their bars or clubs. If we multiply this by the average number of clients and the 
average price, we can conclude that owners’ profits lay between KM60,000 
(€30,690) and KM204,000 (€104,347) a month (an average of KM84,000 
(€42,967) a month). 
 
 
Clients 
 
As far as clients are concerned, although the media portrayal and therefore the 
general population’s assumption is that clients in nightclubs and bars are 
predominantly foreigners (foreign military personnel in particular), one of the 
most surprising findings of the research is that this assumption appears to be false. 
 
Table 5. Clients 
 
Clients N % 
Local men only 119 66.5 
Local soldiers and police 21 11.7 
“Internationals” and local clients 12 6.7 
SFOR and local clients 0 0.0 
All profiles  27 15.1 
Total N = 179 179 100 
 
As the figures in table 5 show, excluding the 24.8% (N=59) of victims who 
were not willing to answer the question, it appears plausible that international 
clients, either alone or in combination with other types of clients, do not 
represent more than 21.8% of clients, whereas local clients account for no less 
than 78% of cases. In other words, only one in five is likely to be an international 
                                                 
20  57.3% of victims had no idea of the price they were sold for but the rest stated the exact 
amounts. Their answers are based on the amounts they had to make up to (earn back for) their 
owners because that is how much he told them he had paid for them. 
21  KM1.00 KM is equivalent to €1.955. 
22  ‘Only’ 15.0% of women had more than four clients a day. 
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client. Therefore, it can be argued that the presence of international personnel in 
the country should not be seen as the primary cause of the increase in trafficking 
in women in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
 
Victimisation characteristics 
 
The research also focused on common victim characteristics. In order to do so, a 
total of 81 variables (situational, status-related or behavioural factors) were 
analysed by means of uni- and bi-variate analysis, and appropriate techniques of 
multi-variate analysis (factor analysis, regression analysis, cluster analysis, 
discriminant analysis, path analysis and logistical regression analysis were applied). 
It was found that 23 of the variables produced 11 factors – which in their turn 
explained 74.1% of the variance. Given that the research involved the collection 
of data from all recorded victims of trafficking in Bosnia and Herzegovina; given 
that the victims came from different countries, and given that victims of the 
same nationalities as those found in our sample are usually found in other 
countries in Southeastern Europe, it is plausible to assume that the characteristics 
found in the sample of victims in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be regarded as 
representative of those for other victims of trafficking in Southeastern Europe. 
The following factors were found to have the most significant impact on 
trafficking in women in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
 The first factor (accounting for 16.4% of the variance) is victimisation by 
owners or clients. This is strongly connected to limited freedom of movement, 
physical or sexual abuse, and the denial of access to medical services. 
 The second factor (accounting for 9.9% of the variance) is the level of 
education, which correlates with sexual abuse and (not) being paid for providing 
sexual services. More educated victims are more successful in obtaining payment 
and in avoiding sexual abuse. 
 The third factor (accounting for 7.5% of the variance) concerns family 
relationships, which correlates with the quality of relationships, the economic 
status of the family, integrity of the family and physical or mental abuse. 
 The fourth factor (accounting for 6.7% of the variance) is a (dis)functional 
family. 
 The fifth factor (acounting for 6.1% of the variance) is a/an (un)known 
recruiter. This correlates strongly with the level of education. 
 The sixth factor (accounting for 5.8% of the variance) differentiates between 
victims on the basis of (not having) knowledge of possible involvement in sex-
related work. This correlates with the type of job that was promised or expected 
and the presence of physical or mental abuse in the family of origin. The seventh 
factor (accounting for 5.0% of the variance) is abuse experienced in the family 
and it includes sexual, physical and mental abuse. 
 
 
Trafficking in women in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
 
 
287 
Push and pull factors 
 
The literature on trafficking in women (Aronowitz, 2001; De Ruyver and 
Niron, 2002) usually attempts to tackle the issue of so called push and pull factors 
that, depending on their impact on a situation and/or individuals, can facilitate 
the process of trafficking. The results of previous research carried out in the 
region have been described in the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe 
Framework for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings.23 The Stability Pact 
has identified the following push factors: unemployment, poverty, lack of 
education, gender discrimination and family violence; and the following pull 
factors: expectations of employment and a salary, for those involved in 
prostitution – high salaries, access to western material goods, improvements in 
social status and treatment, a glamorous life in Western Europe, demand for 
women for reproduction, demand for exotic prostitutes and a cheap labour force. 
In order to test the impact of push and pull factors related to trafficking in 
women in Bosnia and Herzegovina, multiple stepwise regression was carried out. 
The analysis showed that a family’s economic situation (poverty), 
unemployment and lack of education, viewed alone, do not represent push 
factors that facilitate trafficking in women in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, 
the analysis showed that their impact significantly changes once family 
relationships are taken into consideration. In other words, unemployment and 
poverty do represent push factors, but only when a victim has problematic family 
relationships (e.g. due to alcoholism, drug addiction or a criminal environment). 
 As far as pull factors are concerned, the following factors were found to have 
the strongest impact: the kind of a job promised (expected), the way in which 
the victim learnt about the job (and who provided the information), who 
organised the journey and, for those who were aware of possible involvement in 
sex-related work, the potential client profile (foreigners). 
 These pull factors may explain why 27.4% of the victims (see Table 3) 
claimed to have a good relationship with their owners. It seems that traffickers are 
becoming aware that their businesses are likely to be more effective if they use 
their current employees as recruiters. Thus, they treat them well, pay them on a 
regular basis, allow them to see a doctor, allow them to go shopping and 
eventually allow them to travel home, where they are given the task of 
recruiting another woman.24 In other words, it seems that the business is 
undergoing change. A further shift can be observed in relation to the location of 
prostitution: from nightclubs and bars to apartments and hotels.25 These shifts 
                                                 
23  The full text of the document can be downloaded from http://www.osce.org/attf/ attf_pa.pdf 
 27.02.2005. 
24  This was confirmed in an interview with one convicted trafficker. He stated: ‘Today, there is a 
new practice. I send the old girl home. She calls after a few days saying she has two new girls. 
I send money for a train or a plane ticket and they travel to Romania or Hungary, where I 
pick them up’. 
25  This was confirmed during the interview with one of the convicted traffickers 
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towards more satisfactory working conditions may explain the decreased number 
of victims requesting assistance from the non-governmental sector.26 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite the fact that only a few of the available findings on trafficking in women 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been presented here, some valuable conclusions 
can be drawn. First of all, Bosnia and Herzegovina serves as the destination 
country for women from Moldova, Romania and the Ukraine, as well as for 
women from other countries in the region, who arrive primarily via Serbia.27 
Almost all women trafficked to Bosnia and Herzegovina are subjected to at least 
one form of abuse, including, but not limited to, sexual, physical or mental 
abuse. Their sexual exploitation provides their owners with enormous profits, 
which are apparently either invested in future trafficking or laundered and 
invested in legal activities (Adamoli et al., 1998). Although it is widely assumed 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina that international personnel, employed by a variety 
of humanitarian, governmental or non-governmental organisations, military or 
police forces, are the most frequent clients in night clubs and bars, and are 
therefore responsible for most of the demand for prostitution and trafficking in 
women, this study found most clients to be local people. 
 Anti-trafficking activities in the country, including problem-oriented police 
work, investigations, prosecutions and trials, together with legal reforms, have 
brought several changes in trafficking patterns. There are indications that some 
victims are now being treated much better than they were previously. As a 
result, they feel less exploited, and have even begun to serve as recruiters for 
their current owners. This is a possible explanation for the decrease in requests for 
help from victims as well as the geographic shift into private premises. These 
observations do not necessarily mean that the level of trafficking in women has 
decreased in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It should still be understood as a serious 
problem: it is one that has merely changed its appearance. 
                                                 
26  The police, NGOs and the IOM also report that women very often refuse the assistance that is 
offered to them (Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern Europe, 2003) 
27  It should not be argued that Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a source or transit country. On the 
contrary, it is defined as such in a number of studies (e.g. see Lehti and Aromaa, 2004). The 
research presented here, however, confirmed that it also serves as a destination country. 
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